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This dissertation asks a simple question: how are states most effectively 
conducting proxy warfare in the modern international system?  It answers this question 
by conducting a comparative study of the sponsorship of proxy forces.  It uses process 
tracing to examine five cases of proxy warfare and predicts that the differentiation in 
support for each proxy impacts their utility.  In particular, it proposes that increasing the 
principal-agent distance between sponsors and proxies might correlate with strategic 
effectiveness.  That is, the less directly a proxy is supported and controlled by a sponsor, 
the more effective the proxy becomes.   
Strategic effectiveness here is conceptualized as consisting of two key parts: a 
proxy’s operational capability and a sponsor’s plausible deniability.  These should be in 
inverse relation to each other: the greater and more overt a sponsor’s support is to a 
proxy, the more capable – better armed, better trained – its proxies should be on the 
battlefield.  However, this close support to such proxies should also make the sponsor’s 
influence less deniable, and thus incur strategic costs against both it and the proxy.  These 
costs primarily consist of external balancing by rival states, the same way such states 
would balance against conventional aggression.  Conversely, the more deniable such 
support is – the more indirect and less overt – the less balancing occurs.  This should 
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outweigh the cost in its proxies’ operational capabilities.  This dissertation seeks to 
illustrate that deniability is more important than military effectiveness in achieving a 
sponsor’s strategic goals. 
Plausible deniability is the focus in this dissertation because it is the feature 
battlefield advantage that proxy warfare provides.  The other benefits of proxies, such as 
their cheaper political and material cost than conventional units and the ideological 
benefit they provide, may have longer-term strategic benefit in a conflict, but only 
deniability has a direct effect on the forces in the field.  That effect is primarily keeping 
balancing powers out of the conflict; allowing a state to project power into an area 
without meeting the counterreaction or balancing that it would if it projected power with 
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This dissertation asks a simple question: how are states most effectively 
conducting proxy warfare in the modern international system?  It answers this question 
by conducting a comparative study of the sponsorship of proxy forces.  It uses process 
tracing to examine five cases of proxy warfare and predicts that the differentiation in 
support for each proxy impacts their utility.  In particular, it proposes that increasing the 
principal-agent distance between sponsors and proxies might correlate with strategic 
effectiveness.  That is, the less directly a proxy is supported and controlled by a sponsor, 
the more effective the proxy becomes.  Strategic effectiveness here is conceptualized as 
consisting of two key parts: a proxy’s operational capability and a sponsor’s plausible 
deniability.  These should be in inverse relation to each other: the greater and more overt 
a sponsor’s support is to a proxy, the more capable – better armed, better trained – its 
proxies should be on the battlefield.  However, this close support to such proxies should 
also make the sponsor’s influence less deniable, and thus incur strategic costs against 
both it and the proxy.  These costs primarily consist of external balancing by rival states, 
the same way such states would balance against conventional aggression.  Conversely, 
the more deniable such support is – the more indirect and less overt – the less balancing 
occurs.  This should outweigh the cost in its proxies’ operational capabilities.  This 
dissertation seeks to illustrate that deniability is more important than military 
effectiveness in achieving a sponsor’s strategic goals. 
Plausible deniability is the focus in this dissertation because it is the feature 
battlefield advantage that proxy warfare provides.  The other benefits of proxies, such as 
their cheaper political and material cost than conventional units and the ideological 
benefit they provide, may have longer-term strategic benefit in a conflict, but only 
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deniability has a direct effect on the forces in the field.  That effect is primarily keeping 
balancing powers out of the conflict; allowing a state to project power into an area 
without meeting the counterreaction or balancing that it would if it projected power with 
its conventional forces.  The measurements in this dissertation are mostly focused on that 
counterreaction: when it comes, how decisive it is, and what delays it. 
Deniability causes this delay and degradation of balancing in three ways.  First, at 
its most basic, it clouds the tactical intelligence.  All of the cases examined here and 
indeed most proxy relationships involve a significant amount of secrecy.  The 
relationship between sponsor and client, even if it is acknowledged, usually requires the 
clandestine exchange of weapons, money, recruits, or some other type of support.  This 
exchange must retain some level of that secrecy for the proxy relationship to work 
effectively.  That is the entire game: that is how a state can convince other states that 
what looks like a military invasion is actually something else.  By the secret nature of 
these links they are often difficult to parse out, even by sophisticated intelligence 
operations.  The precise nature of Pakistan’s support to various Afghan insurgents, for 
example, was extremely challenging for the US to decipher even with all of its resources 
and even if strategically it had a fairly good strategic idea of what Pakistan was doing. 
This leads to the second way in which deniability helps delay and degrade 
consequences: it impedes the ability of the balancing state(s) to prove to the broader 
international community that interstate aggression is being committed.  Turning often 
extremely sensitive intelligence into indisputable bilateral fact is challenging, even for 
allies.  There are also different tiers of states that a balancer must convince, based on the 
alignment of these other states’ interests with the balancer.  There are those treaty allies 
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that are not directly involved in the conflict but share the same basic goals.  Like 
Germany with the US, these states are predisposed to support the balancer but need 
something more than its assurances.  There are also those states that are not party to the 
conflict nor have much interest at all, but that are nonetheless unwilling to impose costs 
on a fellow-state without some evidence bilaterally or at the UN.  Lastly, there are those 
states of the opposing coalition that will claim virtually any evidence is faked unless it is 
so convincing that they become pariahs by continuing to deny it. 
Finally, there is a third way in which plausible deniability reduces balancing, and 
it involves the proxy sponsor itself.  Deniability gives both sponsor and balancer(s) the 
ability to manage escalation in a way that conventional aggression does not.  This is as 
much a benefit for the balancer as it is for the aggressor: as long as the interstate 
aggression is not too overt, the balancer can decide how much of its resources it wants to 
commit to countering it, and even decide on none, if necessary, without significant 
penalty.  Proxy warfare thus removes the automaticity of the need to respond to 
conventional aggression.  Any decision to intervene in a conflict and balance proxy 
aggression becomes a complicated one, particularly if – as in Georgia and Ukraine – both 
sides include great powers with nuclear weapons.  Deniability provides an off-ramp to 
both parties.  The nominal distance between sponsor and proxy allows the balancing state 
to avoid a confrontation with the sponsor state, and vice versa.  In the case of Ukraine, for 
example, the balancing powers often treated interstate aggression as an intrastate 
problem, and indeed focused the Minsk process after February 2015 on ethnic self-
determination rather than escalate a confrontation with Russia. 
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The state sponsors in this dissertation’s case studies include Iran, supporting the 
world’s Shia malcontents; Russia, supporting ethnic Russians and other marginalized 
groups abroad; Saudi Arabia, supplying its brand of political Islam to mosques and 
madrassas around the world; and Pakistan, supporting militants in Afghanistan and India.  
Two Russian cases are included because they are particularly recent and salient examples 
of proxy warfare.  Of these five cases, according to this proposal, Saudi Arabia should be 
using proxy forces the most successfully. 
The picture is more complicated, however.  This thesis relies on the basic 
assumption that states in the international system will punish interstate aggression.  Why 
they do so – for normative reasons or their own self-interest or the systemic distribution 
of power – is beyond the scope of this work.  Measuring deniability accurately 
necessitates also recognizing the effect of other factors that delay or cloud state balancing 
against interstate aggression and thus affect deniability.  For example, whether the proxy 
force is used for defensive goals, how recognized is the interstate border, how delineated 
are the two conflict areas, impact of a parallel war, and other factors.  Overall, the 
hypothesis appears to hold true for offensive proxy warfare, but results are much more 
mixed in defensive proxy warfare. 
 
I.  Importance 
This dissertation is important both to those states that are waging proxy warfare 
and those that are threatened by it.  Its hypothesis is driven by firsthand observation of 
proxy warfare in the war on terror.  Consider: through 2015, the United States spent 
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about $1.6 trillion on direct funding for its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.1  Compare that 
to insurgent weapons like an improvised explosive device, which cost about $30; or a 
suicide bomb, available for as little as $5.2  In the end the Iraq war cost the United States 
anywhere from $500 billion to $1.1 trillion over its eight-year span and killed nearly 
5,000 of its soldiers.  Not all of these costs were the result of proxy action, but enough 
were, particularly as the war ground on and more advanced types of explosives were 
provided to insurgents.  The war did not cost America’s opponents nearly as much in 
dollars, nor in the lives of their own soldiers.3  A disproportionate body count is 
unfortunately not an indicator of a failed insurgency.  And what they got for that outlay, 
in the end, was a strategic outcome that was arguably more positive than that of the 
United States. 
 America’s enemies in Iraq were not, of course, state forces.  They were 
insurgents, like the Shia Mahdi Army’s Special Groups or the Sunni al-Qaeda in Iraq.  
Both were strengthened by outside actors: the Special Groups by Iran, which trained and 
armed them, and al-Qaeda by Syria, which allowed them free passage across its land.  
But both groups served state ends: self-evidently, or Iran and Syria would not have 
helped them.  They acted as proxies for these states, neither of which had the strength or 
the inclination to combat the United States head-on.   
 
1 Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, 
RL33110 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 8, 2014).  
2 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas Kean, and Lee Hamilton, The 
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States (Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004), 172; 
Nicholas Ryder, The Financial War on Terrorism: A Review of Counter-Terrorist Financing Strategies 
Since 2001 (New York: Routledge, 2015), 23. 
3 “Total violent deaths including combatants, 2003-2013,” Iraq Body Count, 
https://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/reference/announcements/5/ (accessed June 1, 2017). 
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But these two groups had very different relationships with their sponsors.  Syria’s 
support for al-Qaeda was mostly passive.  It did not direct operations in Iraq, but rather 
tolerated insurgent safe havens on its territory and transported potential insurgents to the 
Iraqi border.  Syria had no long-term interest in seeing its sectarian enemy al-Qaeda gain 
a permanent foothold in western Iraq, but very much had an interest in seeing America’s 
democratization project fail.  It also had an interest in tying down the US on its eastern 
border and perhaps distract the Bush Administration from its western border where its 
proxy Hezbollah was struggling to retain control of Lebanon.  Iran was more active in 
Iraq.  It provided hands-on training to select fighters as well as advanced weaponry such 
as explosively formed penetrators that could destroy US armored vehicles.  And then 
there was a third type of support.  Thousands of Saudis and other Sunni Gulf Arabs 
traveled to Iraq to fight the Americans.  Millions of dollars followed.  They joined al-
Qaeda and other extremist groups to conduct guerilla warfare and terrorism against both 
Americans and their Shia-led government, itself partially backed by Iran. 
Who was responsible for the last type of these fighters?  They were Sunnis, often 
from states in the Persian Gulf, Egypt, and North Africa, all from places that were aligned 
with the US.  Most of these states had, to one degree or another, supported the American 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, but also had varying links with the radicals.  Saudi Arabia’s 
state creed was a particularly uncompromising form of Islam which its petrodollars had 
promulgated throughout the world.  It had contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to 
the Afghan jihad against the Soviets, and in the years since hundreds of veterans of that 
conflict – many of them Saudis – had traveled to other conflict zones to stiffen the spine 
of local Muslim insurgents.  Along with them had come preachers, mosques, schools, and 
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charities, which had begun to crowd out other interpretations of Islam such as Sufism in 
Central Asia.4  During the 1960’s, for example, a tourist could walk through downtown 
Cairo or Kabul and come across Egyptian or Afghan women wearing miniskirts.  The 
same would be inconceivable today.  That change in the culture and norms of a society 
might be the result of social or ethnic changes, but it has a cause and an effect, and that 
effect has strategic consequences.  And one of the major cultural changes in the world 
over the past four decades has been an increase in the more stringent forms of Islam, 
particularly those practiced in the Persian Gulf.5  And this too had a strategic effect. 
Saudi Arabia and Iran are not unique in their influence on the modern world.  
Americans are more familiar with them since they have influenced the United States’ 
most recent conflicts.  But in reality, any and every potential battlefield is constantly 
changing at the level of the human terrain, the organic fabric of a society from which 
springs acquiescence or resistance to political control.  Any and every state is constantly 
changing.  Russia proclaims its support for Orthodox Greece, Slavic Serbia, Christian 
Armenia, and ethnic Russians living beyond its borders.  The United States proclaims its 
support for the free peoples of the world, from the Green movement in Iran to the 
umbrella protestors in Hong Kong.  Pakistan stresses its Islamic identity to make 
common cause with its Islamist rebels, Afghanistan stresses its national identity to 
counter the transnationalism of the jihadist narrative, and Qatar’s Al Jazeera shapes the 
news to affect the attitudes and dispositions of the Middle East’s Sunni Arabs.  At any 
given moment, each nation’s human fabric – the thoughts and attitudes of citizens and 
 
4 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New York: Penguin Press, 2003), 223-
224. 
5 Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,” 
International Security 35, no. 3 (Winter 2010/2011): 56-57.  
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potential rebels – is being tugged in a dozen different directions by a hundred different 
actors. 
That tug-of-war has strategic consequences.  The direction the human fabric is 
pulled affects the efforts of America, Russia, China, Israel, Iran, and any and every other 
state to exert control over an area.  Some countries are more simpatico with certain 
cultural changes than others, and that affects the resistance they face when they intervene 
on the ground.  That is true whether the behavior of actors is calculated according to 
some internal adding machine of costs and benefits, or whether it is due to some more 
nebulous adaptation of new ideas.  It is no accident, for example, that Saudi Arabia’s 
troops in Somalia were greeted with less hostility than America’s during the events of 
Black Hawk Down.  Or take the case of Israel: in the West Bank, Israeli forces obviously 
faced less armed resistance among its Jewish inhabitants because their ethnosectarian 
identity is closer to the state’s than their Muslim neighbors’.  And if governments 
promote such an idea or an identity, with an expected strategic response from the people, 
surely that is some type of proxy relationship as well.  It may not be as direct or as close 
as a state-controlled insurgent group like Hezbollah, for example, but surely it is 
something.  Something that makes them effective agents of strategy.  More or less 
effective than Hezbollah or the Taliban?  That is what this dissertation sets out to answer. 
 
II.  Research Design 
Five cases were chosen to represent different varieties of relationships with 
proxies: that is, they were chosen for variance in the independent variable, which is a 
sponsor’s distance from its proxy.  Russia lent the closest support to its Georgian proxies, 
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then its Ukrainian proxies, then Iran with Hezbollah, then Pakistan with the Haqqani 
network, then Saudi Arabia with the Chechens.  This dissertation will trace out the effect 
of these relationships on the proxies:  it will examine how and when that support affects 
the sponsor’s goals, and what its limitations are. 
The case study chapters each have three sections.  First, they will provide an 
assessment of the key features that define that particular proxy relationship.  The first 
section of each case will identify the relevant historical context behind the relationship of 
the sponsor to the proxy.  They examine the range of support that was offered, from 
financial support and materiel to training, colocation of the sponsor’s conventional 
forces, and military intervention on behalf of the proxy.  They will examine other 
mechanisms of support, such as state assistance given to private individuals and 
institutions that then support the proxy, as well as the control a sponsor exerts.  They will 
also review ideological links between the two, and analyze the benefit that sponsorship of 
the proxy offers to the state.  All of these features will allow an estimation of how close 
the principal and the agent are compared to other cases. 
Second, these chapters will use process tracing to identify key moments during a 
defined period when these proxies were used in conflict situations and what made them 
more or less successful.  In particular, international reaction by balancing powers against 
both the sponsor and the local proxy will be measured, particularly at points when the 
type of relationship between proxy and sponsor changes.  This hypothesis posits that it is 
the closeness of relationship between proxy and sponsor that incurs increased external 
balancing against both, which is precisely what proxy warfare is designed to avoid.  
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Lastly, each chapter will sum up the results of the case and analyze in more detail 
the proxy’s strategic effectiveness in achieving its own and its sponsor’s goals.  It will 
also review additional factors that influenced the impact of the support mechanism. 
 
Case selection 
The first empirical chapter examines Russia’s use of proxies against Georgia with 
a focus on the period from 2003 to 2008.  This represents the period when Georgia’s 
strategic orientation had the greatest potential to change, after the Rose Revolution and 
until the August War.  According to the dissertation’s hypothesis, Russia’s relationship 
with the South Ossetians should result in the least effective case of proxy usage.  
Moscow’s proxy forces were closely intertwined with its regular forces, which were 
Russia’s primary mechanism for winning the conventional war when it erupted in August 
2008.  This chapter first describes the relationship between Russia and its proxies in 
Georgia, both in terms of Russian materiel support and also ideology.  It focuses 
primarily on the South Ossetians, since they were the most important proxy in the 
outbreak of the 2008 war.  It then lays out the strategic situation in the buildup to the war, 
including the historical context of the separatist territories in Georgia and the effect of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  The bulk of the analysis focuses on the role the South 
Ossetian proxies played in the rapid increase in hostilities between Russia and Georgia 
from the Rose Revolution and then their war in 2008.  This period includes the rise to 
power of Mikhail Saakashvili, his deteriorating relations with Vladimir Putin’s Russia, 
and Georgia’s efforts to join Western institutions.  It lays particular emphasis on the 
months between February 2008, when Georgia was promised eventual NATO 
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membership, to August 2008, when hostilities between Russia and Georgia began.  This 
is because Russia used its proxies during this period to conduct provocations below the 
threshold of armed conflict, presenting Tbilisi with a choice of conventional war or a 
deteriorating strategic situation.  The chapter also reviews Georgian opposition to and 
international balancing of Russia’s support of the South Ossetians, before and during the 
August War.  Since the war was primarily fought in South Ossetia, events there are 
prioritized over those in Abkhazia, though the Abkhazians had a proxy relationship with 
Russia as well.  This chapter concludes with an assessment of the effectiveness of the 
South Ossetians and the utility they achieved for Russia.  This included the setback to 
Georgia’s NATO aspirations, strategic implications of the successful Russian conflict, 
and the costs Moscow paid.   
The second case is also Russian: it examines Russia’s use of proxies in eastern 
Ukraine and the evolution of the crisis between 2013 and 2016.  Like with the Georgia 
case, this is the period when Ukraine’s strategic orientation is most variable.  This case 
should represent the second-least effective instance of proxy warfare in the dissertation 
since Russia’s relationship with the Ukrainian separatists was not quite as close as in 
South Ossetia.  Russian regular forces were for the most part not involved as the primary 
military agent, unlike in Georgia.  The chapter’s focus is on the war in the east, on the 
fighting that took place in the Donbas region around the eastern Ukrainian cities of 
Luhansk and Donetsk.  It first lays out the historical strategic context by outlining the 
start of the Ukraine conflict from the Maidan Square protests in November 2013 to 
Russia’s seizure of Crimea in March 2014.  Crimea is less a case of proxy warfare than 
conventional war; though the invading troops wore no insignia, they were obviously 
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Russian (though some local provocateurs were involved in fomenting anti-Kiev unrest).  
The core analysis of proxy usage focuses on the most intense periods of the conflict in the 
east, from June to August in 2014 and January to February in 2015.  This includes 
countermeasures Kiev employed to recapture territories lost to the separatists, such as a 
major offensive in June 2014.  This chapter also reviews in detail the two critical 
moments when Russia’s relationship with its proxies changed.  The first instance came 
during the weeklong fighting in late August 2014 around the town of Ilovaisk, east of 
Donetsk, when Russia intervened with conventional forces to halt a Ukrainian 
encirclement of the separatists.  The second moment was during the rebel offensive in 
2015 from February 12-18 around the railway hub of Debaltseve, directly between 
Luhansk and Donestsk, which cut off a brigade-sized Ukrainian force and led to the fall 
of the town.  It then concludes with an analysis of the strategic landscape following the 
diminution of the conflict in 2016.  These included multiple rounds of sanctions on 
Moscow by both the US and EU, a stalemate in the conflict, a weakened Kiev 
government, and probably an end to Ukraine’s nascent NATO aspirations. 
The third case examines Iran’s support of its proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon against 
rival sectarian factions, Israel, and the US-backed Lebanese government.  Though it 
includes a brief review of Iran’s formation of Hezbollah, the chapter focuses on the 
strategic contestation of Lebanon after 2005.  This time period is the focus for two 
reasons.  The Rafiq Hariri assassination crisis in 2004-2005 are the years when 
Lebanon’s strategic orientation came into play for the first time since the Lebanese civil 
war, which was played out under a much different international alignment, with fewer 
insights for modern policymakers.  Second, the Lebanese civil war, the formation of 
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Hezbollah, and its use against Western and Western-allied forces are all well-troweled 
academic ground, and additional review is comparatively less valuable than on the post-
2005 period.  The chapter begins by analyzing Iran’s support of Hezbollah, from the 
ideological inspiration to the presence of trainers in the Beqaa’ Valley and regular 
weapons shipments.  It traces this relationship and argues that the two were linked 
closely, but less closely than Russia and the Ukrainian separatists, and more closely than 
the Saudi and Pakistani proxies.  The effectiveness of this proxy relationship should thus 
be somewhere in the middle.  The chapter deepens its focus on Hezbollah and its external 
support after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri and the subsequent Cedar Revolution until 
the modern day.  After Hariri’s death, Iran and Syria’s role in Lebanon and relationship 
with Hezbollah came under intense international pressure.  That pressure eventually 
forced Syria to withdraw its conventional forces from Lebanon, but Iran’s forces 
remained.  The chapter reviews in detail Hezbollah’s 2006 war with Israel and then the 
eighteen-month-long Lebanese political crisis over the choice of a new president.  
Hezbollah and Hezbollah supporters were deployed skillfully to mitigate the 2004 
ascension of the pro-Hariri factions, and to support Iranian interests in Lebanon.  The 
chapter then concludes with the escalation of Hezbollah’s engagement in the Syrian civil 
war, particularly its offensive to capture the rebel-held town of Qusayr and the 
subsequent balancing it incited.  Like its entry into politics, the dispatch of armed 
formations to a foreign sectarian war was a significant change in Hezbollah’s relationship 
with its sponsors.  The chapter concludes with a review of the strategic landscape of the 
war through 2015, by which time the rise of the Islamic State, the entry of Russia into the 
conflict, the collapse in US and Turkish support for the moderate anti-Assad rebels, and 
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the power of Hezbollah on the ground put the strategic outcome of the conflict much less 
in doubt. 
The fourth case examines Pakistan’s relationship with the Haqqani network from 
2005-2016.  This period was selected because after 2005 the Taliban insurgency began to 
pose a systemic threat to the US-led project in Afghanistan and both American and 
Pakistani involvement in the war increased.  The buildup of military forces under 
President Bush and then the surge under President Obama did not derail either the 
Taliban’s viability or Pakistan’s strategic policy in Afghanistan.  By 2016, the contours 
of the conflict had basically been settled.  The parameters of the strategic orientation of 
Afghanistan were much narrower, and the likelihood of a significant change in the war’s 
outcome likewise small.  Though Pakistan supported several of the Afghan Taliban 
groups, such as the main insurgent leadership body in Quetta, it had the closest ties to the 
insurgent faction linked to the Haqqani family.  Comparatively, however, this 
relationship was not as close as Russia’s ties to the Ukrainian separatists or Iran’s with 
Hezbollah, and the Haqqanis should thus have been more effective as a proxy.  The 
chapter begins with a review of the Haqqani network’s historic ties to military, 
intelligence, and civil organizations in Pakistan.  Throughout the Soviet war and indeed 
into the modern Afghan war, Pakistan provided the Haqqanis with two forms of support: 
both directly, through its intelligence and military links, and indirectly, through its civil-
society decades-long promotion of jihadism through mosques and other civic outlets.  
The chapter then examines the Taliban’s strategic resurgence in Afghanistan in 2005 and 
the worsening insurgent violence from 2006-2009, including several high-profile attacks 
attributed to the Haqqanis.  It ends with the end of the NATO mandate in Afghanistan in 
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2014 and the establishment of regular multilateral peace negotiations in 2016.  The 
chapter also reviews the incumbent government’s countermeasures to this proxy warfare, 
including the American surge of troops in 2010 and the Obama Administration’s 
diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to cut ties with its proxy.  In addition, it further examines 
the blowback effect of Pakistan’s promotion of jihadism within the tribal areas and 
Pakistan proper.  This was clearly a feature, not a bug, of more indirect support and less 
control of proxies.  While the explosion of militancy in Pakistan during these years was 
not monocausal, it was partially fed by the mechanisms Pakistan has established to 
support exportable jihadists for strategic reasons. This covers a significant amount of 
time and events.  However, it is impossible to assess the cost and benefit of the Haqqanis 
as a proxy without including the effect of that support on the sponsor.   
The fifth case examines Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the Chechen rebels from 
1996-2003.  Riyadh’s roundabout support for the Chechens was the most deniable of any 
of the cases included here, and accordingly should have been the most effective.  Several 
of the Kingdom’s top political officials and civil society leaders made statements in 
support of the Chechens in their fight against Russia, and financial and cultural ties were 
established with the Chechen government.  However, Saudi Arabia’s primary support 
was not direct state assistance.  Instead, it was provided by civil society institutions 
similar to Pakistan’s that provided a ready supply of Saudi militants and money to the 
Chechens throughout their conflicts with Russia.  The Saudi government consciously 
supported these institutions and these outcomes through a variety of intentional policy 
decisions.  The chapter begins by reviewing these historic policies, including the rise of 
the Afghan Arabs.  It then offers some historical context for the Chechen conflict leading 
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up to 1996, including the conclusion of the first war.  Next, the case analyzes the 
changing character of the Chechen state during its three years of independence, as the 
influence of radical Islamic figures grew and that of secular, Soviet-era leaders shrank.  It 
examines the beginning of the second Chechen war in 1999 and the subsequent Russian 
invasion and occupation of Chechnya.  This includes the changing nature of the conflict, 
from semi-conventional warfare to guerrilla warfare (which had predominated in the first 
Chechen war) and then modern mass-casualty Islamic terrorism.  It concludes with the 
2003 political settlement imposed on Chechnya by Russia, culminating with the 
ratification of a new constitution and the installation of pro-Russian leader Akhmad 
Kadyrov as the first president of the Chechen Republic.  Though high-profile terrorism 
continued in Russia, and Kadyrov was assassinated less than a year later, Moscow’s 
control over Chechnya after 2004 was no longer seriously in doubt.   
 
Parameters and Limitations 
Distinctions between the sponsor states in size, ideology, risk tolerance, and other 
factors unavoidably increase the variance in the factors affecting the outcome of each 
case and reduce the significance of the independent variable, the different types of 
support each state lends to its proxy.  However, that increased variation is the result of the 
two additional parameters imposed on this study: modernity and relevance.  This study is 
intended to be a modern assessment, dealing with states that are using proxy warfare in 
the modern day under the current international system.  That should increase its 
applicability to policymakers, particularly in states threatened by proxy war.  However, 
the number of potential cases is by definition smaller than if a longer time horizon was 
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used, which would allow identifying cases with variance in their types of support while 
holding constant more of the other variables – ideally, all of them.  However, this 
dissertation’s focus on modernity was judged to outweigh the limitations on the statistical 
significance of its results. 
 The parameter of relevance imposes similar limits.  The cases selected here are 
intended to meet some baseline level of relevance to modern geopolitics and 
policymakers, especially American ones.  They should have some import to the major 
choices facing states and their national policy narratives today.  It is quite possible that 
the research model would be strengthened if sponsor states were selected to be as 
homogenous as possible, regardless of size or power or geographic location.  This might 
have resulted in a dissertation limited only to South America, for example, or to five 
states of the Caucasus, or even to five ethnic groups within one state.  But it 
disproportionately limits the utility of this study if the size and relevance of the various 
geopolitical actors are ignored.  For most modern states invested in the current 
international order, particularly the United States, it is of crucial importance how regional 
and global competitors like Russia, Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia support proxies.  
The statistical weakness this parameter imposes on the study is thus outweighed by the 
applicability of the analysis and results to modern policymakers. 
There are other challenges with this case selection.  In some ways, they are not 
different enough.  One of the clearest commonalities among these five cases is that they 
are all authoritarian regimes of different stripes.  This is another result of the 
dissertation’s stress on modernity and relevance.  The disproportionate proliferation of 
proxy warfare among modern authoritarian states is a function of several factors, but 
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primarily the conventional military overmatch of the United States and its own support 
for liberal democracy.  This means that regional opponents of the current US-led 
international status quo and American strategic rivals are all authoritarian states that seek 
to avoid a direct conflict with the US and its allies when projecting power beyond their 
borders. 
There are certainly cases in the past of liberal democracies sponsoring proxy 
warfare: for example, the United States support for UNITA in Angola, or the Cuban 
exiles in the Bay of Pigs, or Hmong partisans in Laos, or different shades of proxy in 
Syria.  But with the exception of Syria these cases were all during a period with a much 
different international alignment than today.  The United States was matched with a rival 
power, the Soviet Union, that was roughly its material equivalent, and both were 
competing for global influence without provoking a conventional war.  The modern 
paucity of democratic support for proxies looks even scarcer when one considers that the 
only recent full-throated American support for a proxy came with the Kurdish Syrian 
Democratic Forces (SDF), which primarily fought against the Islamic State, another 
nonstate actor, and not a state power.  This type of conflict is best categorized as one of a 
substate group versus another substate group.  It has less application to this dissertation 
and its focus on state-to-state competition because many if not most of the penalties for 
interstate aggression in the SDF-versus-Islamic State case do not apply.   
Changes to the international system have reduced democratic support for proxies 
in two ways.  First, the United States and its allies became less concerned militarily about 
escalating to conventional warfare, in which they have had a significant military 
advantage for the past thirty years.  The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the multiple 
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wars against Serbia, and the expansion of NATO and NATO-adjacent relationships deep 
into the former Soviet space would all be unthinkable under the former bipolar system.  
Even the Syrian case is not dispositive: certainly the Obama Administration’s 
parsimonious aid to the Free Syrian Army (FSA) reflected its political reluctance to enter 
a new war in the Middle East, having recently withdrawn from Iraq, but not fear of 
escalation by another power, at least in the critical years of 2012-2014.  Even with the 
FSA, the United States was confident that it could have military superiority in a 
conventional conflict if it wished to pay the price.  Thus, states that sought to challenge 
US power adopted strategies that avoided direct confrontation or conventional warfare in 
favor of those that delayed a US response, obfuscated their own role, and minimized 
other international reactions – reactions that, if they came militarily, could be disastrous. 
Second, the redistribution of power from a bipolar system to a borderline unipolar 
system after 1991 meant that the parameters of behavior and regime type the United 
States would embrace also changed.  Promotion of American values abroad has been a 
core tenet of the United States foreign policy for at least over a century, and a comfort 
with fellow democracies and fellow republics for even longer.  In practice these policies 
and norms have not always been applied evenly, especially in areas of intense 
geopolitical competition like the Middle East or South Asia where short-term interests 
often outweigh the long term.  But after the end of the Cold War, these needs became 
fewer, particularly in places like South America and Africa.  Regimes and regime actions 
that the United States tolerated in the fight against communism became more problematic 
after that fight ended.  US support for nonstate proxy groups, many of them also morally 
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problematic, declined as well.6  Whether this was itself the case of a strengthening 
democratic norm after 1991 or simply a reduction in such groups’ utility to the US in a 
unipolar world is less important than simply that there was a decline.  This meant that the 
remaining cases of proxy sponsorship, rather than being a tool that both sides used during 
the height of the Cold War, became primarily a tool for autocratic states. 
There was thus a confluence between a US unwillingness to support problematic 
agents and an unwillingness on behalf of autocratic states to challenge the military power 
of the US-led order directly.  With few exceptions, the most compelling modern 
examples of proxy warfare come from autocratic states, not democratic ones, and have as 
such influenced the case selection by necessity. 
How did that impact the results of each case?  Potentially in several ways.   
First, structurally, the balancing group in question that opposed the proxy sponsor was 
usually the same constellation of states.  In four of these cases, the proxy sponsor in 
question was projecting power against the United States and some collection of European 
states, their agents, their ally, or their partner.  Only in the fifth case, in Chechnya, did an 
autocratic power project influence against different competitors, though importantly one 
of which (the Russian government) that still significantly outmatched it militarily.  This 
had a sequential effect that might have muddied the case results.  Since the balancers 
were usually the same group of states and the events are not synchronous, they might 
well have learned from one crisis to the next.  There is an argument to be made that the 
United States was more attuned to Russian danger signals in Ukraine than it was in 
Georgia six years earlier.  Certainly European states reacted more assertively to Russian 
 
6 Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, Trends in Outside 
Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), xiii. 
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aggression in 2014 than they did in 2008.  The same stimuli might well have had a 
different impact case-by-case, all other things being equal. 
Since the same group of states was usually the balancing coalition, the results also 
might be biased by their national interest.  The United States had more of an interest in 
the Afghanistan war than it did in Georgian sovereignty, and would have likely reacted 
more strongly to provocations in one versus the other even if the independent variable 
were not different.  The same was true for European states, which were much more 
interested in conflicts closer to home than in Afghanistan even though many of them had 
contributed troops there.  This was mitigated somewhat by the fifth Chechen case, but 
remained an enduring challenge.  The best overall remedy was first, by measuring 
correlations between changes in deniability and changes in reaction, and second, by 
examining conflict events through a tactical and operational lens and measuring tactical 
and operational changes.  Aggression on the battlefield would theoretically incite a 
reaction in a sort of “black box,” without strategic leadership being invited to 
immediately change policy.  In addition to tactical responses, this challenge is why this 
dissertation takes a close look at what balancing states were saying.  There is far more 
gradation available in the statements that governments made than there were with binary 
policy choices.  And those statements happened far more often than proactive policy 
choices.  Governments have to say something about a growing problem, even if they are 
able or desire to put off a strategic decision until later.  How that language changes is an 
indicator of changes in how egregious they judge proxy aggression to be.  National 
interest thus sets a baseline level of balancing, which then changes as sponsor and proxy 
act.  The changes can be measured and the effectiveness of proxy warfare assessed even 
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if the baseline level of engagement is particularly low or particularly high as the result of 
some exogenous level of national interest. 
The autocratic nature of sponsors also poses an efficacy problem when assessing 
how effective their proxy wars could be.  Democratization is fiendishly complicated, 
particularly in the developing world with the other crush of social problems for a new 
government or counterinsurgent to manage.  It is harder to build a democratic state in 
regions of the world that have little experience with democratic norms than it is to create 
an autocratic state or especially an autocratic enclave.  In the middle of a conflict, those 
challenges grow exponentially.  This means that forces with limited military effectiveness 
like militia proxies can have an outsize impact on nascent democratic regimes.  As a 
democratic tool against autocratic regimes, even fighting for control of an enclave, the 
task would be far greater to both win the conflict and establish a newly democratic 
government.  With all of its power and influence, the United States itself has an 
extremely mixed record on such projects.  Proxy forces, almost no matter the amount of 
support, would be exceptionally challenged to do likewise, and thus their effect is 
probably greater when used by autocratic regimes than democratic ones.  
Does this limit the applicability for the United States and other democratic powers 
as potential proxy sponsors?  Yes, certainly.  To start with, autocratic regimes are more 
tolerant of forces that have broader left and right limits on their standards of behavior.  
The United States would have great trouble legally, politically, and morally, supporting a 
proxy that committed widespread human rights abuses.  The Russian and Iranian 
governments would have little trouble doing so.  The military forces of autocratic regimes 
arguably behave more badly in combat than democratic governments.  Since there is by 
 24 
definition less control over proxy forces by the sponsor government, and thus less control 
over their behavior, such human rights abuses are almost inevitable in a combat zone.  
This limits their utility for liberal democratic powers, which have far less ability to 
tolerate such abuses. 
Sometimes such human rights abuses are not just inevitable but actually 
encouraged.  This is another point where proxy forces are more effective for autocratic 
states than democratic ones.  Terror against the civilian population is a tactic with which 
most autocratic states are comfortable and even rely on to a certain degree.  Proxies, with 
their low cost and veiled ties to the state, are ideal for these actions.  Human rights abuses 
also have a combat effectiveness if exacted correctly.  There is a strong argument that 
Russia was successful in keeping the peace in Chechnya after the second war partly 
because of the long reign of terror Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov enacted against his 
population on Russia’s behalf.  The more deniable nature of proxy forces can make them 
effective tools for maintaining order through terror.  But this same quality makes them 
less effective and less suited for use by democratic nations. 
The human rights question, however, does not a priori answer which type of 
regime needs more control over its proxies.  There is an argument that autocratic 
governments need less control, since they are less troubled by proxy human rights 
violations that would be potentially show-stopping for democracies.  But there is the 
opposite theory as well.  Governments that exert widespread, oppressive control over the 
lives of their citizens often find it difficult to avoid exerting similar control over the 
actions of their proxies.  Witness, for example, the close control the Soviet Union sought 
to exert over many of its proxy communist forces in places like Spain and later the 
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Eastern bloc nations.  Since the result of democratic proxy support is theoretically the 
construction of a new democracy, Western states might well be more comfortable with 
those proxy forces taking a more independent role with local decision-making.  Indeed, 
this was the result of US support for Kurdish factions in Iraq’s north during the 1990’s, 
for better or worse.  Since exerting control costs resources and increases friction with the 
proxy, the least amount of control necessary to achieve the sponsor’s goals is the most 
optimal. 
There is a further wrinkle to the issue of regime type.  The primary ideology for 
each of the sponsors in this dissertation is based on an ethnic or religious identity.  This is 
true even in the examples of Iran and Pakistan, both of which make claim to be non-
sectarian.  This ideology impacts their proxy war in three ways.  First, like any ideology, 
it helped set the state’s strategic goals.  The Islamic Republic’s goals, for example, were 
radically reshaped by its revolution and the change in its ideology.  Iran moved out of the 
US-led regional balance of power and began to challenge it, building its influence in the 
Shia community in places like Lebanon that the Shah had abjured.  Second, such 
ideologies help pre-identify potential proxy communities.  Ethnic Russian communities 
beyond the borders of the Russian Federation were ideal potential proxy agents for the 
state.  Not only did the state derive some endogenous ideological benefit from supporting 
its ethnic kin, the condition of these Russians was a cause that potential balancers 
recognized as legitimate to a certain degree.  Russian involvement in their protection, 
including military involvement, was considered more legitimate by the international 
community than naked Russian military aggression.  It was not only ethnic Russians, 
either, that Moscow could reach out and touch.  Minority populations like Ossetes that 
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spilled over into neighboring states could also be effective agents, if Moscow could claim 
they are suffering discrimination.  This conflating of minority rights and ethnic unrest 
helped muddy international balancing against military aggression, effectively turning 
interstate conflicts into intrastate conflicts.   
Lastly, an ethnosectarian ideology could affect the feasibility of creating support 
networks to proxies.  The existence of ethnosectarian institutions could provide more 
efficient and more effective pathways from sponsor to proxy, ensuring that weapons, 
money, and recruits reached the proxy and it became a more operationally capable agent.  
The impact of this effect would depend on how intertwined a political ideology was with 
the current social structures and extant pathways within a society.  The networks of 
jihadist madrassahs in Pakistan, for example, were supported and expanded under 
General Zia in the 1970’s and 1980’s.  By the time of the US conflict in Afghanistan, 
they were extremely effective at fomenting a base of militancy from which the Taliban 
could effectively reconstruct itself in the years after the invasion.  Russia had to create 
ties to its proxies largely from scratch, beginning in the mid-2000’s.  Remaining Soviet-
era links to former member republics or Russian language heritage clubs did exist, and 
Vladimir Putin in places sought to expand them.  But they were less organic and more 
recent than Iran or Saudi Arabia’s ties to potential proxies, making them less cost 
effective.  Perhaps as a consequence those proxies were never as effective fighting units 
as the agents in the other cases.  An ethnosectarian ideology could also be more 
motivating, at least for enacting violence in the national interest.  Iran, for example, has 
since the revolution maintained an anti-Western ideology that was also distinctly Shia, 
which mixed in themes of martyrdom and military heroism that evoked the Caliphs 
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Hussein and Ali.  This could be an effective (and lower cost) motivator for the Shia 
population in places like Lebanon, and easily fitting together themes of improving the life 
of Shias with calls to sacrifice militarily. 
Democratic states are possibly less easily able to motivate fighters to rally around 
a concept like representative government, particularly if the element of nationalism is left 
out.  How intertwined is the United States’ political ideology with its society and 
potential proxies abroad?  Or, for example, the United Kingdom’s?  There are certainly a 
wide array of Western NGOs that support pro-democracy groups and civil society 
abroad, and financially these pathways can be used to send support to proxies.  But there 
are significant limits on these, in the amount of government involvement possible, the 
range of actors that can be supported, and above all in the type of support that can be 
offered.  Few policymakers in the United States aim to use the Ford Foundation, for 
example, to supply arms to pro-democratic groups overseas. Thus the particular brand of 
autocratic ideology that autocratic states use to justify their repression, especially 
conflict-oriented themes, can make proxies a more useful and effective tool for them than 
for their more democratic rivals.  This probably lowers the cost of proxy sponsorship and 
conversely exaggerates the relative military effect.   
There are also clear-cut opportunities for democratic states, however.  Western 
appeal to nonstate actors is, theoretically, ecumenical, and so is much of the support that 
can be offered.  Protestors against the authoritarian regimes that constitute virtually the 
entirety of Western opponents will look to the United States and Europe for support and 
inspiration.  This is an advantage that autocratic powers’ use of ethnic nationalism and 
sectarian messages do not have.  For example, there is immediate ideological kinship of 
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protesters in Hong Kong with their former colonial power and the United States.  Where 
there is injustice, where there is oppression, most subjugated peoples look to the free 
societies of the West.  In Syria, the Free Syrian Army was an important umbrella group 
for the opposition in a country that has not had significant governmental relationship with 
the United States for eighty years.  During the Cold War, civil society and dissidents in 
communist countries often looked to the United States, even in places and communities 
that had little contact with it.  Certainly, autocratic states are ideologically supple as well.  
They can and will supply aid to ideologically strange bedfellows, such as Iran’s support 
for Hamas or Venezuela.  Regardless, the initial ideological kinship of most revolts 
against an authoritarian government with the democratic West is a significant opportunity 
for the US and its allies to spread their influence. 
There are other similarities that limit applicability in this dissertation.  Three of 
the five cases involve Russia, on one side or another, and three involve Islamic nations.  
This is partially another necessity of relevance: there are only a limited number of 
modern states that are using proxies.  In a qualitative study, with a limited sample size, 
there will almost certainly be some overlap.  There are also different types of Islam 
practiced in these countries.  The Islam of Sunni Saudi Arabia is different than that of 
Shia Iran.  Fighters who flock to support Sunni causes in Chechnya or Afghanistan would 
never go to Lebanon, except to fight against Iran’s own proxies.  The potential bias of 
Islam as a hidden variable is thus real, but somewhat mitigated by Sunni/Shia differences. 
In addition, two of the “more remote” proxies examined – Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan – produce militants from Islamic institutions that are similar and partially 
intertwined.  The Haqqani mosque and other Islamic organizations in Pakistan that raise 
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money from the Persian Gulf do so from similar sources as Chechen jihadist 
organizations.  This means that the effect and the balancing in each case might be 
corrupted by the same exogenous effects, leading to a biased result.  However, Pakistan 
also gives an identifiably different level of active state support to some of its militant 
groups than Saudi Arabia.  The effect of these fighters as a policy tool should thus be 
different. 
 These cases also represent different time periods.  The Ukraine case is the 
shortest, at barely three years.  The Pakistan case is longest, at eleven years.  Comparing 
the results could potentially be problematic, since they reflect different time frames.  This 
issue can be mitigated in two ways.  First, where appropriate, smaller time segments of 
more intense combat and action-and-response between the sponsor and its balancers are 
broken out of longer duration case studies for closer study.  Though they do not constitute 
entire cases in themselves, they can be helpful in comparing, for instance, the effect of 
Iran’s proxy Hezbollah and Russia’s proxy the South Ossetian militias in the July 2006 
and August 2008 wars respectively.  Secondly, it is part of the nature of these proxies that 
some effects are felt over longer periods of time.  Both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan created 
civic institutions to support a more indirect form of proxy – Islamic extremist groups – 
that necessarily had more gradual effects over a longer time horizon than Russia’s 
proxies (so far).  The different time horizons are necessary for measuring the full impact 
of the more indirect use of proxies.  They are thus a feature, not a bug. 
 Lastly, most of the research supporting this dissertation comes from secondary 
sources like think-tanks and academic publications.  For some cases such as the Ukraine 
and Syria conflicts, research also comes from news accounts and social media, since the 
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events are very recent and currently unfolding.  To the extent possible, identifiable bias in 
certain media coverage has been balanced by other media.  For some of the most recent 
information about tactical events, however, such as the mid-February 2014 fight for the 
critical town of Debaltseve in Ukraine, few sources exist and even fewer in English.  The 
variety of sources in certain cases is thus limited and potentially biased.  Broadly, mostly 
English-language media and sources were used, which is also a source of concern.  
English-language news outlets might well be more pro-Western than foreign sources.  
This has been mitigated, where possible, by using English-language sources from neutral 
countries or countries antagonistic to the United States.  Primary-source material is also 
used.  This consists of parliamentary testimony and public statements, both in the US and 
abroad.  Again, the English-language bias exists.   
 
III.  Literature Review: The who, the why, and the how of proxy war 
Proxy warfare in history 
Proxy warfare as a standalone concept remains a broadly under-studied 
phenomenon, though that has begun to change over the past three years.7  The study of 
indirect warfare entered the international relations literature during the Cold War, and 
then after a brief interregnum the War on Terror, both of which served to frame and color 
it.  It emerged alongside studies about the rise of intrastate conflict and the decrease of 
interstate war after 1945, as the costs of the latter rose and insurgents became much more 
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difficult – and expensive – for states to defeat.8  Rebels started winning their wars for a 
variety of reasons.  The colonial powers that supported most of the incumbent 
governments had lost legitimacy during decolonization, thus facing an increased cost of 
maintaining their hold on colonial possessions as local populaces stopped cooperating.9  
These conflicts were also asymmetric: their stakes were enormous for the rebels, and 
much less for the empires, which made defeat easier to bear.10  There were technological 
developments that made individuals more deadly, like the popularization of the AK-47.  
Environmental factors may also have played a role: perhaps the closer insurgents were to 
the state’s border, the stronger they became.11  But one particularly powerful factor that 
strengthened rebels in civil wars was the support of the superpowers.  Both the US and 
USSR were circumspect about risking head-to-head clashes, and often relied on proxy 
forces to do their fighting for them.12   
It was tremendously cost-effective for the superpowers to pay another entity – 
insurgents, state forces, or whomever – to fight for them.13  States could avoid (or at least 
limit) the domestic costs of unpopular interventions, or obviate the need for legislative 
approval.14  There could be ideological benefits to supporting proxy forces, which could 
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bolster a regime’s legitimacy with its citizens domestically and fellow-travelers abroad.15  
An otherwise unpopular, underperforming government could gain legitimacy through the 
struggle, much like Syria’s ruling Assad family has benefited from being the standard-
bearer of radicalism in the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Another reason states employed proxies 
in warfare – the one focused on in this dissertation – was plausible deniability.16  
Supporting these proxies ran less of a risk of incurring international costs, such as 
sanctions or worse.  Taking no official part in hostilities between states reduced the 
potential magnitude of the conflict, escalation, and likelihood of retribution.  
On the flip side, it was easy to see what the ragtag proxies got out of state 
sponsorship.  Governments were powerful allies for rebels, and still are.  They could 
supply fighters with materiel, funding, and training.  They could also protect their proxy 
in a variety of ways.  Adjacent states could provide safe havens, a space in which 
insurgent fighters could refit and regroup.  They could ignore things, like large groups of 
armed men moving through their territory.  They could also provide strategic deterrence, 
preventing their proxies’ enemies from taking drastic countermeasures.  Communist 
ideology, like a uniting ideology of any kind, also played an important role.  Third-party 
ideas like communism or Islamism could provide a worldview and identify strategies for 
the expression of discontent.17  They could also motivate rebels to take risks in pursuit of 
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their goals.18  State sponsorship could also improve rebels’ tactics and weapons, bolster 
their political messaging, and extend their organization.19 
Not all of the proxies supported by states during this period were insurgents.  
They also supported third parties to conflicts, like the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
(AUC) in Columbia, and terrorists, like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).  
The Soviet Union and its allies supported a wide array of terrorist groups, such as Abu 
Nidal and the Baader-Meinhof gang.  Along with intrastate war, the number of 
perpetrators and acts of international terrorism coincidentally rose after 1945.20  Of 
course, these categories of proxy are not neatly delineated.  A guerilla force could also 
use terrorism to advance its cause, like Hezbollah or the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) or the Viet Cong.  Some theorists viewed terrorists 
and guerilla movements as existing on a spectrum of insurgency, with rebels adopting 
one method or another over time as their strength waxed and waned.21  Different types of 
proxy forces could have different strategic effects, both for themselves and for their 
sponsors.  Terrorists could offer different capabilities than a guerilla movement, and 
guerrillas could offer different capabilities than regular military forces.  Certainly, they 
could serve similar goals, such as disorienting the enemy, eliminating opposing forces, 
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and building morale for the rebels.22  But terrorists could also – for example – weaken a 
rival state without contesting its sovereignty.23  
 The Cold War also colored the study of this form of warfare.  One of the most 
contentious issues with many of these groups was how closely they were tied to their 
sponsor states, especially the Soviet Union.  How much did Moscow control their 
actions?  For politically (not to say polemically) minded academics, this allowed the 
reframing of international policy debates to put the onus of action and the burden of guilt 
onto a preferred actor.  Instead of blaming for Israel for sins real and imagined, they 
could blame Iraq for not ceasing funding to Abu Nidal, and vice versa.  Some scholars 
pointed to the extensive support such groups received from the Soviet Union and 
countries like Syria, and claimed that Moscow closely controlled their actions.24  To 
them, the Soviet Union was the nerve center of international terrorism, a puppet master 
with everyone from the Red Army Faction to the PLO on its strings.  Many of the “close 
control” analysts were former intelligence or military officers, who often relied on 
classified or otherwise unverifiable material, and were considered ideological outliers by 
their colleagues in the field.25  Others saw state sponsorship as a red herring.  Since states 
were just capitalizing on pre-existing conditions, they could not be the primary cause of 
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civil conflict.26  Some like Noam Chomsky went still further in the opposite direction, 
blaming interventions and policies by the United States and the West that resulted in 
wholesale terrorism by right-wing governments and movements.27   
Others believed that the use of proxies by either side was simply the result of a 
cost-benefit analysis of modern conflict – states adapting to changes in warfare – and the 
bipolar struggle during the Cold War.28  Supporting guerillas and terrorists provided 
tangible policy gains to the sponsor in certain situations, while also often provoking 
reactions that delegitimized the government under attack.29  This included rewarding 
tactics like suicide bombing, not as the result of particular religious fanaticism or sub-
moralism, but rather as a particularly cold-eyed assessment of costs and benefits virtually 
any state actor might make.30  
After 1991, this paradigm shifted again.  The collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
end of the Cold War led to the cratering of Soviet support for its proxies.  Coincidentally, 
the remaining insurgents started losing civil wars more frequently, as many of the 
elements that had strengthened them disappeared.32  Communism was almost totally 
discredited as a unifying ideology, despite anachronistic holdouts with their own sources 
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of funding like the FARC in Colombia.33  States and proxies may also have suffered from 
the end of the Cold War and the end of the bipolar system.34  However, even bereft of 
outside support, national governments had the advantages of being in power, and so it 
was insurgent groups that were hurt more.35  After a brief spike, which some attributed to 
the removal of superpower support for heavy-handed leaders like Tito, the incidence of 
civil wars began to decline.36  Deaths from terrorism also fell, which suggests a reduction 
in superpower competition did indeed have a multiplying effect on intrastate conflict.37   
In the modern day, the study of proxy forces has largely focused on Islamist 
terrorist groups, both because terrorism is again on the rise and (not wholly incidentally) 
the United States has been involved in long terrorist-linked conflicts in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere.38  Russia’s support of proxies in places like Ukraine has also focused the 
discussion.  Again, much of the study of these groups concerns the relationship between 
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state assistance and state control.  Some scholars believe that revisionist states like Iran 
and Syria have replaced the USSR as the great puppet master behind the activities of 
modern terrorist organizations.39  Others point to nominal US allies like Pakistan and 
Saudi Arabia.40  And to be fair, the Islamist rebels in Afghanistan, Iraq, Tajikistan, 
Somalia, Chechnya, Bosnia, and elsewhere had some sort of tie with the nations that 
supported, however indirectly, their ideology.  Not a strong one, perhaps, but something.  
And regardless of relative culpability, most studies of state-sponsored terrorism argue 
that state sponsorship makes terrorist organizations much more lethal.41   
 
What is proxy warfare? 
So where does that leave a definition of proxy warfare as a concept?  How, in 
other words, is it possible to wrap up all of these types of indirect intervention into a 
concise model of proxy warfare?  Here, the term proxy warfare will be used to refer to a 
non-state paramilitary group receiving assistance from a sponsor to achieve strategic 
ends.  Like most other modern definitions of proxy war, it includes three parts: the group 
itself, an actor in an intrastate conflict; the assistance relationship; and the sponsor, a 
more powerful entity than the proxy intending to achieve strategic goals.42  
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First, the group itself.  In this dissertation, and broadly in the literature, the proxy 
must be a substate group, though some authors argue that proxies can include states.  For 
example, the Soviet Union used Cuban forces to intervene in Angola.  Or, more directly, 
the United States supported the United Kingdom’s fight against Nazi Germany before the 
attack on Pearl Harbor.  Geraint Hughes believes this is a misguided analogy because 
state alliances are far broader and more in-depth than proxy relationships, where the issue 
is simple expediency.  National governments also have much more ability to pursue their 
own interests.43  Yakov Bar-Siman-Tov sees state alliances as precisely the opposite of a 
proxy relationship: in alliances, states are willing to share the sacrifices of war together, 
with often the burden falling on the larger state to guarantee the safety of the smaller.  
The support of a proxy is meant to shift military sacrifice, rather than bear it itself.44  This 
dissertation is agnostic: states could conceptually be proxies of other states, perhaps, but 
here the focus is on relevance and the methods by which states are most actively 
intervening.  So there is a utility to focusing on substate groups, which America’s 
enemies today are using effectively.  
Must the group have an intrinsically political orientation?  The number of private 
military companies like Wagner or Blackwater has greatly increased since the end of the 
Cold War and could certainly be considered proxies.45  Some would disagree with that, 
insisting on a political locus of the agent and placing companies and mercenaries into a 
separate category.46  That does not seem dispositive: as long as the group is an armed 
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force that can effect a policy result, the nature of their tie to local political actors is not 
critical outside of the impact it can have on effectiveness.  In three of the cases examined 
here – Ukraine and Chechnya – actors from outside the conflict zones were transplanted 
to the war to advance their sponsor’s policy.  Proxies can include actors like private 
military companies; indeed, this is one of the most rapidly growing areas in the study of 
warfare.47  Russia’s use of the military company Wagner in places like Libya and 
Mozambique has been quite effective in advancing its interests, though the capability it 
offers is wholly non-organic to the local populace.   
A key element of proxy warfare for many analysts is the relative disparity of 
power between the entity that receives assistance and the entity that provides it.48  For 
Bar-Siman-Tov, the key point is that the donor’s stature and military power in the 
international community is greater than the recipient’s.49  That disparity in power can be 
represented by the concept of control or dependency.  For them, aid to a group without 
any control is something qualitatively different: call it capacity building, or donated 
assistance, or something, but not a proxy-sponsor relationship.50  However, it is hard to 
imagine a situation where the allure of more assistance does not have at least some 
influence, however small, on a proxy.  Like the categories of hybrid warfare, the lesser-
controlled proxy model is another subset of models that can be examined as part of a 
greater whole.  Other scholars do not see the issue of control as primarily one of 
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dependency.  If a group is dependent on state aid, it is effectively subordinate, without 
disposing of the issue of control as such.51  Some of the less-organic proxies in the 
modern world are dependent on their sponsor, such as the private security company 
Wagner, which could not exist without the protection of the Russian government.  
The relative disparity in power between the sponsor and proxy points to a popular 
framework for describing proxy warfare: the principal-agent dynamic.  Principal-agent 
theory was developed in economics but later broadened to other cases where there is an 
actor with specialized expertise and its client.  It entered political science through its 
application to American comparative politics and economics.52  The key elements here 
were firstly that the relationship was hierarchical.53  The principal could influence the 
agent more than vice-versa and it had more choices of agents to support, and could thus 
withdraw its support.54  Second, both sides entered the relationship because they brought 
different skills to the table and were pursuing similar goals.55  For the sponsor, there were 
the resources, and for the proxy, knowledge of the local terrain and deniability.56  But 
like agents, proxies are imperfect animals.  Sometimes they fail to do the thing 
contracted.57  Sometimes they receive the resources and fail to even try.58  Sometimes 
they turn against their sponsor, like Osama Bin Laden and some of the other Afghan 
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Arabs.59  And in any case the principal also faces multiple costs, beyond simply the 
promised resources.  It first must pay for the thing done, which requires resources to seize 
X city or Y mountain.  Second, it has to pay to monitor and ensure that its proxy group 
does what was promised.  And third, it has to pay to incentivize more desirable actions if 
its proxy has dropped the ball.60 
What about the issue of assistance?  There is a kaleidoscope of potential types of 
state assistance to proxy groups in armed conflict, which some authors stratify into 
formal categories.61  These include whether state representatives train their proxy forces, 
and how much training is given.  Some authors like Mumford see the participation of 
third party state advisors as the key element of proxy warfare – or at least the key element 
that makes it successful.62  They include whether states arm their proxies, and how much 
armament is supplied, which others see as the most common and significant way for 
states to intervene.63  It can also include how much economic support is given, and which 
entities are paid; and not just by the state, but by non-state entities like diaspora groups as 
well.64  It can include logistical support, like Syria assisting Sunni fundamentalists 
travelling to Iraq to fight the US.  It can include whether a state’s military or civilian 
officers hold official roles within the proxy force, or if the proxies are wholly indigenous; 
and also whether conventional state forces ever fight alongside proxy forces, and if so 
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how consistently.  A key distinction for some is whether the support is active or not; was 
the state actively providing it or passively permitting it?65  Actively supplying weapons 
to a proxy, for example, could for some be a qualitatively different state policy than 
allowing the Boston Police Department to slough off guns to the Irish Republican Army.  
Did state forces turn a blind eye to proxy military activity and allow sanctuary; or did 
they protect the proxy from harm, and offer a safe haven?  It might also include allowing 
domestic recruits, as in Saudi Arabia, being permitted to join proxy forces, or enabled to 
do so.  But that seems artificial: both seem to require a conscious policy decision, and 
both are analyzed in different cases here. 
 Some of these relationships in proxy wars include features that have been 
described as hybrid war, which is properly a subset of proxy war.  The essence of hybrid 
war is a blurring of these different types of war – conventional, irregular, terrorist – and 
their use (often simultaneously) to project political power.66  Proxy forces in hybrid war 
are used alongside conventional forces, and it is a useful way to think about certain 
“closer” relationships between states and their proxies.  Indeed, some of the cases here 
involve classic cases of hybrid war, such as Russia’s support of its Donbas proxies in 
Ukraine.  Some see this as a new phenomenon.  For Frank Hoffman, the blending of 
conventional and irregular forces down to the operational and even tactical level is what 
makes hybrid war a relatively recent innovation in warfare, distinct from the strategic 
blending between regular and irregular units that has occurred in the past.67  For others 
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like Andrew Krepinovich, the threat of hybrid war has long been a feature of conflict and 
has posed challenges for conventional militaries in Vietnam and elsewhere.
For the 
purposes this dissertation, hybrid war is simply one type of relationship and thus one set 
of measurements of the distance between sponsor and proxy.  Indeed, it is actually an 
outlier: hybrid war involves very close support to and coordination with a sponsor’s 
proxy. 
68  
Williamson Murray goes further and sees this challenge and response as stretching back 
to the ancient world.69  Drawing off of the Russian context, Alexander Lanoska suggests 
additional factors that make hybrid war more likely, such as local escalation dominance, 
a complex ethnography, and a belligerent that is trying to revise the status quo.70  
 
 
What makes proxy warfare effective? 
There has been a great amount of work done on why states have used proxies in 
one form or another over the past eighty years.  There is less on proxy war as a concept.  
But there is less still on modeling what makes it work.  That is the conceptual gap this 
dissertation seeks to fill. 
Measuring effectiveness can be a tricky thing.  The use of terrorists as proxies, 
proxies which have virtually no ability to contest the sovereignty of another state, points 
to an important feature of proxy warfare: that winning is not always necessary for the 
sponsor.  Most analysts agree states can have other goals than victory in a proxy 
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conflict.73  A sponsor’s goal might be political leverage, forcing a different policy choice 
on a rival.  States can also intervene to support rebellions as part of a process of 
disrupting the target state’s growth in power even if the rebellions themselves do not 
succeed.74  Or the goal can be something altogether more total, like inciting the target’s 
collapse.75  Goals may change: Groh suggests that sponsor goals for the proxy will 
become more ambitious the more vital the interests at stake in a conflict are.76  And in 
any case it is not always obvious.  There is always the peril of defining ex post facto that 
the goals achieved by the proxy were the state’s goals, or attributing to a state goals it has 
not declared.  With the semi-clandestine nature of proxy warfare, states often do not 
announce exactly what they hope to achieve.   
This points to a key utility of proxy warfare that conventional intervention does 
not offer: simply prolonging a conflict going can be extremely beneficial for the sponsor.  
Because its costs are much lower than intervening conventionally in the conflict, 
allowing a conflict to continue often offers more benefit and less risk than if the state was 
actively involved.  Allowing an inconclusive conflict to continue: for example, Saudi 
Arabia’s war against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen – is a useful way to embarrass 
and wear down rivals which have to fight an increasingly expensive and messy war.77  
Winning can be even less important for anti-status quo states, revisionist states, like the 
ones examined here, since they are simply trying to make the cost of maintaining the 
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status quo too pricey.  The goals for each sponsor in each case then must be determined 
carefully on a case-by-case basis to most clearly assess the effectiveness of means.   
 Much of the literature that exists on effectiveness focuses on control, again 
drawing from principal-agent theory, and stresses the benefit for a sponsor of tightly 
controlling its proxy.  According to many authors, a hands-off approach might make the 
intervener’s policy more effective with regard for domestic and international audiences 
but would likely lose coherence as the proxy pursued its own ends.
For Groh, who insists on control as a 
condition of proxy warfare, the correct amount of control needed is a function of the 
convergence of the sponsor’s objectives and that of the proxy.
78  That could affect 
its political alignment, allowing space to emerge between the proxy – the agent – and its 
sponsor – the principal.79  This is a key element of the cost-effectiveness of proxy 
warfare deriving from principal-agent study.  
82  If the goals of the 
sponsor and proxy diverged too widely, a great amount of control over the latter would be 
needed.  If they did not diverge, very little control would be needed.  This alignment of a 
sponsor’s goals and a proxy’s is critical to efficiency because it keeps the price of 
sponsorship down.  Only if both groups’ interests are perfectly aligned can support be 
given with no strings attached.  Otherwise, some element of the cost will need to be spent 
on managing the carrots and sticks to keep the proxy in line.  The price of indirect 
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intervention could actually exceed that of direct intervention if the costs of controlling a 
proxy grow too high.83 
Pessimists about the value of proxy warfare often see the inherent lack of control 
as the element that makes the proxy-sponsor relationship fundamentally nonstrategic.84  
Less control risks more criminality, as often-poorly disciplined militia units control 
territory with few left or right limits of behavior.  The Colombian AUC’s drift into 
narcotics trafficking is a good example.  Uncontrolled proxies may be at a greater risk of 
committing wartime atrocities, like some of the more jihadist Syrian rebel groups, or 
unexpectedly widen the conflict, leading to diplomatic consequences and worse for the 
sponsor.  They may fight among themselves with allied factions or states, as with the 
Kurdish militias in Iraq, or escalate the conflict, as the most radical Chechen elements did 
with their invasion of Dagestan in 1999.85  All of these factors argue for a sponsor 
exerting more control over a proxy.  And for their part, the advocates for the 
effectiveness of hybrid war see close proximity to the proxy as a hallmark not just of the 
new form of war, but of its success.86   
It is not at all clear, however, that greater control over the proxy leads to better 
results.  Overcontrolling can lead to the sponsor losing the benefits of indirect control, 
obviating the entire point of indirect intervention.87  The flip side of proximity is secrecy:  
the secrecy of a sponsor’s support, or its plausible deniability.  Deniability is one of the 
main reasons that scholars have offered for the use of proxies in war.88  The primary 
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benefit here of deniability is that it minimizes internal and external costs other than those 
directly related to the proxy.  It can prevent – or at least delay – international partners 
from mobilizing against the sponsor.89  How much was the sponsor state blamed for the 
actions of its proxy?  How effectively did the international community punish that 
sponsorship?  The consequence-to-deniability ratio is not as neat as that, of course: the 
sponsor might well not be blamed at all, for reasons that have nothing to do with the 
effectiveness of its proxy or its degree of control.  An internationally isolated country that 
supports a proxy may suffer a great deal, while another sponsor like Russia, which has a 
multitude of inducements and enticements to attract allies, may suffer very little.  
Deniability also gives potential balancers the ability to look the other way, and not 
provoke a confrontation if the target country at stake falls lower in their priority list.90  If 
the policy is not popular domestically, secrecy can also help keep public opinion from 
shaping against it.91  States also have less risk of becoming emotionally or politically 
invested in a conflict if they maintain sufficient distance, which would cloud the cold-
eyed decision-making necessary to manage escalation and involvement.92 
This dissertation argues such secrecy is the signature element of proxy warfare 
and the decisive one.  Some authors acknowledge secrecy has an implicit tradeoff with 
the type of proxy war that can be waged, because plausible deniability limits the amount 
of support that can be provided.93  But others agree that in certain situations, military 
support is also overvalued.  State support could have negative effects on proxies and their 
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operations.  Authors like Kaufman argue the quantity of military support is not always 
determinative of victory in a proxy conflict.95  The most critical element is the political 
effectiveness of the proxy, and its ability to maneuver in the domestic landscape as an 
entity with some alien elements.  Other critical elements are the proxy’s tactical 
sophistication and its technological expertise.  The introduction of the regular military 
forces of the sponsor does not necessarily lead to victory.  It can actually be 
counterproductive by affecting the interaction of the proxy and the political landscape.96  
Since sponsor states usually demand some degree over its proxies’ goals and even their 
operations, that interaction could become even more strained and counterproductive, as 
the sponsor made demands without intimate knowledge of local political conditions.97   
Others point to various military conditions that can shape effectiveness.  Hughes 
notes that tactical sophistication and technological expertise of the proxy are key for an 
effective sponsor-proxy relationship: the proxy has to be able to use the weapons the 
sponsor provides.98  When Ukrainian rebels shot down a civilian airliner in 2014 with 
advanced air defense weapons, the European Union leveled damaging sanctions on 
Russia, which theretofore it had been slow to do.  Hybrid war theorists agree and suggest 
this is a new development: the ability of irregular forces to receive and employ advanced 
technology is a new feature of hybrid warfare, which can also make them sometimes 
dominant to western forces in their own localized area.99  
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This dissertation combines these concepts of control and military effectiveness.  It 
argues that these constitute a single variable: the sponsor’s proximity to the proxy, which 
it calls deniability.  That measurement is the best assessment of the likelihood of strategic 
success in proxy war.  It suggests the key tradeoff is between operational capability and 
deniability, both of which in the right amounts are necessary for strategic success but 
which exist in a zero-sum equation.100  It thus examines both how effective the proxy 
forces were on the battlefield and how effectively the host country countered them.  But it 
is broader, since proxies are often wholly overmatched compared to the states they 
oppose and sometimes their function is not to win wars by themselves.  It thus assesses 
how effective was the proxy at achieving the state’s strategic goals, regardless of its 
tactical performance.  
Lastly, that strategic effectiveness must be measured against the basic reason 
states continue to intervene indirectly: because it is cheaper.  How much did the sponsor 
state have to invest in the proxy to achieve its results?  What, in other words, was the 
proportional bang for the buck?  This metric is partially a function of the first two 
measurements: it is the first, plus direct costs, divided by the second.  How much did the 
received strategic utility cost the state in terms of international condemnation, hard cash 
and weapons, and any violence received from the proxy itself?  Though this value is not 
computed quantitatively, its will be analyzed as a key measure of effectiveness in a core 
function of delegating the authority for war to a proxy.  It is the key measurement of 
 
100 There is also clearly some ideological benefit to supporting proxies, which can provide a metric of 
success independent from either deniability or battlefield utility.  However, because this dissertation 
focuses on the strategic effectiveness of proxies, particularly in conflicts, ideological benefits will not be 
included in measurements of success.  This study is concerned with how to successfully project power, and 
less concerned with the elements that strengthen domestic regimes. 
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efficiency, the amount of resources necessary for a result, a question with which this 
dissertation had its genesis. 
 And efficiency is an important question.  In the future, the number of proxy wars 
is likely to increase, driven by a number of factors that mitigate against interstate war.  At 
the moment the US is still clinging to its position in most areas as a political landowner, 
which resists and can resist the efforts of revisionist countries to change the political 
status quo by force.  But one of the motivating assumptions here is that compared with 
the three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States’ position in the 
world is changing.  In fewer and fewer places it is likely to be able to maintain the current 
(usually democratic) status quo, because it will have comparatively less ability to project 
its power out to the frontier or to incentivize the loyalty of nonaligned regimes.  It is not 
controversial to suggest that the relative power of China is increasing and will continue to 
do so, COVID-19 and all, for the foreseeable future.  That means more missiles; it means 
a larger blue water navy, and it means greater soft power ability to win over friendly 
governments via the Belt and Road Initiative or similar engagement strategies.  
Governments friendlier to China will likely be less friendly to the United States on key 
issues, such as representative government and regional security.  To retain its interests in 
these areas, the United States could be forced, like during the Cold War, to actively 









CHAPTER TWO: RUSSIA AND GEORGIA, 2003-2008 
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The Georgia war was a seminal event for Europe, and yet familiar.  It was the first 
full-blown Russian invasion of a European state since the Prague Spring in 1968 and yet 
the Russians largely escaped censure.  How?  The location of this conflict, the Caucasus, 
should have been a nightmare for projecting power.  It was a nightmare geographically, 
crisscrossed by 18,000 foot-high mountain ranges, and a nightmare politically, with 
ethnic and linguistic communities scattered hodgepodge across the four states of the 
region.  Its heterogeneity had always been both a hindrance and an opportunity for 
invaders.  When it was eventually half-conquered in the early nineteenth century, the 
Russians played off ethnic divisions to isolate rebellious communities and used 
conventional brute force to push out rivals.  They would do something similar in 2008. 
This chapter analyzes how Russia used militia proxies in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia against Georgia.  It has three parts.  First, it outlines the origin of the conflicts and 
Russia’s ideological approach to its near abroad, including Russia’s proxy strategy for the 
breakaway regions.  Russia was the prime sponsor of ethnic separatists in both areas, 
lending them comprehensive military and political support.  There were Russian officers 
serving in key positions, Abkhaz and South Ossetians were given Russian citizenship, 
and both economies (above all that of South Ossetia) were heavily linked to Russia’s.  
Most representative of this relationship, however, was that Russia was prepared to 
intervene militarily on behalf of its proxies, and indeed had conventional forces pre-
positioned alongside their own.  There were conventional Russian military operations in 
2004 and 2007, and in August 2008 Russia would send a large force openly through the 
Roki Tunnel to overwhelm the Georgians, occupy South Ossetia, and win the war. 
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Second, this chapter examines key moments from 2000 through 2008 (with a 
focus on 2004-2008) when Russia’s relationship with these proxies changed and how the 
international community responded.  Lastly, it sums up the strategic outcome of the 
August War and key conclusions from this case.  Above all, it suggests that Russia’s use 
of proxies was successful in Georgia because it managed to escalate the military pressure 
on Georgia gradually and with enough plausible deniability to avoid consequences to 
itself.  Deniability did not come through the usual proxy method of hiding its ties to the 
separatists, or offering more indirect support, since in both cases its conventional forces 
fought alongside them.  Rather, the impact of these ties were blunted by Russia’s low-
level warfare, which raised the threshold of conventional aggression enough that its 
forces could operate without crossing that threshold and inviting an international 
response.  International reactions were further muted by disagreements in the US and 
among other NATO members about expansion further to the east and the proper 
cognizance of Russian interests, as well as concern about Georgian President Mikheil 
Saakashvili.  Russian deniability was also affected by the presence of other local proxy 
conflicts, primarily Chechnya, the local ethnic shape of the battlefield, and the flawed 
nature of the diplomatic and peacekeeping mechanisms.  
 
I.  Origin 
The question of how Russia approached Georgia partially depended on the 
existential question of what exactly the Russian state was, and who was a Russian.  This 
had historically been a matter of some debate, given Russia’s significant ethnic 
heterogeneity.  The Soviet Union had expressly allowed for some self-determination as 
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both a concession to reality and an inducement to Russia’s ethnicities to favor its rule 
over that of the czars.  Within the USSR there were fifty-three different governmental 
structures and determinations according different levels of autonomy to its peoples, from 
Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) and Autonomous Republics down to autonomous 
okrugs.101  This layering was intended to channel nationalism into manageable 
institutions, and also to reward and punish greater or lesser enthusiasm for the 
supranational Soviet project at its outset.  Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on the territory of 
Georgia – an SSR and a nationality question itself – were two of these structures.  When 
the USSR collapsed, there were 25 million people living outside Russia’s borders who 
described themselves as ethnic Russians and 36 million who considered Russian their 
native language.102  As in post-colonial upheavals elsewhere in the world, these people 
often faced de facto discrimination by newly independent states.  Estonia and Latvia, for 
example, instituted strict language requirements for citizenship that prevented ethnic 
Russians from voting.  In alcoves like Transdniestria, Russian civilians were trapped 
abroad in legal vacuums and caught up in post-colonial ethnic violence.103  Over the next 
several years, a lively debate emerged among Russian intellectuals, politicians, and 
national security experts about what should be done for these people and, as a corollary, 
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what should be Russia’s role in the formerly Soviet countries, the so-called near 
abroad.104   
The answer to that question in turn depended on the definition of Russia.  
Russia’s policies should presumably reflect the nature of the state, which prompted the 
question of what Russia was.  Was it an explicitly national great power, based on ethnic 
Russians; a revived imperial state in Eurasia; or a liberal Western democracy, reborn into 
European norms like postwar Germany?105  Boris Yeltsin, the Russian Federation’s first 
president, by instinct leaned towards the latter.  He had won power on the back of his 
charisma and bravery during the August 1991 coup, and staunchly opposed the political 
alliance between communists and nationalists early in his term.106  Yeltsin was not 
wholly a dove.  He reinstituted the czarist double-headed eagle as Russia’s state emblem 
and supported military deployments to places like Transdniestria.  However, he was also 
anti-Soviet: anti-everything Soviet, including the domination of Eastern Europe.  He 
allowed former SSRs to build their own sovereignty by tacitly eroding the rights of ethnic 
Russians, for which he came under nationalist criticism at home.107  His administration 
mirrored this ambiguity on the relation of Russian identity to Russian foreign policy.108  
His foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev argued that Moscow should address the ethnicity 
issue as part of its conciliatory policy towards the West.  Russians should support their 
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ethnic compatriots through international organizations, rather than with direct political or 
military support, which would lead to confrontation.   
In few areas was this question as fraught as the now-separated former Soviet state 
of Georgia and its own multiple separatist areas, which was symptomatic of the chaotic 
nationality issues in the Caucasus.  As the Soviet period ended, Moscow’s overriding 
policy goal shifted from maintaining the Union to limiting the fallout, particularly 
resurgent ethnic conflict.  Russia had dominated the southern Caucasus since 1783 when 
the predecessor to modern Georgia agreed to become a Russian protectorate.  Under 
different military and civil authorities, Georgia remained part of Tsarist Russia until the 
Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.  After a short-lived period of Georgian independence, 
Georgia was once more brought under Moscow’s control in 1921, despite sustained 
opposition to Soviet rule and regular later demonstrations for ethnic and cultural rights.109  
These became more acute as the Cold War waned.  During a peaceful gathering calling 
for reforms in Tbilisi in 1989, Soviet troops opened fire on demonstrators, killing twenty 
people.110  A coalition made up of nationalists and other activists won a plurality in the 
country’s first multiparty parliamentary elections a year later in 1990.  As a result, Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia became first the chairman of the republic’s parliament and then President 
of an independent Georgia in 1991.111  Gamsakhurdia was a fiery orator and ideologue, 
but unpredictable; a tumultuous leader but also one whose relations with the breakaway 
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regions (above all the Abkhaz) were actually better than they would be under his 
successor, veteran apparatchik Eduard Shevardnadze. 
 
 
Source: Edward Boyle, Borderization in Georgia: Sovereignty Materialized, Eurasia Border Review 7, 18 
(March 31, 2017): 6. 
 
During these years, Russia had a proxy relationship with neither the South 
Ossetians nor the Abkhaz and was broadly supportive of Georgia’s negotiations with 
them over political questions.  Boris Yeltsin generally backed Georgian president Eduard 
Sheverdnadze (though some of his generals did not) and avoided giving direct military 
support to either the Abkhaz or South Ossetian separatists.  This reflected Russia’s 
initially stabilizing, status quo goals towards the two areas.  Certainly, segments of the 
Russian military, both at the top and those stationed in Abkhazia, were hostile to the new 
Georgian government and soon-to-be President Eduard Shevardnazhe, who they blamed 
for sabotaging the Soviet Union.112  However, the supportive policy set by Yeltsin and 
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Kozyrev set the tone of bilateral relations.  The terms of the ceasefires Moscow initially 
negotiated in Abkhazia represented an effort to end the fighting on a neutral basis.  None 
of the agreements, for example, promoted Abkhaz independence, and all sought to 
include international institutions in the process. 
Abkhazia had been absorbed into Tsarist Russia in 1810, around the same time as 
Georgia.  During the Russian civil war, Abkhazia had served as a center for Bolshevik 
supporters until it was conquered by Georgia in 1918 and then both entities were 
conquered by Russia in 1921.113  Like that of most other ethnicities, Abkhaz nationalism 
began to revive as the Soviet Union weakened.114  After Georgian President 
Gamsakhurdia’s fall in 1992, the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet declared Abkhazia an 
independent state.  The next month Georgia sent troops into Abkhazia to seize 
Abkhazia’s western coastline and fighting erupted.115  There was some Russian military 
support to the Abkhaz during the conflict, but it was haphazard, low-level, and 
unrepresentative of the Kremlin’s official policy.  At the top, Yeltsin and Kozyrev 
continued fundamentally stabilizing goals, trying to bring the two parties to the table to 
halt the fighting in a context of Georgian sovereignty.  In September 1992, they brokered 
a deal that included, for the first time ever, an Abkhaz guarantee of Georgia’s territorial 
integrity.116  Moscow also made a good-faith effort to halt the hundreds of volunteers 
from across the North Caucasus, including Chechens and Cossacks, who flocked to the 
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Abkhaz banner.117  However, some local Russian military forces (including those at the 
Gudauta base in Abkhazia) also provided unofficial military aid to the separatists, 
including weapons and intelligence.118  These advantages helped Abkhaz forces seize 
control of Georgia’s coastal gains during a surprise offensive in October 1992.  By the 
time a cease-fire was signed in Moscow in 1994, the Abkhazians had captured the capital 
of Sukhumi and pushed the Georgians back to the regional border and the Khodori 
Gorge.119   
This Moscow Agreement confirmed the status of Russian troops as peacekeepers 
in Abkhazia.  Technically the peacekeepers were supposed to come from the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, but in reality most were Russian.120  The UN 
Security Council endorsed the arrangement, despite doubts from some members, and 
expanded the United Nations Observer Mission In Georgia (UNOMIG) to monitor it.  
This institution was critical to Russia’s later proxy war: the CIS force provided a future 
shield for Abkhaz operations, behind which they could remain protected from Georgian 
interference if Russia so chose.  Its presence was legitimated by the agreement.  This 
would enable Russia to provide direct support for the separatists if it so chose, without 
suffering the diplomatic costs of a military buildup.  
A similar evolution of Russian goals was occurring in South Ossetia, where 
Russian troops were also embedded and which also had a claim on autonomy, though a 
much weaker one than Abkhazia.  Russia’s control over the South Ossetians as a proxy 
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perhaps not coincidentally became eventually greater than over the Abkhazians, as did its 
support.  However, Russian support of the Ossetians during the conflict from 1990-1991 
exhibited the same improvisational quality and was characterized by significant 
independence of action within the military.  Geographically and politically, the Ossetian 
homeland was split, with the Caucasus Mountains dividing Ossetians between the North 
Ossetia-Alania republic in Russia and the autonomous district of South Ossetia in 
Georgia.  The main strategic corridor between the two (and thus Russia and Georgia) was 
the Roki Tunnel.  North Ossetia had belonged to the Russian Empire since 1767; South 
Ossetia joined it after its parent state the Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti was 
swallowed by Russia in 1803.121  After the destruction of the independent Georgian state 
by the Red Army in 1921, South Ossetia was designated an Autonomous District within 
the Georgian SSR in 1922, codifying a special status which it had not had before.122  
After decades of atrophy, Ossetian nationalism flared again in late 1989 in the capital of 
Tskhinvali and after a series of confrontations exploded into violence in October 1990.123  
Like in Abkhazia, Russia’s support for the Ossetian militias was sclerotic.  Certain local 
Russian units, such as the helicopter regiment stationed at Tskhinvali (which was 
majority Ossetian itself), supplied the South Ossetians with arms.124   The Ossetian side 
was also buttressed by support and volunteers from North Ossetia.125  However, Yeltsin 
rejected a South Ossetian referendum in January 1992 calling for unification with Russia, 
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fearing it would send a hostile message to other formerly Soviet states.126  Under his 
personal supervision, Shevardnadze and representatives from both Ossetias signed a 
ceasefire in Sochi in June 1992.  To monitor the accord, the Sochi Agreement created a 
joint peacekeeping control commission (JCC, composed of the two combatants plus 
Russia and the North Ossetians), based in Tskhinvali.127  Operationally, the joint 
peacekeeping forces would be comprised of a maximum of 500 troops each of Georgians, 
Russians, and Ossetians, and fall under the command of the Russian Federation.  Though 
this agreement also codified Russia’s military presence in South Ossetia, it was 
significant that the joint peacekeeping force also included Georgian troops, which would 
not be true two years later in Abkhazia. 
The independent actions by local military units during these conflicts was 
symptomatic of broader opposition in the Russian defense ministry about the ideological 
approach of Yeltsin’s government to its near abroad.  Defense Minister Pavel Grachev 
and other senior leadership profoundly disagreed with Kozyrev’s hands-off, 
internationalist approach to the regions, arguing instead for the necessity of military force 
to enact change.  Under pressure, Kozyrev in April 1993 revised Russia’s national 
security interests to include ethnic Russian communities in the old USSR, which was 
subsequently codified in a new Russian military doctrine adopted in November.128  These 
changes had broader political appeal.  They were strongly supported by Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Russia, which won the most votes in 
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the December 1993 Duma elections.  The LDP’s ideal Russia was an explicitly imperial 
state, reincorporating the territories of the former USSR and eventually expanding to the 
Indian Ocean, which would allow it to confronts threats from both the West and revived 
pan-Turkism.129  Though impractical politically, the LDP’s platform was a heuristic of a 
political current that led Yeltsin to define a special Russian prerogative in the Near 
Abroad.  After Kozyrev was dismissed in 1995, a more interventionist policy became 
standardized.130  In September of that year, Yeltsin announced to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) states that Russia had an interest in ensuring the treatment of 
ethnic Russians outside its borders and called for tighter integration of the CIS as a bloc 
with a particular post-Soviet identity.  His new foreign minister Viktor Chernomyrdin 
followed this up in 1996 by declaring the CIS countries to be a zone of Russia’s vital 
interests.131   
However, throughout the rest of the decade, Russia remained disinclined to use 
either the Abkhaz or Ossetians as proxies to project influence.  Its goals may have been 
more assertive than in the immediate post-Soviet period, but they were not yet revisionist.  
This was reflected in the conflicts’ diplomatic processes, particularly in South Ossetia 
where Russia had more influence.  Western organizations increased their influence in the 
regions with Moscow’s blessing.  The Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) established a Mission to Georgia in 1992 and by 1994 it was officially 
recognized as part of the JCC mechanism.  The OSCE assisted with meetings in 1994, 
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1995, and 1996, the same year the two sides released a diplomatic document (the 
“Memorandum”) illustrating the way forwards.  In the Memorandum, both the Georgians 
and the South Ossetians renounced the use of force to solve their dispute, reduce 
peacekeeping forces in the area, and continue discussions.132  In the spirit of the 
Memorandum agreement, Georgian President Shevardnadze conducted three summit 
meetings with his de facto South Ossetian counterpart Ludwig Chibirov from 1996-1998, 
and trade between the two parties also began to increase.133  In 1999, a working-level 
group was set up between the two sides to negotiate in earnest the details of a final 
settlement, which appeared to be within reach.   
The Abkhaz proved more resistant to Russian desires, but here also Moscow 
attempted to play a positive role.  The CIS formalized the West’s political interests in the 
conflict through the “Friends of Georgia” group organization, which included the major 
European powers plus the US and which was codified in the peacemaking process by 
1997.  But Abkhazia’s autonomy was more developed historically and politically than 
South Ossetia’s, which may have contributed to less Russian control (illustrated, among 
other things, by the multiple failed cease-fires).  When Abkhaz and Russian goals 
clashed, Yeltsin was willing to apply pressure.  For example, in response to 
Shevardnadze’s urging, Russia and eleven other CIS countries imposed trade and military 
sanctions on Abkhazia in January 1996.134   
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In his twilight years, Yeltsin accelerated the ideological shift towards defending 
Russia’s prerogative in the regions that had begun in 1995.  Perhaps his most 
consequential decision was the anointment of a successor, Vladimir Putin, whose 
ideology and worldview would become synonymous with Russia’s own.  At the start, 
Putin’s vision did not seem to deviate from Yeltsin’s.  He was a colorless, somewhat 
banal apparatchik with ties to the security services, which may have made him the perfect 
second fiddle.135  Putin portrayed himself as above ideology, above the partisan fray, 
pragmatically borrowing ideas from systems that worked.136  He gave a lukewarm 
endorsement to the pro-government Unity party in Russia’s 1999 parliamentary elections 
because he was reportedly friendly with some of its members.137  In 2000 Putin published 
the first expression of his political ideology in an article entitled Russia at the Turn of the 
Millennium, in which he specifically warned against danger of ideology.  For the West, 
Millennium was a largely reassuring document, stressing the need for economic reform 
and investment in the population.  He lauded the value of patriotism, free of “nationalist 
conceit” and “imperial ambitions,” and solemnly recognized that “In the present world 
the might of a country as a great power is manifested more in...upholding its interests in 
the international arena than in its military might.” 
Where were these interests?  Russia, said Putin, was a great power 
“preconditioned by the inseparable characteristics of its geopolitical, economic and 
cultural existence.  They determined the mentality of Russians and the policy of the 
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government throughout the history of Russia and they cannot but do so at present.”  It 
mentioned, in passing, that Russian power was at its lowest point in 200-300 years, or 
since the beginning of Russia’s imperial expansion under Peter the Great.138  Over the 
next decade, Putin would amalgamate “great power” Russians into his political coalition.  
He did this through cooption of nationalist ideologues like Zhirinovsky of the LDP and 
appeals to historical symbols and themes that resonated with the common man of 
Russia.139  Some of these symbolic changes hinted at a change in Russia’s conception of 
itself.  Putin changed the state’s national anthem back to its Soviet-era variant in 
December 2000 and the Russian military’s insignia back to the red star in 2002.  A key 
ideologist close by his side during this period was Vladislav Surkov, who served as 
Putin’s key political strategist and propagandist.140  He coined the term “sovereign 
democracy” to describe Putin’s rule, describing a statist, great-power system which had 
some democratic garnishments but was at its heart a noncompetitive system for the 
Kremlin.141  Surkov would help develop the concept of a new greater Russian imperial 
state, a “Third Rome,” and like Rome combining the cultural and religious trappings of 
legitimacy into an expansive project.142   Above all, this meant a privileged Russian 
position – if not dominance – in its near abroad. 
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II.  The Conflict 
A Less and Less Honest Broker, 2000-2003 
Russia began to increase both its control over South Ossetia’s government and its 
conventional military operations across the Georgian border in 2000.  Its motivation was 
prodded by the eruption of the second Chechen War and the Rose Revolution, both of 
which as well as the ethnic geography of South Ossetia helped Russia avoid censure. 
Russia’s first move was to align South Ossetia’s goals with its own and increase 
its control over the proxy government.  During South Ossetia’s elections presidential 
elections to replace Chibirov in 2000-2001, Moscow hand-picked Eduard Kokoity after 
convening a meeting of the three leading candidates in Russia in February 2001.143  
Kokoity was a former militia leader with ties to the Russian security services and had 
been living in Moscow before the election.  He was also a member of an explicitly 
imperial Russian activist group founded by Alexander Dugin, a semi-fascist advisor to 
pro-government members of the Duma.144  The region’s former president Ludwig 
Chibirov had been supportive of negotiations with Georgia, including a final status 
settlement that potentially included South Ossetia under Georgian sovereignty.  Kokoity 
was not.  He abandoned discussing South Ossetia’s status within a Georgian framework, 
and demanded unification with North Ossetia in the Russian Federation.145 
During this period, Moscow also blurred Georgian sovereignty over the regions 
with a passport drive.  This was helpful for power projection, since Russia’s military 
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support of the South Ossetians relied on the use of its conventional forces and the ease 
with which they could operate without the censure of interstate war.  Blurring national 
boundaries would increase that ease.  Though its official position was still that South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia were part of a sovereign Georgia, Moscow changed its citizenship 
requirements in June 2002 to make it easier for Abkhaz and Ossetians (among others) to 
register for Russian passports.  Groups like the Congress of Russina Communities of 
Abkhazia assisted with the wholesale registration of Abkhaz and Ossetians, resulting in 
an estimated seventy percent of the population of Abkhazia holding Russian 
citizenship.146  South Ossetia’s deputy prime minister was eventually able to say that 98 
percent of South Ossetian citizens carried Russian passports.147  This had the function of 
blurring Georgia’s sovereignty and thus eroding the norm against military intervention, 
since there was now a quasi-legal basis for bringing Russian conventional power to bear 
in their support.  Russian authorities, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated 
several times that Russia would act to protect Russian citizens in South Ossetia with “all 
means available,” especially in the face of Georgian military actions.148   
 Why was Russia support for South Ossetia changing?  One factor may have been 
NATO’s expansion into former Soviet space.  In a statement released in May 2000, the 
Baltic States and several other formerly communist countries had declared their intent to 
seek NATO membership.149  The curious thing, however, was that Russia’s support for 
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South Ossetia increased even before it publicly identified NATO or the Vilnius Round as 
a threat – indeed, before the issue of Georgia entering the alliance had been raised at all.  
Preoccupied with the small war in Chechnya, the Kremlin did not appear to be rattled by 
the Vilnius statement.   Indeed, most Russian defense writing during this period stressed 
the need to focus on counterterrorism and unconventional conflicts like the one Russia 
was fighting.  Putin himself had earlier abjured the need to match NATO’s conventional 
and nuclear capabilities.150  Only later, in 2003, did Russia’s defense planning start to 
change.  Russia’s defense ministry issued a white paper that year outlining the new 
Ivanov doctrine, after his defense minister Sergei Ivanov, which called on the Russian 
military to be able to fight a full spectrum of potential conflicts including peer-to-peer 
and nuclear war.151   
However, Russia’s evolving policy towards Georgia and its strategic worldview 
were related to regional issues in the Caucasus.  The Chechen war soured bilateral 
relations with Georgia.  By 2000, Moscow had become frustrated with Tbilisi’s stance on 
Chechnya.  Kremlin officials felt Georgia was giving a free pass for militants to travel 
through the Pankisi Gorge linking the two countries.  They did have cause for concern.  
Undoubtedly the heavily mountainous border was difficult to monitor; but also 
undoubtedly, some Georgian authorities turned a blind eye to separatist activity.  
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Accounts by Chechen militants confirm it.152  The issue was made more complicated by 
the fact that some Chechens like Shamil Basayev had fought for the Abkhaz during their 
first conflict in the early 1990’s.  This problem began to sour Russian-Georgian 
cooperation in the JCC and other working groups.153  If Georgia was not part of the 
solution to Russia’s number one security concern, then it was part of the problem.  
Politically, Chechnya was made more imperative for Russia by the change in its 
leadership. Russia had committed at the OSCE in November 1999 to pull troops out of 
the Gudauta base in Abkhazia, as well as the Batumi base in Adjara and the Akhalkalaki 
base in Georgia proper.  But Putin had benefited politically from a strong stance on the 
Chechen war, using earthy language like “wipe out the Chechen thugs wherever they are, 
right up to the last shithouse.”154  He portrayed decisiveness and toughness, which 
boosted his approval ratings to over 75 percent in 2001.155  Anything that interfered with 
his toughness on the Chechens and terrorism was a threat to Putin himself and thus 
Russia.  And particularly after the terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001, 
Putin received significant leeway in his conduct of the war. 
Adjacent to Georgia and nearly touching South Ossetia, the Chechen war further 
helped to normalize Russian cross-border military operations just like the passport drive.  
In addition to increasing support for the Ossetians, Russia began to conduct airstrikes in 
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Pankisi in 2002 using the rhetoric of fighting terrorism.156  Instead of condemning the 
attacks, the United States warned that Pankisi was becoming a refuge for international 
terrorist networks linked to al-Qaeda.157  It sent military aid and training personnel to 
Georgia in 2002 specifically to help it combat these terrorist groups.  President George 
Bush and Putin released a joint statement in May of that year committing to fight 
terrorism “wherever it may occur,” with a special mention to eliminating terrorists in 
Georgia.158  Russia also continually refused to allow an international border-monitoring 
mission even though it complained bitterly about the presence of Chechen militants.  
Freedom of movement for Russia’s conventional forces appeared to be more important. 
Moscow’s support of the South Ossetians also increased at a time when Georgia’s 
foreign policy orientation had not undergone any significant shifts nor had Russia itself 
been particularly isolated.  During his decade in power, Shevardnadze’s government had 
pursued both a conciliatory line with Moscow and a relatively patient approach towards 
South Ossetia.159  But after parliamentary elections in November 2003 were marred by 
accusations of fraud, a series of increasingly massive nonviolent protests forced 
Shevardnadze’s resignation.160  Georgians went to the polls again in January and elected 
Mikhail Saakashvili, who was determined to both reorient Georgia with the West and 
reclaim his country’s lost territories.161   
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However, his election was a mixed blessing for Georgia.  Certainly Saakashvili 
spoke of modernizing Georgia and accelerating the state-building process that had stalled 
under Shevardnadze.  But he quickly came to be viewed as a hothead, impetuous, which 
had the effect of muting international blame for Russian aggression.  Under Saakashvili 
Georgia made a priority of solving the remaining conflicts.  His hawkish defense minister 
Irakli Okruashvili promised to resign from the cabinet if South Ossetia – his birthplace – 
was not regained by 2007.162  The trouble was that once the status quo was thrown into 
turmoil, violations of it by either side would not be as harshly punished.  Thus, as the 
separatist conflicts accelerated, as much American and European energy was spent 
warning Saakashvili not to do anything stupid as was spent pressuring Russia. 
At first, his haste proved promising.  The success of the government’s policy on 
reintegrating Adjara, an autonomous area on the southwestern tip of Georgia, seemed to 
indicate that Russia would cooperate.  Apparently trying to mimic their success in the 
Rose Revolution, demonstrators and activists from Georgian nationalist movements 
began a grassroots campaign calling for its leader Aslan Abashidze’s ouster.163  
Following a period of popular demonstrations and Georgian pressure, Abashidze fled to 
Moscow in May 2004.   
Why didn’t Russia intervene in Adjara, the way it would later?  There was 
certainly less of an historic tradition of autonomy for the area, and no real ethnic 
animosity between the Adjaran residents and Georgians.  It was also more difficult 
operationally: Adjara was not contiguous by land with Russia, which would have 
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impeded additional support for the separatist government.  Russia’s preferred style of 
proxy war functioned best with territorial contiguity that would minimize logistical 
challenges and worst with clear separation between combatants, which would raise the 
visibility of military support (and thus lower Russia’s deniability) as well as impose more 
operational difficulties. 
Saakashvili had also not yet begun to take concrete measures to change his 
broader foreign policy.  His inauguration speech on January 25 had praised the United 
States but also stressed his desire for good relations with Russia and indeed with “all 
friendly states.”  He emphasized that Georgia’s borders included all of the disputed areas, 
but did not mention the EU or NATO.164  When Saakashvili met Putin on February 11, 
Putin acknowledged that Adjara could be resolved but asked Saakashvili to allow Russia 
to retain its bases in the region.165  Russia maintained a major military base in Batumi on 
Georgia’s Black Sea coast that housed about 3,000-6,000 troops in 2004.166 
Before the summer of 2004, Saakashvili’s only overtures to the West had been a 
March 2004 agreement to allow NATO military aircraft heading to Afghanistan transit 
rights over Georgia.  He had also visited Brussels in April, though no questions of 
Georgian accession had been raised.  The Orange Revolution in Ukraine could not come 
for another six months.  Kosovo’s independence was not certain or sanctioned by the 
international community.  True, the Vilnius Group of Baltic and formerly communist 
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countries had joined NATO only a month before.  But that had been coming for several 
years, and had not yet elicited a major response from the Kremlin.  
 
Drawing the Line, 2004-2006 
Russia followed the resolution of the Adjara conflict by dramatically increasing 
support to the militants in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the spring of 2004.  This period 
coincided with the beginning of Putin’s second term in office.  Russia’s goals during this 
period became increasingly defensive, hyperprotective of Russia’s territory and the 
product of a state that saw itself as more and more besieged.  These goals were twofold.  
First, prevent any future revolutions, especially in Moscow.  This was broader than 
Georgia but shaped the second goal, to keep Russia together.  Prevent any future 
Chechnyas.  Prevent them even if that meant projecting forward, beyond Russia’s 
borders, to grab more territory, rather than protect what it had.  Protect the existing 
autonomous areas in places like Georgia as forward defense, to keep the pressure off 
Russian territory and bolster other communities that looked to Russia for support. 
There were essentially two types of threats to Russia.  First was the big threat, the 
color revolution in the capital that had claimed Russian-friendly regimes in Georgia, 
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.  These had been celebrated by the West and conceptually 
posed a threat to Russia at home.  Putin and his administration began to view Western 
NGOs as agents seeking to bring down his regime and encourage color revolutions 
abroad.  His foreign minister Sergei Lavrov elaborated this theme in a journal article 
when he complained about foreigners “imposing double standards on other countries 
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when assessing their election processes and the state of civil rights and freedoms.”167  
Putin’s ideology was hardening into something like Surkov’s vision, complete with a 
traditionally Russian buffer zone of neutral countries in the Near Abroad.168  Later that 
year, Putin famously described the collapse of the USSR as the “major geopolitical 
disaster of the century.”169  Linked to this was the second threat, the gradual chewing off 
of pieces of a still-undefined Russia through separatist conflicts like Chechnya.  The 
Chechen war was in fact coming under control, and indeed Putin’s strong hand in 
subduing the Chechens had been popular politically.  Putin’s government had learned that 
war worked when it worked.  Putin himself had not made his view on South Ossetia 
public during the Adjara crisis in 2004.  After it was over, he called Saakashvili to tell 
him “…we did not intervene in Adjara, but you won’t have any gifts from us in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia.”170  By the fall, a more defensive, more hostile approach to the 
West and the near abroad had clearly emerged.  After the Beslan terrorist attack on a 
school in September 2004, Putin addressed the nation and said “Some would like to tear 
from us “a juicy piece of pie.  Others help them. They help, reasoning that Russia still 
remains one of the world’s major nuclear powers, and as such still represents a threat to 
them.”171  Voices among the military and private industry were also urging full support 
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for the separatists.172  And since it was trying to keep the separatist region alive and not 
yet use it as a spoiler for Georgia’s NATO aspirations, Russian goals and South Ossetian 
goals appeared to be in perfect alignment.  Survive. 
Operationally, this meant increased ties to the remaining regions in Georgia to 
prevent them from going the same way as Adjara.  Days after Abashidze’s flight, the 
Kremlin issued an order to construct additional military bases in South Ossetia, both in 
Tskhinvali and north towards the town of Java.  It initiated a training program for South 
Ossetians at its military academy in North Ossetia and increased the number of Russian 
trainers on the ground in the south.  Most critically, on May 25, Russia began 
accelerating the issuance of Russian passports to South Ossetians.  In early June, the 
Kremlin sent the separatists a large military shipment of heavy equipment, including 
tanks and self-propelled artillery.173   
These moves coincided with the Georgian government launching a major effort to 
achieve an Adjara-style coup in South Ossetia.174  This began with the construction in 
May of a road linking ethnically Georgian villages bypassing Tskhinvali and a major 
anti-smuggling campaign.  On May 31, Georgia helicoptered troops to three Georgian 
villages adjacent to South Ossetia and one inside it in an attempt to shut down the major 
smuggling market at Ergneti, on the region’s border.175  This eliminated trade worth up to 
$35 million and disrupted a key source of revenue for the separatist government.176  
Alarmed by the sudden action on their doorstep, Russian authorities issued a statement 
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threatening war.  Clashes between civilians, Georgian troops, Ossetian militias, and 
Russian peacekeepers broke out in June and escalated through July.  Georgia accused 
Russia directly of arming the South Ossetians, and seized two Russian military trucks 
containing an estimated 300 air-to-surface missiles on July 7.177  The Russians and 
Ossetians responded by capturing 50 Georgian peacekeepers in a raid the next day and 
filming them on their knees for Russian television.178  Neither the United States nor the 
European Union issued a strong protest against the Russian actions.  Quite the opposite: 
they came down against Georgia, and Saakashvili accumulated more of a reputation as a 
hothead.   U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell gave him a tongue-lashing over the 
incident when he made a trip to the United States in late July.179  Nor did the OSCE 
monitors in place condemn the reports of increased Russian aid.  The violence subsided 
at a meeting of the JCC in August with essentially a return to the status quo ante.180   
At the same time, Russia began to expand its control of the separatists’ security 
forces at the operational level.  Russia already had long-standing ties to the Ossetian 
political leadership – indeed, it had stage-managed Kokoity’s election.  But this control 
now deepened into the security sector.  The wave of security replacements came not 
when Russia was in the depths of the Chechen war, but after the summer crisis in South 
Ossetia when Saakashvili’s economic and political initiatives to regain the territories 
were underway.  South Ossetia’s vulnerability to Adjara-like coups, where a mini-Rose 
Revolution had toppled Abashidze, was also apparent.  Indeed, the personnel selected all 
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had extensive experience in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, most in the North 
Caucasus.  Many had served in Chechnya or Afghanistan or both.  Anatoly Barankevich, 
for example, was made secretary of the Security Council in 2006 after four years as the 
first deputy military commissioner in Chechnya and service in Afghanistan.  Anatoly 
Yaravoy, the former head of the FSB in Mordavia, was appointed chief of the South 
Ossetian KGB in January 2005.  He was replaced in March 2006 by a Russian FSB 
colonel who was himself replaced in November by Boris Atoyev, another Russian FSB 
officer and Afghanistan veteran.  Mikhail Mindzayev, an Ossetian and former official in 
Russia’s Ministry of the Interior in North Ossetia and commando leader of the KGB’s 
elite Alpha teams during the Beslan siege, was appointed the Minister of Interior in April 
2005.181  The head of the border guards was also replaced.  The most incongruous of 
Russia’s selections was the most telling.  In March 2008, South Ossetia appointed as 
defense minister Vasili Lunev, a Russian major general and military advisor in Syria.182  
He was by far the highest-ranking Russian security officer integrated into the South 
Ossetian hierarchy, was not ethnically Ossetian, and was with the regular army, not the 
FSB.  The personnel decisions made during this period expanded Russia’s control over 
the operational capabilities of South Ossetia, helping turn separatist forces into a military 
lever with less political liability than Russian forces.  There was little international notice 
taken about these appointments.  The only United States statement came on the political 
side, after Kokoity was reelected in November 2006 with an improbable 98 percent 
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support and a similar mandate for South Ossetian independence.  In response, the US said 
merely that the vote would “exacerbate tensions.”183  The EU said something similarly 
weak, suggesting that Kokoity’s election and the referendum would not contribute to 
resolving the conflict peacefully.184 
Russia’s ability to deepen its military ties to its proxies without significant 
external opposition was aided by the ethnic geography of South Ossetia.  The threat of 
ethnic violence served to legitimize the presence of foreign troops as peacekeepers, and 
the threat was magnified by the patchwork of communities in South Ossetia.  The 
intertwined geography of the ethnic layout increased the friction points and dyads of 
potential conflict.  According to the Soviet census of 1989, the population of South 
Ossetia was about 99,700, including 65,000 Ossetians and 26,000 Georgians.  As a result 
of the fighting, South Ossetia’s population fell to about 70,000 people, of which about 
20-30 percent was Georgian.185  However, the pattern of returnees in the years following 
reinforced Ossetian control of Tskhinvali, with a patchwork of ethnic Georgian villages 
ringing the perimeter.  By comparison, Georgian villages were scattered over several 
parts of South Ossetia.186  This was an opportunity for the South Ossetians and their 
Russian sponsors, because isolated ethnic Georgians were exposed and thus the threshold 
for initiating violence – to which Georgia would be pressed to respond but which would 
probably not bring condemnation from the international community – was relatively low.  
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They were not huddled across a semi-major border the way they were in Abkhazia.  It 
also meant that Georgian forces would always be forced to be on the offensive, to reach 
and defend outlying villages.  Georgia went to great lengths to alleviate this by 
attempting to build bypass roads to reach isolated communities.  These efforts in turn 
permitted more direct Russian involvement, since the role of Moscow’s proxies and 
military could be portrayed as essentially defensive.  Indeed, that is how the military 
standoff in 2004 and the later August War ultimately began. 
However, in 2004, Russia had still reason to be concerned about keeping its proxy 
states viable, as Saakashvili continued to push reintegration through several different 
channels.  Later in the year he launched a major diplomatic initiative aimed at the South 
Ossetian government with a detailed peace proposal he laid out to the UN.  It focused on 
the resettlement of refugees, demilitarization of the conflict zones, and then final status 
discussions, as well as an international security presence at the Roki Tunnel.187  This 
sequential offering was also the basis for his speech to the Council of Europe a few 
months later, which included guarantees for the Ossetian language, property claim 
settlements, and more detail on the proposed level of autonomy for South Ossetia.188  He 
also offered a conference in Batumi the next year, which the South Ossetians ignored.   
In late 2004, Georgia also began to call for reform of the peacekeeping 
mechanisms in the regions and in particular the function of the JCC.  Its complaints 
included Russia’s relationship to the Ossetian militias, the irreparably flawed nature of 
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the JCC, and the hundreds of “mercenary” Cossack volunteers operating in the combat 
zone.189  This effort was followed by others.  On October 11, 2005, the Georgian 
parliament passed a resolution condemning the operations of Russian peacekeepers and 
calling for them to be replaced if there had been no improvement by July 2006.  
Saakashvili’s government urged action on that request on October 27 at a meeting of the 
OSCE Permanent Council, where the Georgian prime minister offered a new framework 
for conflict mediation disputes.  The Americans welcomed the initiative, but it was 
rejected by Russia and the Ossetians.190  The US, however, explicitly warned Georgia not 
to push too hard for changes to the constitution of the peacekeeping forces, which it felt 
might be destabilizing.191  Tbilisi would revisit this issue diplomatically again on March 
1, 2008, when again the Russians rejected the proposal out of hand, as did the Ossetians.  
US and EU opinion still opposed taking more decisive diplomatic action with regards to 
the status of the Russian peacekeepers.192  
With the diplomatic process stalled and the JCC framework providing cover for 
Russian troops, Saakashvili turned to yet another approach: proxy warfare of his own.  
Georgia’s favored proxy leader was Dmitry Sanakoyev, a former militia commander 
whom Georgia was promoting as an alternative Ossetian leader.193  He administered the 
Georgian-held areas of South Ossetia from the town of Kurta using his own security 
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forces, administrators, and ministerial council.  Georgia turned over to him functional 
governance of its areas of South Ossetia through a parliamentary motion on May 8, 2007, 
and supported his nominal administration with infrastructure projects and economic 
aid.194  
Ultimately, Georgia’s proxy warfare was unsuccessful not because its ally could 
not develop the same material capabilities as Russia’s but because those capabilities had 
little relevance to its success.  If its proxy were able to exert sufficient military and 
political pressure on the South Ossetian separatists, and reduce their military capabilities, 
it would still be irrelevant, because military capability was not the primary function of the 
separatists.  Their primary function was to reduce the international cost of deploying 
Russia’s overwhelming military advantage, not to fight on their own.  The South 
Ossetians gave Moscow’s conventional forces an opportunity to be present in South 
Ossetia and sustain a low level of violence.  It was through those forces – and the threat 
of Russia bringing to bear its overall overwhelming conventional superiority – that 
Russia extended its influence and imposed its policy preferences.  Georgia’s forces had 
no such conventional superiority at the upper levels of escalation.  In addition, no matter 
how strong the Georgian proxies became, they were not included in the decade-long 
processes of the JCC.  The legacy weight of this institution and the near impossibility of 
revising it made including the new party unlikely.   
 
Intensification, 2006-2008  
 
194 International Crisis Group, Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly, Europe Report 
N°183, 7 (June 7, 2007), 5, 8 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/183_georgia_s_s-
outh_ossetia_co-nflict_make_haste_slowly.ashx (accessed July 20, 2015). 
 82 
Russia’s posture began to shift again in 2006.  It had been deeply shaken by the 
Velvet Revolution in Ukraine, even more than the Georgian revolution the year before, 
and increasingly it was focused on the need to prevent further NATO encroachment in 
the east.  In June, Lavrov gave a speech to the Duma saying that the global balance of 
power would undergo a “colossal” shift if Ukraine and Georgia joined NATO, the 
strongest opposition to the idea by a senior Russian official to date.  He told US officials 
privately the move would “destroy” bilateral relations.195  The Duma dutifully passed a 
resolution condemning the idea.196  At the next year’s Munich security conference Putin 
himself blasted NATO expansion to Georgia and Ukraine, threatening an arms race and 
condemning US global leadership.197  This shift was exacerbated by Russian concerns 
about Western policy in the Balkans.  During a press conference on January 31, 2006, 
Putin linked the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to that of Kosovo, where the West 
had intervened militarily to establish Kosovar autonomy.198  Two years later, the US and 
its allies went further and recognized Kosovar independence.  To Moscow, Kosovo was a 
symbol not just of Russian prestige in supporting Serbia’s claims to the territory, but also 
the West’s willingness to double-deal on the issue of national sovereignty.  In a 
subsequent interview with newspaper journalists, Putin further argued that the Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia cases were no different than Kosovo: i.e., that Kosovo was not a one-
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off, but a precedent for independence in the wake of collapsed empires.199  Later on, 
Lavrov would repeatedly use this exceptionalism to justify Russia’s approach to the 
world and use of force.  He pointed to a “pragmatism,” based on “the realities of life,” 
with which Russia would address each issue individually.200  One of these realities, of 
course, was that the principles applied to Western Europe would not be applied to 
countries that were more susceptible to pressure, like Georgia.   
This changing strategic outlook implied more political and military support for 
the separatists and a harder line on final status issues.  South Ossetia became even more 
intransigent about Georgian demands.  The South Ossetian authorities had stalled all 
negotiations with the Georgians; they wanted status negotiations first, followed by 
everything else after, once their separateness was guaranteed.  On April 26, 2006, the 
nominal South Ossetian parliament passed two resolutions, one asserting that genocide 
was perpetuated against its people from 1991-1992 and the other calling for recognition 
of the district’s legal status at that time.  Such recognition would codify South Ossetia’s 
separateness, while offering Tbilisi no mechanism to contest it once relations had 
(presumably) improved later on.  That position was a non-starter for Georgia.   
Russian and separatist military attacks increased at the beginning of 2007 as well.  
However, these actions usually met a muted reaction.  Despite being fairly brazen, they 
usually either escaped censure, or were met with milquetoast statements calling on both 
sides to deescalate.  On March 11, 2007, Russian helicopters attacked Georgian 
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government buildings in Abkhazia.201  In August, a Russian aircraft destroyed a radar 
station on the Georgian border.  When confronted with evidence of the attack, Russia 
claimed Tbilisi faked it.202  There was little enthusiasm from the West for examining the 
claims, even after international observers corroborated Georgia’s story.  The situation 
was made murkier by the ambiguous status of Russian peacekeeping forces which helped 
blur Russian transgressions.  The OSCE declined to send an investigatory team and the 
EU decided not to blame either party.  US spokesmen from the State Department and the 
White House made no comment.  
Russia increased the pressure on the regions in 2008 after two diplomatic blows: 
final US recognition of Kosovo’s independence, which came in early February, and the 
promise of NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine in April at Bucharest.  This was 
a goal that was important for President Bush.  He had been taken with the color 
revolutions in Tbilisi and Kiev and had incorporated independence for Georgia and 
Ukraine into his freedom agenda.  Georgia in particular had been supportive of the US-
led war in Iraq, committing a brigade to support coalition operations with few national 
caveats on combat.  Now several years on, Bush was strongly supportive of bringing the 
two countries into NATO.  The first step would be a Membership Action Plan, or MAP, 
which would set out the needed reforms by Tbilisi in order to accede to the alliance.  The 
MAP had been designed for formerly communist countries to help them join NATO, and 
offering MAP to Georgia and Ukraine would be a clear start to the accession process.  
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However, the Europeans, particularly the Germans, had balked at extending NATO’s 
Article V protections because of the separatist issue, as well as distrusting Saakashvili 
and his government.203  A compromise was eventually agreed upon: that MAP would not 
be offered, but NATO would instead issue a statement saying that Georgia and Ukraine 
would eventually be members.  In fact, this was the worst of all worlds.  Georgia would 
lack the formal MAP link with NATO and the protection it implied, while incentivizing 
Russia to halt the accession, presumably by exacerbating European fears about being 
dragged into a war.  Which it did. 
In response, Moscow made a series of political and military counter-moves with 
the regions, clearly intended to tweak the West – and indeed, exacerbate Germany and 
others’ fears about being dragged into a conflict.  Russia lifted the remnant of the 1996 
CIS-imposed sanctions on Abkhazia, enabling it to formally conduct the full range of 
normal contacts between states and deepen its economic ties.  The decision also permitted 
Russia to send weapons to the separatist government.204  On April 16, two weeks after 
the NATO meeting, Putin decreed that official contacts be created between Moscow and 
the breakaway provinces, which would mimic Moscow’s relationship with its own 
member republics.  This was met with protests by Western organizations including the 
NATO and the EU.205  The US called these actions “provocative,” urged Russia to 
facilitate meetings between the Abkhaz-Georgian meetings, and asked it to reaffirm 
support for Georgia’s territorial integrity.206 
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Russian military activity in the regions increased in 2008 as well, with less 
attention than its political gestures.  Operating in the gray zone Russia had established, 
these often passed unopposed.  On April 20, a Russian fighter aircraft shot down a 
Georgian drone over Abkhazia, an attack caught on the drone’s camera and later verified 
by UNOMIG.  Five more drones were shot down in May, and the Russian military 
announced it would prevent further Georgian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from 
patrolling the conflict areas.207  After an investigation, the UN decided that Russia had 
indeed shot down the drone.  No protest was made by the United States, OSCE, or 
UNOMIG.  The disconnect between the lack of Western interest in Russia’s military 
support as opposed to its political support highlighted Russia’s strategic advantages in 
South Ossetia, and the gray area its proxies had helped carved out for its forces. 
As spring turned into summer, the Russian military further expanded its presence 
in the separatist areas.  These moves were shrouded by the legality of Russia’s presence 
itself, via the peacekeeping arrangement, which sufficiently blurred the distinction of 
which forces were where to avoid – or at least quiet – any clear, agreed-upon violations 
of Georgian sovereignty.  In May, Russia’s leadership admitted that the number of its 
troops in Abkhazia had increased from 1,997 to 2,542.  These included paratroopers, 
heavy equipment, and 400 railroad troops to improve the region’s transport 
capabilities.208  Some of these troops were later caught carrying proscribed anti-tank 
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weapons and air-delivered missiles.209  Russia claimed they were mostly part of a normal 
rotation, again citing the need to replace troops at its Gudauta base.210  The US State 
Department said it was “dismayed” at the “Russian military buildup.”211  In July, 
however, even after provocative Russian military overflights of South Ossetia and near-
daily combat incidents on the border, Secretary of State Rice remained seemingly 
equivocal during a visit to Georgia.  She said that “some” of Russia’s actions had 
increased tension in the region, and her department added that such actions “raised 
questions about Russia’s role as peacekeeper and facilitator of the negotiations.”212  But 
after consultation with Germany, Rice urged Saakashvili to make a public pledge to 
abjure the use of force, a key Russian demand.  He refused, pointing at the increased 
military provocations.  In response, she told him bluntly that “no one” would help him in 
the event of a conflict.213   
There was a strategic gap evident between the military reality on the ground, 
which was growing worse, and Saakashvili’s international support, which declined as it 
did so.  Moscow exploited this gap.  In July, Russian troops from the North Caucasus 
Military District (NCMD) conducted major military exercises on Georgia’s border in a 
simulated effort to protect Russian peacekeepers and citizens in an unnamed ex-Soviet 
republic.  Many of these forces remained in the Caucasus when the exercise 
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concluded.214  On July 20, an infantry battalion moved into the southern Kodori Gorge 
and South Ossetia’s joint Russian and Ossetian peacekeeping battalions were also quietly 
augmented from 530 to 850 troops each.215  By August 6, approximately 11,693 
additional Russian soldiers and nearly 900 armored vehicles were stationed on the 
Russian side of the Roki tunnel, together with another 15,000 combat forces that 
ultimately intervened in Abkhazia.216  The US made no statement on any of these 
movements. 
 The military pressure also came from South Ossetian militia forces.  Tactically, 
they could easily focus their fire on the highly exposed roads between ethnically 
Georgian villages in South Ossetia without conducting larger, less deniable operations.  
On July 3, three Georgian policemen were injured when a remote controlled mine 
exploded near a convoy transporting the alternate president Sanakoyev on a bypass road 
around Tskhinvali.217  The next day, Georgian and Ossetian forces exchanged fire 
between villages, killing one militiaman and a civilian.218  Tit-for-tat shelling and 
detainments continued throughout the end of the month, with the South Ossetians 
allegedly using proscribed artillery (larger than 82 cm) for the first time.219  On August 1, 
five Georgian policemen were again wounded on the bypass road around Tskhinvali 
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when their truck was hit with blasts from two improvised explosive devices.220  Heavy 
mortar and sniper fire were exchanged between Georgian and Ossetian areas through the 
night of August 1, and continued the next two nights as well.221  The OSCE put out a 
statement calling it the worst outbreak of violence since 2004, but declined to blame any 
party in particular.222  Washington was likewise equivocal, calling on August 5 for direct 
talks between the parties and a cessation of violence.  However, a spokesman specifically 
declined to suggest Russia was provoking the violence, even when pressed.223 
 
Fruition: War, August 7-August 12 
 The August War itself was in essence the logical extension of Russia’s proxy 
strategy.  Its increasingly aggressive proxy war escalated into an actual war while both 
delaying Western reaction and successfully making Saakashvili take much of the blame.  
The outcome was a product of two critical questions.  First, could Georgia seize 
Tskhinvali and choke off the Roki Tunnel (barring that, the Gupta Bridge, a choke point 
farther to the south) before additional Russian conventional forces could be brought into 
the battle?  And second, would the international community successfully pressure Russia 
to avoid committing those forces whether or not the former occurred?   
The first question was an operational issue.  Speed was of the essence: to be 
successful, Georgian troops had to achieve a fait accompli before Russia’s larger army 
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could mobilize.  Against Russia’s 27,000-40,000 men just across the border, the Georgian 
military had five brigades total.  One (the 5th) was a training unit, and the top-line 1st 
Brigade was in Iraq, though some of its remaining artillery and mechanized elements saw 
combat.  The primary fighting forces for the August War were the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th 
Infantry Brigades, as well as the 1st Artillery Brigade.  The 2nd had recently returned from 
Iraq and was at its Senaki base near Abkhazia.  The 3rd and 4th Brigades were training for 
Iraq at Kutaisi, in west-central Georgia.224  In total, Georgia could field about 10,000-
11,000 active-duty troops for the conflict, against a few thousand South Ossetian 
militiamen and less than a thousand Russian peacekeepers.225  Militarily, it was possible.  
But the second question cut to the quick of Russia’s proxy strategy in South 
Ossetia.  Given enough time, Russia’s conventional forces would eventually be able to 
move south.  They could only be stopped by Western military action – or more likely, a 
credible Western deterrent – that had to be led by the US.  In Washington, there was far 
from unanimous agreement on the real-world implications – the military implications – of 
what Rice had negotiated at Bucharest.   
In retrospect, NATO’s expansion to the east, the very borders of the Soviet Union, 
were seen by some in the Bush Administration to have been unduly provocative.  Robert 
Gates, the US Secretary of Defense, thought that the United States had vastly 
underestimated the humiliation Russians felt in the collapse of their world position.  An 
entire legion of earnest American social scientists, diplomats, and businessmen had gone 
to Moscow to show the Russians how to build a modern state, and had trampled all over a 
nation’s dignity.  The rapid expansion of NATO after the addition of Poland, the Czech 
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Republic, and Hungary exacerbated this problem.  The Bush Administration had been a 
strong supporter of NATO expansion in 2004, when seven new members entered the 
Alliance, including three from the former Soviet Union, and concluded a basically 
political troop-facilitation agreement with Romania and Bulgaria.226    
The Bucharest statement on Ukraine and Georgia was emblematic of that 
humiliation, and reflected political motives, not military logic.  Worse, these were 
political motives that had not taken Russian interests and reaction sufficiently into 
account.  To remain viable the Alliance had to remain credible, and above all that meant 
preserving a credible military deterrent.  Gates was deeply skeptical of both the European 
and the American publics’ willingness to defend Georgia and Ukraine.227  The question 
of the two for the US should be whether their accession met a military need and increased 
the Alliance’s military power or whether it served a political need?  Gates felt it was the 
latter.228  Now the Russians had baited a trap and Saakashvili had taken the bait.  
The White House’s public comments illustrated this lag.  At the outset, the 
majority of US pressure was on the Georgians rather than the Russians.  Georgia’s move 
was met with disproportionately more condemnation than the escalation before and in 
early August 7.  It had the effect of essentially invalidating its US support, just as Rice 
promised in July.  US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs 
Daniel Fried spoke with Tbilisi several times in the hours before the conflict and warned 
the government not to escalate.229  Bush’s initial statement on August 7 was restrained: 
he urged respect for Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, but did not 
 
226 Gates, 157. 
227 Gates, 157. 
228 Gates, 157-158. 
229 Blank, 118. 
 92 
specifically ascribe blame despite the months of rising violence.230  The private message 
from his cabinet members to the Georgians was not one of support, but that Georgian 
actions had been “stupid” and “provocative.”231   
Almost certainly, the conventional Georgian military moved into South Ossetia 
before the Russian military.  But the proxy conflict between Georgia and the South 
Ossetian militia had already grown intense, placing Georgia in a no-win situation.  By 
August 7, Georgian forces and ethnically Georgian villages in South Ossetia were 
coming under fire nearly every night.  They had no way of suppressing the immediate 
shelling without alienating its outside supporters, primarily the US.  However self-
servingly, Saakashvili testified later that the widespread shelling of civilians crossed a red 
line for Georgia.232  Amidst the backdrop of escalating fighting on August 7, Georgia’s 
State Minister for Reintegration Timur Iakobashvili spent the afternoon in Tskhinvali 
trying to unsuccessfully to arrange a truce.  Saakashvili announced a unilateral ceasefire 
at 7 PM, but after a pause separatist forces resumed firing around 8:30 PM.233  Three 
hours later, Tbilisi had had enough.  Saakashvili called the Chief of the Joint Staff Zaza 
Gogava at 11:35 PM and gave him three missions: suppress separatist fire against 
Georgian security forces and villagers in South Ossetia, protect the civilian population, 
and lastly stop all types of military forces coming into Georgia from Russia.234   
For twenty-four hours, it seemed possible.  During the night of August 7 and early 
hours of August 8, Georgian forces moved into the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali 
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and the surrounding heights.  The 4th Brigade surrounded the capital from the west, 
capturing territory including the town of Khetagurovo that had been the source of much 
of the shellfire.  It was also tasked with holding the Dyzara road leading out of 
Tskhinvali, to prevent more Russian forces from entering the city.235  The 3rd Brigade 
surrounded Tskhinvali from the east.  A third force pushed through the middle of the city, 
occupied parts of it, and then secured the ethnically Georgian villages to the north.  This 
third group was a loose amalgamation of special police units, interior ministry forces, and 
a few supplementary military elements.236  
The entry into Tskhinvali proper was strange, since it did not advance any of 
Georgia’s three war aims.  According to Gogava, it was done for two reasons.  First, the 
Georgian Interior Ministry posts surrounding the area were coming under fire from 
within the city.  Second, the ethnic Georgian villages to the north of the capital needed to 
be evacuated, which necessitated the use of the main road through Tskhinvali.237  
Alexandre Lomaia, the secretary of the National Security Council, later agreed that the 
move into Tskinvali not due to the city’s status as a military objective per se, but only to 
suppress the firing and move northward, closer to the village of Java and then the Roki 
tunnel.238 
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Source: Joint Peacekeeping Force Map, International Crisis Group (2007) 
 
An added complication was that fighting in Tskhinvali’s populated urban center 
opened the issue of human rights violations.  The strategic problem was that violations of 
humanitarian norms by Georgian conventional forces reflected immediately on Tbilisi, 
but South Ossetian violations – deniability, again – did not have the same effect on 
Russia.  The Georgian military claimed it used no aircraft in strikes in or around 
Tskhinvali, but rather only on the Gupta Bridge which connected northern and southern 
South Ossetia, in an attempt to keep Russian forces from coming south.  Similarly, 
Gogava said that only ground weapons and tanks were used in combat around Tskhinvali, 
and targeted the headquarters of the separatist militia forces.239  Regardless, Russia 
justified its intervention in the rhetoric of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo: it claimed 
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massive humanitarian violations of the South Ossetian population, as a result of 
indiscriminate Georgian shelling and airstrikes of civilian areas.  Some of these claims 
were indeed later verified by groups like Human Rights Watch.240   
Operationally, Georgian forces did well during the night and morning of August 
7-8.  They managed to bring up artillery sufficiently far north of the city that they could 
attempt to destroy the Roki Tunnel, the key Russian military conduit from North 
Ossetia.241  They had also significantly damaged with artillery fire a line of non-
peacekeeping Russian forces advancing from the tunnel just after midnight on August 
8.242  On August 9, they would successfully attack a group from the 58th Army 
approaching the capital from the northwest.  This engagement destroyed several vehicles 
and wounded the 58th Army commander, General Anatoly Khrulyov, who was travelling 
with the column.243 
However, two problems stood out.  First, there were more Ossetian and Russian 
troops in Tskhinvali than the Georgians had expected, with reinforcements arriving from 
the northwest during the day of August 8.  This slowed their progress north.  Elements of 
the 4th Brigade had to be added to the Georgian forces trying to clear the town.244  
Secondly, they had not advanced far enough to seize the Gupta Bridge, the second main 
bottleneck after Roki that was critical to contain the expected Russian reinforcements.  
They had damaged it with airstrikes and artillery fire, but that was easily fixed.245 
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These problems would start to become magnified as night fell and Georgian 
forces encountered more of Russia’s conventional military.  Georgia’s mixed task force 
in the center gave up control of much of Tskhinvali and the northern areas and had to be 
reinforced by elements of the 4th Brigade to the west, which was itself reinforced by 
troops from the 2nd Brigade near the Abkhazia border.246  However, Georgia’s relatively 
few number of combat troops meant that this front was now undefended.  Georgian 
forces made an effort to recapture the areas of Tskhinvali they had just abandoned, but 
were unsuccessful due to the increased fighting on the ground.247   
Two elements contributed to Russia turning the tide on August 8-9.  First, Russian 
attack aircraft were taking a toll on Georgian forces.  Georgian forces around Tskhinvali 
were hit by a major airstrike from two regiments of the Russian Air Force, and on August 
9 Russian aircraft hit the major Georgian base at Senaki and Tbilisi itself.  Second, 
Georgian efforts to destroy the key bottleneck of the Gupta Bridge had failed, and 
Russian forces were expanding their southward offensive on the ground.  On August 10, 
suffering heavily from air strikes, Georgian troops pulled out of Tskhinvali.248  
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Source: International Crisis Group (2007) 
 
With so many Georgian forces pulled to the east, Russia began to simultaneously 
increase the pressure on the Abkhazia front.  During the night of August 9-10, Abkhaz 
elements began to make scouting incursions across the Inguri River into Georgian 
territory.249  The remaining Georgian forces offered no resistance, but retreated east 
towards Gori.  Late on August 10, Russian forces in Abkhazia crossed the river and 
began to occupy Georgian territory, including Georgia’s main port of Poti and the major 
Georgian military base at Senaki, from which the 2nd Infantry Brigade had just left to 
reinforce the fighting around Tskhinvali.250  
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It is noteworthy that even as late as August 10th, with Russian troops pouring into 
Georgia, the United States was treading carefully about blaming Moscow, to say nothing 
of countering it.  In a press briefing at the Olympics in Beijing, Deputy National Security 
Advisor Jim Jeffrey refused to blame Russia for the fighting, saying instead that the US 
focus was on getting both sides disengaged and working with international institutions to 
establish peace.  The Bush Administration’s spokeswoman Dana Perino likewise refused 
to call out Moscow, saying merely that they were asking “all parties commit to a cease-
fire – the Russians and the Georgians and the South Ossetians, as well.”251 
In an attempt to stop the war, Tbilisi announced a unilateral ceasefire on August 
10, a gesture that was not reciprocated by any other party.  Georgian troops had pulled 
out of South Ossetia completely by the night of August 10-11 and then from Gori on 
August 11.  The remaining Interior Ministry forces in the Kodori Gorge departed a day 
later.  Georgian formations fell back to the town of Mtskheta, about 15 miles west of 
Tbilisi, where they prepared to make a last stand in the mountainous terrain.252  It was 
only then, four vital days after the conflict started, before the US pointed the finger at 
Russia.  Finally, President Bush released a statement on August 11 saying Moscow’s 
actions had “substantially damaged Russia’s standing in the world” and would 
“jeopardize Russia’s relations with the United States and Europe.”  Russia had “invaded a 
sovereign neighbor state,” he said, and “threatens a democratic government elected by its 
people.  Such an action is unacceptable in the 21st century.”  Bush reiterated two days 
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later that the United States would “insist that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Georgia be respected,” though by that time it was far too late for action to balance the 
situation.253  
This lower-profile US policy was matched by allowing French President Nicholas 
Sarkozy to take the lead in negotiating the ceasefire.  Sarkozy had flown home early from 
the Beijing Olympics, as had Putin.  Bush would stay for the remainder of the war.  
Ostensibly this deference to France was intended to prevent the war from turning into a 
Russian-US standoff.  This would both reduce the risk of escalation and provide Russia 
the ability to compromise without appearing to back down to the US.  But it was also 
helpful for Moscow, since Sarkozy also believed that Georgia bore much of the onus for 
starting the war and was not willing to commit French prestige in facing down the 
Russians.254  The ceasefire document he drafted bore this out.  It was ambiguous on key 
issues, to the detriment of Georgian interests.  The document contained six points: point 
five mandated that Russian forces withdraw to their positions at the beginning of the war 
– that is, August 7 – but then added “prior to the establishment of international 
mechanisms the Russian peacekeeping forces will take additional security measures.”  
This vagueness and tacit permission for Russia to codify a wider sphere of control 
potentially threatened Georgia’s existence.  At its core, the agreement conceded the right 
of Russian forces to be outside of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  Georgia was – is – also a 
narrow country connected by one main east-west road between the port, Poti, and the 
capital of Tbilisi.  The borders of South Ossetia lay very close to this road at the town of 
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Gori.  Permitting Russian troops to venture even slightly beyond the Ossetian borders 
allowed them to bifurcate and strangle the country at will.  Another issue with the 
document was point six, which conceded the need for a discussion on “the future of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia [on] ways to ensure their international stability.”  Which was 
just what the Georgians were trying to avoid, reopening the debate on the territorial 
integrity of Georgia, a concept that was (to their chagrin) not mentioned in the 
document.255 
With its troops only hours away from the capital, Russia announced it had 
accepted the truce brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and halted its troops on 
August 12.256  It would take another two months for them to return to the borders of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, where they proceeded to expand their basing and presence.  
They would never return to the lines of August 7.  Russia formally recognized both South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states on August 26, a move that was condemned 
by both the EU (in its strongest language to date on the crisis) and the US.257  On August 
31, Russian President Medvedev delivered a major speech at Sochi, formally laying out 
the five principles of this new Russian foreign policy.  He promised that Russia would 
protect its citizens, wherever they may be; and formally declared great power prerogative 
– “privileged interests” – in certain regions, particularly the near abroad.  “It is the border 
region,” he said.  “But not only.”258 
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III.  Conclusion and Analysis 
On its face, the August War was a victory for Russian policy despite the close 
links between Moscow and its proxies.  Georgia was crushed on the battlefield: its forces 
suffered an estimated 1400 casualties, compared to a quarter as many Russians and South 
Ossetians.259  After the ceasefire, Russia increased its military footprint in the regions and 
thus the standing threat it could pose to Georgia’s government.  Russian defense minister 
Anatoly Serdyukov announced that the number of Russian forces in both breakaway 
provinces would be quadrupled and added pointedly that they would not be 
peacekeepers.260  There was also an exodus of ethnic Georgians from the region after the 
conflict: most of the villages they left were subsequently occupied by Ossetians.261  
Russia had maintained total control over the South Ossetian government during the 
conflict, which was not strenuous since it had appointed much of that government.  At no 
point were its own goals distinguishable from Russia’s: they amounted to more Russian 
support, more Russian troops, and independence.  When Medvedev recognized the 
regions on August 26, the Ossetians’ aims were achieved.  
Particularly in the short term, Russia also achieved most of its strategic objectives 
in Georgia, halting Saakashvili’s effort to build a more independent foreign policy and 
Georgia’s creeping integration with the West.  Tbilisi’s political support was shattered, 
particularly among Western Europeans, and without the Europeans there would be no 
NATO or EU membership.  Sarkozy believed (reasonably enough) that Saakashvili had 
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started the war; he would later call the conflict a Georgian “mistake” and an 
“inappropriate action,” which provoked a “disproportionate” reaction.262  Even if the 
Russian response was disproportionate, Georgia still deserved blame.  Most of the major 
European states agreed.  Chancellor Angela Merkel disliked Georgian President Mikhail 
Saakashvili personally, which could not have contributed to Berlin’s desire to get into a 
major confrontation with Russia on his behalf.263  The German deputy foreign minister, 
Gernot Erler, called Tbilisi’s actions a “violation of international law,” and said he 
understood the Russian reaction.264  Several other European states like Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Ireland were closer to Russia than Georgia, with Italian Prime Minister 
Silvio Berlusconi vocally opposing an anti-Russian position during the war.265  The EU 
placed minimal sanctions on Russia and dumped them as soon as it was able.266  His 
prestige damaged by the war, Saakashvili would eventually be replaced by a president 
who aimed at restoring ties with Russia and lowering the tension level.  
The key question in this case was how Russia achieved these results in light of its 
direct and massive use of conventional force against a neighbor and its creeping 
escalation over the previous six months, if not two years.  How, in other words, did 
Georgia get blamed for the war?  Certainly, the American support for Saakashvili turned 
out to be was less than might have appeared to him in April 2008.  Internally, the US 
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government had very mixed feelings about its military commitment to Georgia and 
NATO’s expansion to the east.  President Bush was strongly in support of Georgian 
accession, but Rice and particularly Gates were leery.  Gates’s view that the move was a 
political one – that NATO had failed to take account of Russian interests and that Russia 
had reacted accordingly – did not bode well for Georgia’s hope of rapid support during 
the conflict.  And like their counterparts, senior US officials themselves viewed 
Saakashvili as a hothead, impulsive and proud.  Only two months after Bucharest, and 
four since the Russian campaign really escalated after the Kosovo independence 
declaration, Rice was laying out with German leaders a roadmap to deescalate the 
situation.  This roadmap bore much more in common with Tbilisi’s preferred approach 
than South Ossetia, but its evenhandedness – combined with the milquetoast statements 
the State Department was issuing in response to military action and particularly the very 
blunt message Rice gave Saakashvili in July – suggested that a key strategic component 
was missing.  Pressure on Russia.  Or at least accountability for its intensifying proxy 
war.   
This issue of the West’s response to escalation was lent added significance by the 
difference in reaction of the West between Moscow’s political actions in the regions and 
its military actions.  It usually responded effectively towards Moscow’s political moves, 
which had no deniability, and let the military actions pass without comment.  This 
incongruity is at the core of the answer to the August War – and really, Russia’s proxy 
strategy over more than two years.  Russia was able to escalate the military pressure on 
Georgia without bearing the onus of aggression, which was precisely what a proxy 
strategy should achieve.  Partially this was through obfuscating the intelligence and 
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information of potential balancers.  US officials agreed that reporting on combat 
incidents on the ground was muddied in the first hours and days, and indeed the shelling 
on the night of August 7 was both significant and came from both sides.267  This tactical 
uncertainty was a pattern of the conflict since combat incidents in the regions had 
increased, certainly since February 2008.  The war was a short war: it was only about five 
days, and the mixed reporting at the beginning of the conflict helped degrade an 
international response by spreading the blame from the start of the war.  There was little 
time as combat was progressing to get a more detailed picture of who had struck when in 
a way that might allow for the US and other Western states to shift their strategic 
assumptions and rally effective counterpressure in real time.  This tactical uncertainty had 
been a hallmark of Russian operations not just in the leadup to the war but for years as 
the frozen conflict had become hotter. 
Unfortunately for the Georgians, this tactical uncertainty was resolved by the 
presence of Georgian conventional forces in South Ossetia.  A picture existed, however 
fraudulent, that the Georgians had launched a major military offensive into Tskhinvali 
and ipso facto bore responsibility for the conflict.  Whatever the blurriness about shelling 
and Russian aircraft and the JCC troops and so forth, indisputably there were Georgian 
state forces in Tskhinvali and South Ossetia where the fighting was taking place.  
Functionally, this had the effect of abrogating much of Georgia’s external support by 
assigning blame for the conflict to Tbilisi.  And fair enough – Tbilisi had indeed launched 
the operation to retake the province.  But in light of the escalating tactical situation, not to 
say the clear Russian political provocation early in the year, and Russian statements about 
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linking South Ossetia to Kosovo, the gradual escalation of 2008 should have been seen 
very differently, particularly given Bush’s own expressed desires at Bucharest to bring 
Georgia into NATO.  The gaping chasm between Russian political actions in 2006, 
military actions in 2007, the Bucharest statement, and then military and political 
escalation in the first half of 2008 pointed to a disconnect.   
This was the second area where plausible deniability helped the Russians: 
escalation management.  As it escalated the pressure, Georgia paid more and more of a 
political price and the Russians did not.  As long as combat incidents were not clear-cut, 
or at least not obviously so, Georgian responses with state forces to proxy action would 
incur a disproportionate price from its alleged friends.  The disconnect between the 
growing violence in early- to mid-2008 and the corresponding decline of Saakashvili’s 
international support was the core of the outcome of this conflict. Moscow’s entire proxy 
strategy focused on blurring the clear lines of peace and war, raising the threshold of 
conventional military aggression.  That meant the pressure on Tbilisi could be gradually 
ratcheted up through proxies without crossing a clear line labeled WAR, which as an act 
of unprovoked aggression could bring about negative international consequences.  
Russia’s communications strategy before and after the conflict focused heavily on 
Georgia’s violation of that line.  In an op-ed on August 26, Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev blamed Georgian atrocities and aggression for the war and cited the legal 
example of the Western recognition of Kosovo.268  Since the beginning of the war, Russia 
had been arguing that in fact it was Georgia that was the aggressor, that Saakashvili had 
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recklessly provoked a conflict by offensive military action and thus somewhat deserved 
what he got.  Sarkozy and others somewhat agreed.  
This case is something of an outlier, since Russia’s conventional presence in 
South Ossetia made its claim to deniability preposterous.  Its forces very directly 
supported the Ossetians: in fact, conventional interventions were the hallmark of this 
Russian-proxy relationship.  But Russia’s deniability was aided by several factors.  First, 
the major transfers of materiel to its proxies came during its more defensive periods, from 
1991-1992 and then from mid-2004 to early 2006, when the regions were under threat.  
The defensive nature of these periods also helped reduce criticism of increases in Russian 
support, which seemed reactive – to the policies of Gamsakhurdia, to Shevardnadze, to 
Saakashvili.  These helped justify Russian actions.  When Russia wanted to project power 
offensively, it increased conventional operations and its force presence in the regions, 
like during 2000-2003 and 2006-2008.  There was more pushback against these actions.  
In 2006 and again in 2008, the West began – occasionally – to condemn Russia’s actions.   
But it was a testament to how much Russia had raised the threshold of conflict 
that these protests were very few.  Indeed, what sparked the American responses initially 
were Russian steps towards changing the regions’ political status, which had basically 
zero plausible deniability, not just Russian actions on the ground.  There was a striking 
difference between the two.  The most immediate US responses came in November 2006, 
when South Ossetia voted for independence, and again in April 2008 when Putin created 
official contacts with the regions.  This highlights that the US was willing to push back 
against Putin’s use of his proxy on offense.  However, it also highlights much Russia had 
succeeded in blurring Georgian sovereignty enough to project power and pressure 
 107 
Georgia militarily while avoiding the consequences.  It had, in other words, achieved 
significant military deniability.  
Several additional factors improved this deniability.  First, the diplomatic 
mechanism was hopelessly broken.  The JCC was an invaluable tool for enabling 
Moscow to move additional troops and weapons into the region without suffering 
international censure and thus actually contributed to instability.  Identifying which 
troops were peacekeepers and which were not was a difficult business; that difficulty 
contributed to the international inability to identify specific violations of Georgia’s 
territorial sovereignty and initiate countermeasures.  This aided Russia when it introduced 
heavier weapons to its peacekeeping formations in June 2008 and on the night of August 
7, 2008, when reports emerged of troops moving through the Roki Tunnel.  The JCC’s 
codification of the separatists’ local superiority essentially eliminated the main cost of 
direct support to proxies.  By legitimizing the presence of Russian troops on Georgian 
soil, it allowed Russia’s conventional forces to operate in Georgia without incurring the 
costs of conventional aggression.  This mechanism also guaranteed the policy desires of 
the South Ossetians’ government would always be represented, regardless of its military 
power or how much its legitimacy eroded because of Russian stage managing.  The 
Georgians would always be outnumbered, and the weakest part (functionally) of the 
three.  
Second, the scattered nature of Georgian villages in South Ossetia increased the 
conflict dyads between Ossetian militia and Georgian troops and required Georgian 
conventional forces to conduct offensive operations to reach their villages.  The South 
Ossetian authorities faced the same dilemma, of course; they sought to support and 
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defend scattered villages of their own.  But on balance, this dynamic helped them for 
several reasons.  First, Georgia was nominally the landowning state.  It was thus more 
bound to provide some sort of protection to its citizens (particularly its ethnic 
compatriots) if it wanted to make the case for its own sovereignty, which it did.  Violence 
weakened its claim to governance and strengthened the competing claim: that of the 
Ossetians.  This was counterinsurgency one-oh-one.  Second, to provide that support, 
Georgian troops had to leave Georgia proper, enter South Ossetia, and proceed to 
outlying areas.  This made Georgian forces look like the aggressors, because they were 
moving forward.  Critically, though, Georgia needed to manage escalation.  It would 
prevail in a situation of no escalation: that is, where the South Ossetia question was 
purely political.  There, its rights were sacrosanct: South Ossetia was part of Georgia.  
End of discussion.  It could also prevail in a situation of limited escalation.  South Ossetia 
had a few thousand men under arms, but only a handful of these would be involved in 
combat incidents and in any case these were poorly equipped militia, no match for the 
Georgian armed forces.  But it couldn’t prevail in dynamic escalation, which is what the 
South Ossetians offered.  That is, the authorities in Tskhinvali would always seek to raise 
the level of conflict because it would end with bringing in the Russians, and then the 
Georgians would lose.  To avoid this, Georgia needed to illustrate to the international 
community – which might, might deter the Russians – that there was a very clear line 
between no conflict and conflict, and illustrate who was the aggressor.  The offensive 
operations necessary to support outlying Georgian villages clouded that issue.   
Third, Georgia’s post-Rose Revolution government was still relatively new.  The 
status quo was already in flux: because of his early and ongoing effort to change the 
 109 
status of the provinces, as well as often half-baked military operations, Saakashvili was 
viewed as a hothead by Germany and other crucial states.  That is, his identity was 
wrapped up in his effort to change the status quo.  This is more of a perception issue, and 
is thus more difficult to measure, but his behavior and policies clearly masked some of 
the change in Russia’s posture towards the regions, particularly in 2006 when it began to 
tolerate more risk.  Crucially, Russia’s adoption of an offensive posture and its increase 
in support to the regions was not wholly linked to Saakashvili.  He was the same B-minus 
neighbor he had been since 2004.  It was primarily linked to Kosovo and perceived 
Western double-dealing on sovereignty (and not totally exogenously Putin’s hardening 
ideology).  The newness of Saakashvili’s regime thus probably contributed to Russia’s 
deniability for its proxy support, since it could appear more defensive, and did indeed 
contribute to the collapse in Georgia’s Western European support as the war was fought.  
Stability is cumulative. 
Fourth, the Chechen war and Georgia’s neglect of its border region provided 
Moscow additional justification to both support friendly proxies on the other side of the 
Caucasus and to conduct conventional operations across Georgia’s borders.  Particularly 
as radical Islamic groups began to be more prominent in the Chechen resistance and their 
acts of terrorism became more gruesome, Russia’s case for cross-border operations 
became stronger.  This trend was given added weight by the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 in the United States, which fundamentally reordered the US 
perception of interests in the Caucasus, its focus on Islamic terrorism, and its tolerance of 
other countries – like Russia – entertaining high degrees of risk in killing terrorists 
themselves.  For several years, the US acquiesced (if not openly encouraged) in Russia’s 
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aggressive pursuit of Islamist terrorists in Chechnya, terrorists that looked not too 
dissimilar from al-Qaeda.  Indeed, this lowered tolerance for risk was one of the key 
reasons that led it into Iraq.  The additional international latitude provided by the US War 
on Terror aided the deniability of Russia’s cross border military operations into Georgia, 
and gave Moscow a greater cushion of international support with which to work.  
Ironically enough, it was Georgia’s heroic participation in the Iraq War, itself a product 
of this lowered risk tolerance for Islamic extremism, that brought the United States more 
fully into alignment with Georgian goals and more into collision with Russian ones. 
All of these elements contributed to weakening Georgian sovereignty and thus the 
penalties for Russian interstate aggression.  And yet even the strategic outcome was more 
mixed than appeared at first glance.  Ten days after the war ended, Poland signed a long-
stalled agreement to base US missile defenses on its territory.  Within a month, Georgia 
hosted visits by Vice President Dick Cheney, Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Chairman Joe Biden, and Secretary Rice.  Biden brought with him a $1 billion aid bill for 
Tbilisi that he was preparing to shepherd through Congress.  The aid package was passed 
by September, a remarkable achievement in an election year that reflected an emerging 
bipartisan consensus on Georgia.  The billion-plus aid package included $50 million for 
security assistance.  Cheney brought confirmation of the hardening US position on 
Russia, calling Moscow’s actions an “invasion” and an “illegitimate” attempt to change 
its borders that was “universally condemned by the free world.” “Georgia will be in our 
alliance,” he promised.269  The United States and Georgia signed a strategic framework 
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agreement on January 9, 2009, committing the US to support Tbilisi’s territorial integrity 
and security, to cooperate on defense, and to integrate Georgia into transatlantic alliances. 
It was fortuitous for Moscow that the growing balancing it faced was cut short by 
a US election: and not just any election, but a presidential election that reflected deep 
dissatisfaction with the Bush Administration’s foreign policy.  This domestic political 
element was a key but unique mitigating factor in the American response in this case.  
The US political mood was exacerbated by the ongoing global financial crisis, but 
heavily influenced by the perceived catastrophic failure of the war in Iraq.  Five months 
later, the new administration of Barack Obama came to power promising a “reset” in 
relations with Russia, which tacitly translated at the very least into halting Western 
institutions’ eastward expansion and at most according it a sphere of influence in the 
former Soviet space.  This policy was shaped by a number of factors, such as the Bush 
Administration’s perceived belligerence; disillusionment with Bush-era muscular 
democracy promotion; needless antagonizing of Russia through expanding NATO into 
ex-Soviet space; and a different focus on institutions and multilateral priorities like arms 
control.   
But even when rolling out the signature policies of the new administration there 
was recognition of the new threat.  In a speech to the Munich Security Conference in 
February 2009 where he called for a “reset” in relations with Russia, Vice President 
Biden firmly rejected Medvedev’s claims to a sphere of influence in the near abroad and 
the independence of the regions.270  The first meeting of Bush’s strategic partnership 
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group came five months later under the nominally disinterested Obama 
Administration.271  The first disbursement of security aid followed.  The Obama 
Administration’s record on Russia remained ineffectual in many ways, but even so the 
institutional rails were being laid for a bilateral relationship that was qualitatively 
different from ten years earlier. 
And the war likely accelerated a balancing trend, long in remission, among its 
neighbors.  During the conflict, Saakashvili had consulted publicly with several other 
leaders of Eastern European nations including Estonia and Poland.  South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia also remained stubbornly unrecognized by all but a handful of states.  This 
conjoining trend was accelerated by Russia’s war in Ukraine six years later, and even 
extended to some of the Nordic countries.  Georgia was the first Russian extraterritorial 
operation since the end of the Cold War, and thus there was some natural lag in the 
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Russia’s Ukraine war in 2014 was the second shock to Europe’s interstate 
order since the end of the Cold War, but it was not quite such a surprise as the 
first.  Like in Georgia, Moscow used barely-disguised proxy forces and brute 
military strength to invade a state shifting its foreign policy orientation.  That 
force was thinly veiled in eastern Ukraine.  In Crimea, it was not veiled at all.   
From the beginning, there was a disparity of national interest in the 
conflict among the competing states.  Ukraine was not a traditionally Western 
interest.  For the entirety of its modern history, the lands along the Dnieper River 
had been a part of one Russian empire or another.  They were seized by Germany 
after its First World War victory over Russia in 1917, and quickly recaptured 
when Germany withdrew under the Treaty of Versailles.  Ukraine’s people were 
ruined by Stalin and starved into the Holodomor, a national tragedy that became 
the country’s modern founding myth.  Ukraine emerged from the Soviet period 
still aligned with Russia, an autocratic member of a CIS which had many such 
autocrats.  Its first whiff of true independence came in December 2004, during the 
Orange Revolution, when President Viktor Yanukovych tried to fix one too many 
elections and was deposed by two months of civil protests.  After the reformers 
fell out amongst themselves, Yanukovych was reelected in 2009 and held office 
until civil protests broke out in 2013. 
This chapter will examine Russia’s use of proxy forces in Ukraine from 
the beginning of demonstrations in Kiev’s Maidan Square on November 21, 2013 
to the dissipation of the conflict in 2016.  Though it covers all the high-intensity 
periods of the war, this chapter is focused on the fighting in Donbas and not 
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Russia’s takeover of Crimea.  It describes the background context to the conflict, 
Russia’s proxy doctrine, and Russia’s relationship with the separatists.  It then 
analyzes key moments when the relationship changed and how that impacted the 
separatists’ strategic effectiveness.  Unlike in Georgia, Russia never overtly 
deployed conventional forces, nor were such forces used at a consistent operating 
tempo throughout the eastern crisis.  Instead, they intervened operationally at 
critical points to avert defeat or seize key objectives, like at Ilovaisk in 2014 or 
Debaltseve in 2015.  These moments of changing tactics will be examined to 
identify changes in the balancing that Russia’s proxy war incited.  This chapter 
will also examine periods of slack in Western balancing such as in April 2014.  It 
will also describe additional factors that affected Russian effectiveness in 
projecting power.  These include the Minsk process, particularly the second 
Minsk agreement, and the ethnic heterogeneity around the line of control.  
Overall, Russia achieved significant deniability and strategic success in the first 
phase of the conflict but less of both in the second.   
 
I.  Origin 
The previous chapter examined the evolution of Russia’s ideological 
approach to the West, its near abroad, and the issue of ethnic separatism.  By 
2013, this basic ideological id had solidified into something that would be called 
Putinism.  Putin’s was a statist, great-power political system that relied heavily on 
active and former officials of the security services to dominate Kremlin politics 
and Russia’s economy.  Russia had successfully intervened in Georgia in 2008, 
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preventing that country from joining NATO in the foreseeable future.  To do so 
without decisive Western interference, it utilized the fuzzy question of 
Russianness and ethnic identity – what it meant to be a Russian – to blur the lines 
of Georgian sovereignty and transform its military aggression into something that 
was treated less than interstate war.  The ethnic issue also affected the solidity of 
Russia’s border with Ukraine.  Ukraine’s territory was also heterogeneous: it 
included a chunk of historically Polish lands to the west and Romanian and 
Czechoslovak territory from the southwest, all land-booty from World War II.  
But in 2014 nearly 20 percent of Ukrainian citizens were ethnic Russians, who 
constituted a majority in Crimea and significant pluralities in the east and 
southeast.  By the time of the conflict, they made up nearly 40 percent of the 
population in the Donestsk and Luhansk oblasts.272  And ideologically Ukraine 
was integral to the Russian nationalists’ views of their heritage; Russia drew its 
very name and statehood from the Kievan Rus, a Viking tribe that settled in 
Ukraine.   
Crimea was particularly critical.  “It is strange,” the journalist Vitaly 
Tretyakov noted, that “Russia includes Chechnya but not Crimea.”273  It had been 
the home of the Russian Black Sea fleet since 1783, and had only been given to 
the Soviet Republic of Ukraine in 1954 by administrative fiat.  After the fall of the 
Soviet Union, Russia had leased the base for twenty-five years.  This arrangement 
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survived an initial period of tension in the newly independent state and Russian-
Ukrainian relations improved under the country’s second post-Communist 
president Leonid Kuchma.  Kuchma’s reign, though autocratic and beset by 
corruption, was marked by engagement with both Russia and the West.  Ukraine 
allowed Soviet nuclear weapons to be removed from its soil in exchange for a 
1994 guarantee of its territorial integrity.  It became the first nation from the 
Commonwealth of Independent States to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
program in 1994, and Ukrainian soldiers served as peacekeepers in Bosnia 
Herzegovina in 1996.274  None of this prevented Russia and Ukraine from signing 
the Russia-Ukraine Friendship Treaty in 1997, putting to bed disputes over the 
Black Sea Fleet and ethnically Russian areas.275  
However, the hardening Russian security doctrine that marked Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin’s later years maintained that if Ukraine appeared likely to 
join NATO, Russia should take advantage of Ukraine’s ethnic heterogeneity and 
support separatism in Crimea and the east.276  Several key ideological and 
strategic advisors of Putin would provide the intellectual framework for 
intervention, including an article by Putin aide Vladislav Surkov.  In an 
apocryphal short story, Surkov described a new form of warfare – “non-linear 
war” – that would pull apart the trappings of the state and set local communities 
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against each other.277  This was remarkably similar to a Kremlin memo by 
Konstantin Malofeev, a Putin advisor and oligarch, which was leaked at the height 
of the crisis.  This memo argued that in the face of threats to Ukraine’s strategic 
orientation, Russia should use the “centrifugal aspirations of various regions of 
the country with the purpose, in one form or another, of initiating the annexation 
of its eastern regions to Russia.”278   Malofeev was eventually sanctioned by the 
EU for financing separatism in Ukraine.  
Malofeev’s memo was one intellectual piece of a strategy that would come 
to be known as hybrid war.  Hybrid war posited a full spectrum of operations and 
agents all working towards a similar political goal, with the intent of attacking an 
enemy’s conventional military power, psychological power, and leadership 
capabilities simultaneously.279  It would come to define Russia’s joint deployment 
of nonstate and conventional forces to subvert pieces or the whole of an enemy 
country, often while Russia denied involvement.  Among other unconventional 
elements it stressed information warfare, flooding the enemy airwaves with 
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disinformation to inhibit central authority and sway the population.  Information 
outlets would generate and spread narratives of ethnic or social grievance, both to 
rally the local population and muddy the moral and legal issues for outside 
powers.  Controlling key command and control nodes was also critical, to remove 
central authority and replace it with Russia’s own.  Substate military forces could 
perform this function if they were militarily capable.  In eastern Ukraine, they 
generally would be.  If not, as in Crimea, Russian military forces could perform 
this role.  Above all, the goal was to erode the adversary’s will to fight, to disrupt 
and replace their control capabilities in the contested area, to paralyze the 
enemy’s external support, to manage escalation on the ground, and to avoid 
consequences to the instigator. 
Of course, it helped enormously when structural factors – the local terrain, 
a heterogenous population, a weak state – were in place already.  This limited the 
transferability of the Russian doctrine of full-spectrum war elsewhere.  Hezbollah, 
which will be reviewed in the next case, had a long history of effective guerilla 
operations but did not fundamentally adopt Russian innovations in proxy war.  
Part of this was due to the fact that particular features like the human terrain and a 
changing regime were not present on the Israeli border the same way they were in 
Ukraine.  Ironically, for a conflict that often has revolved around the legitimacy of 
Israel, the Lebanon-Israeli border is from a military point of view entirely clear 
which limits the usefulness of techniques like the ones Russia used in Ukraine.  
There was a definite shift in Hezbollah operations, for example, when Israel 
withdrew from Lebanese territory.  Hezbollah attacks become more complex and 
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the group began to acquire more weapons like long-range missiles.  In point of 
fact the guerilla war Hezbollah waged against Israel from 2000 onwards (with the 
exception of the July War, which was obviously fought in Lebanon) bore very 
little resemblance to proxy war or hybrid war and much more resemblance to 
conventional military combat.  The Hezbollah television station al-Manar, for 
example, had rather limited appeal to the Jewish population that lives along the 
Israeli side of the border. 
Region-specific elements also helped spur the evolution of Russia’s proxy 
doctrine during the years between the Georgian war and the Ukrainian one.  In 
Georgia this style of war had been arrived at almost inductively.  After all, the 
proxy forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia had been separate for nearly two 
decades by the time of the conflict.  They had extensive Russian coordination and 
involvement, particularly in South Ossetia.  Russian conventional forces had been 
in both regions nearly as long as peacekeepers.  Russia had built-in levers when it 
wanted to tweak the West after Kosovo’s independence, and done of these 
elements had to be created from scratch.  In Ukraine they did.  This limited the 
initial combat effectiveness of the separatists, and increased the incentive – in the 
early days of Crimea – to use barely-disguised Russian military personnel rather 
than semi-organic separatist military units. 
This case is not focused on the elements of Russian proxy war as 
employed against Ukraine.  Rather it is interested in one facet of its battlefield 
effect: that of plausible deniability, which became more important for Russia 
between the Georgian case and the Ukrainian case.  Deniability was a key element 
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of the new kind of war for Russian military thinkers.280  Hybrid war, at its core, 
was a type of proxy war that traded military power for plausible deniability and 
embodied a close-control style of proxy relationship.  The focus on full-spectrum 
operations that prioritized the politically-focused elements of war – but definitely 
did include direct combat elements – achieved a certain level of plausible 
deniability for Russia.  In Ukraine it included less conventional involvement than 
in in the Georgian case, however, and indeed the relationships between proxy and 
state and state and force were more deniable.  The Georgian case succeeded 
despite a striking lack of deniability partially because of many of the special 
territorial elements described previously.  Six years later these were arguably 
fewer, and Russia’s use of force needed correspondingly to be less direct and 
more deniable to achieve its strategic results.  
This suggests another shift in Russian doctrine since the August War.  
Was Russian doctrine becoming more offensive?  The seminal White Paper 
issued by Russia’s defense ministry in 2003 had been notable for its stress on 
defending Russia from enemies on all sides, foreign and domestic.281  Until then, 
the rebellions of internal republics and civil unrest had been post-Soviet Russia’s 
greatest security concerns.  Islamic radicalism and two brutal wars in Chechnya 
were a harbinger of the threat that other secession-minded member republics like 
Tatarstan could pose to the Russian state.  These wars bore more than a whiff of 
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the Afghanistan debacle, which was widely credited as being an important factor 
in the Union’s collapse.  The last chapter described how Ukraine’s Orange 
revolution, which brought the openly pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko to power 
in 2004, was a turning point in Putin’s attitude towards the West.282  As Ukraine 
and Georgia tried to define themselves into the Western orbit and out of the 
Russian one through groups like the Community of Democratic Choice, Russian 
statements grew increasingly belligerent.  Over the next three years Russian 
policy became more assertive in the near abroad.  During the NATO summit in 
Bucharest in 2008, Putin apocryphally explained to President George W. Bush 
that Ukraine was an amalgamation of territories, not a real state.283  He also 
threatened Ukraine with Russia’s missile arsenal and with dismemberment if it 
tried to join NATO.284   
A decade after the White Paper, many saw Russia as looking abroad for 
fights.  In 2013, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov 
gave a speech that formalized the elements of hybrid war into what he called 
“new generation warfare:” the whole of capabilities approach, blurring the line 
between peace and war, the focus on information as a decisive battleground.  
Above all this focused on the importance, even decisiveness, of the facets of 
power short of direct combat, and the secondary importance of regular forces.  
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Gerasimov’s speech stressed the importance of deniability when military means 
had to be used.  This was aimed not at the rebellious regions of Russia but at the 
West, particularly the West that had celebrated the Color Revolutions in Georgia 
in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004.  The Arab Spring uprisings that began in 2009 were 
seen by many in Russia’s military apparatus as part of the same trend, the political 
result of subversive Western techniques of non-military power to overthrow 
governments.285  Gerasimov had specifically predicated his remarks in this 
strategic battlespace: 
“The experience of military conflicts — including those connected with the so-called 
coloured revolutions in north Africa and the Middle East — confirm that a perfectly 
thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of 
fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of 
chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war.”286 
 
Though this reflected what in Gerasimov’s view the West had done to 
unsuspecting, Russian-friendly regimes like Libya, it also seemed to urge Russia 
to be more forward-leaning even in times of not-war.287  “War in general,” said 
Gerasimov in his speech, quoting an earlier Soviet theoretician, “is not declared.  
It simply begins…”288 
After Ukrainian President Yanukovych regained the presidency from the 
Orange leaders in 2009, the danger of Ukraine drifting away appeared to have 
passed.  Yanukovych was corrupt and from the ethnically Russian east of 
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Ukraine, but he was not particularly ideological.  He sought to improve ties with 
both Russia and the EU, playing a delicate balancing act by taking just as much 
from the West as the Russians would allow.289  Then, in November 2013, he 
rejected an association agreement with the European Union.  He had been 
negotiating with the Europeans for over a year, and though his electoral base lay 
in the more euroskeptic east all indications were that he would sign it.  He did not. 
 As word of the rejection leaked out on November 21, 2013, over two 
thousand demonstrators gathered in the Maidan in central Kiev.  By November 
24, their numbers had grown to 200,000.  Police tried to control the crowds with 
tear gas and beatings, and some of the protestors retaliated.  On November 30, at 
4:00 AM, the security forces made a concerted effort to clear the square and 
failed.  The next day the demonstrators attempted to occupy Kiev’s city hall.  
Yanukovych hastily traveled to Sochi to meet with Putin on December 6.  Their 
discussion focused on a new “strategic partnership” framework, and some rapid 
economic measures to help Ukraine’s economy.  Yanukovych’s Prime Minister 
Mykola Azarov promised a “major agreement” coming out of Moscow in the 
future.290  On December 17, Yanukovych and Putin signed a new deal in 
Moscow, the Ukrainian-Russian joint action plan.  In place of the rejected 
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European association agreement, Putin offered economic goodies.  He agreed to 
buy $15 billion of Ukrainian bonds and cut gas prices for Ukraine by a third.291   
In late January, however, he stalled.  At a meeting in Brussels, Putin 
informed the Ukrainians that because of resistance from his cabinet Russia’s 
promised economic aid would not come.  Russia twisted the knife further by 
having its border guards increase their searches of Ukrainian goods, increasing 
transit time and lowering trade revenue.  Though the Russian government cited 
Ukraine’s failure to pay back its $2.7 billion gas debt, almost certainly its 
intention was to increase economic pressure on the regime in Kiev.292  Putin 
wanted Yanukovych to crack down hard on the protestors, and he had not.293  If 
Putin’s intention was to play hardball with the Ukrainians, it was a fatal 
miscalculation.  Yanukovych’s prime minister resigned on January 28 in an 
apparent attempt to disperse the demonstrations.  Two weeks later, Yanukovych 
issued a blanket amnesty and released all of the protestors who had been detained 
by the police.  The protestors ended their occupation of city hall, and the two 
sides met to negotiate an end to the standoff on February 16.   
Those talks blew apart two days later.  Shortly after Russia released $2 
billion of the $15 billion in aid it had been holding back as incentive for Ukraine 
to crack down, Yanukovych’s security forces issued an ultimatum for Maidan to 
be cleared by 6 PM.  When the protesters refused, riot police attempted – again 
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unsuccessfully – to clear them by force.  The crowd and police exchanged 
gunshots in an escalating firefight that killed 24 people, including seven police 
officers.294  There was a pause, as the government, shocked by the violence, 
looked like it might compromise.  Opposition members of the Ukrainian 
parliament, joined by some of Yanukovych’s own party, passed a resolution 
calling on Interior Ministry troops to stand down and normal police functions to 
resume.  But they did not.  Two days after the February 18 shootings, police 
opened fire on large bodies of demonstrators, some of whom were firing back, 
killing 88 people and wounding hundreds of others.295  As darkness fell on 
February 21, Yanukovych had had enough.  Despite joint mediation efforts by the 
US, Russians, and major European states to reach an agreement on forming a 
coalition government and holding early presidential elections, he fled Kiev in the 
night, first to his political base in eastern Ukraine and then on to Russia.296  On 
February 23, with the capital under control of the demonstrators and former 
President Yulia Tymoshenko released from prison, her ally Oleksandr Turchynov 
was appointed acting President of Ukraine until new elections could be held. 
 
III.  The Conflict 
Rebellion, March 2014 to mid-May 2014 
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Maidan – and the Orange Revolution before it – may have been feel-good 
stories for the West, but they were deeply unsettling to Russia.  Moscow had vital 
interests in Ukraine, the most pressing of which was retaining the leased naval 
base at Sevastopol in the Crimean Peninsula.  The renewal of the lease had been 
Russia’s top priority after Yanukovych regained the presidency in 2010.  Second, 
and almost as important, Moscow wanted to keep Ukraine from drifting into 
Western organizations, the EU as much as NATO.  This had been the context of 
the fight over the EU association agreement.  Post-Soviet Ukraine could be a key 
buffer state between Russia and the West, a role which had grown more critical 
since Putin’s second term and his increasingly zero-sum East-West ideology.  
Putin was also trying to launch a Russia-centric economic zone that would rival 
the European Union: a customs union with at least Belarus and – he had hoped – 
Ukraine.297  A gain for Western institutions was a blow to the sustainability of 
their rivals.  The success of the Maidan revolution would also set a bad example 
for Russia’s other allies that might be ruled by less-than-free governments, places 
like Belarus and Kazakhstan.   
To these ends, Moscow used proxy forces to blur Ukrainian sovereignty 
enough to allow it to pressure Kiev with military force without sparking decisive 
international pushback.  However, some separatists and Russian ideologues like 
Surkov and Malofeev held a broader aim: to create the state of Novorussiya.  
Novorussiya would be an area comprised of not just the Donbas and Crimea but 
Odessa, Kharkov, and other areas beyond Donbas where ethnic Russians were a 
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significant minority.  For them, this entity could be annexed by the Russian 
Federation and become a member republic.298  However, this goal would 
eventually diverge with – and then impede – Russia’s basic desire to maintain the 
pre-crisis status quo.  After the first set of uprisings failed to seize enough 
territory in the east to achieve such a state and the line of control solidified, every 
additional square foot of land would have to be taken by offensive conventional 
military operations and incite significant balancing.  That balancing would pull 
Ukraine into the same Western military camp the entire proxy war had sought to 
avoid. 
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/maps/UP-map.gif 
(accessed June 4, 2020). 
 
For indeed the Maidan movement which had taken control of liberal, 
Catholic, pro-Western Kiev had spread elsewhere.  There were Maidan 
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demonstrations outside the capital and in the east, in places like Kharkiv, the city 
to which Yanukovych allegedly fled.  But in Crimea a different dynamic took 
hold.  Three days after the new government in Kiev took power, pro-Russian 
demonstrators appeared in the Crimean capital city of Simferopol.  They called 
for assistance, and Moscow answered.  On February 28, the first of Russia’s “little 
green men” appeared.  Aided by local agents, these forces quickly took control of 
the Perekop Isthmus, the roughly four-mile stretch of land that connects Ukraine 
to Crimea.  They also occupied Crimea’s airports, naval facilities, and Ukrainian 
television and radio stations, effectively imposing a total blackout.  Among the 
seized institutions was Crimea’s Supreme Council, which promptly named the 
ethnic Russian Sergey Aksyonov Prime Minister of Crimea and called for a 
referendum on seceding from Ukraine and joining Russia.  A day later, the 
Russian parliament initiated legislation to expedite the admittance of Ukrainian 
territory to the Russian Federation, on the basis of Kiev’s alleged ill treatment of 
Russian minorities. 
There was little violence, despite the Ukrainian government’s 190 military 
facilities in Crimea and 20,000 troops.  Most soldiers remained in place or 
surrendered.  The only documented casualties occurred during the storming of a 
reconnaissance facility in Simferopol, when a Ukrainian soldier and a rebel 
fighter were killed.  Russia’s official media claimed that these unknown forces 
were local militia, self-defense groups acting to protect themselves.299  They were 
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instead mostly a rushed mishmash of Russian naval infantry, special operations 
forces, and other ad hoc groupings.  Though operating under the thinnest possible 
disguise, their fast and covert deployment precluded an effective response by 
Kiev after which the occupation became a fait accompli.300  On March 1, the new 
prime minister of Crimea officially called on Russia for assistance and protection, 
a request that the Kremlin said it would honor.  The head of Russia’s upper house 
of Parliament also floated the idea of sending troops to keep the peace.301  
Crimea’s referendum was duly held on March 16, with about 95 percent of voters 
electing to join Russia.  The Supreme Council announced Crimea’s independence 
the next day and signed accession documents with Russia on March 18.   
The West’s response to Russia’s Crimean actions came relatively rapidly, 
particularly given Ukraine’s history as a Russian satrapy, not a Western one.  But 
how not?  Russia’s moves were brazen violations of sovereignty.  They were land 
grabs with the blatant use of regular military forces.  Like in Georgia, the most 
decisive Western actions of this period closely tracked changes to Crimea’s 
formal sovereignty and Ukraine’s territorial boundaries.  On March 3, five days 
after the introduction of Russian troops into Crimea, the European Union’s 
Foreign Affairs Council voted to abandon preparations for the upcoming G8 
meeting in Russia and to consider potential sanctions.  The EU heads of state met 
three days later to prepare a list of people subject to asset freezes and visa bans, as 
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well as suspend other Russian initiatives like streamlined visa negotiations.302  
President Obama simultaneously issued his first Executive Order on the Ukraine 
crisis, preparing but not imposing sanctions.  On March 16-17, during Crimea’s 
referendum, he pulled the trigger.303  The White House said that Russia’s actions 
were “dangerous and destabilizing,” the strongest language and the greatest 
attribution to Moscow it had used so far in the conflict.304  The European Union 
then imposed sanctions on 21 people from Russia and Crimea.  After Putin 
formally accepted the region into Russia, both the US and EU lists were 
expanded.305  These lists were slightly different.  The EU sanctioned either local 
separatist leaders, like the so-called President of Crimea, or Russian officials who 
had publicly called for the seizure of Ukraine.306  The United States sanctioned 
only eleven people at first, but these were figures closer to the center of power 
such as oligarchs and Putin’s advisor Surkov.  Critically, the US list attributed 
blame for the conflict not to the separatists alone, but also to Moscow.307  After 
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the annexation was ratified by the Duma on March 20, President Obama 
dismissed it as “unconstitutional” and the referendum “illegal.”  Obama also 
issued another Executive Order authorizing the first sectoral sanctions of the 
crisis, heightening his response with strategic economic tools to support “the basic 
principles that govern relations between nations,” specifically “respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity – the notion that nations do not simply redraw 
borders.”  He conditioned further strategic measures on Russia not escalating the 
situation further, particularly in Ukraine’s east and south.308  The situation 
escalated anyway. 
 The main phase of the Ukraine conflict, from April to August of 2014, 
differed from the Crimean operation in several ways.  The key one involved the 
enhanced use of proxies.  Russia’s Crimean victory had barely involved local 
militias.  With slightly more time to plan, it could be subtler in eastern Ukraine.  
Russia’s deniability there was aided by ethnic proxies being the primary agent of 
control, not Russian troops.  It was closer to Gerasimov’s vision of hybrid war, 
with conventional forces coming only at the end, if they were needed at all.  
Beginning in early April, demonstrators in eastern Ukraine occupied government 
buildings in the main cities of Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkov and demanded, 
among other things, the right to secede and join Russia.309  From inside the 
regional government building in Donetsk, they declared a “people’s republic” on 
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April 7.310  Those demonstrations were followed on April 12 by armed militant 
attacks against police stations and other Ukrainian security installations.  Unlike 
Crimea, these attackers did not appear to be disguised Russian troops.311  They 
included unconventional units of paramilitaries that seized police and government 
buildings in places like Slaviansk, a town about 35 miles north of Donetsk.  
Militia forces quickly replaced the demonstrators who had taken control of 
government structures in about ten cities in the east and dug in. 
But something changed in what had been a fairly assertive Western 
response to the Crimean operation.  Rather than continue to escalate as Russia’s 
campaign widened, it stalled.  Stern US statements at the most senior level, which 
had been very tough at the end of March, flatlined even as unrest spread across 
the east.  Under intense pressure from reporters during a press conference on 
April 7, White House Press spokesman Jay Carney refused to attribute blame for 
the demonstrations to Russia.  “Circumstances were different in the regions we’re 
talking about” than they were in Crimea, he said, even as he suggested that some 
demonstrators were “not local residents.”312  Secretary Kerry, speaking on April 
17 after days after the unrest had turned violent, likewise refused to explicitly 
blame Russia – which the US had just sanctioned – instead calling on “all groups 
to demobilize.”  In light of what came before and after, his remarks on April 17 
 
310 “Ukraine Crisis: Protestors declare Donetsk ‘republic,’” BBC News (April 7, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26919928 (accessed July 25, 2016). 
311 Andrew Higgins, “Armed Men Seize Police Station in Eastern Ukraine City,” The New York Times 
(April 12, 2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/13/world/europe/ukraine.html (accessed August 4, 
2016). 
312 The White House, “Daily Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney,” (April 7, 2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/07/daily-press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-
carney-040714 (accessed March 14, 2020). 
 134 
bordered on the grotesque.  He condemned an alleged threat against the Russian 
Orthodox Church in Ukraine, praised Lavrov’s “constructive” and “good faith” 
dialogue, and invited Russian monitors onto the ground under the OSCE.313  Even 
in his memoirs later, with the benefit of hindsight, Kerry used the language of 
intrastate war to describe what was happening in Donbas: for example, “Putin 
also had unleashed something ugly and destructive in the Donbass,” with 
“indiscriminate shelling by separatists.”  Whereas Crimea was a straight case of 
invasion by Russian troops.314   
The leading role of ethnic separatists in the east rather than Russian troops 
in Crimea seems to have discombobulated the Western response to the continuing 
unrest.  The increased distance between sponsor and proxy seemed to have reset 
US balancing to almost its pre-Crimea levels, even if, pace Kerry, “everybody 
knew” what the Russians were doing.  The different type of agent projecting 
Russian power in the east had a delaying effect on the US and EU.  It denuded 
their response: it turned Russia’s invasion into something less than interstate war, 
even if culpability for the violence was ultimately clear.  Not only was battlefield 
intelligence messier than in Crimea, these militants gave the West an opportunity 
not to escalate, as Kerry repeatedly said he wanted.315    
On its own the new Ukrainian government’s response to the spreading 
violence sputtered.  After the seizure by militants of the police station at Slaviansk 
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on April 12, acting Ukrainian President Turchynov announced the start of an anti-
terror campaign.  He gave the separatists a deadline of 6:00 AM the next morning 
to lay down their arms.316  When they did not, the government launched a major 
attack against Slaviansk and the air base at Kramatorsk to the south with infantry, 
armored personnel carriers, and airstrikes.317  The results were disappointing.  
While the airport was retaken, separatists remained in control of Slaviansk and the 
militants there became something of local heroes.  For the moment, they had 
enough operational capability to take territory on their own and hold it.  
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Who were these separatists actually?  News reports struggled to describe 
them: they were, for example, “unsavory young toughs” in “surgical masks.”318  
But after a group of OSCE military observers were captured by the rebels in 
April, the wider world was presented with Igor Strelkov, who announced himself 
as the leader of the Donbas militia forces.  Ukrainian authorities claimed he was a 
Russian intelligence officer, a retired colonel in the Federal Security Service 
(FSB) who had fought in Chechnya, Transnistria, and Bosnia.319  This was likely 
accurate.  Strelkov admitted that he and other fighters had traveled to Donbas 
from Crimea where they had assisted in the takeover.  He also added that about a 
third of the separatists were not Ukrainian, though this was later walked back to 
only a tenth.320  
Strelkov’s background pointed to the delicate balancing act Russia was 
playing in preserving a sufficient shred of deniability to make its proxy warfare 
effective.  It needed to avoid inciting too much intervention by the West while 
still creating an operationally viable fighting force.  The cadre personnel with 
which it seeded the separatists provided at first it only loose operational control, 
though this would grow tighter throughout the summer.  Russian military and 
intelligence officers served in the ranks of the ethnic rebels in Donbas.  Besides 
Strelkov, there was Igor Bezler, another ex-GRU officer and commander of 
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militia forces around Horlivka.321  Aleksander Borodai, a Russian writer and 
retired GRU officer, was the first Prime Minister of the Donetsk People’s 
Republic and subsequently the Deputy Prime Minister.  He was a Russian 
national who had fought in Transdniestria, Chechnya, and Tajikistan, and had also 
worked for Malofeev.322  Vladimir Antyufeyev was brought in from Moscow to 
replace a native Ukrainian as the top security official in the Donetsk region.  He 
was a Russian national, and had fought in both Transdniestria in Moldova and in 
the Georgian separatist enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.323  There were 
also others such as Marat Bashirov, with Russian passports and long experience in 
the post-Soviet frozen conflicts.  And Denis Pushilin, the former employee of a 
Ponzi scheme in Russia and a failed Ukrainian parliamentary candidate, was 
elected to lead the Donetsk People’s Republic.324   
In terms of fighting ability, the separatist militias were a mixed bag.  
Many of the separatist units were undisciplined, unorganized, and lacking in 
major supplies including food.325  Unlike South Ossetians and Abkhaz militia 
forces, Russia made no real attempt to regularize the militias, but rather supported 
select groups with weapons, volunteers, and training.  These included the Vostok 
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battalion and the Oplot battalion, led by the same Zakharchenko.326  They were 
relatively capable: for example, the Vostok battalion was regarded by the 
Ukrainians as high quality and was well equipped, allegedly the result of its ties to 
Russia’s FSB.  Vostok was, in fact, eponymous with a since-disbanded Chechen 
unit of the Russian army that took part in the 2008 Georgia war.  The presence of 
ethnic Chechens and other Russian volunteers in the unit suggested that the unit 
had been resurrected.327  Some of the Chechens were fighters linked to Ramzan 
Kadyrov, the pro-Russian president of Chechnya.328  The Oplot Battalion, with its 
ties to the DNR’s President, was similarly well kitted out.  Zakharchenko claimed 
that 1,200 of his fighters had undergone military training on Russian soil.329  
Heavy weapons were also provided.  When three Ukrainian helicopters were shot 
down by rebels near Slaviansk, resulting in the death of an army general, 
Ukraine’s military claimed that the rebels were using Russian-supplied anti-
aircraft weapons, including the Buk-M1 missile launcher that would shoot down 
Malaysia Airlines flight MH17.330  This was later confirmed by international 
investigators and other fact-finding groups.331  Russian personnel also played a 
combat advisory role, guiding separatist combat forces fighting in the front line.  
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As the conflict developed, this would reportedly grow to include operational 
control at the battalion level of all separatist militias.332    
But as long as the conflict involved some sort of popular movement with 
irregular forces against the Ukrainian military, Russia still had propaganda 
leverage.  The more organic to the population the separatists appeared, the less 
they looked like agents of interstate Russian aggression.  Kiev’s Anti-Terrorism 
Operation (ATO) was also helping radicalize the population in the east, which 
played to Russia’s advantage domestically in Ukraine and also forestalling 
Western intervention.333  Russian officials harped on the theme of Kiev inciting a 
humanitarian crisis – for example, the early alleged threat to members of the 
Russian Orthodox Church.  Russian President Dmitry Medvedev warned of a 
“civil war” and Russia’s human rights representative said that events “are 
beginning to develop under the worst-case scenario.”334  During a call with UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, Putin said he expected the international 
community to condemn Ukraine’s actions.335  A Kremlin-sponsored documentary 
released later portrayed Russian policy in Ukraine as reactive and essentially a 
rescue mission to save ethnic Russians.336 
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During most of April, these capabilities seemed to strike the right balance 
of military capability and blowback.  The same day Strelkov appeared, separatists 
took control of the regional administrative center in Luhansk.  In late April, 
President Turchynov admitted that Kiev no longer controlled the Luhansk and 
Donetsk regions.  The fiercest fighting took place around Donetsk, as both the 
emerging separatist militias and Ukrainian government troops jockeyed for key 
territory and infrastructure like the airport.  As combat continued, the US began to 
come around to the realization that more counterpressure would need to be 
applied.  Weeks after the fighting restarted, US Secretary of State John Kerry 
finally broke omerta and explicitly blamed Russia: 
“The simple reality is, you can’t resolve a crisis when only one side is willing to 
do what is necessary to avoid a confrontation…Nobody should doubt Russia’s 
hand in this.  As NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe wrote this 
week, “What is happening in eastern Ukraine is a military operation that is well 
planned and organized and we assess that it is being carried out at the direction 
of Russia.”  Our intelligence community tells me that Russia’s intelligence and 
military intelligence services and special operators are playing an active role in 
destabilizing eastern Ukraine with personnel, weapons, money, operational 
planning, and coordination.”337 
 
On April 28, the United States rolled out its first new sanctions on Russia 
since the seizure of Crimea, targeting seven Putin-linked oligarchs and officials 
including Igor Sechin, the head of Rosneft.  The concurrent statements made by 
members of Obama’s Administration were studies in the subjunctive.  The 
President and others noted that Russia was bearing heavy costs of its actions, 
including the downgrading of Russian debt to junk status.  But many of the effects 
cited were occurring independently of the Western governmental reaction – like 
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the bond devaluation, which actually took place three days before the new 
sanctions.338  And President Obama and other members of his Administration 
actually took pains to suggest how limited – incremental – these new sanctions 
were.  They promised wider economic consequences – sectoral sanctions – if 
there were clearer signs of Russian violations of Ukrainian sovereignty, 
particularly troops moving across the border.339 
 It aided Russia’s deniability during this period that Moscow’s looser 
operational control over the separatists was matched by looser political control.  
The separatists’ goals differed from Russia’s in key ways, particularly on the 
issue of how much political autonomy they should have.  Putin publicly urged 
them in early May to postpone holding votes on independence and to support 
Ukraine’s presidential elections later in the month instead.  It would build the 
“necessary conditions for dialogue,” he said.340  Russia was not seeking an 
independent Donbas, but one that would blur Ukrainian sovereignty.  Neither 
independence nor annexation would offer Russia a similar strategic ability to 
pressure Kiev in the future.  Both would be too clean cut a resolution to the 
conflict, creating bright lines of sovereignty and raising the cost externally of 
pressuring Ukraine in the future – as well as likely incite a strong reaction in the 
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moment, as had the Crimea annexation.  For the separatists, however, marks of 
sovereignty like an independence vote would increase the power and security of 
the leadership by giving them more legitimacy.  This would diversify their 
support base and make them less dependent on the vicissitudes of Russian policy.  
Moreover, declaring independence might well force Putin to commit more deeply 
to their project if there was a major reaction from Kiev, Brussels, and 
Washington.  They duly held a referendum on May 11, and over 90 percent of 
voters chose independence.341    
 
Intensification, mid-May 2014 to September 2014 
Unfortunately for Russia, whatever the level of Western opposition, the 
separatists’ fighting capability began to be insufficient in the face of increased 
Ukrainian pressure.  The balance between deniability and combat power had 
swung too far.  In late May, Ukraine’s offensive finally kicked into gear and 
began to reclaim increasingly larger swaths of the territory it had surrendered a 
month earlier.  Ukrainian paratroopers and gunships launched a successful 
counterattack on the Donetsk airport terminal building (both a prestige prize and 
key infrastructure) on May 27 that left at least thirty rebels dead.  Ukrainian 
forces regained control of the crucial port city of Mariupol on June 13, after 
withdrawing in May in the face of violent demonstrations.  A joint ceasefire lasted 
for a week until the end of June, when the offensive resumed.  Kiev regained 
control over Slaviansk on July 5 and eliminated small rebel enclaves elsewhere in 
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the two oblasts.  Separatist control shrank to the core cities of Donetsk and 
Luhansk which themselves were in danger of being encircled.342  Concurrently, 
Western opposition to Russian actions in Ukraine softened slightly.  Kerry had a 
cordial meeting on Ukraine with Lavrov and European leaders at the G-7 in 
France on June 5.  A month later, Assistant Secretary Nuland’s public testimony 
to the Senate Foreign Relations committee was the model of de-escalation, as she 
stressed non-security initiatives like fighting corruption and constitutional reform, 
and called for de-escalation and addressing the “legitimate concerns” of ethnic 
Russians. 
As the separatists’ battlefield fortunes waned, Russia began to provide 
them with heavier and more advanced weaponry, though still largely without 
direct operational control.  In mid-July, videos of BTRs and T-64 tanks in the 
separatist ranks began to appear.343  On July 14, the rebels downed a large 
Ukrainian transport aircraft with sophisticated anti-aircraft missiles.  And most 
critically, on July 17, separatists used a Russian-made Buk missile launcher to 
shoot down a Malaysia Airlines passenger jet MH17, killing all 298 on board.  
Ukrainian officials believed Strelkov’s forces were responsible.344  The dead were 
primarily European citizens, mostly Dutch, and the act – combined with the 
growing reports of heavier Russian involvement – incited the strongest Western 
response to date.  First, European officials expanded the EU’s list of asset freezes 
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and visa bans to include some of the Putin advisors on the US list.  On July 24, 
the EU then expanded its sanctions to target Russia’s military, energy, and 
financial sectors.  The United States elevated its rhetoric to explicitly condemn 
Russia’s role, and imposed sectoral sanctions (though still relatively weak ones, 
such as limiting US financing for some Russian energy firms).  In a statement 
about the MH17 action, President Obama targeted specifically Russia’s support to 
the separatists and its complicity in lending the separatists advanced weaponry.  
“We know,” he said, “that these separatists have received a steady flow of support 
from Russia.  This includes arms and training.  It includes heavy weapons, and it 
includes anti-aircraft weapons.”345  Obama called for a cease-fire to allow an 
international investigation.  
The downing of MH17 highlighted the drawbacks of Russia’s looser 
control.  It was obviously not in Russia’s interest to incur the wrath of the 
international community for a strategically valueless target.  The separatist force 
at this point had less discipline and more agency: given the opportunity, their 
tactical operations could incur strategic costs.  Making matters worse, the heavier 
equipment might draw attention but it did not win the war by itself.  The rebels’ 
military situation had become critical by the end of July.  Slaviansk fell on July 5.  
On July 23, Ukrainian troops penetrated the northwestern corner of Donetsk city, 
prompting insurgents to fall back from several outlying suburbs.  At the end of 
July, Donetsk Prime Minister Alexander Borodai asked for cease-fire 
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negotiations.  Strelkov bitterly accused the Russians of preparing to let Donbas 
collapse.  On July 28, the Ukrainian army announced it had surrounded Horlivka, 
the last large city north of Donetsk.  Less than two weeks later, Strelkov said that 
Donetsk had been “completely surrounded.” 
The battlefield reverses and strategically damaging blowback from the 
MH17 incident spurred Moscow to more active involvement in the conflict.  It 
tightened its control.  In mid-August, the rebel leadership was sacked.  Strelkov 
was removed from command of separatist forces and his nominal superior Prime 
Minister Borodai resigned.  The head of rebel forces in Luhansk also stepped 
down, and operatives seasoned in interstate conflict were brought in.346  Vladimir 
Antyufeyev, who had previously been the long-standing security chief in 
Transniestria, was appointed to replace Khodakovsky.347  With the leadership 
changes came more direct Russian support, including committing combat troops 
to the fight.  Though it had failed to act on the separatists’ more grandiose 
aspirations for a Novorossiya state, it was not willing to let the remaining 
enclaves be extinguished.  There were reports of additional heavy weaponry 
entering the separatist enclaves, such as tanks and armored personnel carriers.348  
For the first time there were complaints of shelling from Russian territory on 
August 11, and Ukrainian forces allegedly engaged a Russian armored column 
inside Ukraine on August 14. 
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Verified Russian intervention came a week later during the decisive battle 
in the east.  Ukrainian forces were attempting to capture the strategic railway hub 
of Ilovaisk, which would seal off Donetsk from the east.  After a failed attempt to 
storm the town on August 7, Ukrainian artillery began to shell Ilovaisk 
intermittently.  The Ukrainians tried again during the day of August 18, with no 
success.  Led by the volunteer Donbas battalion, government forces finally 
entered the city later that night.  They fought house-to-house and made progress 
against members of the separatists’ Oplot unit.349  The Ukrainians pushed on 
during August 19 and 20, extending further and further to the east, to the village 
of Torez, before they were halted by multiple counterattacks.  By August 20, 
understrength Ukrainian forces were in control of most of Ilovaisk.350  As the 
remaining troops spread out through the city, the volunteer militias leading the 
offensive requested reinforcements.  None arrived.  Defense of the city fell to the 
Donbas battalion and scattershot formations: one company of regular troops and 
some additional volunteer fighters.351  The remaining Ukrainian troops began to 
report seeing Russian soldiers when they were met with a crushing, modern 
artillery- and drone-backed counterattack that was suspected to have come from 
the Russian military.352  They fell back along the western road in chaos, nearly 
defenseless in their disarray.  The United States blasted Russia’s “flagrant” 
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violation of international law in response to reports of Russian military vehicles in 
Ukraine.  But by August 24, no regular reinforcements had arrived and other 
government militia groups had retreated, leaving the remaining fighters trapped in 
a hopeless pocket.  Putin made a public – if cynical - call for a corridor to allow 
the trapped Ukrainian forces to leave; nonetheless, fighting continued during the 
retreat, killing an estimated 1,000 Ukrainian troops.353   
 
Source: Euromaidan Press, http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/08/23/probe-into-ukraines-largest-
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It was a crushing optic: August 24 was also by coincidence Ukraine’s 
Independence Day, and Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko had insisted upon a 
military parade at the same time his troops were howling for reinforcements in 
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Ilovaisk.  On August 28, NATO officials assessed that over 1,000 Russians were 
operating within the separatist areas and another 20,000 were stationed near the 
border.  These troops were equipped with heavy weapons and engaging in direct 
combat.354  The Russian intervention was operationally successful.  The 
Ukrainian forces retreated, losing much of the territory they had regained over the 
past two months.  After a week of fighting, the rebels held about 40 percent of the 
Donetsk oblast and slightly less of the Luhansk oblast.   
During this period of increased Russian direct involvement in the fighting, 
Russia also retained tight political control over the separatists.  During ceasefire 
negotiations in late August and early September 2014 in Minsk, the key decisions 
were made by Russia, and it decided to settle up.  The subsequent Minsk 
agreement signed on September 5 offered the separatists a special status and local 
elections in exchange for Ukrainian control of the border.  The catch – which 
Russia would exploit as part of its proxy strategy – was that nothing was said 
about sequencing.  Even though some separatists wanted to continue their August 
offensive and potentially push on to create a more viable state, Moscow forced 
them to sign.355  Those who opposed Russian strategic decisions like Andrei 
Purgin, the cofounder of the independent Donetsk state, were arrested or 
dismissed.356  Strelkov, who had been critical of Surkov’s dialing back the 
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Novorussiya project, was returned to Russia.357  Others were killed under 
mysterious circumstances, including Aleksander Bednov, who was apparently 
murdered by the separatist leader of the Luhansk region, Igor Plotnitsky.358  There 
was very little evidence of independent decision-making among the separatist 
enclaves in the east.   
Russia paid a heavier price as the veneer of its nonintervention cracked.  
The Minsk agreement did not stop the EU from expanding its sector sanctions on 
Russia, even after the ceasefire came into place.  On September 11, it announced 
it would ban weapons sales, tightened restrictions on dual-use goods, and 
curtailed lending to five Russian state-owned companies, three energy companies, 
and three defense companies, as well as cooperation on energy exploration.  The 
US joined these efforts, sanctioning Russia’s largest bank, a major arms 
conglomerate, and five energy companies.  President Obama called Russia’s 
actions illegal, noted the “heavily armed Russian forces” in the country, and said 
that the US had yet to see conclusive evidence Russian efforts to destabilize 
Ukraine had ceased.359  These sanctions were not crushing: indeed, per Obama, 
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Pawn-Grabbing: Second Donbas Crisis, October 2014-March 2015 
Moscow sustained a high level of support for its proxies after Minsk.  It 
moved heavy equipment and troops into the rebel areas in October 2014 and 
expanded training among rebel units.360  In November, NATO commander 
General Philip Breedlove warned that “Material, equipment, armored weapons, 
and supplies continue to flow into eastern Ukraine.”  The OSCE claimed it had 
spotted unidentified armored columns in separatist areas manned by troops 
without insignia, similar to those in Crimea.361  At the local level, the fighting 
never really stopped.  The cease-fire, said General Breedlove, was “in name 
only.”  There were near-daily violations of the ceasefire around the urban center 
of Donetsk, including artillery shelling of civilian areas.  Between the 
implementation of Minsk and mid-November, the UN estimated that 957 people 
were killed in the conflict and the number of displaced persons almost doubled to 
nearly half a million.362  The heaviest fighting came at the city’s strategically 
located airport in late September and October, as rebel forces attempted to push 
Ukrainian forces out of the facility they had seized in May.   
But after the initial post-Ilovaisk intervention American interest in 
balancing Russia sagged.  The most visible sign of this was the US shifting its 
emphasis to urging Ukrainian political changes and the separatists’ culpability for 
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the conflict rather than their sponsor’s.  The Minsk agreement had taken much of 
the energy behind American balancing against Russia and codified it into pressure 
on the Ukrainian government to enact political reform.  It thus functionally served 
to justify and normalize Russian involvement in Ukraine.  In a statement by 
President Obama during a visit with Ukrainian President Poroshenko shortly after 
the ceasefire, Obama made reference to Russian “aggression” that violated the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, but in literally the same sentence 
linked it to Ukraine’s need to undertake political reforms.363  In October, amidst 
the fighting at the Donetsk airport, US Secretary of State John Kerry praised the 
Minsk process, claimed the ceasefire was holding, and stressed – in the same 
sentence – the need for a new election law.364  Other US statements tended to 
focus on the separatists, not their sponsors.  On November 9, NSC spokesperson 
Bernadette Meehan noted that the fighting had “intensified,” but blamed the 
rebels, and used toned-down language that merely urged Moscow to comply 
with Minsk.365  Two weeks later, another senior US official referred to bellicose 
Russian statements about never letting Donbas be defeated as “a little 
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strange…since it was the separatists who [were] on the offensive 
everywhere.”366  Not the Russians.   
Russia also sought to manage the degree of the separatists’ political 
sovereignty, too much of which could bring quicker Western consequences down 
on Moscow than could changes on the ground.  This was an area where the 
separatists’ and their sponsor’s goals diverged.  It benefited the local leaders of 
Donbass to have more and more the trappings of sovereignty, while it benefited 
Russia for them to have some sovereignty, and certainly survive, but maintain 
enough fuzziness around along the line of control that pressure on Kiev could be 
ratcheted up or down while lowering the risk of significant consequences.   The 
separatist-controlled areas refused to participate in Ukraine’s elections of October 
26, which saw a landslide for the pro-Western parties, and instead held their own 
elections against Russian advice.367  The vote confirmed Alexander Zakharchenko 
and Igor Plotnisky as the leaders of Donetsk and Luhansk, respectively.368  
Politically, Ukraine and the Donbas were growing further apart.   The new 
reformist-dominated parliament in Kiev overwhelmingly voted on December 23 
to revoke Ukraine’s non-aligned status and seek closer ties with the West, 
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including NATO membership.  This was a clear red line for Russia, just as it had 
been with Georgia in 2008.  Putin’s spokesman in November had asked for “a 100 
percent guarantee that no one would think about Ukraine joining NATO.”  
Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called the vote “unproductive.”369   
Beginning in January, the separatists began a major new military offensive 
amid a dramatic increase in artillery and small arms exchanges.  This met a 
stronger, more immediate response from the West than had the proxy operation 
during the spring.  The operation had offensive goals, the seizing of territory in 
the Debaltseve salient, around Donetsk, and in the south to create a land link to 
Crimea.  They particularly aimed at capturing Mariupol and the Donetsk airport, 
which would strengthen the separatists’ strategic position.   
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Source: BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27308526 (accessed May 21, 2020) 
 
At first, the close proximity of the combatants after the cease-fire blurred 
the lines of what was a qualitative change in the violence.  The separatists’ 
January offensive began out of near-daily ceasefire violations, and it first 
exhibited the kind of ambiguous, low-level fighting that had hindered an early 
Western response in South Ossetia in August 2008.  During bitter fighting for the 
Donetsk airport terminal in mid-January, enemy combatants were often on 
different floors of the same building for days at a time.  Pushed out of several 
levels of the terminal building on January 14, Ukrainian forces recaptured most of 
the facility in a counter-offensive three days later that pushed up to the strategic 
Putyilivskiy Bridge between the city and the airport.370  On January 20, a group of 
separatists seized control of several floors of the facility and collapsed one of the 
sections onto many of the remaining Ukrainian troops.  That facilitated a 
complete takeover by January 21.  Separatist forces in Donetsk struck out west 
three days later towards their second target, the regional center of Mariupol.  
Strategically situated at the north of the Russian-dominated Sea of Azov, it also 
lay along the strip of land linking Russian-occupied Crimea to separatist-held 
Donetsk.  Mariupol, which was serving as the government’s capital of the 
Donetsk province in lieu of Donetsk, had briefly fallen into the hands of rebels in 
May.  It was retaken by Ukrainian forces in June 2014, but lay only 10 miles from 
the final cease-fire line at the time of the Minsk agreement.  On January 24, a 
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major rocket barrage struck the city, killing 30 people, as Zakharchenko 
announced a new offensive.371  
But as its offensive widened and began to succeed militarily – and became 
clearly an offensive – Russia’s links to its proxies became less deniable and 
brought far more rapid balancing.  US Secretary of State John Kerry called the 
renewed fighting “a blatant land grab.”372  A senior UN official called the 
Mariupol shelling a “war crime,” echoing Poroshenko’s language, and the OSCE 
monitors called it “indiscriminate” and “reckless.”373  NATO Secretary-General 
Jens Stoltenberg warned he had seen “a substantial increase in Russian heavy 
equipment such as tanks, artillery, and advanced air defense systems” entering 
Ukraine.374  At a news conference the next day, President Obama said he was 
“deeply concerned” about the violence and that he would “look at all options that 
are available to us short of military confrontation to try and address this issue.”375  
Kerry called the Mariupol attack “horrific” and condemned “Russia’s 
irresponsible and dangerous decision” to supply them heavy weapons. 
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A third major target of the separatists’ offensive was the strategic 
crossroads city of Debaltseve, northeast of Donetsk.  Debaltseve lay in a 
Ukrainian salient caught between Donetsk and Luhansk.  It was a major rail and 
road junction connecting the two separatist capitals to each other and also the 
Russian cities of Volgograd and Rostov-on-Don, Moscow’s eastern district 
military headquarters.  Separatists began to exchange artillery fire with the 
remaining Ukrainian forces in the Debaltseve pocket from January 17 to January 
20.376  Rebels assaulted several Ukrainian checkpoints in the vicinity of 
Debaltseve over the next week, overrunning the small village of Vuhlehirsk on 
January 29.  Vuhlehirsk was only a few miles by road from Debaltseve proper, 
and was one of the key defensive buffers for the critical main supply route M-03.  
After its fall, rebel sappers and artillery were able to direct fire onto the road, 
severely disrupting traffic.   
Western reaction seemed inevitable.  The EU held a crisis meeting of 
foreign ministers the same day Vuhlehirsk fell.  There, they identified potential 
additional sanctions on Russia, primarily visa bans and asset freezes on more 
individuals.  The United States also threatened stronger measures.  For the first 
time, Kerry hinted on February 4 that the US was considering sending lethal aid 
to Ukraine.  So far the Obama Administration had only offered non-lethal 
supplies, such as first aid, night-vision goggles, and body armor, despite some 
domestic calls for more active measures.  Other US officials acknowledged the 
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situation was “dire.”  They directly criticized Moscow for “fueling the fire” with 
“new weapons, new advice, new lethality, and new training,” and raised the 
possibility of new sanctions.377  The sanctions to date – the same personal 
sanctions and particularly the sectoral sanctions on Russian companies – were 
having some economic effect, but not apparently enough.  The ratings agency 
S&P downgraded Russian government bonds on January 26, lowering them to 
BB+ levels with a negative outlook.  It was the second time Russian debt had 
been downgraded since the start of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, and left it one step 
above junk status.378  The ruble had likewise declined, losing roughly half of its 
value against the dollar.   
Critically, despite Kerry’s threat, European efforts to win Putin’s 
agreement on a modified version of Minsk detracted from balancing Moscow’s 
proxies in the battlefield, where they would gain ground during and after the 
negotiations.  On February 5, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French 
President Francois Hollande met with Poroshenko in Ukraine before flying to 
Moscow the next day to kick off a week of negotiations.379  This stagnated the 
counter-momentum: the Obama Administration did not again raise the prospect of 
arming the Ukrainians, which was a non-starter for the Europeans anyway.  And it 
had no effect on Russia’s proxies, now reequipped and advancing in some places 
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with Russian military accompaniment.  On February 9, separatist forces captured 
the critical town of Lovynove, which lay directly on the main highway between 
Kiev and Debaltseve, nearly sealing off the Ukrainian troops close to the city.  
Government sources claimed that Russian mercenaries and regulars including the 
52nd Spetsnaz Regiment were directly involved with the capture of the town.380  It 
was left in the hands of the Donetsk separatists, who were then reinforced by 
Russian armor, including at least ten tanks and an armored personnel carrier.381  
Due to communications breakdowns, Ukrainian forces did not get the word that 
the road was cut and several vehicles were ambushed and destroyed.382  About 
2,500 troops were left trapped in Debaltseve.383   
 Where they were unsupported by Russian forces, the separatists were 
weaker.  About 200 km south, Ukrainian volunteer groups launched a surprise 
counterattack against the town of Shyrokyne on February 10.  Shyrokyne had 
been captured by the separatists amidst the low-level fighting in October, after the 
Minsk protocol was signed, and had served as a waypoint for rebel forces 
attacking Mariupol.384  Poroshenko’s administration stated that the attack was to 
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return to the line of control demarcated by the Minsk protocol.385  The operation 
was successful and the Ukrainian forces broke through separatist lines and 
overran several villages.386  They were halted at Sakhanka, seven kilometers 
northeast of Shyrokyne, after intense artillery and Grad rocket fire.387  Taking 
casualties, the Azov forces and others fell back to Shyrokyne, where they dug in. 
Despite Russia’s increased direct involvement in the conflict, European 
energies continued to be devoted to restoring the Minsk agreement.  Following a 
16-hour negotiating session, all sides agreed to a final document, nicknamed 
“Minsk II.”  This deal, referred to as the Steinmeier formula after the German 
foreign minister, was a loss in two ways for the West and Ukraine.  First, in its 
substance, it critically sequenced the two elements Russia wanted (local elections 
and a special status for Donbas) after what Ukraine wanted (control of its border).  
Minsk I had envisioned these happening simultaneously, or at least was not 
prejudicial to sequence.  Because the first two points were vague, and much more 
ambiguous than the last point, Russia would be able to prolong its presence in 
Donbas indefinitely by claiming sufficient autonomy or elections had not yet been 
met.  Doing so would not violate the agreement.   
But even in process Minsk II was a problem because it critically diluted 
growing Western opposition to Russia’s increased involvement in Ukraine at a 
time when Russia was creating more and more facts on the ground – which by 
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extension made its position stronger and the West’s weaker.  Debaltseve was the 
area most in jeopardy; during negotiations with Hollande and Merkel, Putin had 
insisted that the Ukrainian forces in Debaltseve were surrounded.  Thus, under a 
ceasefire, the city itself would fall under control of the separatists.  The day after 
the ceasefire was signed, the rebels began their final push, determined to cut off 
the last land route into Debaltseve.  A crushing artillery- and armor-backed 
assault pushed supporting Ukrainian troops back to the northwest of the pocket, 
preventing the reinforcement of their comrades.  “The Russian military,” the State 
Department somewhat plaintively noted, “has deployed a large amount of artillery 
and multiple rocket launcher systems around Debaltseve, where it is shelling 
Ukrainian positions.  We are confident that these are Russian military, not 
separatist systems.”388  The Ukrainians claimed that the separatists had grouped 
about 15,000-17,000 troops around Debaltseve, of which 80 percent were 
Russian.389  
However, no new sanctions or US counter-pressure was applied.  The new 
accord had an immediate soporific effect on American actions against Russia.  
The White House used its mildest language since mid-January about the spike in 
fighting around Debaltseve, saying only that it was “inconsistent with the spirit of 
the accord.”390  Gone too were any further mentions of sanctions on Russia: 
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officials even acknowledged the ongoing “land grab” but said only that it 
undercut the ceasefire.391  Rather, the US State Department announced it was 
monitoring the situation, and urged respect for Minsk.392  President Obama 
telephoned his Ukrainian counterpart Poroshenko to stress his “deep concern” 
about the ongoing violence around Debaltseve, but promised nothing.393  On the 
night of February 16-17, separatist forces captured two Ukrainian company-level 
defensive positions on its eastern outskirts, opening up the city center.  Ukrainian 
field commanders then made the decision to withdraw in the afternoon of the next 
day.394  
 By contrast, Putin himself was directly involved with the battlefield 
outcome.  He urged Kiev to allow its forces at Debaltseve to surrender; barring 
that, he said, “If they aren’t capable,” then he hoped “they won’t prosecute people 
who want to save their lives and the lives of others.”395  On the night of February 
17, Ukrainian forces combined into a column of about 2,000 men just north of the 
city and then struck out on a northerly looping route only hazily scouted earlier.  
It was a hellish 25-kilometer journey: at night, under tank, artillery, and small 
arms fire, with limited mechanization in heavy snow.  Their column arrived at the 
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Ukrainian-held town of Artemivsk on February 18 with, Poroshenko estimated, 
80 percent of its soldiers.396   
With Debaltseve fallen and the line shored up, Moscow seemed content to 
allow the cease-fire to take hold in most places.  The rebels also agreed to the 
cease-fire terms regarding the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front line.  
However, they continued to contest Ukrainian positions on the eastern approaches 
to Mariupol, where separatist forces began their counterattack a day after Minsk II 
was signed.397  They advanced to the eastern fringe of Shyrokyne, pushing the 
Ukrainian forces to the ridgeline west of the city center.398  Russian special 
operations forces were allegedly mixed in with the rebels.399  A renewed effort 
came on February 23, which reportedly involved Russian surveillance aircraft.  
Pavlopil and its outlying areas fell, as well as Kominternove, an important village 
along a major north-south road between Donetsk and Mariupol.400  These clashes 
would continue into March.  In total, Ukrainian forces after the agreement lost 
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about 70 percent of the territory in the south that its Azov militia volunteers had 
captured.401   
 
Brushfires, April 2015-August 2016 
US strategic support to Ukraine did eventually come, but not until the 
ceasefire took hold.  Russia’s increased support to the separatists, particularly the 
widespread use of Russian troops in combat, helped incite the strongest US 
strategic response to date. President Obama sent $75 million in non-lethal military 
aid to Kiev in March 2015, up from the $53 million he had sent in September 
2014 after the Russian offensive at Ilovaisk.  In a Congressional hearing on March 
4, US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland condemned Russia and its 
puppets’ “unspeakable violence and pillage,” calling the war “a manufactured 
conflict – controlled by the Kremlin; fueled by Russian tanks and heavy weapons; 
financed at Russian taxpayers’ expense and costing the lives of young 
Russians.”402  On April 17, 2015, the first US military forces arrived in the 
country, 300 soldiers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade, who were tasked with 
training three battalions of Ukraine’s National Guard and volunteer militias.403  
Europe also eventually took a stronger stand against Russian aggression after the 
second offensive.  At the European Council in March, member states agreed to 
link sanctions to Russia’s full implementation of the Minsk protocol.  They 
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included visa bans and asset freezes for 149 individuals and 37 entities, a 
prohibition on investment in Crimea, a moderately comprehensive arms embargo, 
and limitations on debt financing for some large Russian companies.  In June, 
those sanctions were extended for another six months, and would continue to be 
so in the future.404  
Russia reined in its proxies in the summer of 2015, likely both because it 
had achieved its goals and to mitigate further US and European pressure.  The 
separatists also assumed a more defensive posture.  On May 20, in a surprising 
policy shift, the rebel leadership publicly walked back its earlier ambitions for a 
larger area, saying: “The Novorussiya project is frozen until a new political elite 
emerges in all these [additional] regions that will be able to head the movement.  
We don’t have the right to impose our opinion on Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, and 
Odessa.”405  Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov pushed this softer line 
further, saying that he wanted the separatists’ areas to “become part of 
Ukraine.”406  This was a comedown from the separatists’ earlier proclaimed goals, 
and brought them in line with Russia’s more conservative aims.  The shift came 
shortly after Putin’s meetings with Merkel on May 10 and Secretary Kerry on 
May 12.  In fact, neither an independent eastern Ukraine nor an annexed new 
member republic was ideal for Russia.  Both would strengthen precisely the 
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territorial boundaries that would make it more costly to exert military pressure 
against Ukraine.  If Donbas remained in Ukraine but with a separate status, its 
political status would be hazier.  Violations of its borders and de facto interstate 
aggression would thus be less clear, allowing Moscow to dominate not just 
eastern Ukraine but, through the threat of force, broader Ukrainian policy as well.  
Such violations and pressure would be more difficult to balance against, and 
increase the deniability of Russian troops operating in Ukraine, the same as 
Georgia. 
Fighting flickered through the summer with varying intensity but no major 
offensives.  However, it still had a strategic effect: it normalized a level of 
violence that Russia could use later on to denude consequences for using military 
force.  The advanced weaponry that Russia had sent the separatists featured 
prominently.  On April 12, heavy shelling broke out along the line of control in 
the south, near Shyrokyne.  Ukrainian forces near the Donetsk airport also came 
under heavy artillery and infantry attack.407  On June 3, rebel forces attacked 
Maryinka, one of the main road junctions into Donetsk, using artillery, rockets, 
and tanks.408  After an advance to the center of town, they were eventually pushed 
back by Ukrainian troops who regained control of the village at the cost of four 
dead soldiers.409  Some of these military initiatives also came from the Ukrainian 
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side.  In a separate action, Ukrainian forces attempted to seize the town of 
Zhabunki, northwest of Donetsk city.  They advanced about a kilometer but then 
got bogged down, with each side using heavy weapons including tanks banned by 
both Minsk agreements.410   
In the wake of the June fighting, Ukrainian President Poroshenko angrily 
denounced the 9,000 troops Russia allegedly maintained in the east and called on 
them to withdraw.411  NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg backed him up, 
saying “We have precise information that Russia is present in eastern Ukraine and 
that it has delivered large quantities of heavy, advanced weapons to the 
separatists.”412  President Obama called Poroshenko to express “deep concern” 
about the participation of Russian forces in the Donetsk assault.413  Ukraine’s 
ambassador to the EU called on the bloc to impose additional sanctions on 
Moscow.  It did not – no clear additional boundary had been transgressed, and 
despite the local offensive Russia’s proxies had conducted no broader push.  No 
additional major rounds of US sanctions related to the Ukraine crisis were 
imposed, nor sectoral sanctions applied. 
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Without significant additional external pressure on Russia, Poroshenko 
moved forward within the Minsk II parameters.  His allies in parliament gave 
preliminary approval to a draft bill in August that would give more power to 
regional authorities as part of Ukraine’s commitments.  However, per the 
sequencing issue agreed to in February, Russia would remain in control of the 
border during this period.  This meant its forces could also remain in the east and 
its military links to the separatists would be unhindered without technically 
violating the agreement.  And the demands were always just out of reach.  The 
Kremlin wanted a specific mention of the Donbas region in Ukraine’s 
constitution, and urged that all legal issues be negotiated directly with the 
separatists.  Putin elaborated these points in a later address on September 4.414  
His Foreign Minister Lavrov reiterated that the special status of Donbas must be 
entered separately into Ukraine’s constitution.415  The ground that Poroshenko 
had already given was unpopular; it was met domestically by opposition from his 
rival Yulia Tymoshenko and violent protests by nationalists that wounded 130 
people and killed two.416  However, with few options, he continued to push ahead 
and try and give Putin something, enough to pull his troops out of the east.   
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And there the conflict largely calcified.  There was still violence – for 
example, some 15,000 cease-fire violations alone in February 2016 – but no more 
strategic offensives by either side.417  The so-called Normandy Format group 
(Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany) that negotiated Minsk II in February 
would meet six months later in October 2015 and then the year after that, in 
October 2016.  No significant results, and “no miracles,” in the words of 
Chancellor Merkel, followed.  It would not convene again for three more years. 
 
III.  Conclusion and Analysis 
So this was the key strategic judgment on Russia’s Ukraine war: in the 
first phase of fighting, the cost was worth it.  All of the goals for which Russia 
had intervened were achieved in 2014.  In the second phase it was not: all that 
was achieved was incurring additional strategic costs for operational, even 
tactical, gains.  This correlated with the different modes of proxy support and 
control in each fight: more deniable in the first conflict, with basically defensive 
aims and textbook hybrid warfare, and less deniable in the second, with more 
offensive goals and something closer to a conventional fight. 
Russia secured the use of the Crimean naval base and Crimea for at least 
the medium term, created a simmering conflict to keep pressure on Kiev, and 
retained a buffer state on its border.  It probably also frightened NATO allies into 
hardening their opposition to Ukraine’s NATO accession, though practically that 
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had been dead since the Georgia war in 2008.  Russia did not wholly achieve the 
codified right to use force in the east, but the Minsk protocol’s Steinmeier formula 
meant that it could sustain troops in the country without clearly violating the 
agreement for the indefinite future.  And like Saakashvili’s successor in Georgia, 
the Poroshenko and Zelensky presidential administrations that followed the war 
were more amenable to Putin than was the government in 2014. 
But those gains came with a cost.  Russia was placed again under Soviet-
era sectoral sanctions and its debt fell to near-junk status.  Its currency crashed, 
with the ruble’s value falling by half.  It was kicked out of the G-8.  Russian 
intervention accelerated the trajectory of the Kiev government to ally with the 
West and join Western institutions, probably eschewing forever Kiev’s interest in 
a Finland-like neutralization.  And perhaps most importantly, Russia incurred 
significant military balancing.  US forces were sent to Ukraine to help train 
Kiev’s military, a near-total reversal of the Obama Administration’s Russia 
policy.  The deployment of American soldiers to a borderline combat mission in 
Moscow’s backyard would have been unthinkable during Obama’s first term, 
when he had prioritized cooperation with Russia and ridiculed more hawkish 
Republicans.  NATO followed the Americans’ lead.  At the NATO’s Leaders 
meeting at Warsaw in June 2016, the allies approved the landmark Enhanced 
Forward Presence, an agreement which based combined Western battlegroups in 
the Baltic States and Poland.  These multinational battalion-sized elements under 
the framework nations of the US, UK, Germany, and Canada codified the 2014 
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Wales summit commitment to create precisely what Russia had sought to avoid: 
more Western military power in the east, on its border.   
For their part, Russia’s proxies survived but did not prosper.  Many 
separatist leaders like Strelkov had hoped for an annexation to the Russian 
Federation similar to Crimea’s, which never came.  Others like Zakharchenko had 
hoped for formal independence over an even wider swath of territory.  Public 
polling indicated that the population of Donbas felt far more favorable about 
independence than about joining Russia.418  But neither materialized.  Instead the 
rebels were left with a still-undefined status within Ukraine.  This suited Russia 
fine, since it blurred Ukraine’s lines of sovereignty and per the Minsk agreements 
gave Moscow justification for a military presence in the future.  But it was far 
from what its proxies sought.  The irony is that the use of Russian forces in the 
east to create a more sustainable separatist enclave isolated it instead.  The cause 
of ethnic self-determination, which initially helped delay the West’s response to 
the Donbas crisis, was increasingly blurred by the presence of Russian military 
forces, making the separatists appear more and more as tools of Russia.  
Moreover, at key junctures like September 2014 Russia had no compunction 
about reigning in the separatists’ goals and forcing them to align with its own.  
Because of its close control over the separatists’ leadership and its own support, it 
could do so relatively easily. 
In terms of assessing the effect of deniability, this case faced the same 
challenges as did the Georgia case.  How much consequence – how much 
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balancing – was due to this issue of deniability and how much to other factors?  
There were certainly other strategic elements that inhibited a loud and proud 
Western reaction to Russian policy.  Perhaps the most important of these was the 
mantra repeated by Obama, Kerry, and others that they did not want to get pulled 
into an east-west Cold War-style confrontation with Russia.  It would be too zero-
sum, seemed anachronistic, and most practically would obviate the diplomatic 
off-ramps they were offering to the Russians.  The White House seemed fixated 
on these off-ramps, as if Russia had stumbled into a conflict and was trying to 
recover with good grace.  This could be seen in policies such as the “scalpel 
sanctions,” as Kerry proudly called the Western sanctions, which were designed 
to target the most minimal parts of the Russian state economy and Moscow’s 
decision-making apparatus.  The Obama Administration also wanted European 
states to take the lead on diplomacy, to further help avoid the Cold War overtones 
and to keep Europe united diplomatically.419  This further slowed consequences 
for Russian aggression, both by essentially requiring consensus with the European 
Union on sanctions and, with Europe’s usually-less-pugnacious approach to 
conflict, probably taking the teeth out of any response.  American recalcitrance 
went deeper, however.  Russian’s invasion of Ukraine struck at the entire 
worldview of the Obama Administration, which had dispensed with the ugliness 
of great power politics in favor of win-win efforts to address global 21st-century 
threats like violent extremism and combating climate change.  The Obama team 
was recognizably reluctant to play those great power politics when they came 
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roaring back.  And indeed, the Administration’s hopes for a “reset” with Russia, 
by the start of the conflict, had not totally died: witness, for example, Obama’s 
sotto voce comment to Medvedev in 2012 that he would have more flexibility 
after the election.  
This basic strategic mindset was the starting point for the West’s approach 
to the Ukraine crisis.  As in the previous case, the best way to control for these 
issues was to examine when Western changes in language and triggers for the 
sanctions actually came and when they did not.  It was helpful that Russia’s proxy 
strategy was marked by a high degree of variability, with different levels of state 
involvement at different points.  This was useful in tracing out correlations.  The 
balancing Russia incurred when its proxy support grew more brazen was 
disproportionately greater and came faster.  The critical points that shifted US and 
EU policy against Russia came in four tranches.  First, after the Crimean 
declaration of independence and annexation to Russia.  Second, after the downing 
of flight MH17.  Third, after the Russian military’s intervention at Ilovaisk.  And 
fourth, most critically, during the concentrated push by Russia’s military and 
proxies at Mariupol and Debaltseve in late January and early February.  These 
were the occasions when Russia involved its own troops in combat or its 
advanced weapons were used by separatists.  In all of these cases, the high 
visibility of Russia’s direct support to its proxies reduced its deniability 
significantly. 
Operationally, this often proved effective, but such shifts incurred 
strategic costs.  Whether those costs were worth it depended on the strategic goal 
 173 
sought.  For example, when Ukraine’s counteroffensive began rolling in June 
2014, the looser control and lower support Russia had been providing the 
separatists was insufficient militarily to hold ground.  This appears to have 
surprised the Kremlin.  And so in July Russia made political changes and 
increased the amount of weapons flowing to the rebels, including anti-aircraft 
weapons, which helped incited the MH17 disaster.  Those weapons – that model 
of proxy war – were not enough to successfully defend the rump state in the east.  
Kiev’s offensive continued almost to the point of victory, when Russia changed 
its proxy style yet again and involved its own troops in direct combat, first 
through cross-border shelling and then directly at Ilovaisk.  This intervention was 
crushing and effective operationally, saving Donetsk from being cut off.  Russia 
was heavily punished for that intervention with expanded sectoral sanctions, 
though it was worth the consequences strategically.  Russian intervention 
prevented the separatists from being overrun and thus retained the enclaves as 
leverage over a pro-Western Ukraine. 
Likewise, there were moments when objectively, given the combat 
situation on the ground, there should have been more balancing but was not.  
Those were points when Russia achieved an effective degree of deniability that 
helped delay or obviate counterpressure.  These periods were most obviously 
April 2014 and November 2014 to mid-January 2015.  By the end of Crimean 
crisis, the United States and European Union were politically mobilized against 
Russia, particularly after Moscow made unilateral changes to Crimea’s 
sovereignty.  Like in Georgia, political changes had no deniability.  Swaths of 
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sanctions were levied.  But then Western reactions reset to almost a baseline level 
mere days later when the fighting in Donbas started, even though no reasonable 
observer would deny that the same Russian hand that had invaded Crimea was 
involved in Donetsk.  Kerry’s comments on April 17 were unbelievable, in 
retrospect.  It took a month before the United States again acted against Russia 
and its proxies.  And these proxies had considerable success seizing territory in 
the meantime.  Similarly, later in the fall, the creeping escalation of combat along 
the line of separation became less creeping in November and blatant in December.  
Senior NATO officials were banging the drum about the increased violence, with 
little response from Washington or Brussels (or Berlin).  It took a major, multi-
pronged offensive for the West to be spurred into action. 
 How did deniability work in these instances?  First, Russia’s different 
style of proxy war in the east obviously helped cloud the intelligence.  It was not 
always clear what exactly was happening tactically on the ground, both in April 
2014 and in certain hotspots during the second phase of conflict (though elements 
closer to the action like NATO obviously had an idea of the operational picture).  
After the annexation of Crimea, Russia preferred to fight with additional distance 
between the state and its proxies, and was rewarded for doing so by incurring 
objectively less damaging sanctions until July and then especially August 2014.  
Much of the fighting looked like either civil unrest or tactical ceasefire violations 
per Kerry’s description of communal violence, even if strategically it was clear 
that the Russians probably were responsible.  And it was not just an American 
tactical picture but a European one.  Per its diplomatic strategy the US had to wait 
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on European initiative and consensus before moving forward, which was 
frustrating.420   
But the deniability of Russia’s proxy warfare also allowed both the US 
and the Europeans to take Russian claims at face value in order to manage 
escalation of the conflict.  In the winter of 2014, NATO officials were sounding 
the alarm about ceasefire violations.  They knew what was happening on the 
ground.  They also knew that in the days before and after Minsk II, the Russians 
were not complying and the separatists were still moving.  But they held back, 
even dropping Kerry’s February 4 threat to arm the Ukrainians.  This was 
ostensibly because the US did not want to escalate the conflict into a Cold War-
type standoff and give diplomacy a chance.  But that impulse in itself was telling.  
The US was responding in a way that suggested Russia’s proxy war in eastern 
Ukraine was something less than conventional aggression.  The Steinmeier 
formula at Minsk II, which was the sum of the West’s efforts, encapsulated this 
issue.  Steinmeier centered the Ukraine crisis on Ukraine’s domestic constitution, 
which had the effect of treating the crisis as legitimate and not wholly 
manufactured, despite knowledge of the intelligence.  It took at face value 
Russia’s view that the Ukraine war was an intrastate, rather than an interstate one, 
and treated its deniability at something like face value, and to solve it suggested 
intrastate solutions.   
Russian strategic shifts are not the only causal factor, of course.  The 
stiffening of the US and European battlefield responses in late January 2015 also 
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suggest another difference between the second period of fighting and the first.  
The second period was clearly an offensive by the separatists with direct Russian 
support; it looked something less like Russia’s doctrine of hybrid war and 
something more like a conventional war.  Russia’s supply of weapons to the 
separatists was met with a slower response during the first period of fighting, with 
the exception of when MH-17 was shot down.  But purely in the Ukraine-
separatist dynamic from June to August, Russia mostly delayed the consequences 
for its extension of military supplies to the rebels.  On the other hand, Kerry and 
other Western officials spoke out strongly and consistently against Russia once 
the breadth of the separatists’ offensive in 2015 became clear, a reaction which 
was diluted only by the Minsk diplomatic efforts.  This suggested that the 
strategic posture of the fighting force mattered for incurring balancing. 
 There were other elements that affected Western reactions.  It was 
interesting that the initial change in regime in Ukraine seems to have altered the 
basic formula of Ukraine’s sovereignty.  The flight of Viktor Yanukovych in 
February and the pro-Western orientation of the new government seemed to 
reduce the sovereign legitimacy of the central government as such despite 
Western statements about Ukraine’s territorial integrity.  Almost immediately 
following Crimea, when the Donbas fighting broke out, US and EU statements 
began to call for altered (or recognized) political status for ethnically Russian 
areas in the east.  Even in Crimea, Russia was only punished after it annexed the 
area, not when its troops arrived.  Likewise, though Strelkov and other separatist 
leaders had obvious ties to Russia, the political changeover in Kiev was 
 177 
unconventional and abrupt enough to lend some credibility to their claims of 
ethnic representation and legitimacy – and thus deniability – to their Russian 
military support. The presence of ethnic Russians was thus adopted by all sides – 
by Russia and to a striking degree by the West – as an additional barometer of 
legitimacy for governments that wanted to have troops on the ground, whether 
Kiev or Moscow.   
Russia’s power projection was also aided by the negotiation of both Minsk 
protocols.  Minsk was a classic example of how diplomatic agreements could aid 
proxy warfare by codifying a blurring of sovereignty.  Critically, Russia secured 
wording denoting a “special regime” for the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which 
could reduce Kiev’s sovereignty in the east and legitimize a continued military 
presence until vague conditions had been met.  The same concept had been used 
to justify Russia’s extended military footprint in South Ossetia after the end of the 
2008 war; with the precedent set, Russian violations of Ukrainian sovereignty 
would thereafter incite less balancing. Because Minsk demanded steps by both 
sides, European pressure would likely increase on Ukraine, rather than Russia, or 
even Ukraine and Russia evenly.  Europe had interests in Russia it did not have in 
Ukraine, such as gas, and Russia could make life unpleasant for the EU – 
prodding, poking, testing Europe’s security – in ways Ukraine could not.  Over 
time, European pressure would more and more fall on Kiev, the easier target, the 
one with fewer stakeholders.  Minsk II made this explicit.  Under the Steinmeier 
formula, Ukraine would only get the border back after its own reforms had been 
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fully implemented.  In a variety of ways Russia could ensure that they would 
never be. 
The human terrain in the east also likely delayed Western reactions, both 
by clouding the tactical picture and allowing the West to treat the problem as an 
ethnic representation issue.  The close-quarters proximity of the Ukrainian and 
Russian communities to the line of control and the fragmentation along each side 
meant that Russia could sustain a high level of violence – and thus pressure – 
without having to suffer strategic consequences.  After the ceasefire was signed 
on September 5, the cross-border shooting and territory grabs did not stop.  
Because there was no logical front line encapsulating the Russian versus 
Ukrainian community, the front line fell to wherever troops were standing at that 
moment.  And with the acknowledgement of ethnic representation as at least 
tacitly a causus belli, drawing clear lines against separatist violence was harder.  
The onus of aggression was particularly murky because in places like Donetsk, 
where the line of control cut through facilities like the airport, the different sides 
were quite literally right on top of each other.  They were seizing and losing 
control of different parts of the airport well before it became apparent to senior 
leadership in the West powers that a strategic offensive was on the way.  Likewise 
in other civilian-dominated areas, the rebels could sustain a level of violence 
through shelling of civilian areas that made spikes in the violence – the makings 
of major operations – harder to identify for outside forces.  Thus, while the second 
period of fighting really began with a significant surge in violence in December, it 
was not until the broad offensive launched in January that the West reacted.  
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When this reaction finally came, it ensured that Russia’s big push in 
January and February was a strategic failure.  Moscow was truly pawn-grabbing 
for operational gains.  As after Crimea, the United States and EU had ratcheted 
down their balancing of Russia significantly after the Minsk agreement beginning 
in October 2014.  Despite NATO officials warning of heavy fighting along the 
line of control and an influx of Russian equipment, US policymakers reverted to 
relatively sanguine public statements about Russia.  When they had to criticize, 
they criticized the proxies.  This changed dramatically in January, however, with 
the start of the separatists’ push for Mariupol and the outlying regions of Donetsk 
like Debaltseve.  These attacks included much more direct Russian involvement.  
Russian combat forces were reportedly involved in several of these operations and 
incurred strategic consequences only two weeks after the fighting broke out in 
earnest.  The EU expanded its sectoral sanctions against Russia, and the US 
threatened military involvement for the first time.  These measures were not 
operationally effective, but they were a prelude to the strategic introduction of US 
military forces into Ukraine two months later, as well as a major aid package.  
This was precisely the situation Russia’s policy was trying to avoid.  And what 
did Russia get in return?  Truly marginal gains around Donetsk city and a failed 












CHAPTER FOUR: IRAN AND HEZBOLLAH, 2005-2016  
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Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah in Lebanon has been the gold standard of 
modern proxy warfare for nearly four decades.  The support Iran has provided helped the 
group grow from a shadowy kidnapping ring in 1982 to the only Arab fighting force that 
has defeated the Israeli military.  Since its founding at the height of the Lebanese civil 
war, Hezbollah gained control of southern Lebanon, then effective control of the state, 
and then rescued Iran’s junior partner the Assad government during the Syrian civil war.  
Throughout most of these decades, outside powers – Western Europe, the United States, 
and Israel – found it difficult to balance against Iran in response.  
Iran’s patronage of Lebanese politics was not unique to the Shia.  Lebanon’s 
diverse population has provided ample opportunity for outside powers to support 
sectarian proxies.  During the Ottoman period, France championed the Maronite 
Christian community and gave it disproportionate weight in the new government at its 
independence in 1943.  In the 1960’s, as French influence faded, an influx of Palestinian 
refugees upset Lebanon’s confessional balance and invited sponsors of their own.  When 
the civil war broke out in 1975, Syria and Israel jousted with each other through 
Christian, Sunni, and Druze militias.  And after its revolution in 1979, Iran used the Shia 
proxy force Hezbollah to gain primacy over the other factions in the country and 
dominate Lebanon’s strategic orientation. 
This chapter focuses on the Iran-Hezbollah relationship from 2005 to 2016.  
Though Hezbollah’s roots go back to 1982, the Hariri assassination in 2005 was when 
Lebanon’s strategic orientation was seriously contested for the first time in the modern 
era.  During Hezbollah’s ascent in the Lebanese civil war, the global and regional balance 
of power was much different, limiting the utility of this case for modern policymakers.  
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For example, it would be extremely unlikely that Syria would have been pushed out of 
Lebanon in 2005 if it still had Soviet support.  How Iran managed to stay even while 
Syria left is of great interest here.  Second, the Lebanese civil war and the early years of 
Iran have undergone intensive study.  Comparatively, the value for focusing on more 
modern events is higher than revisiting, once again, the Islamic Revolution and 
Hezbollah’s attacks against Western targets. 
The chapter consists of three parts.  The first section will review Iran’s creation of 
Hezbollah and the growth of its ideological and material support.  Iran’s early tactical 
involvement in Hezbollah operations gave way later to strategic control of the group, 
which exercised tactical and operational independence.  It will also describe the context 
of that relationship within Lebanon’s political status quo leading up to the 2005 
assassination of Rafiq Hariri.  Second, it will examine how Iran used Hezbollah to 
achieve its goals, with a focus on four periods.  These are the Hariri assassination and 
aftermath, the July war, the 2008 Lebanese presidential crisis, and the Syrian civil war, 
particularly the offensive at Qusayr.  Third, it will analyze the strategic conclusions from 
this case.  Above all, it will describe how Iran achieved effective deniability despite its 
close support of Hezbollah.  Several factors in Lebanon affected the deniability of this 
support.  The most important of these was the two overlapping wars Hezbollah fought at 
once: its conflict with Israel as well as its conflict with internal opponents.  Hezbollah’s 
war with Israel provided justification for its Iranian support and critically reduced 
external balancing against that support.  Those weapons could then be used internally to 
guarantee Hezbollah’s independent military capability and Lebanon’s strategic 
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orientation.  Overall, Iran achieved significant deniability in 2006 and 2012, but 
experienced more balancing in 2008 and 2013. 
 
I.  Origins 
As sponsors go, Iran was a latecomer to Lebanon.  It was geographically and 
culturally distant, linked only by the size of its Shia population, and had been without a 
presence on the Mediterranean since the time of the Sassanids.  The Pahlavi Shahs had 
ignored Lebanon’s Shia.  Theirs was an ethnic nationalism, and the regime was mostly a 
status quo supporter of US policy initiatives in the region.  After the revolution, however, 
Iran’s geopolitical goals shifted along with its ideology. 
The Islamic Republic’s political ideology was a revolutionary brand of Shia 
Islamism that acted as a natural vehicle for a revisionist state.  The dominant form of 
religion in Iran was Twelver or Ismaili Shiism, which posited that political and religious 
authority stemmed from a line of twelve imams since the death of Mohammed.  The 
twelfth went into occultation as an infant, but at a given time, would return and restore 
justice to the world.421  Historically, this tradition helped non-clerical rulers since it 
removed religious authorities as potential rivals for the crown.422  That changed as 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini emerged as a key opposition leader against the Shah and 
defined a governing role for the clergy.  In 1971, he published his proposal for clerical 
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governance, the vilayet-e faqih, or governorship of the jurist.423  This doctrine essentially 
eliminated the idea of separation of powers by placing political authority in the hands of 
the clergy, particularly a faqih who could interpret God’s will into policy decisions on 
earth.424  It was a rejection of the clergy’s traditional deference to government, and a 
particular challenge to the legitimacy of avowedly religious regimes in the Middle East 
and Persian Gulf.425  There were also strong themes in Shiism of millenarianism and 
martyrdom that made it the perfect soup for a revolutionary ideology.  Acts of repression 
by the state, be they in Iran or in Lebanon, evoked the martyrdom of Hussein in the 
seventh century. Demonstrations in the beginning of 1978 fed a cycle of repression, 
funeral, demonstration, and repression that was effective in eroding the Shah’s control.426  
Iran’s revolutionary ideology, not for the first time, had grafted itself onto a social 
practice to enable more effective resistance.  In the fall, leftist elements and students 
instigated a general strike, which was joined and appropriated by the religious resistance 
to the Shah.  He abdicated in January, and days later Khomeini returned to establish a 
new state. 
Khomeini’s political ideology was not enough, however, to bridge the gap 
between competing religious and secular factions when the revolution ended and Iranians 
attempted to create a government.427  His movement sat on a stool with three legs: the 
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religious base, secular nationalists, and the leftists.  The latter two groups held very 
different ideas on women’s rights, social mores, and constitutional government than the 
seminarians of Qom.428  The new constitution codified these divides.  Iran’s president 
and parliament were elected by direct ballot and maintained day-to-day control of the 
state.429  However, the Constitution also created a twelve-member Council of Guardians, 
headed by a Supreme Leader, which would review all legislation to ensure that it was 
compatible with sharia law.430  In practice, this system stripped the elected parliament of 
most crucial decision-making abilities, and the Supreme Leader exercised near-dictatorial 
powers.431  In addition, the Supreme Leader, not the elected government, controlled the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other key sources of Iranian pressure 
abroad.  
To bridge this divide, conservative elements repeatedly took political advantage 
of confrontations with external powers, particularly the United States, to unite Iran’s 
factions (or silence them) in the face of more radical leaders and policy.  For the first nine 
months after the revolution in February 1979, Iran had trod cautiously.432  But then in 
November 1979, militant Iranian students seized control of the US embassy in Tehran. 
The crisis was used by hard-liners to consolidate their power: a top-level cleric informed 
US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that the US would “not get [its] hostages until 
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Khomeini has put all the institutions of the Islamic Revolution into practice.”433  Prime 
Minister Mehdi Bazargan, a nationalist who had aimed at building a more evenhanded 
relationship with the United States, resigned in protest.434  The outbreak of war with 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq further bolstered the revolutionary wing of the government.  
Saddam believed that this schism combined with Iran’s internal disarray and his support 
from exiled Iranians would lead to a quick victory.435  Instead, Iranians rallied behind the 
regime.  The country’s socialist president Abdolhassan Bani-Sadr, who was locked in a 
confrontation with the Council of Guardians, was forced from power.  The leftist 
opposition in Iran was eliminated, and the Iranian parliament was placed securely in the 
hands of the conservative Islamic Republican Party.436   
This consolidation of domestic power under Iran’s hard-liners led to a formulation 
of a more confrontational, revisionist foreign policy.  Iran became more aggressive 
internationally: its geopolitical alignment shifted decisively away from both the United 
States (and even the Soviet Union) to the most rejectionist Arab states.437  Tehran’s radio 
station described Khomeini as the “leader of the oppressed of the world.”438  By 1982 the 
Islamic Republic’s war aims in Iraq had became near-unconditional, including the 
annexation of most of its neighbor.439  This revisionism extended to the Gulf monarchies, 
which faced an ideological threat from the Iranian Revolution, and of course to Israel.  
For the decade after its revolution, as the war with Iraq raged, Iran engaged in an intense 
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struggle for dominance with these powers.  The use of revolutionary proxy groups, often 
but not only from Shia populations, was an integral and familiar part of Iranian efforts in 
this competition.  In its earliest days, the Islamic Republic had hosted a world conference 
of liberation organizations.  These ranged from Shia militants and the Dawa party in Iraq 
to Sunni Palestinian radicals in the Palestinian territories and Hazaras in Afghanistan.440   
But it was in Lebanon that Iranian proxy warfare would make its modern stamp.  
During this period the Lebanese Shia were experiencing their own political awakening.  
They were the poorest of Lebanon’s three major communities, a penury exacerbated by 
tremendous demographic growth and dominated by a few powerful families with a long-
standing monopoly on public life.  An Iraqi cleric, Musa al-Sadr, arrived in Lebanon a 
decade earlier as part of a broader Shia exodus from Iraq’s new Baathist regime and its 
repression of clerics and seminaries.  Sadr created a new political standard for the Shia 
called Harakat al-Mahrumin, which armed itself and became the militia Amal with the 
outbreak of the Lebanese civil war.441  Having helped shape the Shia into an armed 
political force, Sadr disappeared in 1978 on a trip to Libya.  His absence created a 
political vacuum that was filled by more militant clerics like Mohammed Fadlallah as 
well as an ideological vacuum.  Sadr’s Amal had not been particularly religious or 
revolutionary.442  Khomeini’s brand of Shia militancy was.  In the context of Lebanon’s 
civil war, Khomeini’s ideology was attractive to many not just for its religious ideology, 
but also, like in Iran, its stridently anti-Western and anti-Israel rhetoric.  After Israel’s 
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invasion of Lebanon in July 1982, these ideas attracted dissident members of Amal like 
Hussein al-Musawi and Seyyid Subhi al-Tufayli.  They asked for help and Iran’s new 
revolutionary leadership was happy to assist.443  Several hundred troops from the IRGC 
were duly sent to Lebanon to train recruits.444  In late 1982, these IRGC members 
organized dissident members of Amal and Palestinian groups to form the Lebanese 
National Resistance, which became Hezbollah.445   
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For Iran, Hezbollah was useful as a tool to achieve both its ideological and 
geopolitical objectives.  It fulfilled the religious streak in Iran’s ideological makeup, by 
promising the return of Jerusalem and an export of the revolution.  It also degraded Israel, 
one of Iran’s primary regional geopolitical opponents, and humiliated its allies like the 
United States.446  A strong proxy further allowed Iran to maintain political control of 
Lebanon, both during periods when Hezbollah was in government and when it remained 
an armed spoiler.  And for the hardline elements in Iran’s leadership, particularly the 
Revolutionary Guard, Lebanon provided an opportunity to develop its own power base 
and represented a tangible demonstration of the consolidation of power by revolutionary 
factions at home.447 
Iran’s new leaders were familiar with Lebanon: indeed some like Mohsen 
Rafiqdost, the head of the Revolutionary Guard, had trained with PLO guerillas in the 
Bequa Valley.448  Iran’s ambassadors to Syria and Lebanon in those first years, Ali Akbar 
Mohtashami and Mohammed Hassan Akhtar, described themselves respectively as 
Hezbollah’s “spiritual father” and “field father.”449  Mohtashami in particular was a key 
founding supporter of Hezbollah and an ideological advocate of exporting the revolution 
abroad.  Iran’s religious ideology was a defining influence on Hezbollah.  The party’s 
founding document specifically endorsed the vilayet-e faqih.  Like Iran, the group had an 
officially non-sectarian message, calling for the unity of Muslims across the Middle 
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East.450  It cited “Islamic Iran” as a direct source of emulation and Khomeini as its source 
of political authority.451  Even more than in Iran, however, this doctrine was not 
universally popular among Lebanon’s multisectarian population, or even among the Shia 
clergy themselves.452  Confrontation with external powers helped Hezbollah to bridge 
these divides.  Hezbollah’s charter ascribed to itself the Islamic Republic’s division of the 
world into the oppressed and the oppressors, characterized by the “arrogant powers.”453  
These were primarily the Christian Western European states, which Hezbollah believed 
were banding together with the Soviet Union in constant and historic hostility to Islam.454  
Hezbollah used attacks against Western and Israeli targets to consolidate power 
domestically and reduce opposition to its Iranian support.  In that sense, Hezbollah’s 
calculated xenophobia was a microcosm of anti-Westernism in Iran. Kidnappings and 
bombings of Western targets would thus fulfill both Hezbollah’s and Iran’s strategic and 
political ends.  The most well known early Hezbollah operations were bombings of the 
US Embassy in April 1983 and the US Marine barracks in Beirut in October, which killed 
241 Marines and 58 French paratroopers.  In September 1984, Hezbollah stuck the US 
Embassy in Beirut again, with a vehicle some reported to have an Iranian driver.455  
Kidnappings were also a widespread Hezbollah practice.  Under a variety of pseudonyms, 
Hezbollah was responsible for eighty-seven kidnappings during the 1980’s, with the most 
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victims from the United States.  Ten hostages died in its custody, including the CIA’s 
Beirut Chief of Station William Buckley.456  These operations were closely supported by 
Iran, which considered the group to be a core national interest.457  For example, one 
source suggested Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon met in April 1983 with the US Embassy 
suicide bomber before the attack and supplied him with some of the explosives he 
required.458  Iranian officials provided some kidnapping operatives diplomatic passports 
and brought at least one hostage to Iran.459  Iran also provided training for Hezbollah 
operatives in Lebanon with its own forces, primarily from the IRGC, conducted at 
training camps in the Beqaa Valley that all Hezbollah members were required to 
attend.460  By 1984, American intelligence operatives estimated that around 800 
Revolutionary Guards were present in Lebanon.461  Iran also provided a wide variety of 
weaponry to Hezbollah.  By the time of the August war, this would include about 10,000 
missiles, a capability that sponsors like Russia and Pakistan never provided to their 
proxies.  This was critical because Hezbollah was expected to be the unit of influence.  It 
had to carry all of the fighting by itself, without Iranian tactical support, which trailed off 
after the early years of the civil war.  Because IRGC personnel were not the primary 
agent of Iran’s policy in Lebanon, Hezbollah had to build up its own arsenals, cadres, and 
operational capabilities. 
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Though there was a degree of tactical independence among the hostage takers, 
Hezbollah operations came under the strategic control of Iran and were aimed at 
achieving Iranian goals.462  For example, one particular wave of kidnappings and 
bombings in 1984 was intended as a response to the kidnapping and arrest of 17 militants 
arrested in Kuwait the year before.463  This control was further illustrated when 
Hezbollah’s interests clashed with those of Syria later in the war.  After the near-total 
Israeli withdrawal in 1985, Damascus attempted to regain control of state military 
facilities in the Bekaa Valley in 1986, leading to clashes between Hezbollah and its Sunni 
proxy the SSNP.  Syria also opposed Palestinians being permitted to return to Lebanon 
and supported Amal’s fight to remove them, despite Hezbollah’s opposition.464  When 
Hezbollah gained the upper hand against Amal in February 1987, Syrian forces reentered 
West Beirut in response and killed nearly two dozen Hezbollah supporters.  Iran then 
forced Hezbollah to back down, so as not to jeopardize its relations with a key Arab state 
during its war against Iraq.  Another bout of violence between Amal and Hezbollah over 
the abduction of a US-born UN peacekeeper and the threat of Syrian intervention led to 
Iran brokering another deal.  This, too, was mostly in Syria’s favor, allowing Syrian 
troops to remain in Beirut’s southern suburbs.465   
As the Lebanese civil war progressed, an important feature of Iranian support to 
Hezbollah became the funding of its social services.  Iran provided the bulk of 
Hezbollah’s finances, from $50 million to over $100 million per year.466  This funding 
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came from Iranian government-funded businesses, such as the Relief Organization, but 
also directly from the country’s religious leadership via its religious tax.467  Hezbollah 
also developed non-Iranian sources of funding from outside of Lebanon, from pursuits 
like smuggling cigarettes.468  This social work was a key element of the group’s support 
and legitimacy among Lebanon’s population.469  Charitable institutions like the Relief 
Committee, the Islamic Health Committee, and the Jihad al-Binaa, all backed by Iran, 
received public accreditation in 1988.  The Iran-funded Reconstruction Campaign 
operated most of Hezbollah’s construction projects, provided trash collection, and 
maintained water reservoir for the public.470  The Relief Committee built hospitals, 
conducted social work, and issued student and housing loans, including seed capital for 
businesses.471  By the end of the civil war, it was distributing about two million dollars to 
nearly seven thousand families in Lebanon.472  It and the Jihad al-Binna had direct ties to 
their parent companies in Iran, which provided the bulk of their capital, and Iranian 
officials maintained offices in Lebanon to help administer the funds.473  By 1989, Iran 
was financing 90 percent of Hezbollah’s sprawling social program, which included three 
hospitals, seventeen medical clinics, and a vast commercial network of construction 
companies, supermarkets, gas stations, and other businesses.474   
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Beginning in 1989, Iran’s support for Hezbollah began to decline.  Mohsen 
Rafiqdost, an important Hezbollah supporter, was removed from command of the IRGC 
in September 1988.475  Mohtashami was prevented from joining the Council of Experts in 
1990 and from running for a parliament seat in 1992 as part of an overall 
disempowerment of the radical faction.476  Iran’s foreign policy goals had changed.  The 
country was beset by debts from the Iraq war and needed assistance with 
reconstruction.477  The Cold War was also ending: the superpowers had united to oppose 
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iraq, and revisionist states had much less ability to resist 
the American-led order.  In the face of these constraints the new Iranian president 
Hashemi Rafsanjani pursued a restrained path for Iran, cutting subsidies for Hezbollah 
and seeking to improve Iran’s relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the 
West.478  
Despite Iran’s reduced support to Hezbollah, it retained a high degree of strategic 
control.  It forced its proxy to swallow several ideological concessions to coincide with 
its changing geopolitical objectives.  First, Iran ended its opposition to Syrian troops 
remaining in Lebanon after the war and made Hezbollah follow suit, despite its recent 
clashes with the Syrian army.  The Iranian government then dropped its opposition to the 
Taif settlement in 1990.  Hezbollah concurred at its second party congress in April 1991 
over the objections of hard-liners like Hassan Nasrallah.479  Tufayli, with Iran’s and 
Fadlallah’s support, secured the party’s support for both Taif and making accommodation 
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with the other sectarian factions under essentially Amal’s vision of majoritarian 
democratic government.480  In 1991, a Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and 
Coordination was signed between Lebanon and Syria officially permitting Syrian forces 
to remain under the Taif accord.481  The United States, desiring Syrian acquiescence to 
the war against Iraq and the burgeoning peace process, did not press the issue, nor did the 
Sunni Gulf states.482  Iran also shut down Hezbollah’s practice of kidnapping, though this 
took longer, over two years.483 
With the reduction in Iran’s support, and its accommodation to some of Taif’s 
political provisions, Hezbollah made a pragmatic decision to contest the 1992 Lebanese 
parliamentary elections.484  Important Shia clerics like Fadlallah and Iran’s new Supreme 
Leader Ali Khameini both issued opinions supportive of political action in 1992, and 
Hezbollah’s highest decision-making body the Shura Council concurred.485  The rationale 
provided by Nasrallah, who had taken over the Secretary-Generalship of Hezbollah in 
February 1992, was that participation would increase Hezbollah’s resources and support 
in Lebanon, allow cooperation with other groups, and assist in preserving the legitimacy 
and efficacy of Hezbollah’s fight against Israel.486  He was right.  This decision bolstered 
Hezbollah’s legitimacy by integrating the party, its operations, and its armed 
exceptionalism into the Lebanese political system.  This had the greatest effect not among 
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other Lebanese but among potential external balancers, particularly in Europe and the 
Middle East.  Increased legitimacy would both increase Hezbollah’s operational 
effectiveness and – inasmuch as Iran’s support had been grandfathered into the current 
Lebanese status quo – increase Iranian deniability.  
 With this close a relationship between Iran and Hezbollah, it was worthwhile to 
question whether Hezbollah was properly been called a proxy or simply an appendage of 
the IRGC.  Hezbollah received its ideology, military support, and financial patronage 
from Iran.  It had tactical and operational independence, but strategically obeyed Tehran 
and adapted rapidly to Tehran’s shifting goals.  There were also IRGC personnel in 
Lebanon for training, and apocryphally to help the Hezbollahis use some advanced 
weapons.  But the IRGC never engaged Israel or other Lebanese on the ground.  Iran 
never threw its combat power into direct operations alongside Hezbollah, unlike Russia 
during its sponsorship of both Georgian and Ukrainian separatists.  Moreover, even if 
simply a result of geography, those separatists were never permitted the kind of tactical 
independence Hezbollah was allowed by Iran.  Iranian IRGC personnel did not serve as 
ranking officers for Hezbollah, and the Russian personnel certainly did so for the South 
Ossetians and Ukrainians.  These differences mattered.  Particularly in Ukraine, 
operations by Russian regular troops were flashpoints that incurred more concerted 
balancing against Moscow in a way that Iran generally avoided.  For the purposes of this 
dissertation, the combination of more tactical independence, lack of Iranian militia 
leadership, and a lack of direct IRGC involvement in combat served to reduce Iran’s 
fingerprints on the group just slightly.  Or more than Russia, anyway, which had a 






II.  Conflict 
Survival: 2004-2006 
Iranian foreign policy became increasingly defensive in the early years of US 
President George W. Bush’s tenure.  Iranian President Mohammed Khatami, a reformist, 
had continued his accelerated his accommodation with the West, but after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001 this effort frayed.487  Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah 
came under increased scrutiny as part of the broader War on Terror.  In 2002, Bush 
described Iran as a member of the “Axis of Evil,” officially including it under the general 
rubric of top targets in the war on terror.488  In August 2002, an Iranian dissident group 
released evidence of secret Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz.  Khatami’s government 
spent the next two years working to prevent its nuclear dossier from being remanded to 
the UN Security Council, amidst unprecedented international pressure.489  Perhaps most 
pressing, the American invasion of Iraq brought US troops to Iran’s doorstep, to coincide 
with its forces to the east in Afghanistan.  All of these events reinforced the basically 
defensive posture he had set Iran during his first term in office.  Iran wanted to retain 
what it had, but not draw too much attention from the US and others. 
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Hezbollah likewise settled into a basically defensive orientation.  Above all, it 
wanted to retain its arms and its determinative place in Lebanon provided by those arms.  
However, it had to sustain a certain level of conflict with Israel to justify its exceptional 
armed status.  That justification was less legal than political: increased conflict with Israel 
would both justify its militancy, validate its identity as a “resistance” organization in a 
US-dominated Middle East (not just a sectarian militia), and fracture Lebanese political 
opposition to its weapons.  That rationale had become thinner after the total Israeli 
withdrawal from Lebanon and the dissolution of its allied South Lebanon Army in 2000.  
Hezbollah claimed that Israel was still occupying the Shebaa Farms, a slice of territory 
the UN recognized as part of Syria.  The group engaged in a lower intensity level of 
conflict, mostly harassment operations against Israeli targets in the Shebaa area.  These 
operations became regularized, even stylized, reflecting its lower-intensity effort to effect 
strategic change.  So-called “rules of the game” were established, creating semi-regular 
guidelines to escalation management and target selection.490  It did not quite square the 
political circle, however, and Lebanese opposition to Hezbollah’s military operations 
increased as the Israeli presence diminished.491   
This mounting domestic opposition to Hezbollah in 2004 and the changed 
strategic environment led to the first international contestation of Lebanon’s strategic 
orientation since the Taif accords.  That summer, Iran’s ally Syria ignited a crisis by 
attempting to force the Lebanese parliament to amend Lebanon’s constitution to allow the 
compliant President Emile Lahoud a third term in office.  The Christian Lahoud served as 
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a political guarantor that Hezbollah would be able to retain its weapons and an aggressive 
check on the country’s Prime Minister, Rafic Hariri.492  Hariri was a Sunni outsider who 
in his first term as prime minister during the early nineties had sought to normalize the 
post-Taif status quo.493  But this time was different.  Hariri was already clashing regularly 
with Syria and Hezbollah, whose military operations and evident lawlessness hurt 
Lebanon’s reconstruction and foreign investment, and Hariri wanted Lahoud gone.494  On 
August 26, he was abruptly summoned to Damascus for a short, ugly meeting with Syrian 
President Bashar Assad, who threatened to “break Lebanon on [his] head” if he didn’t 
comply with the extension.495  This overt intervention in Lebanese domestic politics 
roused international opposition.  One day before the constitutional vote on Lahoud’s term 
limits, the United Nations Security Council passed UNSCR 1559, a French and American 
resolution calling for all foreign troops to leave Lebanon and the disarming of all 
remaining militias.496  Hariri resigned a month later.497  Lebanese opposition to Syria’s 
presence increased throughout the fall, including among veteran Lebanese politicians like 
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, and coalesced around Hariri.498  Syria responded with 
 
492 Norton, 125. 
493 Joshua Gleis and Benedetta Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2012), 24. 
494 Nizameddin, 102; Norton (2009), 125 
495 Kareem Shaheen, “Jumblatt Urged Hariri to Leave Lebanon After Assad Meet,” Daily 
Star (November 20, 2014), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Nov-
20/278275-jumblatt-urged-hariri-to-leave-lebanon-after-assad-meet.ashx (accessed on 
August 27, 2015). 
496 United Nations, “Resolution 1559,” S/RES/1559 (2004), http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GE-N/N04/498/92/PDF/-N0449892.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 
August 27, 2015). 
497 John Kifner, “Lebanon Agrees to Extend Term of Leader,” The New York Times 
(September 4, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/04/world/middleeast/l-ebanon-
agrees-to-extend-term-of-leader-imposed-by-syria.html (accessed on August 26, 2015).  
498 Norton, 126. 
 200 
physical threats to opposition leaders.  Then, on February 14, 2005, Hariri was driving 
past the Hotel St. George in Beirut when his motorcade was hit with a massive explosion 
that killed him and twenty-one others.499   
The international response was swift, unprecedented for a Lebanese political 
murder, and coalesced quickly around on removing Syria’s troop presence from Lebanon.  
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued an immediate statement that condemned 
the bombing and called for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559.  
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Nicholas Burns in remarks that day 
also called for the implementation of 1559, like Rice calling out Syria – but only Syria – 
by name.500  On February 15, the United States withdrew its ambassador from Damascus 
in protest.  Scott McClellan, the White House spokesman, made it clear the withdrawal 
was in response to the bombing and focused particularly on Syria’s military forces.  He 
referred to “serious concerns” about Syria’s behavior, saying “Syria and their troop 
presence in Lebanon is [sic] a destabilizing voice in the region.”  He added: “…the 
terrorist attack that took place yesterday on former Prime Minister Hariri underscored the 
importance of Syria taking steps to change its behavior, by withdrawing its forces.”501  
There was remarkable international consensus around removing this presence, 
particularly given the schisms Bush’s Iraq War had caused in the western alliance.  
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United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, and 
French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac all issued similar calls. 
Facing intense pressure, Damascus began to bend.  Syria offered several 
compromises in an attempt to retain its whole footprint and delay action on its troop 
presence until the international pressure either stalled out or fractured.  First, it suggested 
a partial withdrawal by the end of March and then negotiations for a complete 
withdrawal.  The US refused.  A White House spokesman called it a “half measure that 
does not go far enough.” Then Assad suggested a different way, promising to withdraw 
all forces to the Bekaa Valley where Hezbollah and Iran’s IRGC were present.  In public 
remarks, Bush rejected that option as well, again calling it a “half measure.”   
By early March the US began to realize that just removing Syria’s military 
presence would not be sufficient.  Rice broadened the focus slightly to try and encompass 
the whole Syrian apparatus in public statements on March 3 and 4, saying that “UNSC 
Resolution 1559 says withdraw your troops.  It is also the case they need to withdraw 
their security personnel because Syrian security personnel, their intelligence services, cast 
a long shadow over Lebanon, and it is going to be very difficult for the Lebanese people 
to exercise their franchise freely in the upcoming elections with Syrian personnel still 
there.”502 
Bush echoed that addition during an interview a day later, saying “Lebanese 
citizens who have watched free elections in Iraq are now demanding the right to decide 
their own destiny, free of Syrian control and domination” and that “a Syrian withdrawal 
of all its military and intelligence personnel would help ensure that the Lebanese 
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elections occur as scheduled in the spring, and that they will be free and fair.”503  Bush 
expanded on the more comprehensive theme on March 16, recognizing that even a full 
troop withdrawal itself would not be sufficient, saying “We believe that there will be a 
thriving democracy, but only if – the but only if – Syria withdraws not only her troops 
completely out of Lebanon, but also her secret service organizations, intelligence 
organizations -- not secret service, intelligence organizations.”504 
But what the US casually described as Syria’s intelligence organizations was 
actually a heuristic for the proxy support that guaranteed the broader hard-power basis of 
Lebanon’s strategic orientation.  This support represented a coalition of forces that 
guaranteed Lebanon’s strategic orientation.  This coalition had three legs: Syria’s 
support, Iran’s support, and Hezbollah’s domestic legitimacy.  Syria’s support was itself 
comprised of both its military presence – the 30,000 troops left over from the civil war – 
and its intelligence and security apparatus.  While certainly its military had equities in 
remaining in Lebanon, networks of corruption and influence that had become entrenched 
over two decades, the strategic orientation of Lebanon was not dependent on it.  In fact, 
that troop presence was actually a liability to Syria’s (and more importantly, Hezbollah 
and Iran’s) strategic control of the country because it delegitimized the latter two legs of 
the stool and gave the international community a visible target to balance against.  It was 
no coincidence that the primary leverage point for the international community was the 
most visible, and the more deniable links – ipso facto, the more effective links – endured.   
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The irony was that the thriving democracy Bush referenced had less to do with 
Syria’s troop presence and more to do with the rest of the coalition of influence that 
allowed Hezbollah to remain under arms: not just Syria but Iran and Hezbollah’s 
domestic political legitimacy.  The key strategic concern for Hezbollah was not 
necessarily keeping Syrian forces in the country, which was disproportionately easy for 
the international community to oppose, less justifiable domestically, and not as 
proportionately critical to its power in Lebanon.  Rather, it was the UN’s investigation 
into the Hariri killing and subsequently the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).  
Opposing the investigation was a top priority of Nasrallah, who routinely referred to it as 
a US-Zionist conspiracy.505  It primarily targeted the second and third legs of the 
coalition’s power, the more shadowy proxy support it received from Iran and Syria and 
the legitimacy it enjoyed among the international community.  Critical to this legitimacy 
was Hezbollah’s use of anti-Israeli operations to justify its special status.  Hezbollah’s 
exceptionalism allowed it to maintain an advantageous sectarian power balance without 
incurring internal and external balancing.  It would lose legitimacy as it appeared less 
organic to the population, less related to the fight against Israel, and more sectarian and 
inwardly-focused on power.  By publicly indicting Hezbollah for sectarian murder to 
maintain its privileged posture, the investigation could certify the elimination of the 
fiction that Hezbollah acted on behalf of the nation and give its enemies something more 
tangible to balance against.   
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This was a key point in Hezbollah’s decision to launch street protests on March 8, 
2005, when half a million Hezbollah and Amal members rallied in Beirut to support 
Lahoud and oppose a foreign investigation.  The demonstrations were not explicitly 
demanding that Syrian troops remain.  Instead, Hezbollah tried to insist that any 
investigation into the Hariri killing consist solely of Lebanese, who would be more 
subject to local pressure.506  It was not enough: a rival demonstration brought over a 
million people to the main square of Beirut on March 14, demanding an investigation into 
Hariri’s murder and the formation of a national government.  The UN dispatched a fact-
finding team which declared in March that Syria bore the responsibility for increasing 
Lebanon’s political tension through its meddling.507  On April 7, the Security Council 
established the UN International Independent Investigating Commission (UNIIIC) to 
more thoroughly investigate the Hariri murder.508  Under heavy international pressure, 
Syria announced its total military withdrawal from Lebanon on April 26, 2005. 
However, even with the ongoing investigation, it was more challenging to 
leverage US and international pressure against the remaining parts of Hezbollah’s 
strategic coalition, which were more covert and thus deniable.  The challenge of more 
deniable support made it more difficult to focus attention other than through the work of 
the investigators, and the intricacies of Lebanese domestic politics were – unsurprisingly 
 
506 Norton (2009), 131. 
507 United Nations, “Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Lebanon inquiring into the 
causes, circumstances, and consequences of the assassination of former Prime Minister 
Rafik Hariri,” S/205/203 (March 24, 2005), 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/79CD8AAA858FDD2D85256FD500536047 
(accessed on September 1, 2015). 
508 United Nations, “Resolution 1595,” S/RES/1595 (2005), http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GE-N/N05/299/98/PDF-/N0529998.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 
on August 28, 2015). 
 205 
– less of a leverage point than Syria’s military had been.  The IRGC and Syria’s 
intelligence personnel were still in Lebanon.  Bush reiterated when the report of the 
investigative chief Detlev Metlis report came out on October 24, 2005 two themes: one, 
that the international community was united, and two, that the intelligence services 
needed to get out.  They did not.  Iran, for its part, had escaped curiously undamaged 
throughout the entire Hariri affair, though it was an integral part of the same coalition the 
US was set on dismantling.  Bush’s only early reference to Iran in the context of Hariri 
was on February 21, and then only in the context of Iran’s use of Hezbollah to threaten 
Israel and the peace process.509  It was not until May 19, over two months later, when the 
top US career diplomat, Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, mentioned Iranian 
support for Hezbollah in the domestic Lebanese context.510  However, he only referred to 
Iran’s role in the broader context of UNSCR 1559, not Hariri’s killing.511  This was 
somewhat understandable, since no direct evidence linked the murder to Iran and US 
pressure on this point might have fractured the international consensus.  But it was also a 
key element – probably the key element – of Hezbollah’s ability to do what it did. 
The UN effort did have internal consequences.  The Metlis investigation did 
damage to Hezbollah’s domestic political standing.  Once Hezbollah’s effort to block an 
investigation failed, and Metlis began to name names, it frayed Lebanon’s fragile national 
consensus.  In December 2005, the Lebanese parliament voted to authorize an 
international tribunal to try suspects in the Hariri murder, forcing Hezbollah and affiliated 
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members to walk out.  Domestic political pressure on Hezbollah increased through the 
winter and spring of 2006, including public mockery of its armed status.512  Even a 
bombing campaign against leading public figures like columnist Samir Kassir failed to 
abort Lebanese cooperation with the tribunal.  For the most part, though, Lebanese of 
other sectarian factions needed no prodding to understand that Hezbollah was a sectarian 
actor intent on retaining its power.  But they could not alter the status quo alone; they 
needed support since Hezbollah had guns and they did not. 
However, it was challenging for the international community that supported the 
March 14 coalition to add tangible support to the investigation and against Hezbollah’s 
political legitimacy, even at a time of nearly-unified political balancing.  When asked 
about that political legitimacy early after the Hariri assassination, White House 
spokesman McClellan dodged.  He repeated that Hezbollah was a terrorist organization, 
and urged disarmament of all militias per UNSCR 1559.  In an interview in March 2006, 
Bush was vague about what other steps needed to be taken.  He called for an “open and 
free and transparent society,” adding, “peace in Lebanon is going to be achieved…by 
people in Lebanon who are dedicated to the future.”  Rather than more international 
pressure, “ultimately the decisions have to be made by the Lebanese citizens that they 
want something better than violence and war and division.”  On Lahoud, he was again 
mushy, saying “I think the characteristics for the President ought to be somebody who is 
independent-minded, somebody who focuses on his -- the future of the country, 
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somebody who understands that foreign influences inside of a country can be very 
negative.”513 
In point of fact, the independence or not-independence of the Lebanese president 
depended on the special status of Hezbollah in the country as an unbridgeable spoiler 
faction.  The group’s special domestic position – and its value as a proxy – came from its 
weapons and its weapons came from Iran.  Indeed, it was Iranian support that made 
Hezbollah an international problem: i.e., a problem that could not be handled by any or 
all of the other Lebanese factions domestically, which had no such backing.  Calling for 
the implementation of UNSCR 1559 but not expanding the aperture specifically beyond 
Syria suggested that Iran (and a certain portion of Hezbollah’s exceptionalism) had more 
deniability than Syria did.  Iranian support could be justified sufficiently as protection 
against Israel.  Hezbollah just needed a war. 
 
The July War 
On July 12, 2006, less than three weeks after Hamas seized an Israeli soldier in 
Gaza, Hezbollah conducted a raid across the Israeli border, capturing two Israeli soldiers 
and killing three.  The IDF quickly threw a second unit after them, a rescue team with 
tank support.  After the tank hit a mine and the team was withdrawn, Israel’s Minister of 
Defense Amir Peretz ordered a major offensive.514   
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Israel’s response was not entirely extraordinary.  It had reacted harshly to a 
Hezbollah rocket attack two months earlier that escalated into a heavy tit-for-tat exchange 
of rocket fire.  However, the conflict was not the result of an Iranian or Hezbollah 
strategic initiative.  Indeed, Nasrallah would admit later that had he known the scale of 
the Israeli response, the chances of launching such an operation would have been “not 
even one percent.”515  It arose from a strategic Israeli response to a Hezbollah tactical 
initiative, an attempt by Jerusalem to restore its military deterrent and change the 
strategic balance in the south.516  But Hezbollah was fortunate.  Not only did Israel not 
achieve its goals, the key strategic outcome of the conflict was the shattering of the 
external diplomatic consensus pressuring Hezbollah, including the US, Britain, the EU, 
and many Sunni Arab states.  This coalition had empowered domestic Lebanese 
opposition to Hezbollah, threatening the group’s proxy relationships and thus its 
existence.   
Initially, the US came down hard on both Hezbollah and its sponsors in its initial 
statement after the kidnapping, calling it an “unprovoked act of terrorism,” and that “we 
also hold Syria and Iran, which have provided long-standing support for Hezbollah, 
responsible for today’s violence.”  It also poked at Hezbollah’s domestic legitimacy, 
saying that the actions “threaten Lebanon’s security and are an affront to the sovereignty 
of the Lebanese Government. Hezbollah's actions are not in the interest of the Lebanese 
people, whose welfare should not be held hostage to the interests of the Syrian and 
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Iranian regimes.”517  It was not alone: the regional backers of the March 14 coalition and 
other Arab states reacted to the war with condemnation of Hezbollah.  Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, Egypt, several Gulf monarchies, and the Palestinian Authority all criticized 
Nasrallah’s actions five days after the initial operation, calling the attacks “unexpected, 
inappropriate, and irresponsible.”518  The source of that opposition was not hard to trace: 
it was largely linked to the threat of Iran. 
In the subsequent fighting, Hezbollah was almost entirely on its own and proved 
again resilient even in conventional combat against Israeli units.  Part of this was due to 
the disconnect between Israel’s strategic goals and its means.  Its goals were wildly 
ambitious:  In a press conference Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert laid out four 
objectives for a campaign against Hezbollah. First, the kidnapped soldiers would be 
returned home.  Second, Israel would change the strategic situation on its border with 
Lebanon.  Third, Israel would rebuild its military deterrent, which had lost some of its 
luster since the military’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.  Lastly, all Hezbollah 
fighters in the south of Lebanon would be disarmed.519  These were almost farcical goals, 
ambitions Israel had not been able to achieve during 18 years of occupying Lebanon with 
its own forces and its own proxy army.  They were even more unlikely because there was 
little desire among the Israelis to commit ground forces to Lebanon; the IDF thus initially 
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relied on stand-off attacks with artillery and air strikes.520  These began with airstrikes on 
the night of July 12-13 against (among other targets) Hezbollah’s leadership offices, main 
television station, and two Lebanese military airfields.521  In response, Hezbollah initiated 
a rocket bombardment against civilian targets as far south as Haifa.  
One of the long-running impediments for Iran retaining deniability in its support 
for Hezbollah was that as Israel withdrew to its own territory, and rolled up its “security 
zones,” its border with Lebanon became more defined and less ambiguous.  This posed a 
problem.  A more defined border meant that its capacities would have to be greater to 
inflict damage.  However, it also meant that successful attacks would have to be more 
complex and high-profile, and thus more obviously interstate aggression, proving an 
easier target for international opposition and lowering its sponsor’s deniability.  This 
border issue helped to make long-range rockets particularly attractive weapons.  Prior to 
the Lebanon 2006 war, Iran had supplied Hezbollah with tens of thousands of rockets, 
including advanced Fajr and Khaybar missiles as well as Katyushas.  It had also supplied 
anti-ship missiles and unmanned aerial drones.522  The bombardment lasted throughout 
the conflict.523  These weapons were effective at maintaining Hezbollah’s level of 
military conflict with Israel and thus mantle of resistance, but also were quite clearly 
Iranian- and Syrian-supplied (and -operated, allegedly, in a few cases).  Indeed, it is 
telling that Israeli complaints of Iranian involvement often came against the group’s high-
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tech missile capability.  Unlike the rockets, this advanced capability did not significantly 
alter the balance or power between the two sides, but did draw attention to Iran’s role.  
For example, Hezbollah successfully hit the Israeli Navy ship Hanit on July 14 with an 
Iranian-made anti-ship missile, a sophisticated weapon the Israeli military believed 
required the direct involvement of Iranian specialists.524  On July 18, Olmert went 
further, blaming Iran for timing the initial attack to divert attention from international 
opposition to its nuclear program at home.525 
During these first weeks, the international community stayed mostly united 
against Hezbollah and its sponsors, but the cracks were beginning to show.  The G8 
summit statement on July 16, 2006 blamed Hezbollah and Hamas for igniting the 
conflict, but did not name check Syria and Iran specifically.  Rather it referred to 
“extremist elements” the US insisted meant Iran and Syria as the “backers and funders of 
Hezbollah.526  The fissures grew deeper as Israel’s operations against Hezbollah 
symmetric warfare caused civilian casualties.  The statement also called for Israeli 
restraint and to avoid innocent civilians.  France had been a close partner of the US with 
regards to UNSC 1559, but already felt that Israel was acting disproportionately, with 
French President Jacques Chirac stating that Israel had used excessive force.527  Russian 
President Vladimir Putin darkly hinted that Israel seemed to be pursuing “wider goals” in 
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the conflict.528  In a White House press briefing following the G8 meeting, Under 
Secretary of State Nick Burns acknowledged these tensions but stressed that on UNSC 
1559 and other priorities like Iran’s nuclear program, there was nonetheless diplomatic 
consensus.529 
Bush remained willing to continue to call out Hezbollah’s sponsors by name, as 
he did in his weekly radio address.  The war was, in fact, having the effect of prioritizing 
Iran over Syria as the guilty party in the eyes of the United States.  But in his joint press 
conference with Tony Blair, his ally was going the other direction.  Bush named Iran and 
Syria as the antagonists in the context of Lebanese domestic politics, and demanded they 
stop using “violence to stop the spread of peace and democracy.”  He described that 
support – particularly Iranian support – the “root cause” of the instability with Israel.  The 
order of priority was reversed: he was beginning to call out Iran alone and then Iran and 
Syria.  But Blair could not go that far, only calling for a Lebanon “free of militias and 
foreign interference, and a Lebanon that governs its own destiny, as is called for by UN 
Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1680.”  He would not even allude to the 
culpability of “sponsors” or some such construction.530 
These fissures were exacerbated by Israel’s early strategic decision to treat 
Hezbollah and the Lebanese government as one and the same; or, at least, to expand 
greatly the range of national government facilities it considered legitimate targets.  This 
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included some of Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure.  Olmert publicly blamed the 
Lebanese government as a whole for the war, saying it was the action of a “sovereign 
state” trying to undermine regional stability.531  After the Hanit attack, Israel claimed that 
the Lebanese government had sent targeting data to the missile crew and responded by 
destroying Lebanese radar stations.  Israeli aircraft subsequently hit bridges and ports 
across southern Lebanon, as well as gasoline depots, food stations, and Beirut 
international airport.532  Militarily, this made some sense.  The attacks could cut off 
Hezbollah’s units in southern Lebanon, allow for more saturated airstrikes, and perhaps 
bring home to the Lebanese population some of the cost of facilitating Hezbollah’s 
operations.  But it had a strategic cost.  Conflating the two essentially bought into 
Hezbollah’s argument that it was a national organization and thus increased Iran’s 
deniability about projecting power.  However much the other Lebanese factions might 
like to confront Hezbollah, they could not without external support, which was damaged 
by Israel’s actions.  The Lebanese government was forced to issue condemnations of the 
Israeli attacks, validating Iran and Syria’s position and (most critically) fissures among its 
own external backers, which included Israeli allies.533  Potentially supportive external 
powers, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, were forced to issue statements condemning 
Israel, rather than Iran or Hezbollah.  Given the internal pressure Hezbollah was under at 
that time, it was the wrong choice. 
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This dynamic became more acute after Israeli forces began their ground offensive 
into Lebanon on July 19.  Israeli forces entered a number of Shia border towns like 
Maroun ar-Ras and Bint Jbeil, which they reached on July 24.534  As combat intensified, 
civilian casualties increased.  On July 30, Israeli forces struck a residential complex in the 
town of Qana, killing sixteen children among the twenty-eight civilian casualties.  Amidst 
international uproar, Israel agreed to halt airstrikes for forty-eight hours while the UN 
evacuated additional civilians from the area.535  
 
Source: Arkin, 52. 
 
The US tried to sit on the growing disagreement.  At US National Security 
Advisor Stephen Hadley’s press briefing on August 6, he stressed the international 
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consensus around Hezbollah that had existed on 1559, and stated that the document “sets 
out the framework that we have really been pursuing since then.”  And that Hezbollah 
was the offending party, so that logically the international consensus that existed on 1559 
applied to the war.  He argued that since 1559 “made clear that [Hezbollah] were 
supported by Syria and Iran.  So the international community has made very clear who 
the offending party here is.”  Under questioning, he stressed that the nuclear consensus 
and the recent Security Council vote on a sanctions resolution was a signal to Iran, even 
in the context of the Lebanese crisis, and that the international community was united on 
the broader issue of Iran.536  But it was not. 
By early August, the diplomatic focus on those sponsors had totally broken down.  
After a second major Israeli push on August 9-10, a UN-brokered ceasefire came into 
effect on August 14.537  Over a thousand Lebanese civilians would eventually be killed 
by the war.538  Human Rights Watch called Israeli attacks “indiscriminate” and suggested 
they may have amounted to war crimes.539  The day of the ceasefire, Bush remained 
resolute in a speech to the State Department when he again blamed Hezbollah’s sponsors, 
particularly Iran, with their domestic hardship. “Responsibility for the suffering of the 
Lebanese people,” he said, “also lies with Hezbollah's state sponsors, Iran and Syria.  The 
regime in Iran provides Hezbollah with financial support, weapons, and training,” and 
“Syria allows Iranian weapons to pass through its territory into Lebanon.”  He followed 
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on to stress that “the task is more than just helping the Siniora government; the task is … 
to continually remind the Iranians of their obligations, their obligations not to develop a 
nuclear weapons program, their obligations not to foster terrorism and promote 
terrorism.”  The White House specifically referred to $150-$200 million that Hezbollah 
received from Iran each year.540 
The increased human cost of the war strengthened Hezbollah by coopting or 
sidelining potential supporters of its domestic rivals and enemies of its supporters, Iran 
and Syria.  After Qana, Sunni Arab countries were forced to state decisively their 
opposition to the Israeli campaign, abandoning their earlier positions and adding their 
voices to those calling for a ceasefire.  Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said his 
country “condemns the irresponsible Israeli attack on the Lebanese village of Qana which 
led to the loss of innocent victims, most of which were women and children,” and urged a 
halt to the war.541  The UN’s Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for the Security 
Council to condemn the Qana attack as well.542  Most significantly, British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair faced a mutiny when his former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and 
others condemned Israel’s actions or broke with Blair’s support of US policy.543    
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Overall, Hezbollah had been rehabilitated by the conflict: not, significantly, 
because its own position domestically had been strengthened, but because that of its 
external opponents (and thus their potential support to internal proxies) had been 
weakened.  Israel had publicly failed to achieve any of its goals.  Despite an estimated 
five to one fatality ratio, Hezbollah’s battlefield effectiveness remained intact, 
particularly its missile capabilities, which continued to fire on Israel at a high rate until 
the end.544  The resolution ending the war, UNSC 1701, expanded the UN’s 
peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon along the border with Israel and called for the 
deployment of government forces throughout the south.  It also demanded that Iran and 
Syria stop arming Hezbollah.  However, since the enforcement of 1701 depended on the 
political will of the same states that were now fractured, it did not fundamentally change 
UNIFIL’s disinterest in confronting Hezbollah.  Most significantly, the war had 
completely fractured the US-European-Sunni Arab coalition supporting the March 14 
alliance in Lebanon.  Without counter-support to its opponents, Hezbollah’s operational 
capacity would be enough domestically to win any confrontation.  That support, if it 
came, would likely be quantitatively less, since fewer nations were united on it.  And it 
would be less justified, and thus deniable as aggression, because its recipients’ enemy – 
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Reassertion: Lebanon’s Political Crisis, 2006-2008 
Iran had largely stayed out of the war.  Partly this was its model of proxy support: 
Hezbollah took the lead in fighting, and the IRGC stayed out of operational positions, 
focusing on weapons supply and financing.  Iran was mostly relegated to condemning 
Israel’s action, threatening retaliation, and complaining about UN inaction and its own 
exclusion from the negotiating process elsewhere.545  Iran’s primary influence came 
before and after, through building up Hezbollah’s capabilities.  After the war, it 
resupplied Hezbollah nearly double the missile stockpile it had expended.546  Though like 
Hezbollah it had been taken by surprise by the escalation of the conflict, broadly 
speaking Iranian policy was becoming more offensive.  Iran’s 2005 presidential elections 
had been won by the conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had promised more 
confrontation with Israel and the West.547  Tehran’s primary focus during this period was 
next door: the July War came as Iran was increasing its commitment to Shia insurgents in 
Iraq.  In this context, Hezbollah was becoming increasingly useful as a model and trainer 
for Iranian proxies.  Its operatives had reportedly been in Iraq since 2003, coordinating 
with Shia militia leaders.548  However, during this period Iran began to greatly expand the 
number of so-called “special groups” in Iraq, paramilitary units specially trained and 
armed by Hezbollah and other Iranian agents in particularly lethal tactics.549  In May 
2006, Iran reorganized its special groups to more closely track Hezbollah, with leadership 
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changes and training.550  The insurgency not only represented a chance to dominate 
Baghdad, but to humiliate the United States and weaken its influence in the region.  
Though there had been domestic opposition to Hezbollah’s actions in Lebanon 
leading up to the July War, the group emerged strengthened.  The Sunni, Druze, and 
Christian opposition elements of the March 14 coalition had not been mollified by the 
war – if anything, the opposition had been emboldened – but without external help they 
could not effectively confront Hezbollah.551  That external help was lacking for a variety 
of reasons beyond political will.  Risk aversion, for one: the United States believed 
arming sub-national groups was too risky, and focused instead on arming the Lebanese 
military.  Bureaucratic slowness, for another.  The first portion of this aid didn’t reach the 
Lebanese armed forces until the fall of 2006.552  President Bush blamed Assad for 
Lebanon’s political turmoil over the tribunal, but could offer no better remedy than 
increasing US aid to Lebanon’s government.553  The effective policy output of that aid 
was unclear, since the Lebanese military showed no signs of being willing to confront 
Hezbollah or the IRGC.  But there was also the prioritization of the Iraq war.  As 2006 
turned into 2007, and the insurgency in Iraq intensified, the US began looking for places 
to accommodate Syria, to help stem the flow of foreign fighters, and some officials 
pushed for Lebanon to be it.554 
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Importantly, there was also no target as clear as the Syrian military to leverage 
against.  Iran still maintained troops in Lebanon, but they were lower profile: they were 
trainers and enablers, unlike Syria’s soldiers that had been the primary agents of 
influence. And building an international coalition to confront them, with their excuse of 
the Israeli threat, was far harder (especially postwar) than confronting them or the Syrians 
over compliance with 1559.  Iran aggressively replenished Hezbollah’s missile arsenals, 
to a point where the group was more equipped with more advanced weaponry than before 
the 2006 war.555  Iranian support also helped strengthen Hezbollah’s domestic legitimacy.  
Though Hezbollah itself was the agent of Iran’s influence, Hezbollah was part of the 
Lebanese political and social system in a way that Syrian forces were not.  This made it 
much more challenging to counter.  Iran, through Hezbollah, had donated significant 
sums to rehabilitate the south after the August 2006 war, earning itself support among the 
population and a useful narrative internationally.556  This served to increase Iran’s 
deniability about its support for Hezbollah.   
During this postwar period, Hezbollah aggressively went on the offensive against 
both the Hariri tribunal and the Siniora government’s relative independence.  Certainly, 
Hezbollah believed the tribunal was itself balancing behavior, one more way of the US 
targeting its arms, and a continuation of UNSCR 1559 and 1701.557  Its investigation and 
findings would erode Hezbollah’s claim to being a national resistance organization, and 
thus hurt Iran’s deniability about arming the group in defiance of UN Security Council 
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resolutions.  Should the tribunal issue indictments against Hezbollah and its sponsors, it 
would diminish the fiction that Hezbollah acted on behalf of the nation and potentially 
ignite balancing behavior on behalf of external powers.  If Nasrallah or the political 
leadership was indicted, Hezbollah’s political wing would be at risk of – for example – 
being designated a terrorist organization, which could impede its travel and financial 
operations overseas.  Key Western governments like the United Kingdom and Australia 
had already placed Hezbollah’s military wing on its proscribed list.  Only the Netherlands 
had banned its political wing; France, Germany, and the EU as a whole had abstained 
from both.  This was evidence of the legitimacy Hezbollah’s “national” status gained it, 
not within Lebanon, but among potential external opponents.   
Hezbollah’s offensive against the political system largely reversed its domestic 
setbacks since February 2005.  On November 15, 2006, the UN Secretary General 
submitted his report on negotiations with the Lebanese government to form a tribunal.  
On November 24, the President of the Security Council asked him and the Siniora 
government to proceed.  Hezbollah’s five cabinet ministers and its one allied Christian 
minister promptly withdrew from the cabinet to try and stop the government’s approval 
of the tribunal.558  Targeted killings began.  No sooner had the STL been requested than 
Pierre Gemayel, Minister of the Industry and son of the former president, was 
murdered.559  These caught US attention: Bush’s statement when Gemayel was killed on 
November 21, 2006 focused on Hezbollah’s sponsors.  “The United States remains fully 
committed to supporting Lebanon's independence and democracy in the face of attempts 
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by Syria, Iran, and their allies within Lebanon to foment instability and violence,” he 
said.  He also urged action on the STL as a countermeasure: “We urge the U.N. Security 
Council and the Secretary-General today to take the remaining steps needed to establish 
the special tribunal for Lebanon that will try those accused of involvement in the 
assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri, and to ensure that that tribunal can also 
bring to justice those responsible for related assassinations, assassination attempts, and 
other terrorist attacks.”   
Alongside its assassination efforts, Hezbollah organized a large gathering of half-
a-million people in December to occupy central Beirut and prevent signature of the 
protocol.560  After the government signed an agreement for the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon on January 23, 2007, and the agreement was sent to the parliament for 
ratification, Hezbollah called a general strike and low-level sectarian clashes erupted 
throughout Beirut, resulting in several fatalities.561  A majority of members of the 
Lebanese parliament requested a Security Council resolution for a Chapter VII special 
tribunal on April 4.  After the UN Security Council duly created the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon in June, targeted killings accelerated.  In July and again in September, two pro-
government members of parliament – a Sunni and a Christian – were killed by bombs.   
Amidst the violence and tension over the investigation, Lebanese President 
Lahoud finally stepped down in November 2007 when his term expired, and the political 
crisis became acute.  The United States opposed the candidacy of General Michel 
Suliman, viewed as too close to Hezbollah, and Hezbollah-aligned factions refused to 
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vote on a replacement for Lahoud without a two-thirds consensus.562  Brigadier General 
Francois al-Hajj, a contender for Suliman’s replacement in the army’s top position, was 
killed in December 2007.563  A particularly effective assassination came on January 26, 
2008, when Lebanese police captain Wissam Eid was killed by an explosion.  Eid had 
been working on his own time to piece together cell phone records connecting Hezbollah 
members to the Hariri killing, sifting through reams of data to establish patterns.  The UN 
investigators were sufficiently intrigued by what he had found that they asked to meet 
him.  He was killed shortly thereafter.564  The political stalemate was deepened by the 
parliament’s deadlock and its inability to choose a successor to Lahoud.565  
The combination of attacks and political movements intended to counter the 
March 14 coalition were hardening the US position on Hezbollah, but also on Iran, at 
least in the context of Lebanese domestic politics.  Bush put out a blistering statement the 
day of the Eid killing, demanding that “Syria, Iran, and their allies end their interference 
in and obstruction of Lebanon’s political process.”566  A few days later, on the third 
anniversary of Hariri’s death, he put in another plug: “it is vital that the perpetrators of 
these attacks must be brought to justice…Syria, Iran, and their allies must end their 
efforts to undermine Lebanon’s legitimacy government and to interfere with its political 
process.”567  A month later on March 24, Cheney called Iran a “darkening shadow” on 
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the region during a trip to Turkey.  Even more than its nuclear program or its malfeasance 
in Iraq, he began with Lebanon, saying, “[t]he concerns that leaders in the region have for 
what they see happening in Iran, and what they see Iran doing in the region is perhaps not 
universal, but it's close to it. And that goes with everything from their support for 
Hezbollah, their efforts – working through the Syrians, for example, to interfere with the 
political process inside Lebanon...”568  This was a change from the earlier US focus 
during 2005 on Iran’s sponsorship of Hezbollah in the context of putting Israel under 
threat. 
The political crisis culminated on May 9, 2008, when a general loyal to Walid 
Jumblatt fired an airport security official who was feeding Hezbollah information.569  At 
the same time, the government began an investigation into the group’s private fiber-optic 
communications network.  In response, Hezbollah supporters poured into the streets on 
May 7.  They invaded Sunni sections of West Beirut, taking over buildings and 
demanding the government cease interference with the “resistance.” The traditionally 
neutral army did not intervene and Sunni militias in the capital were quickly overrun.570  
Fighting spread to Druze areas south of Beirut and north to the Sunni city of Tripoli.  The 
United States blasted this effort and drew particular attention to Hezbollah’s “Iranian and 
Syrian sponsors” which “continue to undermine Lebanon's sovereignty and democratic 
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institutions.”  He urged international action but tipped none: “The United States is 
consulting with other governments in the region and with the UN Security Council about 
measures that must be taken to hold those responsible for the violence in Beirut 
accountable.”571   
Iran’s perceived tactical offensive with Hezbollah in the domestic political sphere 
had clearly refocused the United States.  In a May 12 interview with al-Arabiya ahead of 
a major Iran-focused trip to the region, after Siniora was put under house arrest, Bush 
said “I was hopeful that Hezbollah would become patriotic, patriots to Lebanon, and not 
respond every time to Syrian or Iranian demands.”  He stressed his support for 
multilateral action, but explicitly refused to rule out military action.  He went further 
during a BBC Arabic interview, saying “Hezbollah would be nothing without Iranian 
support, and Iranian [sic] is the crux of many of the problems in the Middle East...So a lot 
of my trip is going to be to get people to focus not only on Lebanon, remember Lebanon, 
but also to remember that Iran causes a lot of the problems around the Middle East.”  
When Bush was pushed further, he asserted the success of democracy in Lebanon was 
paramount in the administration’s counter-Iran strategy.  “So the best way to deal with 
the Iranians in the Middle East is to help the young democracy of Lebanon survive,” he 
said.  Secretary Rice echoed that view of Iran’s close control on May 18, 2008, 
describing how Hezbollah had shown that it was not a resistance movement but by 
attacking Lebanese, but simply “an arm of Iran.”  But like in 2005, it was not clear how 
to counter these tactical actions enabled by this more deniable support.  Washington sent 
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the guided missile cruiser U.S.S. Cole to the region, increased aid to the Lebanese armed 
forces, and loosely referenced sanctions.   
The catch was that Iran’s power projection elsewhere, such as Iraq and against 
Israel, may have made the US threat perception more acute but dulled that of others.  
Bush admitted these international schisms in balancing Iran before he left for the region: 
“The problem is, some folks just don't see the same – the threat that Iran poses in the 
Middle East, for example, as others do.  I view them as a serious threat to peace, and 
therefore I spend a lot of time trying to convince other nations, other leaders to join in 
this common concern.”  In fact, the US-French alliance that had pushed 1559 through in 
2004 was on its last legs.  American and French views of Iran were diverging too 
broadly, spurred partially by US interest in stopping Iranian-made weapons from coming 
into Iraq and French interest in achieving a nuclear deal with Iran.  France had a much 
different view of the viability of Hezbollah’s domestic legitimacy than the US did.  It had 
never listed Hezbollah’s political wing as a terrorist organization, and had engaged the 
group at different levels throughout Lebanon’s 19-month political stalemate.  This 
engagement included a high-level summit in July 2007 that the US had not supported.572   
Even US attention was not undivided amid competing regional priorities.  The 
takeover of Gaza by Hamas in 2007 in the wake of its electoral win the previous year had 
helped convinced the US that the time was right for a serious push on the peace process 
with Fatah, the more moderate faction of the Palestinian political system.573  This was the 
Administration’s second real effort on an issue that had been basically stalemated since 
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Bush took office amidst the ongoing violence of the second intifada.  Bush had made a 
major speech on Middle East peace in 2002 and issued a roadmap for negotiations, but 
much of the US effort had been focused on the slow slog of democratization and reform 
of the Palestinian Authority.574  When Lebanon’s political crisis reached a zenith in the 
fall of 2007 and spring of 2008, American attention was focused not just on the ongoing 
crisis in Iraq, but also on the Annapolis peace conference held in November 2007 and the 
follow up.  It had been challenging to interest the Arab states in a conference.  Syria’s 
attendance at the conference, in particular, was something many of the other Arab states 
wanted as political cover.  The price for Syria’s attendance was including the Golan 
Heights (and Shebaa’ farms, for Lebanon).  Rice eventually accepted making reference to 
the other outstanding issues.575 
There was also the ever-present issue of Iraq.  Iran was increasingly equipping 
militants in Iraq with advanced weaponry, including explosively formed penetrators 
(EFPs) that could destroy US armored vehicles.  Iranian-made EFPs had caused over a 
thousand casualties in Iraq at a tempo that peaked in the spring of 2008, and Iranian-made 
weapons overall had probably caused two to three times that number.576  The US 
campaign was barely clawing back from the brink: amidst massive electoral losses, the 
Bush Administration had inserted thousands of new US forces into the country in an 
attempt to stem an incipient civil war, successfully, but success was fragile.  In 
conjunction with the rising EFP toll, Iran’s seizure of fifteen British servicemen in the 
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Persian Gulf also raised local tensions in March 2008.  US defense and military officials 
were eager to manage escalation with Iran in Iraq, believing the US military had its hands 
full already.577  The new US Secretary of Defense Bob Gates reiterated these points to 
those US allies most interested in balancing Iran like Saudi Arabia and Israel.578   
On the ground, the combination of external disagreement and ineffective and 
distracted American tactical attention meant the die was already cast.  After five days of 
conflict, the government of Qatar intervened to mediate.  On May 21, the Doha Accord 
was signed by all parties.  Prime Minister Fouad Siniora was forced to accept Hezbollah 
as a one-third partner in his cabinet, which would allow it to legally block legislation.  
Sulieman, the original choice for president that the US had vetoed, was elected President 
two days later.  The government left its airport security chief in place and backed off 
Hezbollah’s telecommunications network.  Hezbollah and its allies subsequently ended 
their occupation of central Beirut.579   
This was a settlement very much to Iran’s liking.  Tehran issued a positive 
statement on the agreement, though it also referenced the “remaining occupied territory 
of Lebanon,” a reference to the Shebaa Farms area and clearly an effort to remind other 
states of the Israel threat to continue Hezbollah’s exceptionalism in bearing arms.  Iran’s 
former opponents in Lebanon agreed.  French President Nicholas Sarkozy, who in the 
past had stressed the need for Lebanese independence and sovereignty, celebrated the 
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agreement as a symbol of hope.580  Sunni powers were quiescent: Saudi Arabia issued a 
supportive comment.  The United States issued a terse statement, urging the agreement to 
benefit all Lebanese.581   
Though dozens of people had been killed in the political unrest, Hezbollah had 
also achieved its desired result.  Neither its aims nor its enemy’s aims were any different 
than before the broader fight for Lebanon began in 2004.  Despite the fact that 
Hezbollah’s Iranian support hadn’t changed, and indeed was by some accounts 
increasing, the external supporters of its March 14 opponents actually decreased their 
opposition to the settlement. After nineteen months of political conflict, ongoing murders, 
teetering on the brink of civil war, and several attempted changes to the status quo, 
external opposition to Hezbollah’s perks and Iran’s presence had cratered.  And without 
external support to balance Hezbollah’s military capabilities, the Hariri coalition would 
lose confrontations with Hezbollah because Hezbollah could keep its guns and perks by 
force.  This relative irrelevance of sectarian opposition without external support was 
illustrated by the effort of rival factions to reduce Hezbollah’s military capabilities, which 
presumably were necessary for its national “resistance,” and their subsequent 
acquiescence.  Walid Jumblatt, the key Druze ally of Siniora and the March 14 
movement, drifted away from the March 14 camp.  Sinora sought to rebuild bridges with 
both Assad and Hezbollah.  Neither sought to force an internal crisis for another several 
years. 
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Simmering, 2008-2012 
Iran began to reset strategically in late 2008.  It had regained control over 
Lebanon, in the face of tremendous pressure, and ensured its continuation as a reliable 
launching pad.  It had been defeated, for the moment, in Iraq, where the American troop 
surge against Sunni rebels had succeeded in bolstering moderate elements in the Iraqi 
government at the expense of more extreme Shia factions.  The Maliki government 
launched a major military offensive against Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army in March 
2008, neutralizing a group in which Iran had invested heavily and breaking with a key 
Iranian proxy.  Sadr subsequently ordered it to disarm in August.  A cascade of UN 
resolutions against Iran’s nuclear program from 2006-2008 and additional US-EU 
sanctions accentuated Iran’s economic downturn, which helped fuel domestic unrest.582  
This led to widespread demonstrations after the flawed presidential elections in 2009.  
After Ahmadinejad was declared the winner of disputed presidential elections in June, 
millions of Iranians turned out into the streets to protest and were put down by force.   
Hezbollah was in a better position overall than its sponsor.  Tehran increased its 
supply of weaponry to Hezbollah after the conflict to help replenish its arsenals, and its 
spending in Lebanon’s south also continued at a high level.583  There was very little 
international opposition to this rearmament.  Individual voices sounded the alarm, 
especially about Hezbollah’s acquisition of more advanced missiles than were used in 
2006.584  However, the increase in weapons did not translate to an increase in combat: the 
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border with Israel was quiet.  Hezbollah was likewise more defensive after the resolution 
of Lebanon’s political conflict.  Its position was no longer under threat, and domestically 
the STL was essentially neutralized.585  The tribunal’s epitaph came when Hariri traveled 
to Syria to meet with Assad personally at the end of 2009 to make nice.586  New 
parliamentary elections resulted in a more pro-Hezbollah government.  In January 2011 
the tribunal finally issued the first of its indictments.  Warrants were issued to the 
Lebanese authorities for four Hezbollah members at the end of June: none were 
subsequently arrested.587  Without another show of counter-pressure by external powers, 
or support of militia groups that could oppose Hezbollah, no indictments would change 
the facts that Hezbollah could not be arrested by force. 
Iran’s strategic position began to worsen further in 2011.  On December 17, 2010, 
a Tunisian street vendor set himself on fire, sparking political demonstrations that 
brought revolution a month later.  Similar protests swept into other US allies and 
partners: Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen.  But in March they began in Deraa, Syria, and the 
security forces responded with force.588  Protest became war, and spread to other cities 
like Homs.  The survival of the Assad regime was of vital national interest for Iran.  It 
was the Islamic Republic’s one real ally in the Middle East, one that shared its 
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rejectionist approach to the peace process and was a key conduit for supplying its agents 
in Lebanon.  Hezbollah thus shared its interest.  However, Hezbollah had less diplomatic 
exposure than Iran, and had survived the removal of Syrian troops from Lebanon with no 
apparent effect on its capabilities.  In addition, despite its domestic successes in Lebanon 
from 2008-2011, it had to be conscious of acting too much on behalf of Iran in ways that 
would hurt Lebanon, which would possibly reconstitute the external coalition supporting 
that opposition and certainly harden domestic opposition internally. 
In 2012 came another strategic watershed.  Hezbollah engaged in its first 
conventional external deployment to help defend the Syrian regime, which had begun to 
teeter.  It was initially used as a stopgap defensive force, mostly for key Shia shrines and 
villages close to Lebanon’s border.  By mid-2012, Syrian rebels had repelled regime 
offensives against Homs, a center of the opposition, and were pushing towards 
Damascus.  Four senior security officers were killed by a rebel car bomb in the middle of 
the city in July, and Sunni rebel groups also took control of parts of the strategic town of 
Qusayr and the Qalamoun mountains along the Lebanese border.  Hezbollah was thrown 
into the defense of these areas.  Its elite commando force, Unit 901, directly assisted the 
Syrian government defend an area around Homs in mid-2012.589  In addition, its forces 
were also present in the capital, defending the Shia Sayyidah Zeinab shrine.  In October, 
a senior Hezbollah commander was buried publicly in the Bekaa Valley, and word leaked 
out of Syrian opposition groups that he had been killed by IEDs south of Qusayr.590  
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Hezbollah also began to train a pro-Assad Alawite militia force, just as it had trained 
Iraqi militants.591  In fact, it was performing the same function as Iranian personnel.  One 
U.S. administration official in August 2012 said that there were “thousands of Qods 
Force militants in Syria who train fighters, intercept communications, and so forth – 
though we are unsure whether they are doing the fighting yet.”592  Hezbollah certainly 
was fighting – but defensively, at first. 
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Hezbollah’s deployment to Syria to prop up the regime was another indication of 
how much control Iran maintained over its proxy and strategically a mixed blessing. 
Fighting in Assad’s sectarian war actually incurred costs for both parties that the use of 
Iran’s own military did not.  Because Hezbollah’s effectiveness partially relied on its 
national patina of resistance, which affected the deniability of its Iranian support, acting 
as Iran’s proxy in a sectarian war outside of the Israeli threat put its position at risk, 
regardless of the war’s outcome.  It reduced the group’s deniability with external powers 
as that deployment became more visible.  This would become more acute as Hezbollah’s 
role became more offensive, putting both parties’ position at risk.  Second, the 
deployment began to pull Lebanon into the conflict.  The Hariri assassination and 
aftermath had strained its fiction of national legitimacy, and now Hezbollah’s actions 
were directly harming co-confessional groups.  There was spillover from the fighting.  
The Assad regime’s airstrikes and artillery fire began to hit Lebanese Sunni towns 
regularly in 2012, and the war ignited violence in mixed communities like Tripoli.  
There, two high-profile anti-Syrian Sunni leaders were killed in the summer of 2012 
under mysterious circumstances, provoking deadly riots.  Direct action by Sunni militants 
against Hezbollah and Shia targets began to become commonplace in Lebanon.  These 
came later in 2013, after Hezbollah’s role expanded.   
 
Power Projection, 2013-Present 
In June 2013, Iran decided to deepen its commitment to Syria.  It new inputs 
included elite Qods force personnel, intelligence and training units, and broad economic 
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support.593  Hezbollah’s role in direct combat operations also expanded throughout the 
year.  The first overt Hezbollah offensive in the Syrian war came in June, when the group 
helped retake the whole of Qusayr.594  It was a tipping point morale-wise for the Syrian 
army, which had theretofore been on the end of a string of defeats, and had the strategic 
effect of pushing rebel fighters south and recapturing one of the major border areas near 
the rebel-held city of Homs.595   
But Qusayr was also the point where Hezbollah and Iran’s deniability about the 
group’s role in Syria crumbled.  The party had denied in 2011 and 2012 that its members 
were fighting abroad.  In 2011, Nasrallah had called these accounts “absolutely 
untrue.”596  In the summer of 2012, Hezbollah had secretly buried members of the group 
killed fighting in Syria.597  Then, in May 2013, Nasrallah gave a speech calling the Syrian 
conflict the group’s own war.  There was no more obfuscation: “This battle is ours,” he 
said at a rally in Beirut, “and I promise you victory.”598 
This external deployment of Hezbollah in direct offensive combat led to 
resurrected balancing by both local actors and external powers in Europe and the Middle 
East.599  Hezbollah’s fiction of being a national resistance movement had again 
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evaporated: its involvement in an explicitly sectarian war abroad made hollow the 
assertation that it was a legitimate national organization.  Nasrallah had first tried to 
finesse the issue of openly fighting other Muslims, condemning Sunni radicals like the 
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Taliban as “takfiris” who would harm Muslims, 
Christians, and the resistance.600  But the Qusayr operation was indeed viewed by other 
Lebanese factions as a sectarian militia offensive.  Shortly afterwards, the former 
Hezbollah ally and President Michel Aoun began to engage seriously with Saudi Arabia 
after Qusayr and nearly cut off ties with Shia speaker of parliament Nabih Berri.601  
Serving President Sulieman, likewise a former Hezbollah ally, gave a major speech 
calling for Hezbollah’s retention of weapons to be reviewed since its forces were fighting 
in Syria, and called for them to leave.602  Druze leader Walid Jumblatt likewise 
condemned the Qusayr operation, and Sunni Syrian rebels fired rockets into Lebanon’s 
Shia border villages.603  An anti-Hezbollah protest at the Iranian Embassy in Beirut was 
bloodily broken up by Hezbollah enforcers, leaving one dead.604   
More militant Sunni factions from both Syria and Lebanon joined in, targeting 
Hezbollah militarily in a way unseen since the Lebanese civil war.  Jabhat al-Nusra, an 
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al-Qaeda affiliated Syrian organization, threatened revenge if Hezbollah was not reined 
in.  From May onwards, car bombings, rockets, and other attacks in Lebanon struck 
Shiite neighborhoods and Hezbollah positions with regularity, killing dozens.605   
Hezbollah convoys in the eastern Bekaa Valley were hit by IEDs and a pro-Assad 
Lebanese commentator, Mohammed Jamo, was gunned down on July 17.  On July 9, a 
car bomb exploded in a Hezbollah stronghold in South Beirut, wounding fifty; the attack 
was claimed by a radical Sunni group, the Special Forces 313 Brigade.606  Iranian targets 
came under particular fire.  Despite increased Hezbollah and then Lebanese security force 
checkpoints in southern Beirut, an al-Qaeda linked group conducted a massive double 
suicide bombing next to the Iranian Embassy on November 19.  The attack, which killed 
26 people and injured 147, may have been aimed at the convoy of the Iranian cultural 
attaché, who was killed in the blast.607  As sectarian violence increased in Lebanon, 
Nasrallah implicitly promised to sacrifice his position in Lebanon for Syria.  “If the battle 
with these takfiri terrorists requires that I and all Hezbollah should go to Syria,” he said, 
“We will go.”608 
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Hezbollah’s continuing visibility and participation in non-Lebanese war abroad 
increased anti-Hezbollah action internationally.  Only a month after the Qusayr 
intervention, the European Union finally listed Hezbollah’s military wing as a terrorist 
group.609   This was not entirely due to its deployment in Syria, since it had been 
involved in two terrorist plots in Europe the year before.  However, its history of external 
terrorism was nothing new: Hezbollah had been implicated in dozens of plots in Europe 
over its existence.  The new element was its overt effort to project Iranian power abroad.  
And indeed, when EU High Representative Catherine Ashton spoke about the designation 
after a foreign ministers meeting on July 22, she made no reference to the Bulgaria 
attack.  Rather, she stressed the Syrian conflict, and added that, “due to concerns over the 
role of Hezbollah, we have agreed to designate its military wing on the list of terrorist 
designations.610 
The offensive at Qusayr also impacted United States policy.  The administration 
of President Obama had previously not stressed Lebanon in its Iran strategy, which 
focused on Iran’s nuclear program.  Its early détente with Bashar Assad and the 
appointment of the first post-Hariri US ambassador to Damascus had also mitigated 
against trying to resurrect the former coalition supporting the March 14 group.  But that 
changed after Qusayr.  Obama mentioned Hezbollah for the first time in the Syrian 
context on May 3, 2013, but only in terms of preventing it from getting chemical 
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weapons.611  It was not until June 11, 2013 that the White House specifically began to 
call out the role of Hezbollah and Iran.  Administration spokesman Jay Carney cited 
“concerns about the involvement of Hezbollah and Iran about the fighting in Syria on 
behalf of Bashar al-Assad” amid “great concern” on behalf of the President for the 
situation overall.612  The administration went further on July 15, 2013 as it developed a 
plan for arming the Syrian rebels.  Carney tied this to the Hezbollah and Iranian 
intervention in Syria, saying “we are in daily contact with the Syrian Military Council to 
discuss how we can support their needs…the President believes very strongly, as he made 
clear, that our updated assistance to Syria is essential to helping buttress the opposition as 
it endures this vicious assault from Bashar al-Assad that is supported – in a manner that 
speaks volumes about who he is and who his friends are – by Hezbollah and Iran.”613  He 
returned to this theme three days later, saying “we are coordinating with our allies and 
partners and the opposition to help buttress and strengthen the opposition as they endure a 
withering assault by Bashar al-Assad and his forces, aided by Hezbollah and Iran,” and 
again on July 23, referring to the “brutal assault” by “Assad with the support of 
Hezbollah and Iran.” 
The policy of the former Arab backers of the March 14 coalition was likewise 
changed by the Qusayr operation.  After the offensive, the GCC nations initiated an 
economic and political boycott of Hezbollah, a stark contrast to their resigned acceptance 
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at the time of the Doha agreement.  States like the UAE and even Qatar extradited known 
Hezbollah members and supporters from their territory.614  In December 2013, Saudi 
Arabia, long a supporter of Lebanon’s Sunni community, pledged $3 billion to the 
reformist-controlled army, almost certainly to support the government against Hezbollah.  
The money was the largest single Sunni aid pledge to Lebanon in history and would 
almost triple Lebanon’s annual $1.7 billion defense budget.615  This decision would be 
followed by Saudi Arabia designating Hezbollah a terrorist organization in March 2014.  
The GCC and then the Arab League did likewise in March 2016.  
Coincidental with these designations came renewed Sunni engagement to contest 
Iranian influence in Syria militarily.  This was part of a broader rebalancing by the Sunni 
world against Assad.  Both Qatar and Turkey also emerged as key supporters of Sunni 
rebels.  Turkey radically reversed its Syria policy of previous years and allowed Arab 
rebel groups to develop supply lines for recruits and weapons through its border with 
Syria, and Qatar served as a key fundraising hub for Sunni groups.  With Turkish aid, 
Sunni extremist groups had established themselves in northwest Syria by early 2014.616  
These included both Western-supported groups like the Free Syrian Army, Saudi-
supported groups like Ahrar al-Sham, and the most extreme Salafist organizations. Other 
Sunni states joined in.  Dozens of non-governmental clerics in Saudi Arabia called for a 
jihad against Iran and Assad in Syria in October 2015, and in December, the Saudi 
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Minister of Defense announced a 34-nation military alliance of Sunni-majority countries.  
The following February Saudi Arabia offered to send its own troops to fight in Syria. 
For a variety of reasons, this pushback against Hezbollah and Iran did not become 
decisive.  Two in particular stand out: President Barack Obama’s walking back of his red 
line against chemical weapons and the rise of ISIS.  The Syrian government launched a 
massive chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta on August 21, 
crossing a stated threshold for US military action.617  After a tense stalemate, Obama 
backed down and permitted a third party to examine and remove some of the weapons.  
The United States’ campaign against Syria declined thereafter.  Obama had never been 
excited about arming the Syrian rebels and his administration slow-rolled weapons 
supplies, which never materialized in strategic quantities.618  The administration’s 
subsequent aggressive pursuit of a nuclear accord with Iran precluded an aggressive 
posture against Iranian interests elsewhere, though no strategic collateral from the nuclear 
deal was alleged.619  And indeed Obama himself, when the nuclear deal was reached, 
acknowledged that some more resources might be available with which Iran could arm 
Hezbollah (and others) with, but judged it an acceptable tradeoff.620 
Perhaps more definitively, the rise of ISIS also created an urgent political need 
more acute than the campaign against Assad and Iran’s interests.  In August 2014 the US 
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intervened against the Islamic State to protect besieged Yazidis, and deployed several 
thousand military forces to Iraq to retrain the Iraqi army later in the year.  However, a 
campaign against ISIS essentially precluded one against Assad, since the two were some 
of the largest landowners in Syria.  After the Islamic State claimed credit for a 
spectacular terrorist attack in Paris in 2015, Secretary of State John Kerry dropped his 
insistence that Assad step down prior to a political transition, in effect conceding that the 
Syrian military campaign of regime change had come to an end.  The US did not even 
contest Russia’s intervention on behalf of Assad that September, the first time in history 
Russian military force had been allowed to operate freely in the Middle East.  After the 
fall of rebel-held Aleppo in 2016, the new Trump administration pulled the plug on aid to 
the remaining Syrian Arab rebels.   
 
III.  Conclusion and Additional Analysis 
Despite the opposition its proxies and strategic policy faced, Iran achieved its 
goals in Syria.  Hezbollah’s operational effectiveness, even in more and more overt roles, 
helped to swing the conflict to Bashar Assad.  In the process, however, both Iran and 
Hezbollah incurred major costs.  Iran entered 2017 isolated in the region, with an 
unprecedented Sunni military alliance opposing both it and Hezbollah.  The US campaign 
against ISIS and pursuit of a nuclear deal offset some of the strategic costs it incurred.  
However, these costs would reemerge and be exacerbated over the next three years 
through the Trump Administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign, which was initiated 
(and the nuclear deal abandoned) in no small part as a result of Iran’s actions in the 
Syrian war.   
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How did Iran’s ideology affect use of its proxy?  First, it helped define the Islamic 
Republic’s strategic goals after the revolution.  From a basically secular state founded on 
Persian nationalism, the new government in Iran redefined its interests to include pockets 
of its outlying co-religionists.  It then set about alleviating some of their humanitarian 
concerns but also building them into strategic weapons as powerful proxy groups, 
nowhere more so than with Hezbollah.  Second, Shia religious institutions could help 
funnel money to charitable projects in Lebanon and elsewhere, obviating the need and the 
cost of creating them from whole cloth.  This effect was similar to Pakistan; by the time 
of America’s Afghan, war many of Pakistan’s religious institutions had also been 
receiving state funding and supporting Pakistan’s objectives in Afghanistan for three 
decades with significantly built out operational pathways.  Iran was slightly more of a 
newcomer to Lebanon, though some of the new IRGC had been involved in Shia activism 
there before.  The disappearance of Musa Sadr provided a convenient vacuum of Shia 
leadership exactly when Iran needed it, but his political organizational work meant that 
the new Hezbollah could easily adopt many of Amal’s activated members and functions.  
Lastly, the ideological goals that had been grafted on to Hezbollah probably helped keep 
the group focused on the goals of revolutionary Shiism as Iran defined them, irrespective 
of Hezbollah’s domestic position, without day-to-day Iranian control.  However, without 
tracking the direct communications between Iran and Hezbollah, this would be difficult 
to prove.  How much, in other words, did Hezbollah redefine its interests to match 
changes in Iran’s interests?  The answer is closely, if not totally.  But did Hezbollah adopt 
those changes as the result of strategic instructions or some kind of inference of what 
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khameini, the scholars in Qom, and the religious apparat in 
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Tehran were saying?  Probably the former.  Ultimately that answer is unknowable, 
however, because Iran is the only source of revolutionary vilayet-e faqih doctrine and as 
such the interests of Khameini as head of state and Khameini as supreme religious 
authority are basically identical.  Hezbollah’s entry into the Syrian war, on religious 
pretexts to start with but then with increasingly strategic objectives is one indication of 
how the two motivations were usually indistinguishable. 
For its part, Hezbollah was hurt by its deployment to Syria.  It did maintain an 
important supply route and patron.  But by 2016, it had suffered an estimated 700-1,000 
casualties, approximately one-eighth of its force on the ground.621  That deployment also 
shattered its national legitimacy, both domestically and internationally.  Hezbollah was 
not wholly an Iranian foreign legion, nor simply a branch of the IRGC: its reliance on 
domestic legitimacy to feed its deniability for its Iranian support meant that as its actions 
deviated away from those that conceivably benefited Lebanon, it would pay the price for 
that support and its unique, lawless armed status.  And it did.  With its external combat 
deployment, it was more clearly an agent of power projection by the Iranians and more 
clearly an instrument of interstate war.  The designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist 
organization by two key entities – the EU and Saudi Arabia, to be followed later by 
Germany and the United Kingdom – was an indicator of the increased ease of balancing 
against the group.  The Syria action resurrected the international coalition that had 
successfully backed the March 14 alliance in 2005.  It also had internal effects.  Internal 
balancing came from Sunni and Christian politicians, sectarian groups, and militant 
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strikes against Hezbollah targets.  These attacks frayed the domestic consensus Hezbollah 
had forcibly achieved in 2008. 
But it did help win the Syrian war, to be fair.  Overall, Hezbollah was an 
incredibly effective tool for Iran to project power, both due to the operational capabilities 
it provided and the multiple ways in which it mitigated international consequences for 
supplying those capabilities.  During the course of three decades, it became Iran’s key 
agent of influence with both conventional and unconventional capacities.  Iran’s model of 
support to Hezbollah – controlling its strategic decisions, arming the group, but mostly 
avoiding tactical involvement – was effective.  There was a degree of separation with 
Iran.  Iranians did not serve in the Hezbollah leadership ranks, nor dictate tactical or 
operational actions, nor usually take part in direct combat.  The massive amount of 
weaponry Iran sent its proxy gave it effective tactical capabilities, and robust ones, with 
rearmament coming quickly and easily.  These weapons were usually not terribly 
advanced.  The anti-tank weapons and rockets Hezbollah used so effectively in the 2006 
war incurred no qualitatively different strategic blowback as did Russia’s provision of 
anti-air weapons to the Ukrainian separatists.  This style of operational support helped the 
group mitigate strategic balancing.  The quick ejection of Syrian troops from the country 
in 2005 and the subsequent lack of real alteration to Lebanon’s policy orientation was a 
clear indication of how valuable the more deniable Iranian support was compared to (for 
example) the Syrian troop presence, which was mostly a liability.  Moreover, on those 
occasions when more advanced weapons were used, or when a new capability was being 
tested (like the Hanit missile attack or the early embassy bombings) Iran’s hands were 
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more closely involved.  This brought a certain risk mitigation to Hezbollah’s fighting 
capabilities, despite the closer support.  
The causal mechanism in this case study worked mostly as this dissertation's 
model would predict: more decisive counterbalancing came when Hezbollah’s support 
became less deniable.  That was when the group began to be treated as the outlier it was: 
the sole remaining Lebanese militia under arms, in violation of multiple UN Security 
Council resolutions and the Taif accord.  This was most evident with the removal of 
Syrian troops in the country in 2005 and the operation at Qusayr in 2013 – the least 
deniable, most overt modes of proxy support.  The 2006 war also had the effect of 
focusing international attention from Syria as a sponsor of Hezbollah to Iran, though the 
practical effect of the war was to weaken opposition to those links.  In addition, 
Hezbollah’s offensive against the March 14 coalition in 2008 aroused tremendous US 
opposition to Iran, though the international opposition had mostly splintered by then.  So 
why did it splinter? 
The answer to this and to Hezbollah’s broader deniability was the two wars it 
waged at once.  One was against Israel and one was against all opposing Lebanese 
factions.  Waging the former reduced international opposition to waging the latter and for 
receiving support for doing so.  As time progressed, this effect became integral to 
justifying both Iran’s presence in Lebanon and Hezbollah’s armed exceptionalism.  The 
degree to which this effect was pronounced – the degree to which Hezbollah could make 
this argument – was also fueled by its domestic legitimacy.  That legitimacy was boosted 
by how organically rooted in the population the group was.  Hezbollah’s creation of a 
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political party, the expansive social services it offered (and Iran paid for), and its joining 
the Lebanese government all served to tie its own identity closer to the nation’s.  
This was the key effect of all Hezbollah’s social services: not that they reconciled 
other Lebanese factions to it, because they did not.  Rather, they fed into Hezbollah’s 
ability to portray itself as a legitimate national resistance.  That legitimacy increased 
Iranian deniability: in other words, it lessened the extent to which Iranian support to 
Hezbollah would be balanced either internally or – much more critically – externally by 
outside powers.  Hezbollah aroused the least opposition when it could claim to be acting 
on behalf of the Lebanese nation, either through social work or upholding interstate 
territorial integrity.   
The deniability that resulted did three things.  First, it reduced somewhat the 
hostility from other sectarian factions, though this effect may have been minimal.  In this 
dynamic, anti-Israel operations played the same role domestically that anti-American 
ones did for Iran.  They were a way to consolidate Hezbollah’s internal support, quiet its 
sectarian enemies, and mask itself in the nation; as well as achieve local objectives.  
Second, it offered additional and national-level assets to Hezbollah’s military 
effectiveness, such as the use of government radars during the 2006 war.  The group was 
more lethal when it could take advantage of Lebanon’s national capabilities like its 
airports and its telecommunications systems.   
Third, and most importantly, it allowed Hezbollah and Iran to mitigate the 
penalties for interstate aggression.  Hezbollah’s effort to maintain that it was a legitimate 
part of Lebanon’s national military system made it more difficult for potential balancers 
to contest it as an agent of Iranian influence.  It shattered the cohesiveness of those 
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balancers and potential supporters of Hezbollah’s rival factions.  European nations in 
particular were reluctant to sanction a group that had the trappings of national legitimacy, 
including political representation.  They were often unwilling to sanction Hezbollah when 
it engaged, again nominally on behalf of Lebanon, in interstate warfare against Israel or 
received Iranian weapons to do the same.  Sunni nations felt compelled to praise 
Hezbollah’s operations, which often represented rare Arab victories, or at least condemn 
Israeli mistakes.  It helped, of course, that the legitimacy of Israel’s existence and actions 
was such a contested issue among many European publics as well. 
Without the war against Israel, and the group’s accompanying “resistance” 
narrative enabling Iranian deniability, the group was just as vulnerable as any other agent 
of Iranian influence.  The critical moments when this fiction was exposed – when 
external powers took action against Hezbollah – were when it shed its deniability as a 
national resistance organization.  These included Assad’s intervention in Lahoud’s 
succession, the murder of Rafiq Hariri and (in particular) Hezbollah’s offensive at 
Qusayr, when both Iran and Hezbollah came under intense pressure despite being 
successful tactically.   
This explains why Hezbollah was so insistent on thwarting the Hariri tribunal.  
The Hariri investigation and special tribunal were dangerous for Hezbollah because they 
were a codified attack against its domestic legitimacy, which enabled its Iranian support 
and special status under arms under arms.  Without external support Lebanon’s other 
factions were outgunned.  Thus, the STL’s explicit documentation of Hezbollah’s role in 
conducting a war internal to Lebanon would reduce its legitimacy not among other 
confessional groups, who were on the receiving end of that war, but externally, among 
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potential enemy sponsors, and potentially cause them to re-coalesce.  However, the 
international response to the Hariri investigation as a matter of power politics stalled after 
the July War.  It never truly moved beyond the least deniable target: the presence of 
Syrian troops in Lebanon.  Unfortunately, and perhaps as a surprise to all parties, those 
troops were not critical to Lebanon’s strategic orientation. 
There is also a question about whether these successes were the result of Iran’s 
deniability or other exogenous factors.  Iranian policy in Lebanon benefited from being 
probably America’s fourth priority in the region, at best, behind Iraq, Iran’s nuclear 
program, and at times the peace process.  Sometimes it could rise to third.  Perhaps what 
was ascribed to deniability was simply the result of a great power struggling under two 
wars, trying to manage escalation with the Iranians and cajole the Syrians, alongside 
sometimes unhelpful allies convinced that at least half its misery the United States had 
brought upon itself.  And that is fair, except for international opposition pivoted around a 
few clear data points – and opposition changed, usually, when deniability changed.  First, 
the removal of Syrian forces from Lebanon did little to alter Lebanon’s strategic 
orientation during a period in early 2005 where US and Western priorities were mostly 
held constant.  The West had squared off against the Syrian presence in Lebanon and 
Syria’s troops had left.  There was little consensus about continuing the campaign against 
Iran and the IRGC, though they were the ones holding the line on Hezbollah, which had 
actually killed Hariri.  This spoke to the comparative effectiveness of more deniable 
support.  Second, Hezbollah’s move against Qusayr changed US and EU actions towards 
Hezbollah and the Syrian conflict in a way that upset decades of precedence, particularly 
for the Europeans.  Third, the collapse in opposition to a Hezbollah-dominated Lebanese 
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government really began in 2006, after the July War, when the peace process had not yet 
gathered steam and before the Iranian campaign in Iraq had reached its peak lethality.  
This pointed to a correlation between balancing and the signature dynamics of the Israel-
Hezbollah-Lebanon triangle, which could effectively minimize balancing against Iranian 
aid.  Certainly, there were many pressing priorities in the Middle East for the United 
States and Europeans, but the sequential correlation pointed to something else. 
And there were other factors that affected the effectiveness of Hezbollah.  Early 
on, the external acceptance of the Taif accord despite noncompliance by Hezbollah 
weakened the normative power of diplomatic measures.  This was baked into the 
Lebanese system by the events of 2005.  The problem was not that Taif codified the 
presence of foreign troops or militias in Lebanon: in fact, its key provisions called for the 
disbanding and disarmament of all militia groups and the extension of governmental 
authority throughout the country.622  However, the deal’s backers had no ability to 
enforce that edict on Hezbollah, which quickly said it would retain the necessary 
capabilities for resistance against Israel.  Inasmuch as Hezbollah’s capabilities depended 
on Iranian support, the IRGC would stay as well.  And there the matter lay; Hezbollah’s 
armed status became the status quo.  Functionally, the settlement had the effect of taking 
the power of diplomatic mechanisms off the table by creating a norm by which they 
ignored violations of the deal.  Instead of reflecting the status quo as it existed – that 
Hezbollah would remain armed – it posited a different future its backers were unable to 
achieve.  By doing so, it made those provisions worse than unenforceable: by being 
unenforceable, they normalized the very thing they sought to reverse.  This hurt the 
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ability of UN resolutions in the future that also called for the disarmament of militias.  
Once Taif had been ignored, at least the part about Hezbollah giving up its arms, then UN 
resolutions like UNSC 1559 and 1701 could be as well with fewer consequences, even 
despite the addition of more peacekeeping troops to the border.  
Thirdly, the more clearly defined conflict boundary between Lebanon and Israel 
after 2000 led to Hezbollah relying on more advanced weapons and complex attacks to 
conduct military operations.  Both the introduction and the use of these weapons attracted 
attention.  This had the effect of reducing Iran’s deniability, since these capabilities were 
an ongoing reminder of state involvement.  Nowhere was this more evident than in the 
attack against the Hanit, which gave Israel the opportunity to point to state involvement. 
Though rockets were quieter in some ways, their use was also noisy in terms of 
balancing.  Unless used in response to a direct attack or the apocryphal rules of the road, 
Hezbollah’s rockets could clearly be identified as aggressive acts.  When compared to the 
ability Iran had to pressure Israel in southern Lebanon during its 18-year military 
presence, the solidification of the border and Israel’s withdraw posed challenges to 
retaining maintaining a deniable level of combat.  However, this could of course also 
work to the group’s advantage.  Given sufficient pretext for the initiation or continuation 
of conflict, long-range rockets allowed Hezbollah to maintain a clear propaganda 
narrative of inimitability.   
This reaction to Hariri’s killing and the later political confrontation in 2008 also 
suggested the importance of changes in regime to deniability.  Even though it was the 
political landowner in Lebanon, Syria was trying to change the institutional status quo 
after a long period of stasis.  The requested change in the constitution for Lahoud was the 
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catalyst: had Assad not attempted to brazenly alter Lebanon’s institutions, or had he 
nominated another, equally quiescent candidate for president, the international reaction 
might have been much less, as indeed it was later during Lebanon’s 2007-2008 political 
gridlock.  The March 8 coalition played it just as thuggishly in May 2008 as in February 
2005.  But May 2008 came at the end of a long period of political abdication and unrest.  
The country was already locked in a political stalemate over the UN investigation, which 
was compounded by Lahoud stepping down.  The armed takeover of Beirut in 2008 
aroused far less opprobrium internationally than had the murder of Hariri.  That was 
partially a result of strategic changes, but also suggested that key elements of the system 
were fluid and up for grabs in 2008 in a way they were not in 2005.  Stability was 
cumulative.  Nowhere was this more apparent than in the muted, even occasionally 
enthusiastic international reactions to the Doha settlement.  Exhaustion and relief 
prevailed among many internal and external actors, particularly relief that the civil war 
would not return.  This, despite the fact that Doha essentially cancelled out all the 
political gains the March 14 coalition had made in Lebanon over the past three years. 
And lastly, the strategic orientation of Iran mattered.  Whether Iran’s and 
Hezbollah’s goals were offensive or defensive mattered in terms of the balancing they 
experienced.  Overall, Iran usually incurred the least blowback and consequences for its 
proxy support when it was on the defensive.  The most visible sign of this was during the 
2006 war, when Israel’s unexpected attack into Lebanon did much to mute much of the 
external opposition to the supply and resupply of weapons to Hezbollah.  Though Israel 
was clearly responding to Hezbollah’s raid, the scale of the response – and the 
progression of the war to include ground troops – eventually began to cast it as the 
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aggressor, especially after the events at Qana.  This effect was also evident during the 
Qusayr operation, when Hezbollah experienced unprecedented opposition internationally. 
By comparison, its operations in 2012, basically defensive in nature, aroused much less 
blowback either domestically or internationally.  This does not, of course, rule out that 
the cumulative effect of Hezbollah’s involvement in Lebanon contributed to the eventual 
balancing effects.  Hezbollah’s offensive push in Lebanon politically from 2006-2008 
also accentuated the effect of focusing US policy on its supporters.  It also helped shift 
that focus from Syria to Iran as the key problematic sponsor preventing Lebanese 
democracy from flourishing.  This transition was reflected in US statements, though 
European states were slow to follow.  This was likely due to different strategic 
perceptions of Iran, particularly in the context of the Iraq war, and lingering fallout from 










CHAPTER FIVE:  PAKISTAN AND THE HAQQANI NETWORK, 2001-2016 
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Pakistan has rarely been at peace.  In the seventy years since its independence, it 
has fought three major wars with India, come close to a fourth, and consistently 
supported insurgents fighting for the disputed territory of Kashmir.  Its strategy was one 
of many smaller states confronting a larger neighbor: a focus on additional territory, 
alternate weapons, asymmetric tools.  After the loss of East Pakistan in 1971, the 
importance of its neighbor Afghanistan increased.  In Afghanistan, Pakistani national 
security leaders developed and supported cadres of Islamist militants, including a family 
militia known as the Haqqani network.  This chapter analyzes how Pakistan used the 
Haqqani network to project power inside Afghanistan.  It assesses Pakistan’s founding 
ideology and doctrine, the support structure of the Haqqani network, the Haqqanis’ 
effectiveness in achieving Pakistan’s goals in the context of the overall insurgency, and 
examines key moments from 2001 to 2016 when Pakistan’s power projection was 
challenged.  This chapter also identifies several other factors that contributed to 
Pakistan’s strategic success, such as the contested border known as the Durand Line, the 
structure of policymaking in Pakistan, and its control over the main supply route to 
Western forces in Afghanistan. 
The distinctive feature of Pakistan’s proxy warfare was its two-track system of 
support to the kaleidoscope of militants fighting in Afghanistan.  This framework had its 
roots in the regime of General Zia ul-Haq and the outbreak of the Soviet-Afghan war two 
years later in 1979.  During that conflict, there was direct support to the mujahedin from 
the Pakistani military’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and other government bodies.  
But support was also given to militants indirectly through private religious groups, 
charities, and madrassas, which had seen their funding greatly expand under Zia.  This 
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form of support was more deniable than the ISI’s direct support because the state could 
keep an even greater distance from the actual militants fighting.  The resulting base of 
militancy would eventually aid most of the groups of the Afghan Taliban, including the 
Haqqani network and the broader Quetta Shura Taliban, replenishing and sustaining their 
ranks after the American invasion in 2001.  But there was a secondary effect: it also aided 
militants who took aim at Pakistan.  The increased deniability of this type of aid 
increased the recipients’ agency: as they became stronger, they were more able to pursue 
other goals in defiance of the state sponsor.  Pakistan faced operational and political 
constraints in confronting them, including several costly counterinsurgency campaigns in 
its border regions and terrorism in its largest cities.  This was the cost of more indirect 
support of militancy, incurred over decades and made acute by the US-led war on terror.  
Mitigating these costs, rather than power projection on the battlefield, was the Haqqani 
network’s main value.  
The Haqqanis are the focus of this chapter because they were the major group 
with which Pakistan had the closest relationship and their effect on US actions and 
Pakistani strategic goals should thus be the easiest to measure.  The Haqqani network 
benefited from the looser base of militancy that Pakistan had supported over decades, but 
also received direct Pakistani operational support.  This aided the group in conducting 
high-visibility attacks against Western targets, including the US Embassy in Kabul.  As a 
weapon, this proved to be a liability: the deterioration of the US-Pakistani relationship 
correlated closely with the number and frequency of Haqqani attacks.  The more the 
Haqqani network showed its face, the more likely US consequences against Pakistan 
became, incurring strategic costs without achieving comparable strategic gains.  
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I.  Origins 
The partition of India, when it came in 1947, was cruel to the new state of 
Pakistan.  It faced perhaps the most complex nation-building challenge imaginable, with 
millions of refugees, a built-in adversary three times as large, and a fragmented 
population bifurcated by a thousand miles of that adversary’s territory.  In forging this 
state the unclear role of Islam in public life, problems of internal cohesion, and themes of 
relative weakness haunted Pakistan and would continue to do so throughout its existence.  
For the military, this fomented a strategic focus on both power projection, to push the 
separatism away from Pakistan’s borders, and asymmetric war, to keep Pakistan’s 
stronger neighbor off-balance without inciting a major conflict. 
The five major ethnic groups of Pakistan were united by a common religion and 
vastly disunited in most other things, including language, economic wellbeing, and 
political representation.  Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the head of the Muslim League and 
recognized founder of Pakistan, had viewed Islam as the symbol that would hold the two 
halves of the new state together.  In practice, even the role of Islam was uncertain.  In 
Jinnah’s view, the state was a home for Muslims, but would not be ruled by Islamic legal 
coda.  Religious minorities were still tolerated and supposedly empowered in the state, 
exemplified by the white stripe on the national flag.  But in the view of other politicians 
and religious parties like Jamiaat-e Islami (JI), this was not enough.  Islam had to be more 
of a ruling legal principle, with a society based on sharia law and civil servants and other 
state representatives bound by their piety.623  This vagueness was by design, allowing 
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Jinnah to unite Muslims without alienating potential opponents.624  However, it 
eventually helped exacerbate the same centrifugal tendencies it was meant to counter. 
These tendencies were significant.  India had inherited the structures of colonial 
governance from the British, including the civil administration and the colonial army, and 
possessed a well-developed body politic.  Pakistan was left with the vestiges of a 
viceregal system and provinces in which political development was far less advanced.625  
The state’s governing bodies like the civil service were fragmentary, with only a tiny 
percentage of pre-Partition officials choosing to join Pakistan.626  The army was not only 
also fragmentary but vastly unequal.  It consisted of less than three percent Bengalis in at 
the time of partition, despite being Bengalis being the new majority of the new Pakistani 
population, and was more than three-fourths Punjabis.627   Exacerbating the challenges, 
Pakistan’s founders established a system of centralized decisionmaking which left little 
room for an ethnic autonomy that might well have lessened the tension between different 
groups, particularly the Bengalis, who believed they had been promised at least a share of 
self-governance.628  This centralization was evident in measures like the law mandating 
Urdu as the national language of Pakistan, despite being the first language of only a tiny 
minority of Pakistanis.  The language law caused riots soon after independence, stoking 
Bengali unrest and discontentment with the central government.629  
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For this new state, theoretical problems about identity and formation were 
secondary to the immediate problem of India and Pakistan’s comparative weakness.  
Jinnah believed that India would never accept Pakistan and viewed his state’s creation as 
a temporary dismemberment from the Indian whole.630  Pakistani military officers then 
and later believed that India was intent on not only remaining the dominant power in 
South Asia but on also dismembering its neighbor, including through backing 
secessionist tendencies in Pakistan.631  Fear of a Hindu India and sense of injustice was 
magnified by the sudden horrors of the partition, the treatment of the princely states by 
India, and the delay in receiving military supplies from the Indians.  These beliefs were 
inculcated not just into this first generation of senior military officers but also the 
institutions they created, preserving them in the military’s culture.632   
To meet this challenge, materiel was lacking.  Pakistan had inherited only a 
fraction of the British Indian Army’s equipment and less of the colonial government’s 
money.  There had not been an all-Muslim battalion in the British Indian Army for nearly 
a century since being eliminated after the Indian Rebellion in 1857.633  That meant that 
Pakistan had no bespoke full-strength units.  Nearly half of the available units were 
located in India at the time of partition, and many Muslims elected to remain there.634  
There were few Pakistani senior officers led by only one major-general amidst an overall 
officer shortage.635  This especially included specialist officers, like engineers and 
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medical personnel, and those with staff experience.636  The new army was viewed as 
amateurish, improvised, making up with enthusiasm what it lacked in expertise and 
materiel.637   
The combination of state heterogeneity, a focus on India, and relative weakness 
affected Pakistani doctrine and military operations.  It led to a desire to project instability 
outwards, to take the fight to India and its allies before they could further encourage 
separatism in Balochistan and elsewhere.638  Asymmetric warfare and the support of 
proxy militants became a key part of this view.  The use of proxy groups in places like 
Kashmir and later Afghanistan was justified by the threat Pakistani military leaders saw 
from India and its disproportionate strength.639  It was compounded by American 
influence in the late 1950’s, as wars of national liberation occupied more and more US 
interest and the military relationship between the two nations deepened.640  Ironically, it 
was also perceptions of American perfidy that then deepened Pakistan’s reliance on 
asymmetric warfare.641  The acquisition of nuclear weapons by each actor and their 
potential equalizing effect later reinforced Pakistan’s interest in asymmetric war, since 
both states sought lower-intensity measures to punish each other.642   
The unrest that broke out in the Muslim-majority province of Jammu and Kashmir 
in 1947 seemed a partial remedy to these interlocking problems of strategy, national 
cohesion, and identity.  If Pakistan was a home for Muslims then it should have Kashmir.  
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Mobilizing to fight for Kashmir against India should also help reinforce the state’s reason 
for being and increase cohesion.  And additionally, the territory of Kashmir would 
provide some crucial strategic depth against Pakistan’s much larger neighbor.  As an 
ongoing foreign policy objective, fighting for control of Kashmir could thus serve 
ideological, and political ends, and strategic ends.643   
Kashmir also provided an opening for the politicization of the new military.  
Partially this was due to the use of the army as a tool and a symbol to unite the new parts 
of the state.  But it was also due to the military’s independent role in national security 
policymaking, which would increase almost continuously under both civilian and military 
governments.  In 1947, the shortage of officers meant that senior positions were held by 
British officers, not Pakistani ones.  This inverted the chain of command, providing a 
political opening for independent action by subordinates.  Pakistani field-grade officers 
like Akbar Khan, director of weapons and equipment at Rawalpindi for the new army, 
were able to take independent action with or without the tacit support of political leaders 
but not senior officers.  Khan initiated a largely independent scheme to arm Kashmiri 
insurgents as well as outside irregular forces to assist them, with approval but not 
direction from a few senior leaders.644  As a result of the Pakistani army’s military 
weakness, Khan sought to encourage the unrest brewing in Kashmir and either annex the 
province for Pakistan or stave off a coercive Indian move as in the princely states of 
Junagadh and later Hyderabad.  
Pakistan began infiltrating Afridi tribesmen and other irregular forces into the 
province in September 1947, and helped these irregulars turn the civil unrest into an 
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insurgency.  It supplied food, communications, and weapons to the militants, but did not 
yet commit regular troops.  Pakistani leaders made sure to keep their aid to these forces 
highly circumspect, going around their British army chief to work directly with their own 
officers in the fight.  By early October Kashmir faced a widespread insurgency, which 
was bolstered later in the month by external attacks from Pakistan-backed irregulars.  The 
local authorities requested Indian military aid, which was promptly airlifted into Kashmir 
and succeeded in quelling the revolt.  Despite the Pakistani army’s intervention in April 
1948, the conflict was essentially stalemated until the final ceasefire, leaving one-third of 
the province under Pakistani control and two-thirds under Indian.  The irregular forces 
and tactics used to start the 1947 war were codified into doctrine for the Pakistani 
military and used to sustain low-level guerilla attacks in peacetime and irregulars in 
war.645  These early events contributed to the Pakistani army’s habit of political action.  
This included policymaking and independent action by subordinate officers, to say 
nothing of conducting a coup. 
By the time of the second war in 1965, Pakistan’s asymmetric warfare tactics and 
support mechanisms to the irregulars were more sophisticated.  There was unity of 
command, for one thing.  The head of the Pakistani military, Ayub Khan, had overthrown 
Pakistan’s civilian leadership in a coup and no longer had to subvert the military 
bureaucracy to conduct operations.  Akbar Khan, who had led the Kashmiri irregulars in 
the first war, had tried to launch a coup of his own in 1951 and had been imprisoned.  In 
early 1965, Pakistan began to recruit irregular forces, provided them with a six-week 
training course, and inserted them into Kashmir in larger and larger numbers.  These 
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forces were divided into eight units and fell under divisional leadership, which assigned 
their attacks to specific sectors.646  Unfortunately for Pakistan, local residents alerted 
provincial authorities to the infiltration and India managed to seal off its part of Kashmir, 
quelling the possibility of instigating a broader revolt.  General war broke out at the 
beginning of September when the Pakistani regular army intervened in Kashmir.  After 
successfully containing the attack, India escalated the conflict by crossing into Pakistani 
territory further south before fighting bogged down and a ceasefire was negotiated by the 
Soviet Union and United States. 
The last of Pakistan’s great wars was a different affair but had a strategically more 
important outcome, by reinforcing Pakistan’s use of asymmetric warfare and Islam.  It 
was largely a conventional conflict, at least on Pakistan’s part, and a crushing failure in 
the east, where the Bengalis were finally separated into their own state.  The 1971 war 
was a humiliation for the military, which had failed to both prevent Bengali separatism as 
well as defend Pakistan proper in the West, several thousand square kilometers of which 
were occupied by India.  The humiliation of the army meant the end of military rule after 
nearly two decades and a return to civilian government, this time under the Pakistani 
People’s Party leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.  
Ironically, it was under the more secular Bhutto that the role of Islam began to 
change and occupy far more of national life than it had in the past.  Secularists had 
managed to finesse the constitutions created in 1956 and 1962 to retain much of Jinnah’s 
vision for Islam in Pakistan, but by the 1970’s that was shifting.647  The passive role of 
Islam had failed to unite the disparate pieces of Pakistan in the face of linguistic 
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differences and thus had to be accentuated.648  Islam was declared the state religion of 
Pakistan under the new constitution in 1973.  The Ahmadi minority was officially 
declared non-Muslim, tightening the orthodoxy permitted by the state.  This was by 
changes to the legal, tax, and educational systems.649  The army assumed a new, more 
Islamic slogan.650  This also meant an increase in Pakistan’s reliance on militant proxies 
abroad, and in particular Islamist militants in Afghanistan.651  One of these proxies was 
the Haqqani family. 
The Haqqanis had their roots in an area of Afghanistan called Loya Paktia, 
consisting of the three provinces Paktika, Paktia, and Khost.  It was mountainous land, 
and by tradition only loosely governed from Kabul.  Loya Paktia jutted out from 
Afghanistan into Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA, where 
Islamabad’s authority ran loose and which since the colonial era had been unruly and 
ridden by banditry.  Its outer border denoted part of the Durand Line, the disputed 1,650-
mile colonial border with Afghanistan that Kabul had since the partition of India refused 
to acknowledge.  It cut through the Pashtun heartland, dividing Afghanistan’s south from 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan.  This dispute helped erode attempts to 
control the passage of persons, since lines of authority were contested and unclear.  If 
lines of authority were unclear, acts of aggression were more difficult to identify.  If acts 
of aggression were more difficult to identify, the international reaction to them would be 
muted and likely delayed.  These areas were also riven by common ethnic, tribal, and 
 
648 Kapur and Ganguly, 122. 
649 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 478. 
650 Markey, 49. 
651 Kapur and Ganguly, 122. 
 265 
family bonds between Pashtuns that crisscrossed disputed territory and formed networks 
that were powers unto themselves.  One of these was the Zadran tribe, comprised of 
Pashtuns residing in Pakistan’s North and South Waziristan and concentrated in nine 
districts across Afghanistan’s Loya Paktia. 
 
 Source: Institute for the Study of War 
 
Jalaluddin Haqqani, patriarch of the sprawling family network that bore his name, 
rose to prominence and Pakistan’s attention in the years of Daoud Khan, who ruled 
Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion.  He attended seminary school at the Dar ul-Ulum 
Haqqaniya madrassah in what was then called Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province 
and later KPK.  Like many other proto-militants, he was involved in Islamist political 
circles through Pakistani religious parties like Jamiat Ulama-e Islam (JUI) that were 
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active in supporting frontier madrassahs at the time.652  After graduation, Jalaluddin 
worked for Mawlana Abdel Haq in his successful campaign for a seat in Pakistan’s 
parliament as a member of JUI.  After teaching briefly at the Haqqaniyya madrassah, he 
returned to Afghanistan and opened a school of his own in a town called Nika, in Paktika 
province.653  He was there on July 17, 1973 when former Prime Minister Mohammed 
Daoud Khan seized power in Afghanistan, deposed his cousin the king, and declared 
himself president of a new republic.  Pakistan viewed Daoud Khan as a direct threat to its 
integrity; he was an aggressive Pashtun nationalist and outspoken about supporting 
Pashtun autonomy or independence within Pakistan.  More troubling for religious 
Afghans, Khan was a committed leftist, one who included communists in his government 
and deepened relations with the Soviet Union.654   
Partially as a result, Pakistan under Bhutto began to support militants and 
members of Afghanistan’s Islamic opposition.  These included Bernahuddin Rabbani, 
Gilbuddin Hekmatyar, and Haqqani himself.  The Pakistani army began to train several 
thousand Islamist guerillas in 1973 and 1974, as well as pay anti-Khan activists through 
organs like the Frontier Constabulary.655  Haqqani claimed that he attempted to launch an 
uprising against the Khan regime immediately; in any case, at some point between 1973 
and 1975, he moved his primary base across the border to North Waziristan in 
Pakistan.656  Haqqani’s first battle against the Afghan government came in Urgun 
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District, in Paktika, coinciding with an unsuccessful coup led by Islamists in Kabul.  
After the government cracked down, Haqqani retreated to Peshawar to regroup with other 
Islamists.657  However, Daoud Khan stepped back from the brink.  Afghanistan ratcheted 
back its calls for a Pashtun homeland, and Pakistan in turn reduced its support for the 
rebels, who squabbled among themselves.  Some returned to Afghanistan to fight 
intermittently on their own.658  Relations between Pakistan and its neighbor warmed, as 
did those between Khan and the United States.   
Two events brought a halt to this rapprochement and restarted Pakistan’s support 
for proxies in Afghanistan.  First, Pakistan’s own prime minister Zulfiqar Bhutto was 
overthrown in 1977 by General Zia ul-Haq, a man who believed strongly in an Islamist 
identity for his country.  Second, the warming relationship between Kabul and 
Washington eventually so alarmed the Soviet Union that it backed his removal in a left-
wing coup in 1978.  Support for the Afghan rebels came roaring back with a vengeance, 
particularly once the Soviet Union intervened militarily in Afghanistan on behalf of the 
new government.  Those family and tribal ties between Pashtuns began to be 
strengthened and overlaid by a new network: Pakistani money, advisors, and other forms 
of state support. 
During the war, Haqqani became an integral element in Pakistan’s overall proxy 
campaign and began to receive significant amounts of direct aid.  Overall, this aid tended 
to favor Pashtun leaders such as Hekmatyar rather than Tajiks.659  The Pakistanis also 
rewarded success on the battlefield, and both as a Pashtun and a capable commander 
 
657 Brown and Rassler, 48. 
658 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet 
Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 114. 
659 Coll (2001), 119. 
 268 
Haqqani profited.660  Beginning in 1981, he constructed a major military and training 
complex across the border at a town called Zhawar in Khost Province, with the financial 
and logistical help of the ISI.661  The Zhawar base, and indeed his entire operating area in 
Loya Paktiya, lay along one of the main transit routes between Afghanistan and Pakistan.  
Soviet and Afghan government forces launched three separate assaults against Zhawar; 
the size of the third one allegedly forced a Pakistani commando unit to intervene across 
the border.662  One ISI general estimated that as much as 60 percent of supplies to the 
mujahedin went through Khost and Paktiya, and one-third through Zhawar itself.663  
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In addition to direct support for the insurgents, Pakistan began to funnel 
significant amounts of money to Islamist organizations, part of Zia’s drive to Islamicize 
his country.664  This effort constituted the basis for the second part of Pakistan’s modern 
two-track proxy doctrine.  Zia instituted measures like the zakat tax, in which the 
government appropriated 2.5 percent of most Pakistanis’ savings during Ramadan.  Much 
of this money went to madrassahs, religious schools which offered religious education as 
well as room and board for poor students.  The number of religious schools in Pakistan 
began to grow rapidly during this time, particularly in Pashtun areas along the frontier.665  
At the country’s founding in 1947, there had been 137 madrassahs in the territory of 
modern Pakistan.  That number grew to 908 in 1971, 2,861 in 1988, and 5,500 less than a 
decade later.666  Critically, this growth came with a decline in religious education in 
Afghanistan proper during the 1980’s.  More and more Afghans were sending their 
children to madrassahs in Pakistan, rather than at home.  This increased the importance of 
clerical influence over their students, since usually the students were cut off from family 
networks.  It also gave clerics a much more supranational network of students and 
potential militants, blending talibs from all over Afghanistan together with those from 
refugee camps in Pakistan.667  It also exposed those students to the themes of the Islam 
coming from Pakistan, which were increasingly militant.  As a madrassah complex owner 
and an Islamist, Haqqani also benefited from these religious policies of Zia’s 
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government.  The increase in Pakistani funding for zakat projects under Zia helped him 
build upward of eighty schools on both sides of the Durand line, with the largest being 
Manba al-Ulum near Miram Shah in North Waziristan.668  
The funding going through mosques and madrassahs also reinforced increasingly 
militant themes, invoking the ideas and capabilities of the Afghan insurgency.  These 
institutions were already ideologically strict, with madrassahs of the conservative 
Deobandi school of Islamic jurisprudence supported by JUI and predominating in 
Pakistan’s border regions.669  But with the war and this building boom came 
“Kalashnikov culture,” a glorification of jihad and an expanding private-sector base of 
support for Islamic radicalism.670  In addition to their religious education, many schools 
also distributed books, magazines, and DVDs of militant groups like Jaish-e Mohammed 
praising jihad and promoting armed conflict.  Others went further and trained their 
students in the use of weapons.671  Militancy and battlefield successes, in turn, made 
these institutions and their owners more financially independent.  The most well-known 
fighters – including Haqqani himself – developed funding sources from governments and 
wealthy donors in the Persian Gulf, and even received American money directly, without 
the intercession of Pakistani middlemen.672  This put them further outside the 
government’s control.   
These policies of Zia created a dangerous weapon.  Over time the state would face 
both a political and functional capability gap in confronting militants when their goals 
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and those of the state diverged.  Pakistan’s government would repeatedly shy away from 
attempts to directly address the radical themes that bled into its domestic media, schools, 
religious institutions, and politics, reflecting how sensitive these ideas were but also how 
helpful such institutions could be.673  Religious parties and madrassah associations such 
as Wafaq al-Madris al-Arabia actively worked to stifle any reform.  This contributed to 
inertia at the enforcement level and a lackadaisical policy approach to investigating 
madrassah links to terrorism.  Pakistani police often made little effort to crack down even 
on the institutions or clerics praising domestic militants.674  Pakistan’s national security 
apparatus, which benefited from schools producing militants like Lashkar-e Jhangvi, 
showed little interest in allowing major trials of radicals who were viewed as helpful to 
the state.675  Mainstream Pakistani politicians felt free to visit and campaign with the 
leadership of officially proscribed militant groups for decades after the Soviet war.676   
The deepening of relations with jihadist proxies was not confined to Afghanistan, 
but also included militants in places like Kashmir.  The years of the Afghan war saw an 
increase in the Pakistani army’s instrumental support for Kashmiri insurgents, which 
helped exacerbate a revolt that broke out in 1988.677  In the decade afterwards this 
continued, but the aid was funneled to increasingly Islamist groups and then on to more 
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radical non-Kashmiris, who were less concerned with civilian casualties.  In the early 
1990’s, the ISI shifted its support from secular, independence-minded groups to the 
Islamist Hizb ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which was supported politically by JI.  HUM 
became the preeminent group in Kashmir and attacks on Indian forces skyrocketed.678  In 
the mid-1990’s Pakistan pushed further, believing that HUM was still too politically 
moderate.  The ISI began to patronize the most violent jihadist groups, like Lashkar-e 
Taiba (LET) and Jaish-e Mohammed (JEM).  Both LET and JEM were proscribed after a 
major attack on the Indian parliament, but continued to operate relatively freely and meet 
with Pakistani politicians.679  And active or passive, the jihad was spreading further than 
Kashmir.  For example, the Uzbek government condemned Pakistan after the war for 
allegedly training Uzbek militants like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which had 
spread to Afghanistan and the FATA.680 
The relative autonomy of many of these groups meant that other means were 
necessary for the state to control its radicals, such as mediators and informal managers of 
the radical community.  As Russian forces withdrew from Afghanistan Haqqani began to 
act as a key mediator between militants, a role that would become more critical in the 
future.  He had feet on many sides of the aisle: he had, for example, been one of the only 
Afghan mujahedin leaders who openly recruited and aided foreign fighters such as Bin 
Laden and other Arabs.681  Pakistan, with the support of the United States and Saudi 
Arabia, placed Haqqani at the lead of an effort to mediate a power-sharing arrangement 
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among the mujahedin commanders, though its primary battlefield proxy in the immediate 
interwar period was the hardline Islamist Gilbuddin Hekmatyar.682  Haqqani’s role 
continued to focus on reconciling the disparate mujahedin parties during Hekmatyar’s 
devastating siege of Kabul in 1992 and the emergence of the Taliban movement in 
1994.683  After Hekmatyar’s star dimmed, Pakistan would gradually shift its support to 
the Taliban.  Beginning as a Kandahar-based anti-warlord movement, the Taliban spread 
to the west and northeast, eventually reaching the Loya Paktiya region.  There, too, the 
Haqqanis were diplomatic.  At the prompting of Pakistan’s ISI, Haqqani joined the 
Taliban in 1995, receiving financial and political autonomy in exchange for assisting with 
the capture of Kabul in 1995 and Mazar-e Sharif in 1996.684   
Compared to the military’s involvement, Pakistan’s civilian government had only 
loose influence over the Taliban and other Islamist militants during these years.  In 
Kashmir, this presented the absurd spectacle of Nawaz Sharif signing a goodwill accord 
with India in February 1999 in an attempt to reduce his international isolation, while the 
military had already begun to smuggle irregular forces into Kashmir to precipitate the 
Kargil crisis two months earlier.685  In Afghanistan, the Haqqanis continued to harbor 
Islamist rebels wanted by the US government, including al-Qaeda and other militants like 
Harakat ul-Ansar.686  Particularly after al-Qaeda’s US Embassy bombings and Osama bin 
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Laden’s declaration of war against the US, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s 
administration came under intense US pressure to compel the Taliban to extradite bin 
Laden.  That pressure continued after the civilian and military branches of the Pakistani 
government were united by force in 1999 under General Pervez Musharraf.  It proved 
fruitless; al-Qaeda and a number of Pakistani insurgents remained in Loya Paktia until 
the end of the regime.687   
 That end came with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which brought the 
United States into Afghanistan and forced Pakistan to alter its ties to the Taliban.  When 
it became clear an invasion was imminent, Pakistani leaders asked for time to negotiate 
with Mullah Omar over the surrender of bin Laden.  At the same time, however, ISI 
director Lieutenant-General Mahmoud Ahmad then traveled to Afghanistan and 
reportedly urged Omar not to buckle to the Americans.688  Whether Omar needed the 
encouragement or not, he did not buckle.  Unfortunately for him, the success of the initial 
American campaign was extraordinarily rapid.  The United States inserted paramilitary 
forces into Afghanistan on September 26 and began bombing the country eleven days 
later on October 7.689  Northern Alliance forces led by Atta Muhammed Nur and Abdul 
Rashid Dostum took Mazar-e Sharif on November 10 and Kabul fell on November 13.  
On December 6, senior Taliban officials led by Mullah Omar abandoned Kandahar and 
eventually left the country.690  US and Northern Alliance representatives met with 
Jalaluddin Haqqani to discuss reconciliation but no deal was struck.691  That was 
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unfortunate.  Many of the foreign fighters in Afghanistan were hiding in a cave complex 
called Tora Bora, in the eastern province of Nangarhar.  Focused on maintaining a light 
footprint, the US allowed local Afghan forces to lead the effort to encircle these militants.  
Many of them subsequently escaped over the border into Pakistan, and many of those 
eventually trickled into the Haqqani stronghold of North Waziristan.692  
 
II:  The Conflict 
Recovery, 2001-2006 
Pakistan’s key objectives in Afghanistan remained consistent from the beginning 
of the American invasion.  Above all, Pakistan sought to prevent the country from 
emerging as an Indian ally, which could place it in a precarious strategic situation.  
Second, it wanted to maintain a positive military and economic relationship with the 
United States.  Third, it wanted to prevent chaos emerging, as had happened in the 
1990’s.  Fourth, it desired a friendly, deniable area to train militants like the LET, mostly 
for use in Kashmir.  Lastly, it wanted to degrade Afghanistan’s ability to foment 
separatism in its ethnically Pashtun areas.693 
These goals suggested a strategy that would offer sufficient cooperation with the 
US to preserve bilateral relations while providing enough support to insurgent elements 
to ensure Pakistan retained a veto over the strategic alignment of any future Afghanistan.  
Pakistan helped the United States conduct counterterrorism operations against the 
remainder of the al-Qaeda network.  But it also provided varying degrees of support to 
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the Afghan Taliban, which was useful as a proxy to ensure that veto.  This support was 
essentially twofold.  Pakistan combined benign neglect of the Quetta Shura Taliban and 
its associated militants with more direct support to the Haqqanis.  This strategy achieved 
a high degree of deniability with the “regular” Afghan Taliban, which had a baseline 
degree of operational competence, while less deniability but more high-end operational 
capability and tactical responsiveness with the Haqqanis. 
The Haqqani network received the most support of any Afghan proxy from 
Pakistan’s military and intelligence institutions, including active operational assistance, 
weapons, and funding that increased its battlefield capabilities. This relationship was a 
category of its own.  After the American invasion, Haqqani’s group retreated to its core 
area around Miram Shah and the Shawal Valley, in North Waziristan.  During 
discussions with Jalaluddin Haqqani in the aftermath, Pakistani officers urged him to 
fight back against the Americans.  In February of 2003, the Miram Shah Shura was 
inaugurated as the locus of the Haqqanis jihad efforts against the Americans.694  
Throughout the war, Haqqani would consistently rely far more heavily on financing from 
Pakistan than other branches of the Taliban.695  Pakistani officers also allegedly helped 
Haqqani rebuild his training facilities on their side of the border in North Waziristan.696  
They subsequently provided operational expenses for the complex, high profile attacks 
that would become a trademark of Haqqani operations.  For example, Pakistani ISI 
officers reportedly sent the Haqqanis motorbikes for use in suicide attacks.697  Militants 
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were equipped out near the frontier and then sent across the Afghan-Pakistan border.698  
More complicated attacks, such as the devastating bombing later of a CIA base in Khost 
Province in coordination with al-Qaeda, were also reportedly funded and supported 
operationally by Pakistani officers.699    
This and other types of direct support made the Haqqani network a highly capable 
element of the Afghan insurgency.  This was aided by the centralization of command, 
sometimes down to the tactical level, which differed from other Afghan Taliban factions 
like the Quetta Shura.700  Indeed, the enhanced operational capabilities the group 
developed prompted some to refer to it as the special operations wing of the Taliban.  
That was not its formal function in the insurgency, but it is true that the Haqqanis 
conducted complex operations (particularly suicide attacks) throughout the country.701  
Kabul, in particular.  The Haqqani network conducted the majority of the violence in 
Kabul, and nearly all of the spectacular attacks.  It kept its facilitation networks – its safe 
houses, its staging areas, its arms dumps – separate from other Taliban factions.702  
Coincidental with affinity for high-profile attacks was that the Haqqani network retained 
its ties to al-Qaeda, even as most of the other Taliban factions shed them.  These ties 
were not just a source of honor resulting from long personal ties and Pakhtunwali, but a 
two-way street of operational support.703   
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This was the distinctive nature of Haqqani support from Pakistan.  Other Pakistani 
support was more passive, similar to its support for the Quetta Shura Taliban, which 
through most of the American period served as the political umbrella group for the 
insurgency.  The Quetta Shura’s leadership was primarily comprised of the senior 
members of the deposed Taliban government, most importantly Mullah Mohammed 
Omar, which relocated to Quetta in 2002.  Omar retained the overall allegiance of all 
insurgent factions, despite periods of tension and of migrating power centers, and 
national-strategic decisions about the war remained in Quetta. 
This passive support from Pakistan was visible in three ways.  First, there was the 
state’s toleration of the leadership’s presence in Quetta, the same as Miram Shah, and the 
logistical and operational nodes it maintained around itself.  Pakistani security officials 
allegedly kept reporters and other members of the public away from Taliban leaders and 
their base areas around Quetta.704  Pakistani military and intelligence officers also passed 
on warnings of suspected raids by American forces to select Afghan Taliban leaders, 
including the Haqqanis.705  They soft-peddled their own raids on Taliban facilities, often 
waiting for a politically convenient time like a high-level US-Pakistan meeting to execute 
the operation and capturing few unimportant personnel.706  Second was permissiveness 
about cross-border interdiction.  The state permitted Taliban leaders and fighters to cross 
the border freely in their area.707  These were nearly impossible to verify by Afghan or 
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American forces.  Deniability was also enabled by Pakistan’s historically loose control 
over the FATA.708  This was a theme Musharraf would return to over and over during 
friendly meetings with President Bush.  At Camp David in June 2003, for example, he 
stressed that Pakistan had not controlled the FATA for over a century, while accepting 
Bush’s praise of his leadership and cooperation.709  Pakistani forces also reportedly 
assisted militants in crossing the Afghan border to conduct attacks through measures like 
clearing checkpoints and ignoring identification.710  And third was the state’s tolerance of 
the Taliban’s recruitment of foreign fighters, usually Pakistanis, who added punch to their 
cause. 
Recruitment was an area where Pakistan’s passive support was critical to the 
Taliban, particularly in the early days after the American invasion.  Though the Quetta 
Shura would rely heavily on local recruitment in Afghanistan, far more than the Haqqani 
network, in the early days Pakistani recruits were critical to reconstituting both groups.  
After the former regime’s leadership settled in Quetta, the proto-insurgency was in 
disarray.  After taking stock of its remaining fighters, the Quetta Shura began a 
recruitment drive among madrassah students in Karachi and Balochistan.  This effort had 
limited success at first, but was then expanded to the mosques, refugee camps, and 
Pakistani Pashtun villages of Quetta and perhaps KPK.  Between 2004 and 2006 
Pakistani madrassahs began to send an army of new recruits.711  Foreigners were also 
recruited this way, mostly Pakistanis with a smattering of extraterritorial jihadists who 
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were usually better-trained and more able to conduct operations like suicide attacks.712  
These recruits were critical in sustaining the insurgency through its lean years.  Those 
numbers began to fall in 2006, when the fighting strength of the Taliban rose back up to 
as much as 75 percent locally-based fighters.713 
These recruits were particularly critical for the Quetta Shura Taliban because it 
fought and fundraised in different and more manpower-intensive ways than the Haqqani 
network.  It needed people for both.  The Haqqanis would become known for their 
facilitation networks and high-profile attacks, and were already conducting effective 
guerilla warfare, but with exception of some remote areas in Loya Paktia they were not 
landowners.  They did not provide shadow governors for their provinces, only military 
commanders.714  The Haqqanis formed an operational relationship with the budding 
Taliban insurgency early on, though their political relationship (as indeed it had been 
during the emirate) was nebulous and sometimes tense.715  For one thing, they had only a 
minor representation on the insurgency’s leadership committee, which was dominated by 
the Quetta Shura.  But perhaps this was inevitable.  They were not really offering an 
alternate national government to the one in Kabul, and the Quetta Shura certainly was.  
The Taliban worked to seize territory and villages throughout the country, excepting most 
of Loya Paktiya and the eastern highlands, and even committed to standoff fights with 
international forces.716  The Taliban’s primary operational focus remained in the south, 
however, in Helmand and Kandahar, where its movement was rooted and which supplied 
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much of its cash flow from narcotics.  Their formations were often larger than the 
Haqqani network, from five to thirty people or more.  Though they received strategic 
guidance from their leadership in Pakistan, they also enjoyed significant autonomy at the 
district level.717  These larger groups of fighters helped with financing as well.  The 
Haqqani network received a significant portion of its funding from Persian Gulf donors 
and from Pakistan.  The Quetta Shura Taliban by comparison relied on narcotics 
trafficking and other insurgent staples like taxing the local populace.718  Both of these 
were manpower-intensive and required relatively more troops.   
The two-pronged nature of Pakistan’s proxy strategy meant that Pakistan could 
project power and keep military pressure on the Afghan government while delaying 
direct consequences from the United States, its major competitor.  The insurgency grew 
slowly.  Jalaluddin Haqqani, the senior leader most familiar with insurgent tactics, began 
operations from 2002-2003 with the help of the Pakistani government.  The network 
relied on Haqqani’s madrassah system and influence with Zadran tribal elders to build its 
influence.719  It took the Quetta Shura Taliban until the next year to begin operations in 
any strength.720  Other groups, such as Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami and al-Qaeda in the 
north and Mullah Nazir and Gul Bahadar in the south, also established facilities in 
Pakistan in places like South Waziristan.721  American forces were certainly aware of the 
insurgent bases in Pakistan, and in January 2003 a spokesman for US forces frankly 
acknowledged their troops need to pursue militants across the border.722  US Ambassador 
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to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilizad raised this issue repeatedly throughout his tenure from 
2003 to 2005, including and especially the need to capture the Afghan Taliban living in 
Quetta.723  However, Pakistan was treated gently.  President Bush had built a good 
relationship with Pervez Musharraf who had cooperated with both the invasion of 
Afghanistan and the campaign against Al-Qaeda in the FATA.724  The White House 
called him a “stalwart ally” in the War on Terror in June 2003, as well as a “courageous 
leader” and “friend of the United States.”725 
 The growing base of militancy along Pakistan’s border comprised a potent tool 
for projecting power into Afghanistan if the militants’ interests aligned with Islamabad’s.  
However, since most of them had few ties to the state, they also had more agency.  Left 
to their own devices, the militants would strike Pakistani targets if the government 
encroached on their territory, assisted in counterterrorism strikes, and cracked down 
domestically on jihadist networks.  At the very least, they could contribute to the 
lawlessness of the border areas that would allow more hostile militants to fester.  This 
security challenge was exacerbated by the rise in Islamic extremism in Pakistan more 
broadly.  By the time of the US invasion of Afghanistan, ten to fifteen percent of 
Pakistan’s mosques were estimated to be affiliated with extremist groups.726  According 
to police reports in one province, for example, 2,100 of Sindh’s 12,500 madrassas were 
classified as dangerous.  An estimated 800 madrassas in Karachi were linked to jihadists, 
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and 20 around Islamabad – the capital – were linked to domestic Taliban militant 
groups.727   
This latent threat became more critical as Musharraf began to drift towards 
reconciliation with India and his goals began to deviate from the various goals of the 
militants.  In addition to enabling American strikes on al-Qaeda, he pursued a 
conciliatory policy towards New Delhi after largely bearing responsibility for a series of 
confrontations – including a nuclear standoff – earlier in his tenure.  Musharraf 
established a ceasefire with India in 2003 and explicitly put the issue of Kashmir on the 
back burner.728  He would subsequently begin describing the peace process as 
“irreversible.”729  Blowback came soon.  Two plots against Musharraf’s life in 2003 
spurred the government to try and increase its control over the FATA.  Both plots were 
linked to militants in South Waziristan agency and were followed by senior al-Qaeda 
leader Ayman al-Zawahiri’s call for Musharraf’s death in December.  A second crisis 
came on March 16, 2004, when members of Pakistan’s paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) 
attempted to seize a compound west of Wana, the agency’s major town.  Instead, they 
were ambushed by around 500 al-Qaeda and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 
fighters and lost dozens of troops in a weeklong siege.730  The failure of the operation 
was partially due to the ISI allegedly withholding information about the militants from 
other security forces.731  
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Here, the passive support Pakistan offered militants in the FATA increased 
Pakistan’s deniability with the insurgency in Afghanistan but contributed to a functional 
capability gap domestically that was dangerous.  The extent of militancy and the 
considerable arsenals that were hidden in many madrassahs (particularly in the FATA) 
meant police were often outgunned and orders became requests, contingent on the 
goodwill of clerics.732  Even if a majority of voters wanted the authorities to crack down 
on militants, they were sufficiently strong that enforcement required more political and 
military effort than basic law enforcement could provide.  Under the FATA’s colonial-era 
arrangement, the tribes were largely left to govern themselves, with order maintained 
loosely by governmental Political Officers who negotiated disputes and settlements with 
the tribes.  There was also the Frontier Corps, a body which was deputized to keep order 
in the FATA but which in reality like the police was often outgunned.733  That meant 
relying on military operations, which again faced inertia, partially because the army was 
deeply affected by Zia’s Islamicization.  Pakistan’s military and intelligence officers were 
undoubtedly more conservative than the preceding generation, including at the senior 
level, partially a result of Zia’s policies and their support to the mujahedin in 
Afghanistan.734  American academic Vali Nasr, testifying before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on July 14, 2004, noted that extremism was on the rise and there 
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was corresponding sympathy in the Pakistani military for jihadist views, which affected 
the counterterrorism fight.735 
Nor did Pakistan necessarily have the capability to cut off funding for the militant 
institutions, since they had developed independent financial links abroad.  In 
congressional testimony, police leaders estimated that 950 schools in just one province 
alone – Punjab – received funds from countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.736  
The Haqqani network also developed these sources, building offices in the Middle East 
and reducing its dependence on Pakistan and increasing state deniability.  The US 
Treasury Department would eventually designate several Haqqani logisticians as 
terrorists for their work in raising money from places like the United Arab Emirates.737  
The Haqqanis also had a vast array of smuggling and other businesses that relied on 
shipping items like precious stones, lumber, and chromite from the Loya Paktia region to 
Pakistan.  Some of these were legitimate businesses in Pakistan proper, such as real estate 
and car dealerships, and others were not.738  In North Waziristan, they collected taxes and 
fees in much the same way as a regular government.  They were also active in the media 
market, selling subscriptions to a monthly magazine, Manba al-Jihad.  But their 
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fundraising also included more criminal activities, like kidnapping and protection rackets 
for American and Afghan reconstruction projects in Khost.739   
All of these elements of Pakistan’s lack of control over its local Islamist militants 
and the militants’ corresponding independence made the Haqqanis’ relatively close 
connection to the state vital.  As both the Afghan insurgency and domestic militancy 
increased, Pakistan relied on the Haqqani network to mitigate the cost of its passive 
support.  Due in part to its operational weakness, the Pakistani government tried to 
negotiate three separate peace agreements with the FATA militants from 2004 to 2006.  
Two of these were short-lived and poorly received among Pakistan’s Western allies.  The 
first was broken in June 2004, after attacks against a Frontier Corps fort and an army 
school in Tiarzeh.  In September, the Pakistani army launched a large-scale operation 
involving 10,000 troops against militants under Baitullah Mehsud and foreign fighters in 
South Waziristan.  It was largely ineffective, and many of the militants fled into North 
Waziristan.740  After the fall operation, Islamabad attempted to end the fighting with a 
second South Waziristan peace deal in February with Mehsud.  The state agreed that he 
would be able to impose elements of sharia law under his territory, while Mehsud agreed 
not to allow militants into Afghanistan and cut off ties with the Taliban.  Again the 
agreement failed.741  
In North Waziristan, after a period of militant attacks against its facilities, the 
Pakistani government attempted to negotiate a third agreement in September 2006.  
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However, this one was mediated by Jalaluddin Haqqani.  The Pakistani army agreed to 
remove its checkpoints and roadblocks in North Waziristan, return captured equipment, 
and release the militants it had captured.742  In exchange, Gul Bahadar and other militants 
agreed to forego Pakistani army targets in Pakistan and focus on Afghanistan.743  In 
another example, when militants captured Pakistan’s ambassador to Afghanistan Tariq 
Azizuddin, Haqqani reportedly interceded with the Pakistani Taliban and secured 
Azizuddin’s release.744  Pakistan paid heavily for the exchange, handing over a reported 
$2.5 million, numerous Pakistani Taliban prisoners, and two high-ranking members of 
the Afghan Taliban.  Thus, the state ceded even more agency to its proxies by reducing 
its local control, but it did manage to secure a respite that its military capabilities alone 
were unable to achieve. 
As unhelpful militancy against the Pakistani state increased in the FATA, so too 
did helpful militancy increase against Afghanistan.  By 2006, insurgent attacks had risen 
to the point where they were beginning to threaten the viability of the Afghan 
government.  Direct attacks from insurgents using small arms or rocket-propelled 
grenades grew from 1,558 in 2005 to 4,542 in 2006.   Suicide bombings rose from 27 to 
139 and IED attacks had increased from 783 to 1,677.745  Assassinations were up, as 
insurgents targeted government officials and security personnel, and chipped away at 
Kabul’s ability to keep order.746  The Quetta Shura Taliban was beginning to hold land, 
establishing control over villages and districts in Kandahar and Helmand.747  Afghan 
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officials had no doubt about where the violence was coming from.  In a 2006 interview 
with PBS, Afghan intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh said the Afghan government was 
“fighting proxy forces created by Pakistan.”  Its neighbor was a “breeding ground for 
insurgents,” at several different levels.  “If you look at the pattern of propaganda in the 
Pakistani media against Afghanistan – and some of the papers are state-sponsored papers 
– they clearly try to undermine the Afghan government.”  Funding was coming from 
“undercover charities,” so as to “conceal the official hand.”  And the 80,000 Pakistani 
troops stationed in the borderlands were allegedly giving free reign to Afghan Taliban 
leaders.748 
 However, the American response to this offensive was overall relatively 
restrained.  The two-pronged nature of Pakistan’s proxy strategy meant that Pakistan 
could project power while delaying direct consequences from the United States, its major 
balancing power in Afghanistan.  American forces were certainly aware of the insurgent 
bases in Pakistan:  they had pushed on this subject as early as January 2003, when 
spokesmen for US troops were assuring reporters that they reserved the right to pursue 
militants across the border.749  But President Bush enjoyed good relations with Pervez 
Musharraf, who had made concessions both to the American war in Afghanistan and 
against terrorism more broadly.750  Bush recognized Musharraf had put himself at risk by 
his support of American counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda in the FATA.751  
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Musharraf had also pursued a restrained foreign policy elsewhere, such as prioritizing 
engagement with India, and had paid for it, with increasing domestic dissatisfaction and 
three assassination attempts since 2003.  As late as 2007, Bush was calling Musharraf a 
“loyal ally” in fighting terrorism, and saying he was a “man of his word.”752   
 
Intensification, 2007-2013 
As violence in Afghanistan increased, Pakistani foreign policy began to shift in 
2007.  Musharraf’s political capital at home was badly weakened by two events.  First, 
the firing of the head of Pakistan’s judiciary resulted in months-long protests by the so-
called Lawyers’ Movement and sporadic violence.  Second, Musharraf faced a 
confrontation over Islamabad’s Red Mosque, which contained thousands of students and 
was a recognized transit place for jihadists heading to Afghanistan.753  Religious zealots 
began enforcing elements of Sharia law in the surrounding blocks, harassing women and 
banning shopkeepers from selling Western products like movies.  Eventually, the regime 
had enough.  In early July, Pakistan’s army seized the mosque after ten days of fighting 
and more than a hundred casualties.754  The confrontation provoked another spike of 
violence internally, this time beyond the FATA.  Bombings and terror attacks rocked the 
North-West Frontier Province, and fighters gathered in its Swat Valley as a show of 
defiance to the Pakistani state.   
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These domestic tensions coincided with an intensification of long-running 
international objections to Musharraf’s rule, and in particular his continuation as both 
head of the military and head of state.  Democratization and a focus on the 2007 elections 
became an increasing theme of US public statements about the war.755  The 
Commonwealth of former British colonies warned Musharraf in early 2007 he must 
choose a military or civilian role by the time of the election, and suspended him when he 
did not.756  Under significant domestic and foreign pressure, he finally stepped down as 
army chief in November 2007 and was replaced by General Ashfaq Kayani.  Shorn of his 
military base, Musharraf would lose elections the next year and be forced to leave the 
country.  Pakistan’s new President Asif Ali Zardari tried to continue Musharraf’s foreign 
policy alignment with the West but as a civilian had far less control of Pakistan’s military 
apparatus, including its ties with proxy forces.  General Kayani did have control of them, 
however.  Kayani rejected Musharraf’s détente with India and sought to re-prioritize the 
fight for Kashmir.  He believed that Pakistani military doctrine remained centered around 
the threat from India and that the concept of strategic depth was still critical.757  After a 
massive attack by Pakistani militants in Mumbai in February 2008, India suspended the 
former president’s signature dialogue.   
In Afghanistan, contacts between Pakistani security officials and the Taliban also 
increased as insurgent attacks ticked upwards.758  Security incidents in the spring and 
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summer of 2008 reached their highest peak since the invasion, up 40 percent from the 
year before.759  In 2008, one hundred and fifty-five US servicemen died in Afghanistan, 
up from a hundred and seventeen the year before and ninety-eight in 2006.760  After its 
initial reconstitution, the Quetta Shura Taliban had stepped up operations dramatically in 
the south since 2004 and spread its military influence out to Herat and the key adjoining 
Kabul provinces, primarily Logar and Wardak.  This allowed it to threaten supply 
convoys going to ISAF forces in the capital.761  By the end of 2007, the Taliban had 
advanced operations sufficiently to start pressuring the main highway linking Kandahar 
and Herat to Kabul, threatening to choke off the key arteries of the nation.762  Where it 
had presence, and where it could, the Taliban occupied villages and created parallel 
government structures to establish control over the population.763  On February 5, 2008, 
Director of National Intelligence Admiral Michael McConnell acknowledged to the 
Senate Armed Services Committee that “[t]he security situation has deteriorated in the 
south and Taliban forces have expanded operation into previously peaceful areas of the 
west and around Kabul.”764 
Operations in Kabul proper were something different, however.  There was some 
violence but the Haqqani network had not yet begun conducting the spectacular attacks 
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for which it would later become infamous, and which would bring American attention to 
their sponsor.  In the east, the Haqqanis had sustained a continually high level of guerilla 
warfare since 2003.  In his home territories of Khost, Paktika, and Paktiya, Haqqani 
remained focused on guerilla warfare, mostly hit and run attacks.  By the start of 2007, 
Haqqani was able to threaten the Khost-Gardez pass, a key road that was cut off 
throughout the Soviet war yet still remained open during the American one.  With less 
presence on the ground than the Taliban, and with lighter manpower needs, Haqqani 
could rely on the support of his madrassah network and his influence with tribal leaders 
in Loya Paktia to field an effective fighting force.765  Haqqani recruited correspondingly 
fewer local Afghans than the Quetta Shura, and instead focused on developing hardened 
cadres from his schools.766  Haqqani’s ISI contacts were also instrumental in helping him 
solidify his local support, allowing him to bribe tribal elders with Pakistani passports, 
houses across the border, and trips to the Persian Gulf.767  
The worsening security situation did incite a strategic reaction by the United 
States, though not yet with corresponding consequences or public blame for Pakistan.  
Washington began to increase force levels rapidly.  In 2007 the United States had had 
13,000 troops in Afghanistan under ISAF command, part of a larger 50,000 troop 
international contingent.  After repeated plus-ups during Bush’s last two years, that 
number rose to 32,000 by the end of 2008.768  The increasing violence provoked an even 
steeper increase by the new US President Barack Obama, who had been fiercely critical 
of the Bush Administration’s alleged inattention to Afghanistan during his campaign.  
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Obama and his surrogates repeatedly promised to shift focus from what they described as 
a distracting war of choice in Iraq and concentrate on “the good war,” America’s original 
mission in the mountains.769  This began with a leadership change.  In June, Obama 
replaced the US commander General David McKiernan with General Stanley 
McChrystal, who as commander of Joint Special Operations Command had 
revolutionized American counterterrorism.  
McChrystal’s view of the situation was dire.  Like the year prior, 2009 would be 
the most violent year on record, with 317 US troops killed.  That number would rise by 
almost 60 percent again in 2010.770  In his initial assessment in August, McChrystal 
warned, “Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, 
many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating.  We face not only a resilient 
and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans…that 
undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents.”771  He also called for 
increasing America’s military commitment.  McChrystal recommended adding 40,000 
additional US troops to the effort, as well as more international forces, on top of the 
roughly 30,000 that had already been sent to the country under the new president.  
Obama eventually sent his general another 30,000 troops.772 
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The Obama Administration was taking this seriously – it could hardly do less, 
after the president’s laceration of the Bush Administration’s policy during the campaign.  
However, the White House initially sounded relatively sanguine about Pakistan’s role in 
the violence.  During Obama’s March 2009 rollout of his new Afghan strategy, he urged 
a supportive relationship, saying “Pakistan needs our help in going after al-Qaeda.”  His 
language was in certain ways stronger than Bush’s, promising that Islamabad would not 
be offered a “blank check”, but remained in the vein of Pakistan as victim, not as 
perpetrator.  He also announced the launching of a trilateral mechanism to improve 
cooperation among the US, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and called for more military 
cooperation along the border.773  In May, during a summit with both the Afghan and 
Pakistani presidents, Obama again made careful note of the ambiguity of the border, and 
here there was a less recriminatory tone.  The US would “work together with a renewed 
sense of partnership” to fight “our common enemies.”774  US Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton called the meeting a “breakthrough,” and also announced a new major trade 
arrangement with the Pakistanis to help foster “common cause for common objective.775 
In truth, Pakistan and the US did partially share an interest in confronting militant 
violence spreading from the FATA.  And there had been a correlation between the 
increase of violence in Afghanistan, attributable to the Afghan Taliban groups, and that 
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within Pakistan, attributable to the Pakistani Taliban or TTP.  But it was a loose interest 
only, because the militants targeting Pakistan and those targeting Afghanistan were 
usually different: thus their utility for Pakistan was different, and the state’s interest in 
confronting them was different.  North and South Waziristan had been all but abandoned 
to both kinds of radicals after 2004, despite abortive attempts by the military to reclaim 
control in 2007 and 2008.776  Militia leaders targeting both Afghanistan and Pakistan – 
Gul Bahadar, Mullah Nazir, and Baitullah Mehsud – proceeded to form the Council of 
United Mujahideen in February 2009.777  After blockading South Waziristan for three 
months, and after Baitullah himself was killed by a drone strike on August 5, 2009, the 
military launched its operation into Mehsud tribal territory in October with between 
30,000 and 60,000 troops.  Pakistan claimed that nearly 600 of the dead were militants 
and declared victory in December.  However, many TTP members including Baitullah 
Mehsud’s successor Hakiemullah Mehsud appeared to have fled to North Waziristan.778  
Pakistan subsequently used the Haqqani network to mitigate the lawlessness of the 
militants by establishing tribal councils of leaders to institutionalize mediation of 
disputes.779  This lent the Haqqanis an additional utility, and additionally decreased 
Pakistani incentive in confronting them. 
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And yet the primary purpose of the Haqqani network was warfare in Afghanistan, 
and particularly high-visibility attacks against Western and Indian targets within Kabul.  
Though violence had been steadily increasing in Afghanistan, high-profile operations by 
the Haqqani network began to appear with more regularity only in 2008.  These often 
involved complex plans involving several attackers, suicide bombings, and direct fire.  
On July 7, a suicide bomber in Kabul killed 58 people in an attack targeting the Indian 
defense attaché, who died in the blast.  US intelligence officials placed the blame on 
Lashkar-e Taiba and the Haqqanis, and claimed to have intercepted operational 
communications between the ISI and the Haqqani network planning the attack.780  Three 
other major vehicle-borne explosive attacks that year were also attributed to the 
Haqqanis, including a complex attack against a foreign delegation at the Serena Hotel in 
Kabul and an assassination attempt against Afghan President Hamid Karzai.781  A second 
bombing against the Indian Embassy in Kabul a year later was similarly attributed to the 
Haqqani network and Pakistan.782  Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for a sophisticated 
bombing at Forward Operating Base Chapman in 2009 that killed seven CIA officers, but 
US intelligence indicated that the ISI had paid the Haqqanis $200,000 to assist with the 
attack.783  A reported seventy percent of insurgent violence in Kabul was carried out by 
the Haqqani network, and virtually all of the spectacular attacks.784  The Haqqani 
network was also effective in other forms of advanced operations.  It achieved a major 
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coup in the capture of US Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl in 2009.  Bergdahl was held in 
Haqqani territory in North Waziristan, in the Shawal Valley and Miram Shah, under the 
care of Mullah Sangeen Zadran, a top Haqqani network leader.785  All of these operations 
necessarily required a high degree of training and organization, which would have been 
more challenging for the Quetta Shura Taliban with its more rudimentary operational 
capabilities and looser command and control.  
However, many of these operations were tactically successful but strategically 
foolhardy.  They represented Pakistan’s primary strategic liability in Afghanistan and the 
flashpoint that eventually incited balancing.  These attacks, not the overall deteriorating 
security picture, brought increased American recriminations against Pakistan and did 
little to advance Pakistan’s goals more than the Taliban’s more “conventional” 
operations.  During the fall of the Obama Administration’s first year, American language 
describing Pakistan’s role in the insurgency took a sharply more negative tone.  Gone 
were the public declarations of trust and friendship.  During an October 2009 trip to 
Pakistan, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton caused a stir when she bluntly said that 
al-Qaeda had been in Pakistan for nearly a decade and she found it very hard to believe 
that the Pakistani government did not know where they were.  She referred to a trust 
deficit between the two countries and said the Pakistanis were simply not doing enough 
to pressure the Afghan Taliban.786  President Obama followed that up two months later 
 
785 David Zucchino, David Cloud, and Shashank Bengali “Bowe Bergdahl’s captors: Who, where, why?” 
LA Times (June 14, 2014) http://www.latimes.com/world/afg-hanistan-pakistan/la-fg-bergdahl-captivity-
20140615-story.html (accessed June 1, 2016). 
786 U.S. Department of State, “Interview With Wyatt Andrews of CBS” (October 30, 2009), https://2009-
2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/10/131136.htm (accessed January 10, 2019). 
 298 
by stating that the United States could not tolerate safe havens on the border, more stark 
language about Pakistan than Bush had ever used. 
By the winter, however, with no further major complex attacks by the Haqqani 
network, the pressure had eased off.  A massive new assistance package for Islamabad 
was released, sending Pakistan $7.5 billion over five years.  This was followed by the US 
and Pakistan restarting an upgraded Strategic Dialogue at the ministerial level in March 
2010, devoted to “strengthening the bilateral relationship and building an even broader 
partnership based on mutual respect and mutual trust.”  US rhetoric also warmed towards 
Pakistan, tacking back towards the Bush framework of a partnership.  Clinton eased off 
her earlier statements and recast Pakistan again in the mold of victim, praising the 
government for courage” and promising America’s “full support.”787 
By the summer of 2010, the bilateral relationship had only become warmer.  
Clinton said she felt “strongly that the Pakistani Government has become very serious 
about fighting terrorism within their own borders and working with Afghanistan and the 
United States to try to stabilize the region.  When I became Secretary of State, that wasn’t 
happening; there was not the extraordinary commitment of military assets against 
different terrorist groups that we now see.”  In a different interview, she said the US had 
“certainly seen a change in attitude on the part of the Pakistani Government.”  This was a 
line that held even in the face of a massive document dump by the press freedom 
organization Wikileaks in July 2010, which described closer than publicly known 
Pakistani security cooperation with the Afghan insurgents.  From the White House, 
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Robert Gibbs echoed Clinton’s more positive sentiments: “I will tell you that we have 
made progress in moving this relationship forward; in having the Pakistanis, as I said 
earlier, address the issue of safe havens, the issue of extremists operating in the 
country.”788  By December 2010, President Obama was also heralding the Pakistani 
government’s new approach, saying “Increasingly, the Pakistani government recognizes 
that terrorist networks in its border regions are a threat to all our countries, especially 
Pakistan.”789  In a press briefing the same month, Clinton was celebrating “an entirely 
different approach” by the Pakistanis against their homegrown militants: “That was not 
something that was predicted two years ago that they would do.  They’ve done it.”790 
This was a remarkable statement in the context of a full-blown US effort against 
an insurgent enemy backed by Pakistani institutions.  The Quetta Shura Taliban proved to 
be a formidable and resilient force themselves, despite the comparative lack of direct 
support from Pakistan.  There was perhaps no better example of the differing utility of 
Pakistani proxies than the first head-to-head collision of Obama’s new strategy with the 
insurgency at a town called Marjah in central Helmand Province, where a combined 
operation by 15,000 ISAF troops sought to cut off part of the Quetta Shura Taliban’s drug 
transshipment lines and reimpose governmental authority.  It was more than drugs: 
Marjah was emblematic of a growing Taliban control of south and central Helmand 
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which allowed the group to dominate the north and help project power into Kandahar and 
the ring road.  US control of Marjah and central Helmand would interdict supply 
networks of people and materiel back and forth to Balochistan, isolate the north, and 
bring the province back under control.  In theory.  In fact Marjah became emblematic not 
of the new counterinsurgency strategy but of classic insurgent – and proxy – success.  
Though the named Operation Moshtarek was ultimately successful, fighting lasted far 
longer than the US expected.  The ‘clear’ phase of counterinsurgency was quick, but 
‘hold’ was elusive.  McChrystal and his command suggested thirty days would be 
necessary to clear the area.  In fact, the higher-end Taliban forces pulled out within days 
and the local enemy went to ground.  Marines and their Afghan police partners quickly 
gained control of the town.  Reports surfaced of the Taliban shadow governor entering 
the area in April, along with Taliban fighters returning for the poppy harvest.  Insurgents 
placed IEDs and waged an effective campaign of assassination and intimidation.  By late 
May, firefights in the area were on the rise.  From mid-May to mid-June there were more 
casualties than in the first month of the operation.791  By December 2010 Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates was acknowledging that the Marjah campaign had “taken longer 
and been more difficult than we anticipated,” but speculated that in another six months 
the town would be in a “pretty good place” and congratulated the Pakistanis for 
increasing cooperation and effectiveness in securing the border.792  It was never truly 
pacified.  Sporadic violence in the town continued for years, and indeed lasted until 
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international forces withdrew from most of the province four years later.  The trouble 
McChrystal’s campaign ran into in Marjah and northern Helmand was an indicator of 
how robust the Quetta Shura’s insurgency could be generally even without the Haqqanis, 
and how little Pakistan would be threatened by the US directly. 
When the US-Pakistan relationship finally faced significant and sustained 
tensions in 2011, it came with an uptick in Haqqani complex attacks as well as a brace of 
other crises.  In January, a CIA contractor shot and killed two Pakistanis in disputed 
circumstances before being flown out of the country under a cover of diplomatic 
immunity in April.  In May 2011, a US raid killed Osama bin Laden in a compound close 
to Pakistan’s major military academy in Abbotabad, making the government’s claim of 
ignorance almost fanciful.  But despite these flashpoints, US statements remained 
relatively restrained.  The President in May made special note that it was the cooperation 
with Pakistan that had led to bin Laden’s capture.  As late as June 2011, White House 
spokesman Jay Carney was describing the US relationship with Pakistan as complicated, 
but an “extremely important” one with an “important partner.”  He stressed the need to 
value the relationship and highlighted that it was “important to remember the successes 
we have had – successes that have come, in many cases, precisely because we have this 
[bilateral] cooperation.”793  And the President again on June 22, in a major speech on 
Afghanistan, was portraying Pakistan as the victim: no country, he said, “is more 
endangered by violent extremists.” 
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That changed after a new spate of attacks from the Haqqani network.  On June 28, 
2011, several gunmen attacked a heavily guarded luxury hotel in Kabul, killing twelve 
people.794  In September, a major truck bombing in Sayyedabad, south of Kabul, 
wounded 77 ISAF troops and killed five civilians.  That attack came days before a major 
siege of the US Embassy and ISAF headquarters in Kabul, in which 16 Afghan police 
officers and civilians died.795  An assassin killed the Afghan government’s chief 
peacemaker Bernahuddin Rabbani on September 20, 2011, allegedly with the support of 
the Haqqani network.  Rabbani’s loss was a particular blow for reconciliation efforts: he 
had been a leading mujahedeen in the 1980’s and President of Afghanistan after the 
Soviet withdrawal.  It was a clear indication that Pakistan wanted to control the political 
agenda of how and when the war would end.797  One month later, on October 29, 2011, 
the Haqqani network was also responsible for a truck bomb in Kabul that killed 13 
American troops.798   
Coupled with the increasing tempo of Haqqani operations against American 
targets, these high-profile attacks placed Pakistan’s deniability in unprecedented 
jeopardy.  After three months of them that summer, US policy statements hardened and 
focused on the links between the Pakistani government and the Haqqani network, which 
heretofore it had not.  On September 22, 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
 
794 Alissa Rubin, “Attack at Kabul Hotel Deflates Security Hopes in Afghanistan,” The New York Times 
(June 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/20-11/06/30/world/asia/30afghanistan.html (accessed May 22, 
2016). 
795 Elizabeth Bumiller and Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s Spy Agency is Tied to Attack on U.S. Embassy,” The 
New York Times (September 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/world/asia/mullen-asserts-
pakistani-role-in-attack-on-us-embassy.html (accessed May 19, 2016). 
797 Christine Fair, “Pakistan in 2011: Ten Years of the “War on Terror,” Asian Survey 52, no. 1 
(January/February 2012), 105. 
798 Rob Nordland, “12 Americans Die as Blast Hits Bus in Afghanistan,” The New York Times (October 29, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/world/asia/deadly-attack-strikes-nato-bus-in-kabul.html 
(accessed June 5, 2016).  
 303 
Admiral Mike Mullen publicly blamed Pakistan’s ISI for supporting the earlier attacks on 
the Intercontinental Hotel, the Sayyedabad troops, the embassy and military headquarters, 
and scores of lower-profile events.  The Haqqani network, he said, “acts as a veritable 
arm of Pakistani intelligence.”  Until then, Mullen had been considered one of the more 
pro-Pakistan members of the Administration.799  Though the administration tried to clean 
up his comments, six days later White House spokesman Jay Carney called the links 
between the Pakistani military and the Haqqani network “troubling,” and said the US 
wanted action taken against them, the first time he had used that word.800  Secretary 
Clinton added separately that the process of deciding whether to designate the Haqqani 
network as a terrorist organization was in its final formal review.801  In response to the 
succession of attacks on the Embassy and other targets, US and Afghan forces launched a 
major assault on the Haqqanis’ Loya Paktia facilitation networks on October 16, 2011, 
entitled Operation Knife Edge.  During private meetings in late 2011 and early 2012 with 
the Pakistani military leadership, the new US commander General John Allen also 
demanded that Pakistani forces move against the Haqqanis.  At a public forum with 
Pakistan’s prime minister in March 2012, Obama acknowledged “strains” in the US-
Pakistani relationship.802   
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The Pakistanis pleaded for understanding, meaning delay.  Kayani and other 
Pakistani officials continued to reiterate to their US counterparts that their country was 
the real target of terrorism, from homegrown and Afghan militants.  When pressed, 
Pakistani officials pointed to the safe havens that these groups enjoyed across the border 
as evidence of greater Afghan culpability, rather than specific culpability on their part.803  
Kayani had even shared a lengthy memo with President Obama that in part accused the 
United States of seeking destabilization in Pakistan as part of its strategy for 
Afghanistan.804  In response to the latest pressure from Allen and others, Kayani 
promised military action in 2012 but pleaded patience, citing ongoing struggles with 
other insurgent groups in the FATA.805  Even the Quetta Shura Taliban tried to distance 
itself from Islamabad and seemingly the Haqqani Network.  Mullah Omar used his Eid 
message, traditionally a venue to encourage fighters, to rebut claims of Pakistani support 
for the insurgency.806 
 However, this time, Pakistan was less able to delay the consequences.  The 
Obama Administration faced increased public pressure to formally declare the Haqqanis 
a terrorist entity.  Their key operational leader Badruddin Haqqani had finally been 
included on the list on May 11, 2011, but not the network as a whole, to the disbelief of 
many observers.807  This became increasingly untenable politically throughout 2011 after 
the series of high-profile attacks.  Senator Richard Burr introduced the widely supported 
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Haqqani Network Terrorist Designation Act in December 2011.  As it happened, 
Pakistan’s link to the group had actually further delayed action.  The Obama 
Administration had been concerned that given those links to Pakistan, a terrorist 
designation would necessarily implicate the Pakistani military and intelligence services as 
well.808  A public rupture with Pakistan would also harm the civilian Zardari 
administration, perhaps fatally, and potentially lead to a less-cooperative government in 
the next elections.  Third, there had been hope that as an arm of the Taliban with more 
centralization and closer ties to Pakistan than the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani network 
could be a reliable interlocutor to negotiate an end to the war.  A terrorist designation 
would make it radioactive.  However, despite these standing policy hurdles, the Obama 
Administration finally designated the Haqqani network as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization (as well as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity) in September 
2012, three years after the surge began.   
The United States also began to assume more bilateral risk in taking action 
against the Haqqanis directly in Pakistan.  Over the course of the Afghan insurgency, the 
leadership and operations of Jalaluddin Haqqani’s organization had been taken over by 
his sons, primarily Badruddin and Sirajuddin.  Sirajuddin Haqqani was the network’s 
military leader as his father stepped away from operations, and succeeded him as overall 
leader when he died.  His younger brother Badruddin served as his deputy and the 
group’s operational chief.809  The US had been reluctant to conduct unilateral attacks on 
the Haqqanis not just because of the civilian casualties and the violation of Pakistan’s 
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airspace, but because Pakistani military or intelligence personnel might be present.  In 
August 2012, Badruddin was finally killed in a US drone strike in the Shawal Valley.  
Perhaps as a result of the pressure applied by the United States, Islamabad did not 
condemn the attack as a violation of its sovereignty, as it often did when Afghan Taliban 
targets were killed by US forces in Pakistan.810   
 
Consolidation, 2013-2016 
In retrospect, 2012 was the high water mark of confrontation.  Taliban fortunes 
were at their lowest and international pressure on both them and their sponsor was at its 
most intense.  A standoff with Pakistan that might have resulted in a strategic shift earlier 
had been delayed almost to the end of the war, and indeed already when the Americans 
were on their way out.  A combination of factors served to improve US-Pakistani 
relations beginning in mid-2012.  First, the ground supply route for troops in Afghanistan 
through Pakistan reopened after being closed for six months, spurred by a coalition 
summit in Chicago in May and intensive bilateral engagement.811  Second, US forces in 
Afghanistan began to draw down and transition security to the local Afghan security 
forces, decreasing the military urgency of halting Pakistan’s power projection.  US troop 
levels reached their peak of 98,000 in 2011 before declining to 90,000 in 2012, 63,000 in 
2013, and 37,000 in 2014, when ISAF officially disbanded.  Obama continued to promise 
that all would depart by the end of his second term in office in 2016, though over nine 
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thousand would remain.812  And at the same time international forces were declining, 
indigenous ones were as well.  Afghan national security forces, which at their peak 
numbered 352,000, were decreasing to a level of 282,000 partially as a result of a 
reduction in US support.   
Third, the Pakistani election of May 2013 brought in a new civilian government 
led by veteran politician Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister.  Sharif had proven in the past 
willing to try and rein in the military and made gestures towards improving ties with 
Kabul.  He attended the inauguration of India’s prime minister in May 2014, and worked 
on resuming a strategic dialogue.  He also sought to improve relations with the United 
States.  His election was greeted warmly by President Obama, who promised to be “fully 
supportive” of Sharif’s continued success in his work.  The White House issued a 
statement praising the close security partnership between the two countries during a 
summit in October, and the White House spokesman said the US was “optimistic” about 
the future.  During a January 2014 meeting with her counterpart, National Security 
Advisor Susan Rice released a similarly upbeat readout of her meeting, focusing on the 
strengthening of bilateral ties and promoting peace in the region. 
Significantly, this warming took place without either appreciable improvements 
on the battlefield in Afghanistan or action against the Haqqani network and other Afghan 
Taliban at home.  Pakistan at last initiated its much-heralded operation against militants 
in North Waziristan in June 2014 after a devastating TTP attack against Karachi’s airport.  
General Raheel Sharif, who replaced Kayani as Chief of the Army Staff and who had 
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launched the campaign, visited the United States in 2014 in a sign of improved 
cooperation.813  But the campaign in North Waziristan ignored the Haqqani network and 
other Afghan-centered groups.  Militants were warned in advance that an offensive was 
coming, and senior personnel relocated themselves to other agencies, across the border, 
and to Pakistan proper.814   
This thaw could also not disguise that Pakistan had largely sustained its key 
policy goals through the high water mark of the US campaign.  These had been codified 
along two axes, the military and the political.  First, the US had begun negotiating with 
the Afghan government about America’s post-2014 military presence and the process of 
handing over security responsibilities to the Afghans.  As it moved closer towards self-
sufficiency, Afghanistan’s leadership was concerned about balancing internal sovereignty 
with a defense against Pakistan.  It was focused on acquiring high-end military 
technology like tanks and aircraft that would posture Afghanistan against a conventional 
threat from its neighbors.815  These mostly did not come.  The US preferred supplying 
Kabul with counterinsurgency equipment less useful for countering peer competitors, 
which suited Pakistan fine.  The United States and Afghanistan had also signed a 
Strategic Partnership Agreement on May 2, 2012, which set the groundwork for a 
functional military relationship in the future.  Negotiations for a follow-on agreement 
began in November, but were stymied by the US announcement of direct peace talks with 
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the Taliban in Doha.  One of the enduring sticking points was the Afghan desire for a 
security guarantee against potential aggression by outside powers – implicitly, Pakistan.  
In the text, finalized in November 2013 and initialed by Afghanistan’s new president 
Ashraf Ghani in September 2014, this demand was abandoned.   
Then there was Afghanistan’s choice of leader.  Ghani was a relatively safe 
successor to Karzai for Pakistan, which was certainly not unhappy to see Karzai go.  
“The recent developments in Afghanistan,” said the Pakistani foreign ministry after the 
election, “offer a unique opportunity to transform the bilateral ties and build a strong and 
forward-looking relationship.”816  Karzai and officials like the departed intelligence chief 
Saleh had often accused Pakistan of supporting the Taliban, and Pakistan suspected 
Karzai’s administration had – at best – turned a blind eye towards TTP militants using 
Afghanistan as a safe haven.817  The new President Ghani, a Pashtun, had spoken about 
the need to improve relations with Pakistan and was far preferable to the losing 
candidate, Abdullah Abdullah.  Abdullah was considered a Tajik through both his 
mother’s heritage and long association with Northern Alliance figures like the late 
Ahmed Shah Massoud.  An Abdullah government would have been precisely what 
Pakistan feared: not just a pro-Western government, but likely a pro-Indian one as well.  
During a runoff election in June, there were widespread reports of Taliban fighters 
encouraging citizens to support Ghani in the southern Pashtun areas, closest to Pakistan, 
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where voter turnout spiked dramatically.818  This paid off, and Ghani took power on 
September 21.  Shortly after taking office, he signed the Bilateral Security Agreement 
Karzai had negotiated with the United States, but without the paragraph on alliances that 
had enraged the Pakistanis.  Ghani visited Pakistan in November 2014 to improve 
relations, and also dropped Karzai’s long-running request to buy Indian weapons.819  
Pakistan subsequently indicated to its proxies that it was willing to allow the Taliban to 
negotiate with Kabul, which warmed ties between Quetta and Islamabad. 
Neither Pakistan’s strategic gains nor its relaxation of tensions with both the 
Americans and Afghans reduced the pressure the Taliban put on Kabul in 2015.   The 
drawdown of US forces and the withdrawal from counter-Taliban combat meant the 
Taliban could shift tactics again, away from the Haqqanis’ guerilla warfare and closer to 
the conventional warfare with which it had experimented in the earlier days of the 
insurgency.  Organizationally, the Quetta Shura Taliban was moving further and further 
away from the kind of local militias that had seen it through the first decade of the war 
and focusing on developing larger formations of mobile, “professional” Taliban, full-
time, who did not hail from the area where they fought.820  These more competent 
fighters helped it work towards capturing larger-scale objectives key territory like district 
centers and cities.821  
The most emblematic symbol of this new phase of the war came when the Taliban 
overran the city of Kunduz in September 2015 with a reported 7,000 troops, the 
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culmination of a five-month campaign.  Afghan forces were only able to retake the city 
after two weeks of intense fighting, including a US airstrike that killed twenty-two people 
at an international hospital.  Another hotly contested area was central Helmand, including 
the 2010 surge’s original goal of Marjah.  A major Taliban offensive in October was 
barely contained by the Afghan 215th Corps, which could not retake all of the ground the 
Taliban had captured.  Northern Helmand was essentially lost.  By January, a very 
conservative estimate by the US Defense Department admitted that the Taliban controlled 
nine of Afghanistan’s 404 districts and had influence in 17 others.822  This was almost 
certainly low.  Pakistani estimates suggested the Taliban controlled 55-60 percent of 
Afghanistan, the most territory to date.823  
 In the east, along its facilitation routes, the Haqqani network was reaching its all-
time high military strength of an estimated 50,000 troops, of which 20,000 were full time 
and with 3,000-6,000 reserves mobilized at any time.  This was still relatively small, 
compared to an overall Taliban strength of over 200,000.824  What there was not, 
however, was the series of high-profile attacks in Kabul that in 2008 and 2011 had 
threatened to fundamentally alter the strategic relationship between the US and Pakistan.  
The Haqqani network launched a grenade attack against Kabul airport in July 2014 and a 
complex attack against the Afghan Parliament in June 2015, for which the Afghan 
government blamed the ISI.825  Those were the only high-profile actions taken, however.  
Instead, Haqqani activities bled more into the broader Quetta Shura strategy, following 
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Sirajuddin Haqqani appointment as the Taliban’s deputy military commander.  After the 
death of Mullah Omar’s successor Mullah Mansur in 2016, Sirajuddin effectively 
increased the assault on cities, assaulting Helmand’s capital Lashkar Gah, Uruzgan’s 
capital Tarin Kot, and again Kunduz.826 
 
 
Source: The New York Times/Long War Journal (October 2015) 
 
The overall security situation incurred some policy changes by the United States 
towards Afghanistan but not Pakistan.  President Obama, who had hoped to draw down 
US forces to an embassy protection detachment by the end of his administration, was 
forced to announce in October 2015 that the US would keep 9,800 troops in Afghanistan 
through the entirety of 2016.  They would also return to performing direct combat roles 
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against the Taliban.827  The withdrawal would remain aspirational: when the Trump 
Administration took office, the 8,500 troops remained.   
Relations between Pakistan and the United States became even more cordial, 
despite the Quetta Shura Taliban’s successes.  By and large, US statements on Pakistan 
remained positive, emphasizing the need for improving the bilateral economic 
relationship.828  President Obama himself muted the calls to end sanctuaries for militant 
groups in an October 2015 meeting with Pakistan’s prime minister and did not reference 
the Haqqanis at all.  Instead, the joint statement linked the sanctuary issue with border 
security, a more technical issue with less culpability.829  In fact, few serious actions had 
been taken against either the Haqqanis or militancy more broadly.  The United States had 
commended the Pakistanis’ late great assault on North Waziristan, even though the 
Haqqani network had largely been left undisturbed.830  During a visit by Secretary of 
State John Kerry to Pakistan in January 2015, Kerry “commended Pakistan’s resolve” in 
fighting terrorism, as well as the “comprehensive” and “robust” steps being taken.831  At 
the March 2016 ministerial session of the bilateral Strategic Dialogue, he went further, 
calling Pakistan an “essential partner.”  In fact, even as the Obama Administration was 
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altering course and increasing the amount of troops that would remain in Afghanistan 
because of unsatisfactory progress in the war, other officials were citing cooperation from 
Pakistan against networks like al-Qaeda and the Haqqanis.832  But the Pakistanis 
eventually shelved Kerry’s key request to sanction the Haqqani network.  Though 
anonymous Pakistani officials claimed that the Haqqani network would be officially 
banned as part of a crackdown on terrorist financing, no formal designation was ever 
made for the Haqqanis or other “good” groups like Lashkar-e Taiba.833  Additional 
punitive sanctions on Pakistan did not materialize. 
 
III.  Conclusion and Additional Analysis 
Donald Trump had campaigned on a promise to end the war in Afghanistan.  In 
2017, his second national security advisor H.R. McMaster apocryphally talked him out of 
it.  In this McMaster was supported by Jim Mattis and Rex Tillerson, the Secretaries of 
Defense and State, and virtually the entirety of the foreign policy establishment of 
Washington.  Instead of retreat the Afghans got a mini-surge added to Obama’s remnant 
force.  Pakistan at last faced a cutoff of almost all foreign aid in January of 2018, which 
the Trump Administration said would resume only when it took verifiable steps to end 
the sanctuaries enjoyed by the Haqqani network and the Quetta Shura Taliban on its 
territory.  It was far too late.  The incentive of such a stoppage was unlikely to overcome 
compromises made in the war’s endgame, which Trump signaled repeatedly he wanted 
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sooner rather than later.  And in any case the problem of Pakistani support had waned in 
relative terms.  Other states were increasingly dumping money and materiel into the 
Taliban, predominantly Iran.  The Islamic Republic had begun to invest significant sums 
and manpower from the Revolutionary Guards into making various Taliban elements 
more lethal, sometimes in cooperation with Pakistan and sometimes not.  The Islamic 
State had also established a presence, drawing support from its other branches and donors 
in the Persian Gulf while it warred with both the Afghan government and the Taliban.  
But the consequences for Pakistan had at least finally been implemented.  That such a 
step had been delayed nearly until the war’s third decade was remarkable, a testament to 
Pakistan’s effective proxy strategy. 
Largely because of this strategy, Pakistan achieved its strategic goals.  Above all, 
Kabul would not be a meaningful Indian ally.  Indeed, despite India’s development of a 
transshipment port at Iran’s Chabahar port, Ashraf Ghani had dropped Karzai’s flirtation 
with India as a strategic balancer or even partner.  Afghanistan would certainly not be 
strong enough to chart an independent foreign policy.  Peripheral Pakistani militant 
groups like Lashkar-e Taiba also retained freedom of action in Afghanistan, usually 
plugged into the friendly Haqqani network, and remained a threat to unfriendly targets.  
Pashtun separatism was not a serious threat.  Unrest did persist, admittedly, in wide 
swaths of the borderlands and radicalism in Pakistan proper.  But that was partially 
related to the passive support strategy Pakistan had adopted years earlier, and thus at least 
a semi-conscious tradeoff.  Critically, Pakistan also avoided most American 
repercussions, even when US efforts in Afghanistan were at their peak from 2010 to 
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2012.  It was never listed as a state sponsor of terror and never received less than $1 
billion per year in US total aid through 2016.   
These successes were a triumph of the proxy doctrine that the state had developed 
decades earlier, particularly the passive support of militant groups and their sustainment 
through religious and social institutions.  This was the defining feature of the Pakistan’s 
support to the Quetta Shura.  The Haqqani network, which also benefited from these 
institutions, was characterized by closer operational support from the state that helped 
make it more capable of spectacular high-end attacks.  This was the Haqqanis’ defining 
competency on the battlefield and feature as a proxy.  Support came in several direct 
forms.  Pakistani officers supported the group with weapons, funding, and training; 
connected them with capable foreign groups, like al-Qaeda; they cleared checkpoints for 
raids; and allegedly, on occasion, joined in operations.  Some of this active support was 
observable by the United States and its allies, and far more than the passive support drove 
the two nations towards a confrontation.  As such, the Haqqani network remained the 
major strategic liability for Islamabad in prosecuting the war, due to the relatively close 
ties between the two and the spectacular attacks the Haqqanis would carry out.  Under 
Jalaladin Haqqani and then even more under his son Sirajuddin, the Haqqani network 
turned into something like the Afghan al-Qaeda, holding little land but able to bring the 
war to American television screens and Senate hearings.  It was an al-Qaeda with 
fingerprints, relatively large ones, that the US could glimpse and then on which the US 
could focus its accusations of Pakistani duplicity.  This danger was evident in the ebbs 
and flows of the US-Pakistan relationship, which closely tracked the most visible 
operations of the Haqqani network, usually those against Kabul.  The network’s liability 
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was greatest in the significant deterioration of Pakistan’s relationship with the US 
between mid-2008 to 2009 and mid-2011 to 2012.  Both periods came after a succession 
of high-profile Haqqani attacks.  The bilateral US-Pakistan relationship correlated with 
those periods more closely than the fortunes of the actual war and the ensuing jeopardy of 
Washington’s policy goals.  If all of Pakistan’s proxies had enjoyed the same degree of 
direct support, the United States might well have taken more vigorous action earlier 
against their sponsor. 
And it was not worth it:  the risk to Pakistan for its Haqqani relationship far 
outweighed the benefit.  Certainly, there was some value the Haqqanis could attract in the 
form of media attention by attacking protected targets, like their prolonged siege of the 
US Embassy in the center of Kabul.  This was classic insurgent doctrine: creating a crisis 
of legitimacy by demonstrating that the state was incapable of keeping order.  Though 
such high profile attacks might only affect a tiny portion of the battlefield, the overall 
effect was to shape the media narrative and denude the will to fight among the 
counterinsurgent.  However, in this case, the attention these attacks generated sparked 
debate about balancing actions and direct reprisals against their sponsors.  In Admiral 
Mullen’s 2011 testimony, an important heuristic of the shift in American attitudes 
towards Pakistan, the Haqqani network had been the major data point suggesting 
Pakistani culpability for America’s trouble in Afghanistan.  These attacks highlighted a 
relationship between proxy and sponsor that became a major driver of possible US policy 
shifts towards a harder bilateral position.  Perhaps the main driver.  
There was not even really a military logic to using the Haqqanis as a proxy.  
Throughout the entirety of the US military presence, the Afghan Taliban projected power 
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sufficiently for Pakistan to achieve its policy objectives.  They successfully contested 
American offensives during key phases in 2007-2008 and 2010-2011 in areas like 
Marjah.  Their links to Pakistan were more difficult to pin down and less clearly tied to 
their operational output.  Because there was less active Pakistani assistance with the 
Quetta Shura Taliban, repercussions against Pakistan were less directly tied to their 
military operations, making them a more effective proxy.  By the end of Operation 
Enduring Freedom, the Afghan Taliban – and Pakistan – were in a stronger position to 
influence the political future of Afghanistan than at any point since 2001.   
Was there a difference in the utility for Pakistan in the goals the Quetta Shura 
Taliban would have pursued without Islamabad’s support for the Haqqani network?  
Certainly, given their closer local ties to Afghanistan and their comparative lack of 
funding from Pakistan, the Quetta Shura was a less politically responsive proxy.  Their 
presence on the ground in Afghanistan gave them increased independence, and probably 
that would translate to a more independent government in Kabul than one dominated by 
the Haqqani network.  But two points mitigated this danger.  First, the Quetta Shura 
would dominate postwar Afghanistan anyway, should the Afghan Taliban win.  There 
was no scenario where the government in Kabul would be decisively shaped by the 
Haqqani network, nor had it been before 2001.  It was too small, too regional, and not 
tied sufficiently to the population to be able to govern nationally.  Indeed, the Haqqanis’ 
guerilla tactics – and especially the al-Qaeda-like tactics favored by Sirajuddin Haqqani 
and Arab militants – had not deepened the national reservoir of support for the group.  
The opposite, if anything.  And secondly, there was no evidence that the modern Taliban 
would show more independence from key Pakistani goals than the Taliban of yesteryear, 
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which had been a reliable ally.  Not a proxy, and not a puppet, but an ally.  And after two 
decades sheltering under the Pakistani wing, why would that change? 
Pakistan’s relationship with the Haqqani network might have been a liability, but 
that was not to suggest that a US confrontation would necessarily have changed 
Pakistan’s strategic policy.  It was not clear that if the maximum had been threatened and 
implemented earlier – a cutoff of aid, designating Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism, 
some embrace with the Indians – the key Pakistani institutions would have changed 
course and acceded to US demands.  Reversing a three-decade long policy of supporting 
Islamic militants, to say nothing of a doctrine of asymmetric warfare dating back to 1947, 
was a tall order for a military at war.  And there were built-in limits to any such 
confrontation.  A key lever Pakistan could hold over the head of the US was the ground 
supply corridor for the war effort, the so-called GLOC, which was closed in November 
2011 after a friendly(ish) fire incident at Salala.  But even this was not dispositive.  About 
thirty percent of NATO supplies passed through the GLOC, the majority of which was 
fuel.  With it closed, these supplies were forced to use other routes, including a 
constellation of shipping methods through several central Asian states, the Caucasus, and 
Russia.  The premium for this rerouting was about $90-$100 million per month.834  That 
was a significant figure, but not insurmountable for a war effort that was costing the US 
over $100 billion per year during this period.835  And at the time the shutdown happened, 
the Obama Administration was at the peak of its surge force.  Strategic victory, to say 
 
834 Luis Martinez, “Afghanistan War: Closed Pakistan Routes Costing U.S. $100 Million a Month,” ABC 
News (June 13, 2012), https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/06/afghanistan-war-closed-pakistan-
routes-costing-u-s-100-million-a-month (accessed August 29, 2020). 
835 Neta Crawford, “United States Budgetary Costs and Obligations of Post-9/11 Wars through FY2020: 
$6.4 Trillion,” Brown University Costs of War Research Series (November 13, 2019), 
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2019/US%20Budgetary%20Costs%20of%20W
ars%20November%202019.pdf (accessed August 30, 2020), 7. 
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nothing of election victory, was certainly a priority.  There is no evidence that military 
operations were shifted as a result of the closure, nor that strategic policy changed, nor 
that supplies needed for the fight never reached Afghanistan.  If anything the GLOC 
closure would have affected the withdrawal of equipment during the drawdown in 
Afghanistan when it came, but by that point the route was long since open.  And even 
during the GLOC crisis the US had more leverage than it believed.  For example, a key 
element in reopening the GLOC was the massive loss of revenue to the Pakistani 
military-industrial complex.  It was not clear at all which side, in extremis, would buckle 
first. 
Two issues complicated the “confrontation” strategy, however, even if it had been 
adopted.  First, the potential policy costs stemming from a US-Pakistani confrontation 
were not spread out evenly among Pakistani decisionmakers.  The Pakistani military 
would have been hurt relatively less by a cutoff in foreign aid than the civilian 
government and it arguably gained relatively more by its proxy war.  This likely 
contributed to an internally broken cost-benefit analysis of strategy.  Since the military 
had the lion’s share of control over national security and proxy war questions anyway, it 
would have fought hard and perhaps successfully against a change.  Second, it was not 
clear that Pakistani aid was definitively necessary to the Taliban’s success.  Had it been 
cut off, would the Taliban have been successful?  It was probably critical for the Haqqani 
network’s ability to conduct high-profile attacks, and also important to rebuild the Quetta 
Shura Taliban’s strength in the early days of the insurgency.  Those madrassahs and rear 
areas in Pakistan certainly remained important recruiting zones, helping to replenish 
numbers as the year-in, year-out fighting ground away at the Taliban.  This was an 
 321 
important point about the Afghan insurgency – or almost any insurgency, for that matter, 
but particularly one in a land so alien to the counterinsurgent.  It was a numbers game.  
The Afghan Taliban could rely on numbers to wear away the Americans’ will to achieve 
more and more blurry policy objectives.  By the end of ISAF’s mandate, the Taliban was 
estimated to have 200,000 total members, who cost far less and were far more convenient 
to field than American forces were for the Americans.   
Admittedly, this falls into a broader critique about modern counterinsurgency 
theory and its downplaying of the critical factor of time.  For the purposes of this 
argument, however, the consequences of an earlier Pakistani confrontation are also 
irrelevant.  This is not meant to be a “roads untaken” analysis of the Afghanistan war.  It 
is instead meant to argue that Pakistan’s utility in supporting the Haqqani network – the 
return on its investment – was low, perhaps even negative.  And even if a US 
confrontation with Pakistan would not have ended Pakistan’s support for proxies, it 
would have significantly decreased the utility of the Haqqanis as a proxy in cost-benefit 
terms.  The penalties enacted by Pakistan’s major balancer would have made its Afghan 
policy far more expensive, possibly too much more expensive, but less efficacious in any 
case. 
Without question, Pakistan’s two-track proxy doctrine and institutional support 
for the Afghan Taliban  had a cost of its own.  Its secondary support system – its more 
robust strategic tool – incurred costs of a different type.  The same social institutions Zia 
set up to help fight the Soviet war and change Pakistani society retained the policy 
preferences they were created with, even as time passed and the state evolved.  The 
policy preferences of the madrassahs and tribal communities in North and South 
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Waziristan reflected many of Zia’s preferences, fewer of Musharraf’s, and fewer still of 
Benazir Bhutto’s and Sharif’s.  Unlike the Afghan Arabs in places like Chechnya, it was 
not that the same fighters would attack both Afghanistan and Pakistan (though some like 
Nazir and Bahadar did), but that the institutions that supported one were blunt and bled 
over into militants who did both.  With policy preferences of their own, those same 
institutions then effectively punished Pakistan when it attempted to pursue policies its 
proxies opposed, like exerting more sovereignty over the FATA or cracking down on 
Islamic radicalism.  And since they were more indirectly supported, the Pakistani state 
had less ability to change their goals in real time.   
Eventually, the institutions and policies that effectively supported insurgency in 
Afghanistan against the Soviets and helped regenerate the Afghan Taliban posed a threat 
to Pakistan itself.  However, even this threat could help Pakistan project power.  Pakistan 
could deflect US accusations of complicity and apathy towards the militants by pleading 
weakness and by pointing to a lack of capability both operational and political.  The 
weakness of the central government in controlling organs of the security forces was a 
component of Pakistani deniability and a US excuse for inaction.  And indeed, there was 
some truth to that.  Its troops were often ineffective in countering the militant threat in the 
FATA, which eventually expanded into KPK and Pakistan’s major cities. That failure 
regularly provoked the question among potential balancers: were frontier areas like North 
Waziristan safe havens – was Pakistan powerless – or were they sanctuaries – was 
Pakistan complicit?  An argument that took time to resolve, even if the answer was the 
former. 
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Herein lay the main value of Pakistan’s close relationship with the Haqqani 
network: to mitigate the fallout from Pakistan’s own domestic militants while its Afghan 
militants made the strategic gains.  Jalaluddin Haqqani had decades of experience in 
Islamist militancy and the profile to match.  His network was both one of the most 
experienced and respected Afghan Taliban groups and the faction closest to the Pakistani 
state.  It was thus a way to mediate with other militants and moderate their agency when 
their policy priorities differed from Pakistan’s.  This would prove critically helpful during 
Pakistan’s military campaigns in South and North Waziristan. 
 It would not have worked, of course, without Pakistan’s own long history with the 
Haqqani network.  This illustrated one of the advantages provided by Pakistani military 
doctrine and its active experience with proxies: it lowered the friction of war.  Among 
other things, proxy warfare required a level of trust on each side of the relationship.  The 
sponsor had to trust that the proxy would act according to enough of its objectives that 
arming it will be worthwhile, and in this case the proxy had to trust the sponsor not to 
turn against it when its attention and combat power is elsewhere.  In Pakistan, there were 
operational pathways for proxy war that were already well established in institutions like 
the ISI and experienced officers, which was not something that could be established 
overnight.  Pakistan and much of the Afghan Taliban had such a relationship: with the 
Quetta Shura, since 1994 (even accepting that many of the personnel were different), and 
with the Haqqani network since the Soviet war.  Many Pakistani military officers had had 
experience with the Afghan war and the mujahedin and the ways in which they were 
supported.  Some of them had fought inside Afghanistan itself.  These techniques were 
not lost in the intervening decade-and-a-half, but absorbed partially by the Kashmir 
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uprising and the Taliban campaign.  This served to reduce the cost of restarting proxy 
warfare after the Taliban’s 2001 defeat.  Pakistan’s passive experience with proxies was 
helpful also.  The fact that major political parties like JI (and to a lesser extent, JUI) were 
tied to the engagement with and protection of militant Islamists was an operational boon 
to them.  It lowered deniability somewhat – for example, when senior militant leaders 
like Hafiz Saeed would make public appearances with mainstream political figures – but 
it also reassured proxies that Pakistan would not turn on them.  It also reassured them that 
announced campaigns against Islamism and radicalism would likely be short-lived, since 
the political costs the parties could inflict were significant. 
The broader effect of relationships like these and Pakistan’s proxy doctrine came 
in two parts.  First, it exacerbated the Pakistani military’s autonomous role in national 
security policy, a consequence of proxy war since 1947.  Because few army and ISI 
officers knew the full extent of Pakistani operations, to say nothing of civilians, the 
military’s accountability was diminished and political oversight became more 
challenging.  The first Kashmir war had thrust army officers into a policymaking role and 
degraded the military’s chain of command.  Then, the issue had been circumventing the 
army’s British officers, including the chief of staff.  The Soviet war accentuated this 
issue, since a growing portion of Pakistani operations were being conducted with some 
secrecy by proxies and its supporting army elements.  If the first two Kashmir wars had 
been relatively surgical proxy interventions, the expansion of Pakistan’s proxy war 
capabilities under Zia during the Soviet war fundamentally shifted Pakistani attention and 
material weight towards asymmetric operations.  Did this autonomous role help Pakistan 
wage more effective proxy war?  Yes, certainly.  It may have led to an internally broken 
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cost-benefit assessment and societal consequences, but it enabled the government’s 
deniability and deterred consequences.  During the US war in Afghanistan, and certainly 
during the height of the surge post-Musharraf, it was well to Pakistan’s benefit that 
elements of the military were operating beyond the control of the central government.  
This increased the government’s deniability and delayed, if not prevented, harsher US 
sanctions and responses to Pakistani double-dealing.  If Pakistan had a recognizably 
healthier civil-military relationship, one in which the US recognized Bhutto and then 
Sharif were waging war against US forces, strategic policy towards their governments 
would have been much harsher.  As it was, blame could be shifted on to the military – 
and not even the military, really, but just odds and ends from the ISI and retirees. 
 The second long-term effect of Pakistan’s post-Soviet doctrine of asymmetric war 
was that it fundamentally limited future policy choices.  Pakistan had taken a basically 
instrumental approach to Islamic militancy in the first two Kashmir wars.  Though it used 
the language of Islam to cloak its intervention, there were few societal ramifications from 
the state’s support of militants.  In the first Afghanistan war this changed.  Pakistan’s first 
support of Afghan militants came under the secular hand of Zulfiqar Bhutto, and it was 
intended to counter Daoud Khan’s regime next door.  This was very similar to the 
approach Pakistan had taken in 1947 and 1965 in Kashmir.  But this instrumental 
intervention came at a time when first Bhutto (for political reasons) and then to a much 
greater extent Zia (for both political and ideological reasons) were also promoting 
Islamism as a more concrete national identity for Pakistanis.  In the constitution, in rights 
for minorities, in the metrics of performance for civil servants, and above all in the 
military, Islam was being emphasized by the state.  This included especially the swaths of 
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religious schools being built in the tribal lands and elsewhere.  The “passive track” 
represented by these social institutions and domestic spending on Islamization resulted in 
societal changes that would bolster Pakistan’s instrumental proxy war during the Soviet 
conflict yet exist separately from it.  This was a key effect of Zia’s implicit doctrine: that 
Zia’s Pakistan had invested in societal capabilities of school and mosque that then 
pursued its own strategic agenda, even to the detriment – and then absorption – of 
Pakistan’s official agenda.  Even if institutions were not necessarily captured by 
militancy, Islamist forces gained enough power to be effective spoilers.  This put 
Pakistan in a different position than Russia or Iran: in effect, the proxies had captured the 
state.   
This was accentuated by the curious ambiguity at the heart of the country.  
Pakistan was a Muslim state, but was it an Islamic one?  Jinnah had left the question 
unanswered, and the military over two decades had basically punted on the question.  
Certainly, Pakistan’s mobilization around Islam as a political cause had been a long-
standing foreign policy of the state.  Validating the ideological reason for Pakistan was 
one of the key motivators for the intervention in Kashmir.  Like Pakistan’s other 
linguistic groups, Kashmiris were linked to the state by their religion, and in both of the 
state’s first two conflicts the cause insurgents rallied under was specifically Islamic.  The 
challenge was that given an opening at the top, like under Zia, this wink-wink 
instrumentalism could blow back on policymakers.  The unclear role of Islam that Jinnah 
had bequeathed to the state created significant political space to change the society and 
change it rapidly.  Strategy followed identity.  Regardless of who held power at the 
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moment in Pakistan, the question of Islam in society had been partially answered, and 
answered in a different way than Jinnah likely intended.   
 This analysis is of course reductionist.  Certainly, additional factors beyond its 
connection with the Haqqanis affected Pakistan’s domestic militancy, its relationship 
with the US, and the likelihood of American retaliation.  Some of these factors were 
exogenous, such as the CIA’s Ray Davis killing of two men in 2011, a one-off that 
nonetheless gripped the attention of Pakistanis.  The US raid that killed Osama bin Laden 
near Abbottabad, less than 70 miles from the capital, also hurt US-Pakistani relations, 
though primarily on the Pakistani side: the US was at pains to play down Pakistan’s 
complicity.  Which was curious, since the world’s most wanted fugitive hiding for years 
in a pleasant house near Pakistan’s major military academy should have raised questions 
about its ties to al-Qaeda, the gold standard of Pakistan’s counterterrorism cooperation. 
However, such macro events can be controlled for in Islamabad’s relationship with the 
Haqqanis for the reason that American statements were still relatively positive about 
Pakistan even in the summer of 2011. 
Other elements that were more endogenous to the proxy war also affected the 
likelihood of US retaliation and thus the effectiveness of Pakistan’s proxy warfare.  The 
crisscrossing wars between the TTP, the Afghan Taliban, and other militants illustrated 
how powerful a related proxy war could be in denuding the overall norm of territorial 
integrity and subsequently enhanced Pakistan’s deniability as a sponsor of militants 
conducting territorial aggression.  Pakistan repeatedly cited Afghanistan’s alleged support 
of the TTP to normalize intelligence suggesting its own role in supporting proxies.  These 
blurred lines were exacerbated by the degree of ethnic fragmentation.  The intermingling 
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of ethnic groups like the Pashtuns, tribes like the Zadran, and families like the Haqqanis 
along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border decreased accountability for sponsoring militants 
against either state, since both had historically done so.  These cross-border networks also 
weakened efforts to enforce the border, reducing the normative force of the prohibition 
against interstate aggression and increasing the deniability of sponsors.  The dispute over 
the Durand line exacerbated this weakness.  Since there was no agreed-upon demarcated 
border, clear violations by proxies and thus actionable examples of interstate aggression 
were more difficult to identify.  This helped power projection by raising the threshold of 
interstate aggression to a higher level, and allowing smaller violations to go unpunished, 
which helped protect Pakistan against balancing.  At times like 2004 and 2015, the border 
issue was more prominently raised by Presidents Bush and Obama when overall Afghan-
Pakistan (and certainly US-Pakistan) relations were improving, as well as 2008 and 2016 
when both presidents were trying to prevent them from deteriorating.  It was a helpful 
excuse.  At these moments the technical problem of cooperation at the border could serve 
as a stand-in for the policy problem of Pakistani proxy warfare.  The US could thus 
blame border cooperation, not Pakistan, for the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan, and 
Islamabad would be saved again. 
he use of the aqqa ni network for strategical ly offe nsive purpose s also re duce d akistan’ s de nia bility and carried a g reat dea l of risk. his wa s gene rally mea sure d by the tempo of high- profile and especial ly lethal attacks by the aqqa ni net work, which increa sed from to and to . hese corre lated to periods first, whe n akista n did not wa nt to pursue negotiations with a bul ove r a settlement, as some uetta hura a liba n had wante d, and second, whe n it wa s conte sting t he he ight of bama’ s surge. he le vel of high- profi le attacks during this pe riod re pre se nted the most intense period of com petition bet ween t he and akistan in fgha nistan. his was not a pe rfect measure, since it risked sim ply defining both periods of high- profi le attacks as offensive. oweve r, given t he more ha nds-on akistani engagement during t hese periods, and broa de r akistani policy
shifts, it is rea sonable to categorize them as conscious policy choices. nd the two pe riods also correlated with othe r indicators, such a s increase d contacts betwee n akista ni officials. hat suggeste d an offensive sta nce. erhaps unsurprisingly, the se we re also the periods of greate st akistani tension wit h the . inally, reg ime cha nge in akistan correlate d wit h cha nges in akista n’s deniability, thoug h the causal relationship was more ambiguous. he highe st leve l of bala ncing came just be fore akistan’ s own periods of reg ime chang e in and . his sugge sted t hat whe n the sponsor of a proxy ex perie nces a regime cha nge it re sets t he clock on culpability, offe ring a fresh slate. n t he othe r ha nd, it might sim ply reflect a akista n-specific mechanism or one involv ing civ il-mil itary relations. he stre ngt h and inde pende nce of the milita ry and mig ht mean that afte r a change in regime, the a nd ot her powers would divide their focus: good
relations wit h the civil ia n gove rnme nt to stre ngt hen it, but ha rsher relations wit h those orga ns deemed t o be re sponsible for the killing. his wa s a famil iar, i f ine ffective, response.
These factors correlated with Pakistan’s ability to cloud its relationship to its 
proxies and may have contributed to the achievement of the state’s goals.  But it should 
be acknowledged that at least by 2008, the United States was fully aware of the shell 
game Pakistan was playing.  Why there were not consequences – why Pakistani policy 
did not change, and was ultimately successful, and US policy ultimately a failure – is the 
core of this chapter.  Potential answers have been suggested here.  The new Pakistani 
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administration, being given the benefit of the doubt.  The new Obama administration, just 
coming in.  Continued cooperation on al-Qaeda targets, which were the stuff of US 
electoral gold and national security priority.  The GLOC issue, and so on.  However, the 
success of Pakistan’s proxy war, at its core, reflected the effectiveness of the implicit 
doctrine of two-track proxy war Zia had established.  Like the Quetta Shura Taliban, the 
Haqqani network benefited from the funding and support mechanisms that had begun 
under Zia, but also saw its capabilities augmented by Pakistani operational support, with 
more harmful results.  This two-tiered structure between Pakistan and the Haqqanis 
represented a degree of support and control that was more distant than Russia and its 
Ukrainian and Georgian proxies or Iran and Hezbollah.  Their direct operational ties 
made it a closer relationship than Saudi Arabia and the Chechens, however.  The costs 
incurred by Pakistan in terms of the US relationship and risk of balancing by the more 
attributable Haqqani operations over the course of the war thus supports this 
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It was Russia’s misfortune, in the 1990’s, to fight a fractious nation at a time 
when its own ability to concentrate force was at its weakest.  During the first Russian-
Chechen war from 1994-1996, radicals supported by Saudi Arabia became an 
increasingly important influence on the Chechens.  The republic’s first elected president, 
Aslan Maskhadov, was forced to make a series of concessions to the growing strength of 
Islamic fundamentalists who both the Russian and Chechen governments often referred 
to as “Wahhabis” or “Salafists.”  By 1999, the new state had become something closer to 
the Taliban’s Afghanistan than an ex-Soviet republic, complete with a declaration of 
sharia law and public executions. 
How that happened is the focus in this case study, which has three parts.  First, it 
will examine the type of ideological and materiel support Saudi Arabia offered to the 
Chechens.  It is the most indirect of the support mechanisms examined here, and thus the 
most tenuous proxy link.  Though Saudi state support did not flow directly to the rebels 
in this conflict, long-standing Saudi policy supported private sector assistance to 
Chechnya, including the flow of militants and money, which bolstered the rebels but also 
changed the nature of the resulting state.837  The first section will also briefly review the 
historical context leading up to the establishment of the Chechen state and the second 
Chechen war.  Second, it will examine key moments from 1996-2003 when that strategic 
support was effective and when it was challenged.  This represents the period from the 
beginning of Chechen independence through the interregnum, when the radicals’ 
influence increased, and then to the effective conclusion of the second Chechen war.  
Because Saudi Arabia’s support was so indirect and thus difficult to assess or isolate, this 
 
837 Moshe Gammer, “Between Mecca and Moscow: Islam, Politics, and Political Islam in Chechnya and 
Dagestan” Middle Eastern Studies 41 (November 2005): 837. 
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case will also consider moments when the goals of the Chechen state changed to illustrate 
the effect of this type of support.  Since Saudi Arabia supported the radicals through non-
national, pan-Islamic mechanisms, the militants it produced promoted non-national, pan-
Islamic policies.  The adoption of their pan-Islamic goals by secular Chechens indicates 
the effect of the support mechanism (rather than Saudi Arabia’s own goals, which they 
sometimes hindered), and will therefore be identified as well as changes in Riyadh’s 
behavior.   
 These proxies were used against two targets: the secular Chechen rebels and the 
Russian state.  Both the proxies’ operational capability and Saudi deniability was high.  
They repeatedly won combat engagements and soundly defeated their internal and 
external opponents, forcing the secularists to adopt their goals and the Russians to give 
them space.  Deniability was also high.  Though Russia repeatedly blamed Saudi Arabia 
for sponsoring “Wahhabis,” the vast majority of international opprobrium was on Russia 
for its military actions.  Nor did Western balancing in the form of support for 
Maskhadov’s secular government appear, even as the Salafists pressed his government 
more and more to adopt pan-Islamic goals and the West paid increasing attention to 
Islamic radicalism.  This made the proxies highly effective until 2001.  The last section of 
this chapter will assess the radicals’ overall effectiveness and additional factors that 
affected deniability and the outcome in this case. 
 
I.  Origins 
Saudi Arabia’s support for the Chechen rebels came almost entirely from private 
sources and often indirectly, making it the most distant relationship of any sponsor and 
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proxy in this dissertation.  The Kingdom’s official efforts consisted of mobilizing these 
sources through means like promoting a domestic pan-Islamic ideology, supporting them 
with state funds, and normalizing the practice of Saudi citizens going abroad for jihad.  
The rebels also received support from other Arab states like Qatar, which funded Islamic 
extremists as well.  However, Saudi Arabia was the most active supporter of militancy.838   
These policies were pursued for decades, from the 1960’s through at least the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  The Saudi fighters who engaged in the Chechen conflict 
were both those who had fought in the Afghan war and those who joined the jihad 
afterwards.  They were a function of the same basic generating factors in Saudi society.  
Likewise, some of the Saudi institutions that supported the rebels were created to support 
the broader pan-Islamic project and some were created for Chechnya specifically. 
  Russia often described foreign fighters in Chechnya as “Wahhabis” in reference 
to the conservative brand of Islam in Saudi Arabia that gained prominence in Chechnya 
after the end of the first war.  Wahhabism was named for 18th century preacher 
Mohammed Ibn Abd-al Wahhab, who had called for the reform of Islam and a return to 
its doctrinal roots.839  The Chechen radicals were also sometimes called Salafists, after 
Salafism, a similarly puritanical reform current in Islam that emerged in the 18th century 
and was often used interchangeably with Wahhabism.840  The tenets of Wahhabism and 
Salafism became a major influence on the Sunni communities of the Caucasus since the 
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early 1990’s.841  In Chechnya, their adherents demanded the establishment of sharia law 
and more explicitly religious morals for social issues like the role of women.842 
Wahhabism had deep roots in the Saudi state.  Ibn Wahhab’s alliance with the 
Saud family in the central Arabian Peninsula was critical to the eventual emergence of 
modern Saudi Arabia.  In the 1960’s, the royal family’s legitimacy came under pressure 
from the revolutionary Arab ideologies of Baathism and Nasserism.  In response, King 
Fahd adopted a pan-Islamic foreign policy, which attacked the fundamentally atheistic 
roots of Arab socialism and encouraged private and semi-private institution building.843  
Transnational Islamic institutions like the Muslim World League and the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference were founded in Saudi Arabia during the 1960’s and served as 
both tools and symbols of Saudi foreign policy.844  The International Islamic Relief 
Organization was founded by the League in the years afterwards and would later serve as 
a key conduit for funds supporting Sunni militancy.845  By the end of the 1960’s Saudi 
Arabia hosted the world’s greatest concentration of Islamic organizations.846  After oil 
prices spiked following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, these institutions became flush with 
cash, and as their programs expanded Saudi political and religious influence did as 
well.847  
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Such organizations would be useful when the Saudi monarchy faced another 
challenge, this time from the right.  In February 1979, the Iranian revolution offered a 
powerful lesson to the region’s Muslims of the ability of political Islam to overthrow 
monarchies.  Iran’s Muslims, united behind a charismatic cleric, had overthrown one of 
the world’s oldest monarchies after its corruption and foreign acquiescence became too 
unpopular.  There were echoes of this in Saudi Arabia, especially after the ill-fated and 
corrupt rule of Saud bin Abdul Aziz, who had stepped down a decade earlier.  This 
warning to the monarchy was brought home later that year when religious radicals took 
over the Grand Mosque in Mecca.  The Grand Mosque attack was a second shock to 
Riyadh and its allies.  The United States saw it as a continuation of the Iranian threat, 
coming months after the revolution and seizure of the US embassy.  The Iranians 
believed it was a US-Israeli plot and said so publicly, inciting anti-US riots in several 
countries throughout the Islamic world.848  For the Saudis the Grand Mosque seizure 
posed a twofold challenge.  It provoked their Shia, second class-citizens at best, to agitate 
against their lot, and illegal celebrations of the Shia holiday Ashura broke out later that 
year.849  But it also had an appeal to Saudis who felt that the Kingdom under King Fahd 
had deviated from the strict religious and societal traditions laid down by the state’s 
founder his clergy.   
Emboldened by these examples, Saudi Arabia’s domestic Islamist movement 
became increasingly critical of the monarchy.850  The Kingdom sought to shore up its 
domestic legitimacy by instituting moral reforms at home and increasing its support for 
 
848 Dilip Hero, Cold War in the Islamic World: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Struggle for Supremacy (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 79. 
849 Ibid. 
850 Vassiliev, 396. 
 336 
Islamic institutions abroad.851  Riyadh tightened up its domestic religious strictures 
immediately.  It ended many of the special privileges for the Dhahran Aramco camp of 
Western oil workers, prohibiting alcohol and the external celebration of Christian 
holidays.  School curriculums were changed, reducing the time spent on topics like math 
and eliminating European history in exchange for teaching Islamic studies and the history 
of the Saudi family.  Clerics in Saudi Arabia had to receive clearance from the 
government to preach in mosques, to make sure their message was appropriate.852   
Missionary activity exploded through institutions like the Muslim World League, which 
seeded Wahhabi preachers and schoolteachers throughout the world.  In 1984 Saudi 
Arabia launched the King Fahd Printing Complex and a new translation of the Koran.  
This facility would blanket the Islamic world and its outposts with copies of a holy book 
that was annotated with more militant scriptures, and filled to the brim with polemics 
against Christians and Jews and modern political issues like Palestine.853 
Islamic Iran was not only an ideological threat to the Saudi state but a direct 
geopolitical one as well.  This prosed a challenge for the Kingdom.  Though its 
Wahhabism could help with the ideological threat, it would need something more solid 
militarily to balance Iran in the short term, and the Americans were it.  US military 
personnel were deployed to Saudi Arabia during the 1980’s, bringing with them long-
range radar, AWACS aircraft, and an air defense system that would systematically link 
the Gulf States together against Iran.854  But this was dangerous, and ran the risk of 
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obviating its increased ideological strictures.  The presence of a Western military power 
on some of Islam’s holiest ground would more ammunition to the ideological challenge 
of Iran (and later militants like Osama bin Laden) but it was necessary.  Riyadh also led 
the effort to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in May 1981, which would 
provide an institutional framework for the oil emirates to coordinate on softer security 
issues.  Its most important geopolitical compromise, however, was the support of Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein’s war against Iran.  Iraq invaded its neighbor in 1980, 
initiating an eight-year conflict that drew in most of the GCC.  Despite Hussein’s legacy 
as a Soviet client and atheist Baathism, Saudi Arabia lent Hussein billions to continue the 
war and allowed Iraq to use Saudi air bases.  Iran pushed back ideologically, increasing 
its agitation against Saudi Arabia throughout the decade, and militarily, initiating a four-
year war against Saudi and GCC oil tankers in the Gulf.855   
Saudi Arabia’s ideological and geopolitical needs aligned, however, with the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  The Soviet state was still an ideological concern, a 
definite geopolitical threat, and – unlike Iran – offered a key release valve for Saudi 
Arabian militants.  The Afghan resistance offered the state an opportunity to demonstrate 
its fidelity, and the state opened the floodgates.  Saudi money flowed to the conflict.856  
By 1984, a surge of Saudi youth was following.  Their passage to the combat zone and 
operational handling were coordinated by a network of charitable and educational 
foundations created over the previous two decades as part of the expansion of pan-
Islamist ideology.857  An estimated 15,000 Saudis fought in the Afghan war, three times 
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the number from Yemen, the next-highest origin state.858  The Kingdom winked at the 
private soldiers, though it lent them little direct support.  It built religious schools among 
the Afghan refugees in Pakistan to spread its brand of Islam, but stayed one step 
removed, never directly supporting the fighters themselves.859  Saudi state clerics did not 
officially call for individual jihad in Afghanistan, nor would they later in Chechnya.860  
But the mujahedin won anyway.  
After the victory in Afghanistan, Saudi and other foreign veterans of the conflict – 
the so-called Afghan Arabs – travelled to other civil wars such as Tajikistan and 
Yugoslavia.  These foreign fighters became a staple of conflicts involving Muslims, with 
an estimated 10,000-30,000 foreigners migrating to conflict zones to take part in the 
wars.861  Saudi society normalized the practice of supporting and fighting for the broader 
Muslim umma, Islamic communities like those in Bosnia under attack by nonbelievers.862  
When these fighters did come back to Saudi Arabia from Afghanistan or elsewhere, they 
were treated gently, far differently than transnational gunmen would be in other states.  
Most were usually detained for a short period of time – if at all – and then released.863 
The benefit Saudi Arabia gained from these wars was threefold.  Many were 
genuine geopolitical victories over unfriendly states by at least nominally less-unfriendly 
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actors.  In addition, they helped with domestic legitimacy among Saudi Arabia’s own 
radicals.  The state could point to its support for jihad and spreading Salafism abroad as 
marks of piety, and in the worst case distract the radicals with foreign jihads rather than 
the monarchy’s own failings.  This was particularly helpful since Iran, in places like 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, had been supporting and building ties with Shia communities, 
both to support militants but also simply to promote its Shia brand of Islam, antithetical 
to Wahhabis.  It was an imperfect release valve, of course, since some of this radicalism 
would eventually target the Saud regime nonetheless.864  Lastly, this support also earned 
the Saudi government domestic legitimacy among non-radicals concerned about Muslim 
communities abroad.   
Chechnya was one such community.  Nationalism ran deep in Chechnya: its 
people were famously ungovernable, even for the Caucasus.  Their first rebellions against 
Russian domination were launched in 1825 and 1829 by a local Sufi leader, but their 
most successful revolt came under the insurgent Imam Shamil.865  Shamil’s Caucasian 
Emirate, a combined religious-political state, collapsed shortly after his capture in 1859, 
and Russia absorbed the rest of the North Caucasus several years later.  The Chechens 
rebelled again during the Bolshevik revolution; they cooperated with communist 
insurgents against Czarist authority in the Caucasus, and then unsuccessfully demanded 
independence from Russia’s new leaders when the Bolsheviks took power.866  Concerned 
about their loyalty during the Second World War, Joseph Stalin deported the entire 
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Chechen population to Kazakhstan in 1944.  It took a decade for them to return.  When 
the USSR began to totter, a Soviet Air Force general named Dzhokhar Dudayev returned 
to Chechnya to declare independence in 1991.   
 
Source: Oliker, 11 
 
Chechnya’s revolutionary military and political leadership had a dualistic 
character.  Dzhokhar Dudayev and Aslan Maskhadov, the republic’s first leaders, were 
both reasonably secular ex-senior Soviet military officers and many of their fighters had 
experience in the Soviet army.  At the same time, there existed an Islamist element of the 
Chechen rebel forces which gained power steadily through the decade: not through the 
political process, such as it was, but through strength on the ground.  The northern 
Caucasus region, like other lands in the former Soviet Union’s south, experienced a 
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religious revival after the collapse of communism in 1991, particularly a rise in 
Salafism.867  As Afghan Arabs drifted into Chechnya, they were integral in spreading this 
version of Islam and tying it economically and politically to local Chechen communities.  
These foreigners were almost wholly from the Middle East and usually from Saudi 
Arabia’s Wahhabi community.868  For example, the first networks of militant Salafist 
communities – jamaats – were established by the Afghan Arab Shaikh Fathi Mohammed 
Habib in the Chechen cities of Urus-Martan, Vedeno, and Gudermes, the republic’s 
second-largest.869  As the decade went on dozens of these jamaats sprang up in 
Chechnya.  The camps and growing network of jamaats created self-reinforcing links 
with each other.  During times of crisis, leaders and fighters from Dagestan’s Salafist 
jamaats would reinforce Chechen radicals and vice versa, increasing both groups’ 
operational capabilities to the point where they could overwhelm local authorities.  
Politically, they supported pan-Islamic organizations in the Caucasus and would 
eventually create their own, imperiling both Chechen and Russian secular authority.870  
But at the time of independence in 1991, radical groups were also a minority.  Up 
until the end of the first war, most Chechen leaders opposed Salafism.  It was a creed of 
foreigners; the Islam that was native to Chechnya was Sufism, a tradition that placed 
great emphasis on the personal, mystical experience of God.  Sufi practices like the 
veneration of holy men were anathema to the puritanical traditions of Salafism, and they 
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had deep roots in local tradition.871  Even later radicals like Shamil Basayev started out as 
Sufis during the first war.  However, the Salafists had something the Sufis did not: 
resources.  Salafist mosques and representatives often had a surplus of cash to distribute 
to help attract followers and converts, a product of their external support.872  Over time, 
this would help their movement overwhelm competing ideologies and dominate the new 
republic. 
 
II.  Conflict 
Saudi Arabia and the first Chechen war, 1991-1996 
Saudi Arabia, the source of much of this support and many of these foreign 
radicals, was vocally supportive of the Chechens’ burgeoning independence 
movement.873  Safeguarding the freedom of the Chechen state was an essentially 
defensive goal the Kingdom, the secular Chechens, and the slowly increasing number of 
radicals shared.  Russia had long been an opponent of Saudi Arabia, especially during the 
Cold War.  The Soviets’ revolutionary atheism and the pretend atheism of their clients 
had been a direct threat to the monarchies of the Gulf.  Earlier Saudi monarchs like Faisal 
bin Abdul Aziz had despised the USSR, communism, and especially the restrictions the 
Soviet state put on its Muslims.874  Geopolitically it also was the Soviet clients and fellow 
travellers that had provided the main threat to Saudi Arabia, at least until Iran’s 
revolution.  In the 1980’s these tensions reached a peak; in addition to backing the 
 
871 Ware and Kisriev, 100. 
872 Tishkov, 174. 
873 Zbigniew Brzezinski and Paige Sullivan, eds., Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: 
Documents, Data, and Analysis (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 564. 
874 Hero, 34. 
 343 
Afghan resistance, Saudi Arabia had also been critical in depressing oil prices expanding 
production, leading to severe budget shortfalls at a time when Gorbachev’s Soviet Union 
needed revenue the most.  In the last years of the Union the relationship had partially 
thawed.  The end of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the unification of Yemen, and the 
humbling of Iraq all reduced Russia’s threat to Saudi Arabia and relations between the 
two improved.875  The Saudis and other Gulf States offered Russia a $2 billion loan in 
1990 to help stabilize its economy, and Moscow had high hopes for future Saudi 
investment and bilateral trade.876  But those ambitions collapsed under new geopolitical 
strains in 1994.  The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan alarmed the Russians, as did the 
increasingly prominent role of Saudi institutions vying for the loyalty of Russia’s 
Muslims, especially in the restive south.  Saudi Arabia’s perceived support for the 
Chechen independence and the separatists exacerbated these strains.   
This went both ways.  In Riyadh, Saudi anger over the Chechen war was itself 
was worsened by Russia’s involvement in nuclear proliferation and disregard for OPEC 
policy.877  The Kingdom was increasingly preoccupied with Russia even as its immediate 
security concerns with Iran were easing.  This was largely a result of Iran’s desire to 
reduce its isolation, spur economic growth, and improve living standards, but it found a 
receptive audience in Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz.878  Saudi officials 
met with Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani at the UN in 1990 to discuss a détente 
and then in March 1991 both countries officially restored diplomatic ties.  The Saudis 
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subsequently lifted their restrictions on Iranians performing the hajj.879  King Fahd’s 
stroke in November 1995, which all but incapacitated him, allowed Abdullah to continue 
this warming, including regular head of state consultation.  Even after the Hezbollah-
linked bombing of the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia, the Saudis hesitated to 
jeopardize the opening with Iran and declined to participate fully in the investigation.880  
President Mohammed Khatami, Rafsanjani’s successor, continued this warming and 
Saudi Arabia’s ties with Iran improved throughout the decade, capped off by an historic 
visit of Khatami to Riyadh.  Abdullah further encouraged his GCC allies to warm ties 
with the Islamic Republic, and some did.881 
Saudi goals towards the burgeoning Chechen state were threefold.  On principle, 
Riyadh supported Chechen independence, and was one of the few states to recognize 
Chechnya.  Secondly, it aimed to weaken Russia, its traditional rival.  The separatists 
shared these two goals, though there was a contingent like Maskhadov that sought to 
retain functional relations with their neighbor since it dominated Chechnya’s economy 
before and after independence.  For most of the separatists, however, Russia was still the 
primary enemy: Russia and perhaps secondarily some of the secularists of the so-called 
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.   
But Saudi Arabia also sought to Islamize the new state: that is, to introduce 
conservative Islamic social and political norms.  The function of Saudi institutions in 
spreading Salafism overseas and to Chechnya in particular suggested that this was of 
value to Riyadh.  Certainly, Saudi Arabia’s domestic ideology was far more sharia-
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adherent than was the post-Soviet republic of Chechnya’s.  This Islamicization also 
included the promotion of pan-Islamic goals, the creation of a network of Islamic states 
knit together by an Islamic community.  In particular, these were shared by the foreign 
militants arriving in Chechnya whose experiences in transnational conflicts reflected their 
belief in a broader Islamic community.  
Operationalizing this third goal would ultimately incur significant consequences 
for the Salafists.  It was the cross-border actions by large groups of armed men – 
Wahhabis in Chechnya supporting Wahhabis in Dagestan, and vice versa – that turned 
intrastate wars into interstate wars and incurred dispositive balancing.  These operations 
altered the high-deniability Saudi model of proxy warfare into something like separatist-
sponsored conventional warfare and incurred much more of a reaction from the target.  
However, when the Salafists chose to operate in this fashion, there was little Riyadh 
could do.  The proxies Saudi Arabia supported had a high degree of operational 
capability on the battlefield, but also a very high degree of agency.  With independent 
sources of support, Saudi proxies had no reason to heed the Saudi state.  Riyadh had only 
minimal ability to influence the Islamists’ actions tactically or operationally, and even 
strategically its control was limited.  All it could do was increase or decrease the flow of 
support – money, primarily – going into its vast network of private Islamic institutions, 
and perhaps filter down some guidance to its networks of state and semi-state clerics.  
Unlike Pakistan’s relationship with the Haqqani network, only rarely would any of the 
Afghan Arabs work on behalf of their sponsor to change the aims of other militants to 
benefit the state.  This was a key weakness for the Kingdom when its proxies sought to 
operationalize pan-Islamic goals. Taken to an extreme, the Salafists’ pursuit of this goal 
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could incite intense balancing by Russia and ultimately the West, enough to harm all 
other goals the Salafists and their sponsors pursued.  The clearest examples of this were 
the later combat events at Buynksk, Gudermes, and decisively at Karamakhi.   
The Chechen war began when the Russian army launched a major assault on 
Grozny in December 1994, finally seizing the city four months later after heavy losses.  
Amidst widespread tactical and operational failures, Russia sustained a high level of 
casualties as it gradually expanded its control throughout the lowland areas of Chechnya 
and pushed up against the mountains.  By mid-1995, the Chechen war was already a 
political millstone for Yeltsin; after only seven months of operations, 80 percent of 
Russians favored an end to hostilities.882  Though Grozny had mostly been secured by 
federal forces, the rural areas and highlands were still lawless.  Russian troops came 
under frequent guerrilla attacks, including a series of devastating ambushes by an Afghan 
Arab known as Ibn Khattab.  Khattab’s attack on a Russian armored column in the 
mountainous village of Shatoy, south of Grozny, left over a hundred dead and destroyed 
dozens of vehicles, earning him considerable fame.883  Throughout the rebel area, 
unmotivated and badly trained Russian troops were unable to pin down an elusive enemy.  
Again and again, periods of apparent stability were broken by semi-independent 
operations including terrorist attacks that produced almost immediate Russian political 
concessions. 
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The end of the first war was born of one such attack in mid-1995.  On June 4, 
Russian troops captured Vedeno in the southern mountains, a major rebel military 
headquarters where insurgent leader Shamil Basayev was reported to be hiding.  Basayev 
was gone.  He and two hundred armed men had slipped away to Budennovsk, a town in 
the neighboring province of Stavropol Krai where Russia’s main airbase for its Chechen 
campaign was located.884  The militants seized approximately 1,500 hostages and 
barricaded themselves into a hospital, demanding immediate negotiations to end the war.  
After six hostages had been executed on the fourth day of the siege, Russian troops 
attempted to storm the hospital in a spectacularly uncoordinated effort.  Special 
operations forces assaulted the Chechens’ position as armored vehicles fired blindly into 
the hospital, killing hundreds.  After multiple assaults were repelled, Prime Minister 
Victor Chernomyrdin called a halt.  He offered a temporary ceasefire, negotiations to end 
the conflict, and safe passage for the militants back to Chechnya.885  Basayev had won. 
The peace talks began in Grozny on June 19, 1995.  They successfully established 
a ceasefire that came into effect on June 20, but negotiations on other points stretched out 
for weeks.  Eventually, on July 31, both sides agreed on a strategy for disengagement.  
Russian forces would depart, leaving only two brigades behind, and the Chechens would 
disarm most of their fighters and try to bring the Budennovsk perpetrators to justice.886  
Amidst grumbling from their commanders that the terms were too generous to Russia, 
Dudayev and Maskhadov supported the outcome.887  Under the agreement, new Chechen 
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elections were scheduled for later in the year after Russian troops withdrew.  However, 
Moscow broke the ceasefire in October after a failed assassination attempt against the 
commander of its forces in Chechnya.  It appointed the reliable ex-Communist official 
Doku Zavgayev as Chechen head of state in October and stood him in presidential 
elections two months later.  Zavgayev had little Chechen support, but since federal troops 
had not yet withdrawn, the 75,000 Russian soldiers could vote and did, ensuring his 
victory.888   
Again, however, Russian progress in Chechnya was disrupted by semi-
independent guerrilla raids.  On January 9, 1996, militants under the command of Salman 
Raduyev crossed into neighboring Dagestan and attacked the Russian military airfield at 
Kizlyar, two miles over the border.  Initially, the raid failed.  Raduyev’s force destroyed 
several helicopters and killed 33 people, but they were repelled by Russian troops and 
forced to fall back towards Chechnya.889  Under heavy attack, the fighters once again 
changed course and reentered the town, taking an estimated two thousand people prisoner 
and barricading themselves in a hospital.  There, surrounded by hostages, they negotiated 
safe passage back to Chechnya.  As they neared the border, however, Russian forces 
welshed on the deal and attacked Raduyev’s convoy which scattered into the town of 
Pervomayskoye.  Shortly thereafter, Moscow launched a hastily planned attack on the 
town, which collapsed.  The siege was broken when another Chechen column crossed the 
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border and attacked Russian forces in the rear, thus allowing Raduyev’s militants to 
withdraw.890 
Like Budennovsk, the Kizlyar raid drew unwelcome attention to the conflict in 
Russia and abroad.  Facing federal elections that summer, Yeltsin tried to demonstrate 
that the war was nearing an end.  On March 31, 1996, he signed a measure initiating 
Chechen parliamentary elections to bolster the Zavgayev government and announced 
further troop withdrawals.891  In another coup, Russian forces killed Dudayev with a 
missile strike on April 21 while he was talking on a satellite phone.  Dudayev was 
succeeded by his vice president Zelimkhan Yandarbayev, a poet and children’s book 
author who was more religious and ideological than Dudayev but weaker politically.  A 
month after Dudayev was killed, Russian forces announced their capture of the last rebel-
held village after a major battle in late May.  These measures worked: Yeltsin was 
reelected with a 35 percent plurality of the vote. 
Holding a strong hand, Yeltsin restarted reconciliation talks for the remaining 
rebel holdouts with Yandarbayev.  Peace negotiations between Russian and Chechen 
delegations began on June 4 in Ingushetia but were quickly followed by a wave of 
terrorism.  On June 11, there was an explosion on the Moscow subway, and on June 28 a 
bus traveling to the North Ossetian capital of Vladikavkaz was bombed.  Two more 
bombings followed in Moscow in early July.892  The rebels combined these asymmetric 
attacks with a lightning strike on the Chechen capital.  Shortly before Yeltsin began his 
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second term in August, following a quiet July, an estimated 1,500 Chechen militants led 
by Basayev and well-known commander Ruslan Gelayev advanced into the capital, 
surrounding and isolating Russian troop emplacements and fortifying the three key roads 
into the city.893  When Russian relief forces attempted to reach their compatriots, they 
suffered heavy losses and were repulsed. 
On August 19, local Russian commanders laid down an ultimatum to the rebels: 
leave Grozny within 48 hours or the military would level the city.  When word of this 
reached Moscow, Yeltsin blinked.  He sent his Secretary of the Security Council 
Alexander Lebed to Chechnya to disavow the ultimatum and instead establish an 
immediate ceasefire on August 20.  After several days of negotiation between Lebed and 
Maskhadov, they signed the Khasavyurt Accord, which marked the effective end of the 
war.  It codified the ceasefire in place, established joint control of certain areas, and 
committed Russia to remove its troops from Chechnya by December 31, 1996.  At a cost 
of 25,000 Russian and 80,000 Chechen casualties, the first war had – somewhat 
improbably – resulted in a rebel victory.894   
 
Saturation, 1997-2000 
After the end of the first Russian war, Salafists in Chechnya began to aggressively 
expand their influence, aided by Saudi institutions, Saudi money, and Saudi militants.  
They were able to grow powerful enough to subvert the Chechen state and carve out 
autonomous territory in Dagestan, while facing little effective internal or external 
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balancing.  This changed when large groups of them transgressed state lines, most clearly 
in August 1999. 
In this model of proxy relationship, the lawlessness of the proxies did have 
benefits in delaying additional external balancing against both the Salafists and their 
sponsor.  The West had been relatively friendly towards Chechnya in the first war, 
despite numerous major terrorist attacks and the growing role of foreign Salafists.  US 
President Bill Clinton had reacted with caution after hostilities broke out in December 
1994, wary about upsetting his relationship with Yeltsin.  At the podium the day after 
Russian troops went in, White House spokesman Mike McCurry stressed that the issue 
was “an internal affair of the government of Russia for all Russians.”  He said the US had 
only asked the Russians if “bloodshed can be minimized, that the use of force can be 
minimized, and that they might be successful…in negotiating an end to this conflict.”  A 
few months later, that equivocation had sharpened.  Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott called Russia’s actions an “outrage” in February and his boss Warren Christopher 
called Russia’s actions “foolhardy” in March.896  The Chechen war led President Clinton 
to decline attendance at Russia’s commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the victory 
over Germany in May, joining a similar boycott by Germany, the United Kingdom, and 
France.   
This friendliness was sustained through the entry of foreign fighters into the 
conflict and the increasing use of terrorism by the rebels.  The Saudi radical, Ibn al-
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Khattab, for instance, was never mentioned by name nor criticized for any of his 
operations, including his leadership of major ambushes in October 1995 and Shatoy in 
1996, the latter of which came five days before Clinton met Yeltsin in Moscow.  This 
was somewhat abnormal for the White House: national security officials would 
sometimes mention specifically other combat incidents that occurred, usually less 
major.897  Nor did the Administration make mention during the conflict – ever – of the 
training camps for militants that were being established, or indeed foreign fighters that 
were entering the republic.  When the issue of terrorism did come up, US officials would 
usually contextualize Chechen blame away.  The US did not even criticize Basayev’s 
hostage-taking operation at Budenovsk, with the White House limiting itself to a 
milquetoast comment endorsing Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin’s negotiations.898  
That stance was barely dented by Raduyev’s actions in January 1996 in Dagestan at 
Kizlyar and Pervamoskoye.  Clinton personally condemned the taking of hostages, which 
the White House said “simply had no justification,” before the US returned to the familiar 
theme that it was “troubled and concerned by the use of force” to resolve the incident.899  
This was consistent with the broader US slowness to wake up to the challenges of Sunni 
radicalism during this period and particularly the murky involvement of Saudi Arabia.  
For example, there was nothing but praise for the Saudi government after the November 
13, 1995 attacks by Saudi radicals against US personnel at a Saudi National Guard 
training center.  Even months later, the US was citing Saudi Arabia as a “like-minded 
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state” in dealing with this problem and avoiding questions about Saudi involvement in 
radicalism.900 
The curious thing was that the Russians did not focus on foreign interference in its 
war either, despite Salafist leadership of numerous devastating ambushes during the first 
war and the establishment of militant training camps.  Broadly, pan-Islamic activity in 
territory of the former USSR did concern Russia, and especially on the territory of the 
Russian Federation.  For example, Yeltsin was deeply alarmed when in 1992 the Tajik 
Islamic Renaissance Party held a conference in Russia attended by Chechens and other 
Muslims from the former Soviet Union to discuss creating a unified Islamic movement in 
southern Russia.901  After Tajikstan’s president Rakhman Nabiyev was forced from 
power in September 1992, Russia condemned “outside interference” in its Islamic 
south.902  But during the first Chechen war, these themes were rarely touched on.  
Instead, effort was made to downplay the crisis publicly, including the role of outside 
forces.  Chernomyrdin blamed the start of the war on Shamil Basayev’s involvement in 
the assassination of a Russian general.  At the May 9 Victory Day celebration that the 
West had boycotted, Yeltsin’s hardline Defense Minister Pavel Grachev did not mention 
Chechnya or more broadly outside forces involved in Chechnya.903  Of course, this was 
partly political: Yeltsin had been politically wounded by the war and had no desire to 
portray it as escalating.  But this position continued beyond Yeltsin’s political 
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vulnerability, even after serious atrocities.  For example, during a meeting of Yeltsin and 
Clinton on April 21, 1996, Yeltsin startled the audience when he claimed, “military 
actions in the Chechnya region are not going on.”  Lingering hostilities were blamed on 
“some bands” that were “still running around...making life difficult for a lot of people.”  
When the issue of outsiders did come up, it was in the context of intermediaries to 
Dudayev and the secular leadership – the King of Morocco, the President of Tatarstan.  
Nor did Yeltsin have qualms with Chechnya internally: in the same appearance, he 
stressed that the only question the two states disagreed on was whether Chechnya was 
part of Russia.904   
Acknowledged or not, the outside influence was definitely there.  The growth of 
Salafist influence in Chechnya was visible in people and money, particularly Saudis and 
their money.  Foreign fighters were pouring into Chechnya, home of the ‘next great 
Afghan victory’, and nearly half of these travelled through networks run by Saudi 
Arabia’s established charitable and educational institutions.  This included several 
hundred Arabs, of which Saudis were the most numerous, comprising 59 percent of the 
foreigners, along with 14 percent Yemenis, 10 percent Egyptians, and 10 percent 
Kuwaitis.905  The most famous of these Arabs was Ibn al-Khattab, the bête-noir of 
Russian forces for seven years.  He was a Saudi, born to the name Saleh Abdullah al-
Suwailem who had fought the Soviets in Afghanistan at the age of seventeen and perhaps 
met Osama bin Laden.906  Khattab traveled on to fight in the Tajik civil war in the mid-
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1990’s and came to Chechnya in 1995 at the invitation of a fellow Afghan veteran.907  
Following the practice that members of al-Qaeda would employ later in the tribal areas of 
Pakistan, he married a local woman from the town of Karamakhi in neighboring 
Dagestan.908  Khattab was close friends with Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev and a 
critical influence in radicalizing Basayev’s worldview.909  Another prominent Saudi 
arrival during the war was Abu al-Walid al-Ghamdi, who succeeded Khattab as the 
commander of the Chechens’ best military unit, the International Islamic Peacekeeping 
Brigade (IIPB).  He had fought in Bosnia and Tajikistan, before joining Khattab on the 
front line during the first war.910   
Khattab founded the first major foreign-run training camp in Chechnya during the 
war.  It was called Kavkaz (“Caucasus” in Russian) and located in Serzhen-Yurt, a small 
town about 35 kilometers southeast of Grozny.  Khattab and about 100 foreign instructors 
focused on teaching the sabotage and guerilla tactics they had learned in Afghanistan as 
well as providing Salafist religious instruction.911  Eventually, his operation grew to a 
chain of four compounds all around Serzhen-Yurt, with a well-known 45-day curriculum 
that served as a model for others.912   
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Camps like Khattab’s flourished after fighting concluded in 1996.  They were 
located in Chechnya, Dagestan, and in the Pankisi Gorge along the border with 
Georgia.913  Wahhabi recruiters often offered Chechen youths 100 to 200 rubles a month 
to attend.914  The camps were promoted by a variety of organizations like the Islamic 
Institute in Grozny (which itself received funding from Saudi Arabia) and the Saudi 
Ibrahim ben Abd al-Aziz al-Ibrahim Foundation, and by the beginning of the second war 
had trained an estimated 1,600-2,500 recruits.915  At their apogee, these had different 
functions: the Yakub camp instructed recruits how to use heavy weapons, the Davlat 
camp taught psychological warfare, and the Abubakar camp taught terrorism.916  Several 
of these facilities allegedly had direct ties to Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and other Islamic 
countries.  The Sayed Ibn Abu Vakas camp, for example, received recruits and money 
from Pakistani militant groups.917  Khattab’s camps and others like them were a feature 
of the type of private sector support received from places like Saudi Arabia, and were 
mimicked elsewhere like in Afghanistan.  They were pockets of political autonomy and 
an enabler of the more radical opposition, by sustaining and increasing their power base.  
Like the recruitment and training of militants, Saudi financing for the Chechens 
came mostly from private sources.  These sources were a function, at least in part, of the 
pan-Islamic ideology and jihadist currents that had been normalized in Saudi society. 
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Funding for humanitarian efforts bled over into more overtly military ones, all seen 
broadly within Saudi society as charity, part of a community effort to support Islam.918  
There was certainly some limited direct support: for example, the Saudi monarch King 
Fahd gave $5 million for Chechen Muslims through the Joint Saudi Committee for the 
Relief of Kosovo and Chechnya, and he flew hundreds of Chechens to Mecca for the hajj.  
Saudi television also conducted fundraising efforts on behalf of the Chechens, like the 
Chechnya Relief Campaign.919  But the bulk of the financing was private.  The U.S. 
government estimated that during the period of independence, private Islamist groups 
broadly donated $100 million to the Chechen cause.920  This included both older 
institutions that supported the Afghan jihad and those that were created after, some 
specifically for Chechnya.  The al-Haramayn Islamist Foundation, for example, was 
founded to support the mujahedin in Afghanistan, but during the Chechen war funded 
Khattab and Basayev through its branch office in Azerbaijan.  Khattab used Saudi money 
to open religious schools in Chechnya and paid families to send their children as 
students.921  Saudi organizations like Igatha and al-Haramayn were also instrumental in 
funding the Chechen fighters, as well as legitimate humanitarian projects.922  These and 
other active charities like the Benevolence International Foundation and the Islamic 
Salvation Organization all had strong Wahhabi or Salafist influences.923  
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Afghan Arabs like Sheikh Fathi Mohammed Habib helped connect the Chechen 
rebels to these private financial communities and institutions in the Gulf.925  The 
Benevolence International Foundation, based in Chicago, was one of Fathi’s conduits for 
funneling charity money to Chechnya, and Fathi also maintained safe houses for 
travelling jihadis in places like Azerbaijan.926  Another key financial link for the 
Chechens was Ahmed Nasser Eid Abdullah al-Fajri al-Azimi, known as al-Kuwaiti, who 
had come to Chechnya in the late 1990’s after having attended al-Qaeda-run training 
camps in Afghanistan.  A third important fundraiser was the Saudi-born Abu Omar al-
Saif, who had fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan before travelling to the North 
Caucasus in 1996 to become the head of the court system under Chechnya’s interim 
president Zelimkhan Yandarbayev.927  The robust funding streams these sources 
represented helped support the camps and communities of local radicals who ultimately 
operationalized Salafist tenets in Chechnya.928  
The Salafists’ first target, the republic’s political leadership, emerged from the 
first war in a position of strength.  The secular former Soviet military officer Aslan 
Maskhadov was appointed prime minister of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria on 
October 17, 1996, and elected president in January of the next year with over sixty 
percent of the vote.  It was not close: Shamil Basayev came in second with 23.5 percent 
and Yandarbayev an even more distant third.  Several other well-known candidates like 
the Salafist Movladi Udugov polled only a fraction of support.  Maskhadov quickly 
 
925 Tumelty, “The Rise and Fall of Foreign Fighters in Chechnya.” 
926 Pokalova, 89; Aukai Collins, My Jihad: The True Story of an American Mujahid’s Amazing Journey 
(Guilford: Lyons Press, 2002), 122-123. 
927 Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Abu Omar Al-Saif: His Life and After His Death,” North Caucasus Weekly 7, 
issue 5 (January 19, 2006), https://jamestown.org/program/abu-omar-al-saif-his-life-and-after-his-death/ 
(accessed December 20, 2016). 
928 Sagramoso, 697. 
 359 
began amalgamating some of the most high-profile commanders and rivals into the 
structures and confines of the secular civilian government.  The power ministries like 
Defense and Internal Affairs were given to his allies.  The two most significant 
commanders Basayev and Gelayev were consolidated with high-level but non-military 
posts.  Basayev was appointed deputy prime minister and Gelayev was made the Minister 
of Construction, a portfolio rife with opportunities for skim.  Salafist commander Arbi 
Barayev’s brother Shirvani was put at the head of the State Committee for Energy 
Resources, another significant role given Chechnya’s oil deposits and extensive prewar 
refining operation.929  Movladi Udugov was made the Minister of Information.  Udugov 
was a radical: besides Khattab, probably the commander most identified with Salafist 
Islam.  He had served as a press secretary under Dudayev and later rose to deputy prime 
minister in Yandarbayev’s cabinet.930  
Maskhadov followed these moves with attempts to consolidate the security forces 
under his control.  On March 13, 1997, he founded the National Guard as a centrally 
controlled armed force consisting of about 2,000 members.  He ordered the integration of 
wartime guerrilla formations like Barayev’s Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (IPON) 
into the National Guard and handed out commissions to prominent commanders.931  
Maskhadov eliminated the wartime autonomy of the various guerrilla “fronts,” placing all 
forces under Grozny’s command and control.932  His administration also attempted to 
 
929 Williams (2015), 119. 
930 “Chechen President Puts His Cabinet Together,” Monitor 3, issue 33 (February 17, 1997), 
https://jamestown.org/program/chechen-president-puts-his-cabinet-together/ (accessed November 28, 
2017). 
931 Ekaterina Sokirianskaya, “State and violence in Chechnya (1997-1999),” in Chechnya at War and 
Beyond. ed. Anne Le Huerou, Aude Merlin, Amandine Regamey, Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski (New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 103. 
932 Sokirianskaya, 103. 
 360 
reduce the number of privately held weapons in the republic through measures like 
buyback programs and gun control laws.  However, these measures stalled. His nascent 
government could not actually implement gun control and other security measures, 
particularly in places like Khattab’s camps and other Salafist enclaves.933  The different 
wartime groups ignored his order to reorganize and resisted serving under each other.934   
The first major conflict between the Salafists and the secular government came 
over peace negotiations with Russia.  This was a heuristic of a broader disagreement over 
goals for the new republic.  Dudayev and Maskhadov had been careful to stress the 
nationalism in their project.  Maskhadov’s vision was that of an independent, healthy, 
sustainable, Western-oriented state that retain amicable ties and close economic links to 
Russia.935  For one thing, Russia continued to pay pensions to Chechen retirees and 
veterans.  With few social services of its own, the Chechen economy (and many of its 
people) was deeply dependent on these payments and on its energy links to Moscow.  
The treaty was very brief, a mere half a page, and focused only on establishing “mutually 
beneficial relations” and rejecting the use of force.  The critical issue of Chechnya’s 
political status was left unaddressed: the treaty said nothing about Chechnya’s 
independence.  The only clue was in point two, which cited the need for both nations 
“[t]o develop their relations on generally recognized principles and norms of international 
law.”936  That implied state relations.  And in addition, Maskhadov signed the document 
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as the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.  But he did not force a 
confrontation with Russia over these points during negotiations. 
The compromises inherent in the document were totally antithetical to the 
Salafists, and their opposition attracted other commanders.  Yandarbayev and Salman 
Raduyev (a man widely considered one of the most unstable of the wartime commanders) 
criticized the negotiation of this treaty and announced their opposition to Maskhadov 
only a month after the election.937  Basayev also broke with Maskhadov and left the 
government after the treaty was signed.938  Udugov joined him.  Gelayev and several 
other prominent guerrilla commanders resigned later in June over the same issues.  These 
rejectionists were strengthened by Khattab and his networks of people, militants, and 
money.939   
This schism with Maskhadov had the effect of shifting the bulk of the 
opposition’s goals from simple nationalism to Islamist and transnational goals.  In 
opposition, Basayev and others began to adopt pan-Islamic aims and set up operational 
alliances between their fighters and local Salafist communities.  Yandarbayev, for 
example, founded the Caucasus Confederation in August 1997, which aimed at uniting all 
of the Caucasus nationalities against Russian rule.  It had a paramilitary wing and 
participated in cross-border incursions into Dagestan.940  In December 1997, Salman 
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Raduyev announced an alliance between his forces and the “Fighting Squads” of the 
jamaats of Dagestan, proclaiming their intent to form a unified Islamic state.941   
With most of his wartime rivals in opposition by late 1997, Maskhadov tried to 
mitigate their political pressure by adopting some of the Salafists’ goals himself.  Sharia 
law was a key issue that increasingly united opposition figures like Basayev, Raduyev, 
and Yandarbayev.  On November 5, 1997, Maskhadov declared Chechnya an Islamic 
republic, formally committed to the imposition of Islamic mores of dress and behavior.942  
Maskhadov made his pronouncement vague enough to attempt to avoid undercutting his 
own constitutional authority but still appeal to the radicals’ followers.  Earlier Chechen 
leaders had also played with this idea.  Dudayev had ordered a commission to study the 
development of Islamic law in Chechnya, though he refrained from taking action.  His 
more radical successor Yandarbayev went further, piloting the creation of sharia courts 
and calling for the supremacy of Islamic law before he was ousted.943  Under 
Maskhadov’s scheme, both secular and religious courts existed in parallel, with sharia 
judges receiving training by the Dagestani Salafist leader Bagautdin Kebedov.944  Two 
military units were assigned to the courts, the Sharia Guards and Barayev’s Islamic 
regiment, and were given wide latitude to police behavior like the consumption of 
alcohol, similar to the role of the morality police in Saudi Arabia.945  Though Maskhadov 
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had rejected sharia law as a candidate for president, he moved closer and closer to the 
militant position throughout his term.946   
 Unfortunately for him, Maskhadov’s efforts to coopt some parts of the radicals’ 
agenda made him appear to be condoning the others, particularly their cross-border 
incursions, which isolated him internationally.  For Maskhadov, Islamic law was largely 
an internal phenomenon.  But the more domestic Islamist goals Maskhadov adopted, the 
more he appeared to be supporting the radicals’ pan-Islamic projects, which were much 
more likely to incur intense balancing by Russia.  Shortly after Maskhadov declared 
Chechnya an Islamic republic, the radicals launched their first raid into Dagestan on 
December 27, 1997.  Khattab and about 120 fighters joined local Dagestani militants in a 
cross-border attack against the Russian 136th Armor Brigade at its base in Buynksk, 
Dagestan.947  The damage was actually relatively slight, with fourteen casualties and the 
destruction of dozens of armored vehicles.948  But it was an embarrassment to 
Maskhadov.  His government was preparing to host Boris Yeltsin’s first visit to 
Chechnya, with the goal of turning a new page in relations with the Russian Federation 
and establishing its international bona fides as a member in good standing of the 
international community.  The attack cratered those efforts. 
 Khattab’s Buynksk raid seems to have been an inflection point in the way Russia 
thought about the Chechens.  It spurred Moscow to a more urgent sense of the growing 
danger of Salafism in the new republic and the Caucasus as a whole.  Lieutenant General 
Ivan Golubev, who headed the public order department of Russia’s interior ministry and 
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led the investigation of the Buynksk attack, blamed the security situation on Fathi’s 
Wahhabi communities like Karamakhi.  “The gangsters concentrated in those settlements 
of Dagestan populated mostly by supporters of Wahhabism, an extreme movement of 
Islamic fundamentalism,” he said.949  Golubev’s boss, Russian Interior Minister Anatoly 
Kulikov, demanded that the Chechen authorities take action against the camps that were 
being used to train gunmen and threatened Russia would do so if not.950  Maskhadov in 
turn denied they existed.951  One of Yeltsin’s representatives to the Northern Caucasus 
pointed the finger at citizens from Middle Eastern and Western nations for sabotage 
operations and receiving training and other support from the intelligence organizations of 
their home countries, from camps which co-opt local inhabitants.952  Other officials, 
including the Dagestani chief prosecutor, blamed coordinated attacks against the chief of 
the organized crime unit and others on Wahhabis from Chechnya working to form an 
Islamic state with their patron.953  Dagestan subsequently banned Wahhabism in January 
of 1998: its parliament speaker said that the law would defend “norms of traditional 
Islam” and eliminate “propaganda of interreligious antagonism and prevent dissemination 
of Islamic fundamentalism in the territory of Daghestan.”954  Russian television began to 
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air programs about the increase in Islamism in Chechnya and the penetration of sharia 
law, highlighting Chechen students studying Islam in the Middle East.955   
These warnings were not yet echoed by the senior Chechen authorities.  For 
instance, on March 19, Chechnya’s senior counterterrorism official blamed Islamic 
militants for the ongoing violence and said he was ready to confront them.  Makhadov, 
however, quickly countermanded him.956  After an attempt on the life of Georgian 
President Eduard Shevardnadze days later, the same official blamed foreigners who were 
allegedly financed by “eastern countries” and were trying to turn Chechnya into the hub 
of international terrorism.957  Maskhadov fired him. 
However, Maskhadov did seek to capitalize on the secular identity of the state he 
was trying to build.  On the ground, external support made the Salafists powerful enough 
to contest Maskhadov’s authority.  In response to this threat, and in an effort to realize his 
own vision for Chechnya, Maskhadov sought Western support to balance the Salafists’ 
power.  It never arrived.  No Western states recognized the new republic or helped it 
bolster its sovereign government.  Maskhadov traveled to the United States and the 
United Kingdom to seek their recognition for his state, but neither acquiesced nor even 
granted him an audience with senior officials.958  The Americans considered him weak 
and virtually powerless to influence events around him, despite the fact that some of his 
 
955 “Chechen students study Koran in Syria,” Russian Public TV (January 16, 1998), https://advance-lexis-
com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3RTH-5F50-006F-X077-
00000-00&context=1516831 (accessed April 19, 2020). 
956 “Chechen crime fighter accuses Islamic fundamentalists of hostage taking,” The Associated Press 
(March 19, 1998). 
957 Igor Rotar, “Georgian terrorists were trained in Chechnya,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (March 26, 1998). 
958 Valery Tishkov, Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 2004), 125. 
 366 
later decisions (on sharia, for example) maintained the same ambiguity that Dudayev’s 
had.959  His attempt later in the year to join the United Nations was also rebuffed.   
Worse, radicals within Chechnya were able to thwart Maskhadov’s foreign policy 
outreach through their tactical actions.  Perhaps nothing was more harmful to his policies 
than Chechnya’s kidnapping epidemic, as militants were able to isolate the Maskhadov 
government when the international community blamed him for their actions.  Arbi 
Barayev, whose Islamic regiment in Urus-Martan had been recognized as the 29th 
Division of the Chechen army, was a particular problem.  Barayev’s forces were 
notorious for their lawlessness, smuggling, and kidnapping, and increasingly an 
embarrassment for the government.  Khattab was also widely blamed for the rash of 
abductions.960  Men, women, and children were taken, with ransom prices ranging from a 
few thousand dollars to millions for especially choice captives like NTV journalist 
Yelena Masyuk.961  During the period of independence, there reached as many as 560 
kidnapping hostages awaiting ransom in Chechnya.962  These had strategic consequences, 
particularly beyond the Russian Federation and CIS.  Kidnapping (especially foreigners) 
outraged the victims’ home countries and deterred private investment, increasing 
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Maskhadov’s isolation, while monies gained from kidnapping enhanced the power of 
groups that participated in it. 
In a further concession to the opposition, Maskhadov brought his old rivals back 
into the government, organizing a new cabinet in early 1998 that included Basayev as 
prime minister and Udugov as foreign minister.  The shuffling backfired as the Salafists’ 
goals took deeper root.  Basayev grew closer to Udugov, the religious ideologue, and by 
April 1998 had joined with him and Yandarbayev to found the new extraterritorial group 
the Congress of Nations of Ichkeria and Dagestan.963  This organization eventually 
included most of Maskhadov’s opposition, including Chechen militant formations like 
Khattab’s.  It also united them operationally and ideologically with Dagestani jamaats, 
which were experiencing a Salafist movement of their own and helped radicalize 
Chechnya’s leaders.  Basayev’s Congress aimed to unite Dagestan with Chechnya into a 
new independent state under sharia law.  It served as a unifying umbrella organization for 
other militant groups, including Khattab’s International Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade 
(IIPB).964  The IIPB itself was an explicitly extraterritorial organization; it was intended 
to defend Muslims in areas where they were under attack by non-Muslim forces.  By 
mid-1998, both renowned guerrilla leader Shamil Basayev and skilled propagandist 
Movladi Udugov were calling for the unification of the North Caucasus against Russian 
influence under an Islamic state.965   
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The battlefield competence of Salafist militants was high and often enough to 
overwhelm local authorities, particularly when different communities could reinforce 
each other.  Under the leadership of the Jordanian Abdurakhman al-Zarqi, the villages of 
Karamakhi, Kadar, Chankurbe, and Chabanmakhi in central Dagestan had became 
centers of Wahhabi radicalism by 1998 with remarkably little federal opposition.966  The 
area was home to an estimated 2,000 to 4,000 Wahhabi converts as well as fourteen 
Wahhabi madrassas.967  Their first major challenge to state authority came on May 21, 
1998, when militants seized the government building in Karamakhi (the home of 
Khattab’s wife) and drove out the local police.  The police reaction was ineffectual.  A 
sizeable force of Dagestani government troops scrambled to respond, but were repelled 
by militants arriving to reinforce the local Wahhabis.  A ceasefire agreement on May 25 
left Karamakhi virtually autonomous and under its own governance.968  Semi-
governmental institutions like an Islamic governing council were created, and the 
militants received emissaries and other support from Chechen groups like Udugov’s 
Congress.969  Frightened and nonplussed, Dagestan’s government publicly condemned 
outside groups from the Persian Gulf for conducting jihad against their republic.970  
However, Yeltsin sought to avoid a confrontation.  Under an agreement struck by 
Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, the local Wahhabi leaders were permitted to 
govern themselves if they abandoned their claim to sovereignty in Dagestan or unity with 
Chechnya.  They agreed.973   
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Maskhadov’s major counteroffensive against the growing power of the radicals 
came later that year.  Long-simmering tension between the Maskhadov government and 
opposition Wahhabi elements escalated into a major confrontation near Gudermes on 
July 14, 1998.  Here, the autonomy of Karamakhi in Dagestan empowered religious 
radicals in Chechnya.  Gudermes was a stronghold of Chechen rebel commanders Arbi 
Barayev and others who had instituted elements of Sharia law, as well as a waypoint for 
Dagestani Salafists.  A dispute with Maskhadov’s National Guard forces exploded into 
violence that lasted for days and dragged in hundreds of fighters on each side.974  
Barayev’s forces were joined by Dagestani militants from the Karamakhi jamaat and the 
Chechen Kurcholai jamaat, south of Gudermes.  Chechen police under the control of 
Maskhadov’s ally Sulim Yamadayev arrived the next day and besieged the town.  
Though the militants took the worst casualties, Barayev and his group eventually were 
permitted to surrender and leave the city.  They left Gudermes and traveled to Urus-
Martan, a key Barayev fiefdom.975  Zarqi, who had travelled to Gudermes from Dagestan 
to help the radicals, was expelled from Chechnya, along with other leading Dagestani 
militants. 
The events at Gudermes seem to have had the effect on the Chechen authorities 
that the Buynksk raid had had on the Russian authorities in January.  In response to the 
fighting, Maskhadov lashed out at the influence of Persian Gulf countries.  In a televised 
address on July 15, Maskhadov blamed Arab countries for imposing a “foreign ideology” 
on his country. “Those behind this movement come to Chechnya from Arab countries, 
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call on people to start war and justify the kidnappings," he said.  He continued, “I will 
soon throw out of Chechnya those who have come here to impose a foreign ideology on 
the Chechen people.”976  A day later he banned Wahhabism in Chechnya, following a 
move Dagestan had made six months earlier.  He deported four foreigners accused of 
spreading Wahhabism and issued decrees disbanding the Sharia Guard and the Islamic 
Brigade, which were never implemented.977  He also ordered all Arabs like Khattab out 
of the republic, which was similarly not enforced.978  Maskhadov stripped Barayev of his 
military rank and called up 5,000 army reservists to crack down on kidnapping.979  On 
August 2, during a trip to Turkey, Maskhadov took aim at Arab countries that were 
spreading Wahhabism in Chechnya.  “After the war,” he said, “some circles tried to stir 
up trouble in our country.  Certain Arab countries tried to teach us Islam...we took the 
necessary steps and we did not allow them to foment unrest in our country.”  In August, 
group of leading clerics from the North Caucasus, including Chechnya’s mufti Akhmad 
Kadyrov, created a joint coordinating center in Ingushetia specifically to combat 
Wahhabism, which Kadyrov called a foreign “plague” introduced to split up Islam.980  
On October 2, 1998, Maskhadov explicitly warned that Saudi Arabia was spreading and 
financing Islamic radicalism in the North Caucasus in an effort to combat Russian 
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influence, which posed a “serious threat” to Chechnya.981  After failed attacks on the lead 
mufti of Chechnya and its anti-kidnapping chief, Yeltsin’s envoy to the CIS blamed 
“political, financial and religious forces from Middle Eastern countries” for the 
attacks.982 
However, due to Maskhadov’s inability to attract Western support (partially itself 
due to the actions of the Salafists), this attempt to balance external influence actually 
backfired.  His government had a final falling out with Riyadh.  Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 
and the United Arab Emirates had been the only states that tacitly recognized Chechen 
independence.  This recognition was somewhat tenuous: though multiple media outlets 
reported it, government officials from none of the three states would confirm.983  After 
Maskhadov’s call to expel Arabs from the republic, that support was withdrawn.  There 
was an additional financial dispute as well: Saudi Arabia had been paying for cell phone 
coverage for Chechnya, and in the summer of 1998 that support was withdrawn, causing 
Russian cell companies to cut off coverage.984 
Maskhadov’s actions at Gudermes and subsequent turn against the Salafists’ 
sponsors not only failed to attract foreign support and incited Middle Eastern opposition, 
but left him alone in a weakened government.  Basayev quit the government again.  He 
informed his colleagues that he wished to die in jihad and went to live with Khattab at his 
camp to study religion.985  The Dagestani leader Kebedov also moved to Serzhan-Yurt to 
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assist with Khattab’s camps.986  Udugov defected from the government as well and joined 
Yandarbayev in opposition.  This time they established rival media organs to amplify 
their message, using the news agency Kavkaz Tsentr to promote Salafist ideas, glorify 
jihad, and attack Maskhadov.987  As the government grew weaker, these organs would 
compete with official Chechen mouthpieces as the voice of the government.  These 
campaigns undermined not just Maskhadov domestically but also his international 
outreach and message of stability.988  
They also took more active measures, creating facts on the ground that forced 
Maskhadov’s direction.  A key blow to Maskhadov’s external outreach came in 
December 1998, when Barayev’s men kidnapped and beheaded three British 
telecommunications workers and their New Zealand colleague.  Barayev later claimed he 
would receive more money from “his Arab friends” for their execution than from the 
British to secure their release.989  The British government called the murders 
“repugnant;” the leader of next-door Muslim republic Ingushetia called them a 
“horrifying crime” committed “against the international community.”990  A well-known 
Russian journalist, earlier sympathetic to the Chechen predicament and a kidnapping 
victim herself, said that the epidemic had cost the republic all the sympathy it earned after 
Russia’s war crimes.991  Maskhadov’s reinvigorated effort to address the kidnappings that 
fall was decapitated nearly immediately, when the head of his anti-kidnapping unit was 
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killed with a car bomb shortly after the campaign began.  The first assassination attempt 
on Maskhadov also followed.992   
Isolated abroad and under siege at home, Maskhadov swung back the other way, 
and capitulated totally to the radicals’ domestic goals.  He announced full Sharia law for 
Chechnya on February 3, 1999, and ordered the drafting of an Islamic constitution similar 
to Sudan’s.993  He also disbanded parliament and created an Islamic shura council that 
would consult with him on policy, a key demand of the opposition.  The shura included 
Basayev and Yandarbayev.994  Stability did not come, however.  Basayev, Udugov, and 
the others quickly decried Maskhadov’s organization as not Islamic enough.  They 
abandoned it and created their own rival policymaking government.995  
However, it was the transnational goals of the radicals – the least deniable – that 
ultimately sparked Russian intervention and the second Chechen war.  Operationalizing 
these goals involved transgressing demarcated state boundaries with large groups of men 
and made the irregular, subversive warfare that the militants could conduct effectively 
more like conventional aggression.  In July 1999, a group of Dagestani militants 
attempted to expand their control of the Karamakhi area into the neighboring 
Tsumadinski district in Dagestan.996  They killed several members of the federal MVD in 
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fighting on August 4 and Moscow rushed in reinforcements, blocking off roads around 
the area.  Three days later, Basayev and Khattab led hundreds of Chechen militants into 
Dagestan to support the besieged fighters.997  This time the transgression of sovereignty 
was significant and occurred on multiple levels: there was the violation of the Chechen-
Dagestan border, as well as the violation of the Dagestani district line.  These actions 
were also perpetrated by a large group of Chechens.  All of this served to increase the 
significance of their violation of Russia’s sovereignty and provoke a greater reaction.  
Correspondingly, it incited intense Russian balancing that escalated into invasion.   
Russian troops used artillery and airstrikes with fuel-air explosives to subdue the 
occupied area, while local police engaged the militants on the ground.998  As the conflict 
worsened, Yeltsin fired Stepashin as prime minister and replaced him with Vladimir 
Putin.  Maskhadov attempted to disassociate himself one last time from the pan-Islamic 
goals of the Salafists.  He condemned the Salafist incursion but refused (or was more 
realistically unable) to take action against the perpetrators.  Under heavy attack from 
Russian airstrikes, Khattab’s Chechen fighters began to withdraw from Dagestan on 
August 23.  Without support from the Chechens, the remaining Dagestani militants were 
quickly overrun.  Russian forces proceeded to cordon off and eliminate Salafist enclaves 
in Karamakhi and other Islamist villages.  Russia’s foreign minister sent a formal letter to 
the Organization of Islamic Countries warning them not to support the separatists in 
Dagestan, saying there was proof the Chechens were receiving outside support.999  After 
a week, virtually all Dagestani territory was back under federal control.  Following a 
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series of bombings in Russia throughout September, which Moscow chose to blame on 
Chechen Salafists and Khattab, Russian aircraft began bombing Chechnya.1000  
 
The Second Chechen War, 2000-2003  
The second Chechen war was fought in a far different strategic context for both 
proxy and sponsor than the first one. The biggest change was the degree of international 
balancing against the Salafists and Saudi Arabia.  In November 1999, Saudi Arabia's 
interior minister, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, rejected accusations that Saudi Arabia 
was financing the militants.1001  But extraterritorial attacks by Salafists – related to 
Chechnya or not – created a strong reaction against the kind of Saudi private sector 
funding and institutions that until then had been tolerated.  Of course, no greater shift 
occurred than after the terrorist attacks of September 11th.  This resulted in US pressure 
on the Saudis to reduce their support for radicalism, which they did, and spurred US 
sanctions on the separatists.1002  The opening of America’s Afghanistan war in 2001 and 
particularly Iraq in 2003 offered more compelling causes for jihadists than Chechnya, 
which was both hard to reach and still culturally alien to Middle Easterners.  The brutality 
of Salafist terrorist attacks within Russia also served to reduce the rebels’ support.  Not 
least, the Kingdom became more concerned with its own domestic revolutionary threat 
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from Al-Qaeda, especially after the bombings in 2003.1003  Between those and anti-
terrorist measures imposed after 9/11, its support for private sector jihadism was greatly 
scaled back. 
Operationally, the Chechen rebels were also far more divided than they had been 
in 1994, largely due to the successful cooption of the Chechen state by the Salafists.  
Akhmed Kadyrov, the republic’s chief mufti and a former secessionist, opposed the 
Salafist incursion into Dagestan and quickly broke with the government.  He called on 
Chechens not to oppose the Russian invasion and was promptly fired by Maskhadov.1004  
Kadyrov joined a coalition of Chechens that were pro-Russian and anti-Salafist, including 
another Maskhadov ally Sulim Yamadayev who had fought at Gudermes in 1998.  This 
group gave Russia a significant base of Chechen support it had not enjoyed during the 
first war.   
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Russia fought the second war differently in important ways.  For one, the Russian 
government retained tight control of the information space through media offices in 
Moscow and North Ossetia.  Unlike in the first war, entry to Chechnya was forbidden 
without explicit permission.  Russian media officials suggested language for journalists to 
use about the conflict and issued veiled threats to those who ventured out on their 
own.1010  Russia also employed nearly 100,000 troops in the initial invasion, three times 
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more than in 1994.  By early 2000, that number would increase to 140,000 against an 
estimated 12,000-15,000 Chechen fighters.1011  As Russian forces moved further south, 
they used artillery extensively and preemptively to soften up potential strongpoints in 
villages, as they had done in Dagestan two months earlier.1012   
They reached the outskirts of Grozny on October 15 and began preparations for a 
siege.  The Yamadayev brothers negotiated the surrender of Gudermes without a fight on 
November 11.1013  Urus-Martan, a key center of Chechen resistance southwest of Grozny, 
fell to Russian forces in early December.1014  By December 4, the Russian theater 
commander General Viktor Kazantsev announced that his forces had completely 
surrounded the capital.1015  On December 13, Russian troops took control of Grozny’s 
airport to the east of the city in Khankala.  Maskhadov called for negotiations the next 
day, which Moscow declined.1016  In an interview, Putin outlined three preconditions to 
any political negotiation: Maskhadov must renounce terrorism, ensure the release of 
kidnapping victims, and bring the perpetrators of the Dagestan raid to justice.1017  
Eliminate the radicals, in other words.   
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 Russia’s plan for assaulting Grozny involved capitalizing on the divisions among 
Chechens operationally as well as politically.  Bislan Gantemirov, for example, was a 
former mayor of Grozny who commanded a small force of militia that would act as 
pathfinders for Russian forces as they advanced into the city.  As they closed in, federal 
troops began probing the interior of the city.  The large Russian troop presence around 
Grozny also meant that soldiers could be quickly rotated in and out of the fighting for 
one-week deployments to sustain morale.1018  Airpower was used extensively, as well as 
the fuel-air explosives that had been used to eliminate the insurgents in Dagestan in the 
fall.  However, despite improvements in Russian urban combat capabilities, the fighting 
quickly devolved into house-to-house combat reminiscent of the first campaign for 
Grozny.1019   
Tactically, the Chechens remained highly capable.  The city’s estimated 2,000-
2,500 defenders formed mobile detachments consisting of three- to five-man fire teams 
that infiltrated secure areas of the city to ambush Russian forces.1020  Poor 
communications prevented the effective use of airstrikes, as pilots had to maneuver 
around troops from different ministries as well as friendly Chechen units.1021  Russian 
tank columns were leery of entering the city; when they did they were punished.  On 
December 15, Chechen forces cut off and nearly annihilated an armored column in the 
strategic Minutka Square, south of the central river in Grozny.1022  As the Grozny 
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operation dragged through January and then into February, the Russian death toll rose 
from 400 to 1,500 to as high as 3,000.1023   
 
Source: Emil Pain, Military Review (July-August 2000) 
 
By late January, the sheer weight of Russian resources, marshaled more 
effectively than in 1994, began to overwhelm the defenders.  When the time came to 
retreat, Russian FSB operatives reportedly offered the remaining Chechens a ceasefire 
and a corridor out of the city in exchange for $100,000.  They were led west into a 
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minefield and then ambushed by Russian troops, suffering an estimated 600 losses.1024  
By February, Russia’s military operations in Grozny were largely finished though 
sporadic ambushes from snipers and booby traps continued for months.1025  The heaviest 
fighting shifted to the south as Russian forces attempted to cut off retreating Chechen 
formations before they could reach the Argun and Vedeno Gorges, areas which could 
support a sustained guerrilla campaign. 
 The most intense pitched battles came with the most operationally capable 
elements, the Salafists.  In late February, Russian airborne troops attempted to encircle 
Khattab, Abu Walid, and about 1,600-2,500 fighters (including many Arabs) in the 
village of Ulus-Kert, thirty-five kilometers south of Grozny.  Under pressure, the 
Chechens retreated out of the town and made their way four kilometers southeast through 
a ravine, where they found a vastly outgunned 6th Company of the 104th Guards 
Parachute Regiment waiting for them.  The ninety paratroopers, attempting to dig in 
between two hills flanking the gorge, were caught in the open and pushed back to a single 
hilltop.1026  Waves of well-armed Chechen fighters assaulted the hill for four days, as 
enemy fire and bad weather prevented Russian relief forces and air support from reaching 
the besieged company.  All but seven of the defenders were killed by the time 
reinforcements arrived on March 3.1027   
The second major post-Grozny engagement came on March 7.  A large force of 
600-1,000 Chechens under Ruslan Gelayev had retreated south to the mountains before 
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doubling back due to a lack of supplies.1028  They fought through a cordon of Russian 
motorized infantry troops to reach Gelayev’s hometown of Komsomalskoye, about 25 
kilometers south of Grozny.  Russian forces quickly surrounded the village and began 
leveling fire into the village, using airstrike, incendiary fuel-air explosives, and armored 
vehicles.1029  Gelayev’s fighters held out for nearly two weeks before surrendering on 
March 20.1030  Sporadic resistance continued throughout the month, and Gelayev himself 
escaped.1031   
Komsomalskoye effectively represented the last example of large-scale conflict in 
the war.  In March, Putin was elected President of Russia, replacing the ailing Yeltsin.  
On June 12, Putin appointed the loyalist cleric Akhmad Kadyrov president of the new 
Chechnya.  With Grozny, Gudermes, and Urus-Martan in its hands, Moscow did not 
seem particularly interested in negotiating a political settlement with the remaining 
separatists.  And with whom would it negotiate?  The radicalization of the remaining 
Chechen resistance and the changing international environment delegitimized the 
Chechens as negotiating partners, reducing their potential external support even from 
Saudi Arabia.  Putin finally offered talks in September 2001, and representatives of the 
two sides met two months later.1032  After inconclusive discussions in Moscow, further 
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talks were postponed indefinitely.  Russia subsequently requested that the chief Chechen 
negotiator be extradited from Britain to face criminal charges.1033 
As a balancing action, Russia’s war was genuinely brutal.  By the time 
widespread Russian counterinsurgency operations officially ended in 2002, the Chechen 
campaign had resulted in more than 14,000 Chechen fighters killed as well as 4,500 
Russian troops.  Estimates of civilian deaths ranged between 10,000 and 80,000.1034  By 
Russia’s own admission, hundreds of Chechen civilians vanished every year at the hands 
of Russian security forces.1035  But there was no surge in support for the remaining 
Chechens.   
This was a key strategic problem the Chechens faced: they had no friends.  The 
war had initially sparked a response from the international community.  Saudi Arabia had 
been an early critic of the conflict, calling Moscow’s actions “inhumane” and demanding 
ethnic self-determination in Chechnya.1036  The IMF postponed a scheduled loan to 
Russia, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe suspended Russia’s 
voting membership in 2000.1037   But the prominence of the Salafists hampered 
Maskhadov’s ability to muster international opposition to Russia as the fighting 
escalated.  After the war started, he harshly criticized Yandarbayev for travelling to 
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Afghanistan to seek recognition from the Taliban, which he felt would alienate the 
Western states necessary to force Russia into a ceasefire.1038  Maskhadov’s aides also 
publicly blasted Saudi Arabia for funding the radicals.1039   
As time went on, genuine Western concerns over Chechen independence and 
Russian human rights violations faded in comparison with their concerns over Islamic 
terrorism, foreign fighters, and funding from the Persian Gulf.  This concern became 
acute after the September 11 attacks in the United States, and led to US officials changing 
their approach to Chechnya and the Salafists significantly.  During a press briefing on 
July 23, 2001, for example, US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice hewed to 
the traditional US line that Russian human rights abuses were the priority concern of the 
US, and did not even mention terrorism.1042  Two months later, that was completely 
reversed.  In a press briefing on September 26, Ari Fleischer cited the problem of an 
“international terrorist presence”  and quoted the President as demanding that “The 
Chechnya leadership, like all responsible political leaders in the world, must immediately 
and unconditionally cut all contacts with international terrorist groups, such as Osama bin 
Laden and the al Qaeda organization…The President welcomes the sincere steps that 
have been taken by Russia to engage the Chechen leadership and…respect for human 
rights and accountability for violations on all sides is crucial to a durable peace there.”1043  
When asked if his thinking on Chechnya had changed, Bush summed up this new line: 
“…our initial phase of the war on terrorism is against the al Qaeda organization.  And we 
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do believe there are some al Qaeda folks in Chechnya…And so I would hope that the 
Russian President, while dealing with the al Qaeda organization, also respects minority 
rights within his country.”1044  This was a far cry from the denunciations of Russian 
actions during the first war.  Instead, the US and other Western governments now 
besieged Chechen representatives over their government’s ties to Islamic radicals like 
Khattab.1045  The Council of Europe restored Russia’s voting membership only a year 
after it had been stripped.1046   
This collapse of international support was accelerated by the remaining rebels’ 
increasing adoption of terrorist attacks.  After Khattab was killed in 2002, his close friend 
Basayev became the key operational driver of Chechen resistance.1048  Basayev promptly 
announced targeted terrorist attacks against Russian cities that sent recruits to military 
units in Chechnya.  Suicide bombings also began to increase rapidly.1049  Unlike the first 
war, however, these attacks accelerated their defeat.  Two attacks particularly horrified 
the Russian public and international community.  On October 23, 2002, about forty 
armed Chechens under the command of Arbi Barayev’s nephew Mosvar Barayev seized 
the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow.  Russian security officials later claimed that the 
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terrorists made several calls to Saudi Arabia and other states in the Gulf.1050  After three 
days of negotiations, Russian forces saturated the theater with an unknown soporific gas 
before assaulting it, killing all of the terrorists but also one hundred and thirty of the 
hostages.1051  Though the Russian government came under heavy criticism for its 
handling of the attack, Dubrovka was deeply harmful to the Chechen cause abroad, 
particularly in the post 9/11 United States which promptly sanctioned the groups 
involved.  A second major terrorist incident at a school in Beslan, guided by Basayev and 
with the support of Afghan Arab financier Al-Kuwaiti, damaged the Chechen cause 
irreparably.1052   
After Dubrovka, Maskhadov condemned Udugov and other Salafists for 
instigating Chechnya’s collapse.  He lamented they had wasted their energy on 
ideological projects for the region like the Congress of Nations rather than focus on 
strengthening the Chechen state.1053  However, he had little influence remaining among 
the remaining resistance.  Maskhadov was forced to moot a UN ceasefire plan proposed 
by his foreign minister, saying the increasing religiosity of the fighters would not permit 
more cooperation or concessions to Western democracies.1054 
To make matters worse, the collapse in Western support also affected the 
Chechens’ support from Islamic nations.  Under intense US pressure, Saudi Arabia 
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committed in 2002 to eliminate the private funding that bled into militancy and more 
closely police its humanitarian foundations.  Saudi money for Chechnya subsequently 
dropped sharply.1055  The Kingdom’s support for Chechnya dried up almost completely 
after the death of Khattab’s successor Abu Walid two years later.1056  In early 2003, the 
United States placed financial sanctions on the Chechen Salafists, a step it had not taken 
before.  It designated Khattab’s International Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization, along with Barayev’s Special Purpose Islamic Regiment and 
Basayev’s Riyad us-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen 
Martyrs, a small group of suicide bombers.  
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III.  Conclusion and Additional Analysis 
Any strategic assessment of Saudi Arabia’s proxy warfare in Chechnya first 
hinges on whether this is a fair case to include.  Is it fair to categorize the Saudi regime as 
a proxy sponsor of the Chechen Salafists like Khattab?  This question has the danger of 
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resurrecting the ideologically leaden debates about whether Soviet-era groups like 
Baader-Meinhof and the PLO were Russian puppets or not.  In the Chechen case, some 
scholars would say no: they would say that some degree of control is necessary for either 
the definition of a proxy or the effectiveness of proxy warfare.  For them, the relationship 
between the Saudi state and scattered Islamist militants would be too distant, with no 
communication or real bonds between the two beyond a common liturgy.  For the 
purposes of this dissertation’s argument, however, it is appropriate to treat this 
relationship between the Chechen Salafists and Saudi Arabia as one type of proxy link.  
The Kingdom had little control over local Salafists or the Afghan Arabs in the Caucasus: 
that is without question.  What control there was came from increasing and decreasing 
the amount of funding going to Saudi Salafist institutions, as well as perhaps guidance 
put out through the Kingdom’s clerical networks of sermons and preaching.  This did 
offer an incentive for the militants, however imperfectly effective and however minor.  
But this dissertation makes no claim upon the necessity of controlling a proxy: it simply 
assesses the effectiveness of more or less close relationships, of which control is one part.  
The chain of linkage to Saudi Arabia, and why this is an appropriate case, is then clear.  
Saudi Arabia provided a vast amount of support to Salafist institutions, and through them 
to both Salafists in the Caucasus and the Afghan Arabs, a number of whom travelled to 
Chechnya.  The Afghan Arabs were key influencers in determining the course of the 
separatist project, and the Salafist movement a key influencer of Islam and Islamism in 
the Caucasus.  Over the decade, the Afghan Arabs and Islamist proselytizers drew from a 
pool of Salafist recruits and money that was ever growing, giving them and their 
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movement often-decisive weight.  Since their goals and the goals of the Saudi state 
overlapped, actions by the Salafists often advanced Riyadh’s aims. 
So how to assess the Salafists’ effectiveness for Saudi Arabia in Chechnya?  By 
the start of Putin’s second term in 2004, the original Chechen cause of separatism was in 
shambles.  Chechnya’s independence had vanished and the separatists had been 
irrevocably tarnished by atrocities at Dubrovka and Beslan.  Most of their major 
leadership figures were subsequently killed off, one by one.  Raduyev had been captured 
in 2000 and died in a Russian penal colony.  Gelayev was fatally shot during a raid into 
Dagestan in 2004.  Yandarbayev was assassinated in Qatar the same year.  Maskhadov 
was killed by Russian intelligence in 2005, and Basayev died from an explosion in 2006.  
Of the major political actors during Chechnya’s independence period, Udugov the 
propagandist alone remained on the run.   
But Russia’s battlefield success in the second Chechen war came after a decade of 
Salafist success in Chechnya.  From 1991-2000, Chechnya had achieved its independence 
and become a significant bleeding sore that weakened the security of Russia’s southern 
border.  The Salafists played a supporting role in the first war and then a dominant role in 
the interwar years as the most operationally capable force on the battlefield.  And with 
regards to weakening Russia, there was still a strong case that Saudi Arabia came out 
ahead even if the ending of the second war were taken into account.  Up against the cost 
of supporting private Islamist institutions, which provided endogenous benefits to the 
state anyway, there was the benefit of costing Russia a fortune in men, money, and 
prestige with a forced fifteen-year on-again off-again counterinsurgency in the Caucasus.  
The Chechen conflict had nearly lost Yeltsin his presidency and helped tarnish US 
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goodwill towards Russia after the demise of the USSR.  And Russia was still an enemy; 
perhaps not the ideological Soviet threat that had posed an existential danger during the 
Cold War, but still a major power with profoundly dissimilar aims than Riyadh, including 
in the Gulf.  Purely as a cost-benefit analysis, and even given the loss of independent 
Chechnya, Saudi Arabia appeared to have inflicted significant and disproportionate costs 
on an historic enemy, arguably worthwhile for its investiture.   
By the time the second war broke out, the Salafists had won their battle for the 
ideological orientation of the republic, the third key Saudi goal.  The Chechen cause 
became theirs.  Chechnya became increasingly Islamist, in legal code and social mores.  
Major figures in Chechnya like Basayev adopted Islamist goals, including expanding 
their jamaat networks beyond the republican borders of Chechnya elsewhere in the North 
Caucasus.  This Salafist absorption of the Chechen separatist movement reached its 
zenith in 2006 when Doku Umarov was chosen as the remaining rebels’ leader.  In 2007, 
with Udugov’s support, he abolished his office and the state altogether.  Instead of 
president, Umarov would reign as emir over the Caucasus Emirate, a transnational 
Islamic state under Islamic law stretching throughout the North Caucasus.1065  If it is 
posited that Saudi Arabia benefited from Salafist regimes and social mores – and it did by 
definition, since it created institutions to sustain them – then it certainly gained from the 
growth in Salafism through the dozen years of Chechen independence.   
 The transnational aspects of the Kingdom’s third goal were also achieved, but in a 
slightly different way.  The pan-Islamic currents in Saudi Salafism took off and coopted 
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communities during the 1990’s throughout the Caucasus.  Some of the autonomous 
enclaves of Salafism were lost after the second Chechen war, which replaced Chechen 
state authority with Russian.  There was a crucial difference, however, between the 
Islamic vision of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic vision of the radicals.  Though the 
geopolitical effect of a pan-Islamic state could potentially benefit Saudi Arabia in relation 
to its two primary goals, the resulting religious legitimacy of such a state could pose a 
direct threat to the Kingdom itself.  Saudi Arabia would benefit from an Islamic state 
rising in Chechnya and Dagestan within national strictures.  It would not benefit from the 
transnational creation of a new Caliphate.  Indeed, a splinter faction of the Afghan Arabs 
including Osama bin Laden would target the Saudi state on precisely such grounds of 
legitimacy.  And in fact the victory of the Salafists in Chechnya over the Maskhadov 
government but not over the Russians might have had this significant silver lining for 
Riyadh: that it would not result in an ultra-orthodox state that might, at some point, offer 
itself as a rival to Saudi Arabia in terms of religious legitimacy, the same way the Islamic 
State later would in 2014.  In addition, since the Salafists’ goals and the Saudi goal were 
transnational and revisionist, then Saudi geopolitical goals are best thought of not as 
aiming to gain control over Russian political structures like Chechnya and Dagestan, but 
replace them.  In that sense, what country controlled the territory of Chechnya became 
almost less important than the growth of the human terrain upon which Salafist structures 
could sit – a radicalized populace throughout the North Caucasus that could inflict costs 
on Russia.  In this, arguably, Saudi proxies succeeded spectacularly.  
If the proxy link between the support of Wahhabism and geopolitical victories in 
Chechnya is accepted, however, there must be a full account of the costs of this support. 
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There was a significant additional cost to this policy.  A cadet branch of al-Qaeda, fueled 
by the same pots of money and state institutions as the Afghan Arabs in Chechnya, 
launched a bombing campaign in Riyadh with major attacks in May and then November 
of 2003.  The May bombing targeted three residential compounds, killing almost thirty 
people and wounding hundreds, the first in a string of dozens of terrorist attacks against 
the government and its enablers.1066  This was the most significant counterterrorism 
challenge the state had ever faced, one that its national security agencies were initially 
hard-pressed to manage.   
So how could this policy possibly be considered a success for Saudi Arabia when 
it blew back on Riyadh so heavily?  In two ways.  First, the sheer scale of what it had 
unleashed mostly on geopolitical rivals versus what it reaped at home was radically 
disproportionate.  The al-Qaeda affiliate in Saudi Arabia was above all a counterterrorism 
problem, which in terms of threat to the state was manageable.  Al-Qaeda’s second 
bombing in November 2003 and subsequent bombing campaign against oil and other 
targets, including the US consulate in Jeddah, helped accelerate a shift in Saudi public 
opinion against the radicals.  The Saudis launched a deradicalization effort called the 
National Meeting for Intellectual Dialogue that shaped the opinions of Wahhabi and other 
clerics.  As a result of these and other efforts, senior radical clerics denounced al-Qaeda 
in 2004.  With local militants more isolated and backing from the US, Saudi forces 
instituted a broad crackdown in 2005, arresting nearly a thousand people.1067  This helped 
suppress the militants.  Though al-Qaeda attacks continued, the group was aided by the 
 
1066 “Backgrounder: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” Council on Foreign Relations (June 19, 2015), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap (accessed September 12, 2020). 
1067 Hero, 199. 
 392 
establishment of safe havens in Yemen after the civil war began, rather than in the 
Kingdom. 
Most importantly, at no point during these three years was Saudi rule over the 
Kingdom seriously threatened, and the response to the attacks had the effect of better 
aligning Saudi Arabia’s private Islamist institutions and pathways of support to more 
efficiently benefit the state.  If this ledger includes the 2003 attacks in Saudi Arabia as a 
cost, then surely it should include, for example, the victory over the Soviets in 
Afghanistan as a benefit as well.  Nothing is monocausal, including the Chechen war and 
al-Qaeda, but the Saudi promotion of Wahhabism in Muslim and borderlands alike for 
decades achieved significant geopolitical results next to which a counterterrorism 
problem – however severe – was cheap at the price.  This was really the core tradeoff: 
tactical and operational losses for a few big strategic gains. 
The second point that suggested its proxy policy was worthwhile was the 
international reaction, or lack of it.  This was the key value about the entirety of Saudi 
Arabia’s proxy enterprise.  Unlike Iran and Russia, and to a lesser extent Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia was not turned into an international pariah by its proxy warfare.  There were no 
major or even relatively minor diplomatic consequences for Saudi Arabia during the ten-
plus years in Chechnya of sponsoring Salafism; or indeed, though it is beyond the scope 
here, of its forty years of its jihadist proselytization.  Perhaps some of this was 
geopolitical.  The United States was the predominant power in the world during this time 
and Saudi Arabia was a key ally of the United States.  This limited how much Russia and 
other victims could influence Saudi Arabia directly, in response to its proxy warfare, and 
also limited the costs it could inflict on the US for protecting Saudi Arabia.  In a more 
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bipolar or multipolar world, where US opponents could wield more power and inflict 
more costs, Saudi sponsorship of Salafist proxies might incur more effective balancing.  
But then again the United States experienced terrorist attacks from Salafists of its own 
during the 1990’s and still did little to target the Kingdom or pressure the Kingdom 
directly.  And when discussing state sponsorship of terrorism, even after attacks in Saudi 
Arabia, the US often took aim at Iran and Libya, more geopolitically problematic actors 
though ones that presented perhaps less of a direct, imminent terrorist threat.  
Even after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US-Saudi relationship 
never really suffered a strategic blow.  The 2003 terrorist attacks in the Kingdom actually 
had the strategic effect of not just improving the Kingdom’s counterterrorism posture but 
also healing over any fissures that had emerged between the US and Saudi Arabia after 
9/11.  Like Pakistan later, Saudi Arabia began to look less like a perpetrator and more 
like a victim.  This reconciliation was helped by other factors, as well, including the 
discovery of Iran’s nuclear program which helped scuttle the Saudi-Iranian détente.  But 
it was not just with the United States that Saudi relations warmed.  Despite its assistance 
with Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant, Russia’s relationship with Saudi Arabia also improved 
from 2003 onwards.  Both states opposed the invasion of Iraq, and both were pleased 
when oil prices went up afterwards.  Crown Prince Abdullah visited Moscow in 2003 and 
Putin made his first trip to the Kingdom in 2007. 
So how did this proxy strategy work?  The lack of balancing Saudi Arabia 
experienced during the decades of its proxy support was largely a function of a very 
indirect, very deniable doctrine that actively promoted private jihad and funding of 
radicals.  In Chechnya, this model of proxy warfare delayed balancing from Russia until 
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early 1998 and the secular Chechen authorities until late 1998, effectively too late to save 
Chechnya from the radicals.  It delayed any consequences for their sponsor in Riyadh 
until 2002, roughly a decade after Salafist influence first began expanding in the 
Caucasus, and then those were only short-lived.  During this decade, it was clear that the 
Russians and the Maskhadov government had a relatively good strategic picture of the 
influx of Salafists into the conflict.  The Maskhadov government was obviously aware 
tactically of the foreign fighters and foreign supporters in the midst of its fighting forces, 
but Maskhadov chose not to escalate the issue until late in 1998 and then only 
sporadically.  He was trying to keep together a coalition, and in any case did not have the 
strength to confront the better-funded field commanders.  Tactically, during the first war, 
Moscow may have been unable to pin down the level of Salafist influence and their 
external support.  By 1997, however, the Russians had overcome the intelligence gap.  
They were certainly aware of the burgeoning extremist problem and increasingly vocal 
about it.  The international community was at least partially aware as well, given the 
kidnapping epidemic and the lack of Western interest in investing in Chechnya.  But the 
direct links to Saudi Arabia were murky, and not clearly enough delineated nor part of 
Saudi policy to engender a strong reaction.  The links did not meet the international 
standard of aggression, and merited little pressure on Saudi Arabia by the Kingdom’s 
traditional allies or even often by Russia.   
The moments when Saudi Arabia’s proxies did increase the amount of balancing 
they faced were when large groups of them crossed state lines, most clearly at Buynksk 
and the Khattab raid in 1999 but also at Gudermes in 1998.  This effectively turned the 
Saudi model of proxy warfare into a much less deniable form of Chechen conventional 
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aggression and was treated as such by adversaries.  Had the militants mirrored their 
subversive operations in Dagestan the same way they did in Chechnya, they might have 
incited less of a reaction.  This was suggested by the successful takeover of Dagestani 
areas in May 1998 with little opposition from Moscow.  It also pointed to one of several 
factors that affected Saudi deniability: the strength of the relatively delineated borders 
between Chechnya and Dagestan.  The strongest Russian reaction came with Khattab’s 
ill-fated attack across the border in 1999.  His group of hundreds of armed men, coming 
to join an already cross-district attack by local Salafists, provoked a reaction in the way 
that local Salafists in Dagestan themselves did not.  Those radicals had successfully 
created an autonomous zone organically, from the inside out, without the help of large 
formations of Chechens or with federal interference.  Yeltsin had backed down in 
confronting the autonomous zones in the Dagestani villages of Karamakhi and others 
when they were established in 1998.  When the Salafists committed aggression that 
violated too many norms of conventional interstate aggression, they suffered.  The 
Saudis, however, did not. 
The offensive or defensive posture of the militants less of an effect in this case, 
likely due to the high level of deniability the Saudi model of proxy warfare offered.  Its 
expected advantage, after all, was that the sponsor state could project power offensively 
without drawing as much balancing as other models.  Still, despite pursuing offensive 
goals for three years, balancing was slow to come. The Salafist militants who entered 
Chechnya during the first Chechen war when the rebels were on the defensive met little 
opposition from external powers or Russia.  The United States, for example, was 
conspicuously quiet on the issue of outsiders arriving in Chechnya, even after Khattab 
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and others were involved in major combat operations.  Russia also did not highlight 
foreign influence in the first war.  Its desire to downplay the conflict owed in part to 
Yeltsin’s political fortunes, but that was also partly the result of the fact that Russia was 
clearly viewed as the aggressor in the first war and faced crushing international criticism 
as a result.  Then, during the period of independence, the Salafists successfully forced the 
government to accept their domestic aims, such as sharia law, without incurring 
significant external balancing or much internal balancing from Maskhadov.  Until 2001 
and 2002, in fact, by far the bulk of the international condemnation was on Russia’s 
balancing actions, not on the protagonists.  The only significant international balancing 
against the Salafists and Saudi Arabia’s links to radical Islamic institutions came after 
2001, when the Chechen militants were clearly in a defensive role.  This suggested the 
more remotely a proxy is connected to the sponsor, the more offensive goals it can pursue 
effectively.  
It was also indicative that the increase in Salafist influence domestically came 
after the Chechen republic’s first president Dzhokhar Dudayev was replaced by his 
successor, Aslan Maskhadov.  Certainly, Maskhadov was a weak leader.  His repeated 
and ineffectual attempts at conciliation with the radicals and inability to provide security 
revealed a weak base of power himself.  But there was also an uncertainty about his 
regime that helped prevent him from enjoying the same perks of international sovereignty 
that other states enjoyed.  His failure to win clear international recognition from any other 
state was telling, despite his efforts in the West.  Western countries offered him little 
tangible support against either his Salafist rivals or against the Russians once the second 
war began, particularly compared to Dudayev’s government and the first war in 1994.  
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And this was true besides his actions on domestic items like Islamic law or ambivalent 
independence arrangements with Russia being not too dissimilar from Dudayev’s. 
Did the involvement of Salafists in other wars affect Saudi culpability in 
Chechnya?  The Islamic institutions that supported militants in Chechnya also supported 
them in places like Dagestan and elsewhere.  This was a feature of the Saudi model, not a 
bug.  Support specifically to Chechnya could rise or fall depending on the attraction or 
necessity of the conflict to the Saudi state, the Saudi public, and the broader Salafist 
community.  There were charitable foundations that were created specifically for 
Chechnya, and others that were repurposed.  But other Saudi foundations, and certainly 
the body of the fighters who came out of the Afghan war were also involved in places as 
far afield as Tajikistan, Algeria, and Bosnia – and the United States, for that matter.  This 
may have helped normalize the involvement of them and other Saudi proxies in the 
Caucasus, and contributed to Yeltsin’s reluctance to make addressing it a feature of his 
Chechen policy.  It also may have normalized the seizure of Karamakhi and other 
Dagestani villages by Wahhabis in 1998: after all, this was a phenomenon to which 
Russia was used.  However, broadly, the impact of these other conflicts involving the 
Afghan Arabs and the spillover of financing from Saudi Arabia might not have been to 
decrease the pushback against violations of sovereignty, but to saddle the Chechen 
Salafists with the transgressions of the US-based Salafists like al-Qaeda.  In fact, it might 
even be appropriate to suggest that al-Qaeda’s attacks on November 11, 2001 themselves 
indicate that the Afghan Arabs and their Salafist movement as a group themselves were 
still offensive in 2001 – after all, they were choosing new targets – and thus that reduced 
Saudi deniability catastrophically.   
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The brief Russian-Chechen peace treaty signed in 1997 may also have aided 
Saudi deniability by neither recognizing Chechnya as an independent state nor clarifying 
its position within the Russian Federation.  It certainly hurt the ability of both Maskhadov 
and Moscow to resist Salafist influence.  Chechnya’s unclear status hamstrung 
Maskhadov’s efforts to gain support from the West.  Even until deep in the second war, 
Western countries and organizations like the Parliamentary Committee for Europe 
(PACE) would leaven their criticism of human rights abuses caused by Russian actions 
against the Chechens with declarations of support for Russia’s territorial integrity.1068  
That lessened the impact of Russia’s violations of human rights standards (and thus some 
of the benefit of Maskhadov’s Western orientation) and all but excluded the possibility of 
Maskhadov receiving conventional interstate support.  The ambiguous treaty also 
precluded for Moscow the use of Russian forces against the growing Salafist problem by 
keeping its troops out of Chechnya – until 1999, of course, when the entire question 
became moot.  Though there was no clear codification of Saudi influence in the country 
like in Georgia and Ukraine, where diplomatic arrangements increased Russian 
deniability, this may parenthetically have actually increased Saudi deniability.  Including 
the Kingdom might have had the reverse effect and decreased Saudi deniability to an 
unacceptable degree.  It would have presumed Saudi control over or involvement with the 
actors.  That was a suggestion Saudi officials would certainly like to avoid, and did.   
They did in Chechnya and elsewhere, besides, right up until the events of 
September 11, 2001.  It is something of a cop-out to hold up 9/11 as an exogenous shock 
 
1068 Thomas Grant, “Current Development: Afghanistan Recognizes Chechnya,” American University 
International Law Review 15, issue 4 (2000): 872, 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1276&context=auilr (accessed 
December 4, 2017). 
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but-for-which the Saudi proxy warfare on the battlefield would have been more 
successful.  And yet it is quite true that Russia had little ability to affect Saudi 
sponsorship of the Salafists until after those attacks.  None of its operations on the ground 
or diplomatic outreach led to a serious multilateral action against said funding, nor was 
Russia able to leverage Saudi Arabia successfully to reduce its ties to Chechnya or 
support to private institutions.  Nor is it clear that it ever successfully urged the United 
States to do so as well.  There is no reason to believe, therefore, that without said shift in 
the international strategic landscape, the battlefield outcome of the Salafists versus the 
Russians from 2001-2003 would not have been far closer to that of the first war, whatever 
Moscow’s initial victories.  After all, Russia conquered Grozny during the second war in 
about the same time period as it conquered Grozny during the first.  And the rebels would 
likely have had far more robust external support without 9/11 than they did with it.  The 
Salafist control of the government and their spoiling actions on the ground (like 
Barayev’s kidnapping of the British engineers) obviated the possibility of Western 
support, but there was a very real possibility of replacing it with support from radical 
Salafist movements, particularly the Taliban, and other Islamic states including perhaps 
increased Saudi support.  As it happened, when Salafist support became anathema after 
9/11, those avenues of assistance dried up as well.  That was not the only effect.  The US-
led invasion of Iraq, which may well have not happened without 9/11, likely also hurt the 
Salafists’ battlefield capability in Chechnya by drawing off much of the attention and 
resources of militant communities in the Arab world.  Before Iraq, before Afghanistan, 
the Chechen separatists had more than a whiff of the mujahedin from 1980, heir to the 
landmark victorious battle against the Soviet Union.  But after September 11th there was a 
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real Afghanistan – and even more alluring, a real Iraq, closer and more habitable for 















CHAPTER SEVEN:  SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
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This dissertation began with the question of how states were most effectively 
using proxy warfare.  In response it proposed three linkages.  First, that the plausible 
deniability of a sponsor’s support to its proxy was inversely related to the amount of that 
support – and not just the thousand different iterations of support, from weaponry to 
training to recruitment, but also to control.  The more closely a sponsor had to control a 
proxy’s goals and decision-making, the less deniable was its relationship with that proxy.  
Second, all things being equal, a sponsor’s support boosted a proxy’s operational 
capabilities on the battlefield.  A proxy receiving fifty machine guns and fifty million 
dollars per month should be less capable than the exact same proxy with one hundred 
machine guns and one hundred million dollars per month.  A sponsor’s deniability, 
therefore was inversely related to a proxy’s operational capability.  And the third key 
point – the answer to the motivating question here – was that this tradeoff of deniability 
for capability was an overall net loss to the effectiveness of the sponsor’s proxy warfare 
and the success of its strategic goals.   
To illustrate and test this hypothesis, it examined five instances of proxy warfare 
by four powers:  Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.  In all five cases examined 
here, the moments when deniability slipped were the ones when the sponsor incurred 
strategic consequences.  More direct, active support and control of proxies reduced 
sponsor deniability, usually for the worse.  The strategic costs in those instances were 
greater than the operational gains achieved by such support, though the battlefield 
outcomes were often more complicated. 
To frame its analysis of the benefits of proxy warfare, this dissertation took up the 
basic reasons states used proxies: their lower cost, their ideological benefit, and their 
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strategic benefit.  Proxies were often cheaper in terms of domestic political and financial 
cost than were conventional forces.  The United States could support a robust Kurdish 
militia group to preserve its interests in Syria without committing a large number of its 
forces.  Proxies could also provide ideological validation for the regime sponsoring them, 
as with Saudi Arabia, or the proxies themselves, as with Hezbollah.  This phenomenon is 
further apparent among the myriad Sunni extremist groups franchising themselves under 
whichever group is most powerful at the moment, from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-
Sham (ISIS) to al-Qaeda.  
The analysis here has focused on the third reason states use proxies: for the 
strategic benefits they offer.  Of these, the main one is plausible deniability.  How is 
deniability defined?  Traditionally, plausible deniability meant the degree to which a state 
can plausibly assert to other states it is not responsible for a given act – here, the act of 
intervention in a conflict through support or control of a proxy.  This was true even if 
(and especially if) the deniable action was assumed to involve them – for example, an 
airstrike in Pakistan for which the United States was assumed to be responsible even if it 
did not claim responsibility.  Or if heavy weapons were carried into eastern Ukraine by 
unmarked trucks: that was also plausible deniability.  Or if large sums of money 
somehow made their way from state coffers to jihadist institutions and then to Islamist 
militants, who themselves acted, in places, in pursuance of interests that were generally 
the state’s.  Of course, these three scenarios involve different levels of deniability, and 
this dissertation has posited that they each had correspondingly different strategic effects, 
not just in the first order effect of how materiel travelled from the sponsor to the proxy 
but what kind of reaction it incurred from other states. 
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This reaction is the core of what this dissertation measured, and it was 
challenging.  It has attempted to measure the period between when a state should have 
reacted to aggression and when it actually did react, if at all.  The baseline metric of 
aggression it used – its ideal type of interstate warfare – was aggression by conventional 
forces.  It implicitly posited that if one state invaded another using conventional forces 
with no other mitigating effects, there would have been a balancing action by other 
members of the international community.  This could be an elusive concept: it was like an 
error, in baseball, because it was essentially normative.  It suggested something that 
should have been done, and measured what was done against that benchmark.  To 
mitigate some of this normative ambiguity, it looked particularly closely at when the 
support or relationship of sponsor to proxy changed.  It identified those moments when 
the level of deniability increased or decreased, and looked for a correlating strategic 
reaction from opponents.  This was a way to tease causality out of complex examples. 
This is at its core an agnostic dissertation with regard to why states balance other 
states.  It takes no position on whether they do so:  because, for example, the increasingly 
normative strength of territorial boundaries and prohibition against interstate war, or 
because of the self-interest of great powers and other states, or because of the blossoming 
flower of international democratic ideals.  Some of these arguments were surveyed in the 
literature review earlier, but for the purposes here the argument relies on the assumption 
that they do balance interstate aggression.  Interstate aggression is heavily punished 
heavily by other states in the international community.  The strategic benefit a state 
receives from proxy warfare, at its core, is some diminution of that balancing, whatever 
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level its base level due to the myriad complicating factors involved.  This diminution is 
due to plausible deniability of the support method employed. 
In the results of these cases, deniability offered three types of delay.  The first was 
obfuscation of what is happening and the second was the provision of an excuse not to 
act.  Deniability could help a state hide its involvement in a conflict to a greater or lesser 
degree.  While it was not immediately obvious that Pakistan was actively supporting the 
Afghan Taliban from 2002-2004, by 2006 and certainly 2007 the picture had become 
clearer.  However, this was a comparatively minor effect.  In all five of the cases here, 
there was early suspicion, sometimes confirmed, that the proxies involved were agents of 
their respective sponsor.  In the earliest days of Hezbollah, for example, emissaries would 
travel to revolutionary Iran to ask that kidnapped Westerners be freed.  When militants 
appeared in eastern Ukrainian cities, suspicion immediately fell on the Russian 
government that had inserted unmarked soldiers into Crimea only weeks before.  To a 
certain degree the rapidity of confirmation of these links is exogenous, a function of 
states’ military and intelligence budgets.  Intelligence is available to governments that 
invest in it, and it allows national policymakers to come to conclusions about proxy 
support and act accordingly.  But the alignment of objectives between proxies and their 
presumed sponsors provides a strong starting point when looking for a sponsor.  Of 
course, the degree of overlap between the objectives of proxy and sponsor has an effect 
on this element of a sponsor’s deniability.  The more disparate the two entities’ 
objectives, the more challenging it was for sponsors to cut through a state’s obfuscation 
to the question of intent.  This was helpful for both Pakistan and especially Saudi Arabia 
in delaying the counterbalancing.  Opposing states had to sift through the intelligence to 
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determine how much control each state really had on their relative militant groups, even 
as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia themselves were coming under attack.  How much they 
were perpetrators, in other words, and how much they were victims. 
 The second type of delay came from the balancer’s inability to prove to the 
international community the link between the sponsor and proxy.  Not just the link, 
either, but the inability to argue that the proxy sponsorship in question constituted a form 
of interstate aggression.  Understanding that a state is intervening in another to support a 
proxy and convincing allies, partners, and adversaries of the same thing are very different 
proposals.  Many of the information sources are classified, and require downgrading 
sensitive intelligence to pass to different tiers of partners.  By the time such information 
travels beyond the very closest allies, it tends to become degraded into mush.  Deploying 
this information effectively at international organizations also can be challenging.  
Mistakes, like Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the Security Council in 2003 
on Iraq, can haunt a nation for decades and add fuel to those states that want not to 
believe.  It is certainly not the case that any great power needs approval or acceptance 
from the UN or other multilateral institutions (or even allied states) to balance aggressors 
or intervene in third countries.  But not having multilateral consensus raises the cost for 
unilateral action, both in material and in political terms.   
There are, of course, different tiers of consensus.  There is a difference between a 
state like Germany, which when confronted by US demands to help it punish proxy 
aggression will demand legally enforceable evidence, and Russia, which unless directly 
confronted and backed into a corner will refuse to see what is under its national face.  The 
two states have different interests and different levels of alignment with US interests.  
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But it is not usually necessary or feasible to convince this last group of states.  A proxy 
sponsor’s allies, obviously, will fight tooth and nail against sanctioning their own proxies 
or their allied sponsors.  This type of delay, then, is mostly relevant to treaty allies and 
international partners that would join in a balancing effort even if they were not bound by 
treaty to do so.  Germany’s actions in sanctioning Russia and the Ukrainian separatists 
were one example of this.  So were other European states’ reluctance to sanction 
Hezbollah and Iran until the former’s entrance into the Syrian civil war.  The 
participation in balancing of these middle-of-of-the-road states is valuable.  They mitigate 
the unilateral cost of balancing, but also critically provide the ability to impose much 
greater non-military costs that might be able to obviate the need to intervene militarily at 
all.   
Both the inability to prove aggression nor the ability to fully understand proxy-
sponsor links did not prevent sponsors from suffering reputational damage among both 
balancers and middle-of-the-road states.  This reputational damage affected how quick 
potential balancers were to act over a period of time and sequence of proxy actions.  The 
European reaction to Russian proxy sponsorship in Ukraine was quicker, all things 
considered, than its reaction to Russia’s actions in Georgia.  Saudi Arabia did not really 
suffer determinative reputational damage for its sponsorship of jihadist proxies until the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, even though its sponsorship mechanisms had not 
significantly changed since the 1970’s and 1980’s.  Iran, by contrast, suffered significant 
reputational damage from its closer control and sponsorship of Hezbollah.  There was 
little doubt in any potential opposing states, and even most neutral parties, that Iranian 
leaders were in control of Hezbollah’s strategic decisions.  Suspicion from prior proxy 
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sponsorship, even if improvable, could bleed over to cast suspicion even if hard 
intelligence is lacking.  Pakistan obviously had deep ties to the Taliban and a long history 
of proxy sponsorship, though it was able to defer determinative US blame until about 
2007-2008, a period when the Haqqani network began its high-profile bombings (along 
with, of course, other indicators the Afghan campaign was going poorly).  And ideology 
affected reputation.  A state like Iran with a revolutionary ideology based on millenarian 
Shiism faced more suspicion when revolutionary Shia movements broke out elsewhere 
than a state without such an ideology, like many liberal democracies.  It should be said, 
however, that Russia and others also viewed democratic movements and many civil 
society groups with suspicion and publicly accused them of Western support.  This could 
itself be affected by how vocal states are about wanting to change existing regimes to 
make them more democratic.  There was a significant difference between the Russian 
reaction to the Rose Revolution in Georgia, which also seemed to have caught the West 
by surprise, and the toppling of Ukrainian President Yanukovych in 2014, which did, to 
say the least, not. 
 The third and primary strategic benefit of deniability was to manage escalation: 
that is, both the aggressor and the balancer could pretend a confrontation did not exist.  
This benefit had nothing to do with accurate intelligence about proxy sponsorship and 
only a limited amount to do with the balancer’s ability to prove such sponsorship to other 
states.  Preventing escalation, in fact, relied on both sides knowing what was being done 
and operating within tacit constraints.  Preventing escalation came from a desire to limit 
domestic cost, certainly.  But the plausible deniability in proxy warfare also allowed the 
sponsor to set the strategic constraints by which they preferred to try and fight.  In eastern 
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Ukraine, Russia experimented with several levels of intervention between May and 
August of 2014 and January to February of 2015.  It changed these both when it 
experienced significant balancing, as after the MH17 attack, or more definitively when it 
was losing on the battlefield.  Pakistan’s entire strategy in Afghanistan was based around 
keeping the so-called pot warm, but not boiling – that is, not inciting a direct 
confrontation with the United States.  This type of delay is of course not unique to proxy 
warfare.  Indeed, it encompasses an entire sub-genre of international relations literature 
largely spurred by the introduction of nuclear weapons into strategy during the Cold War. 
The causal mechanism was not so clear-cut, however.  There are, of course, many 
other reasons for the delay between when a state should, conceivably, have responded to 
aggression and when it finally did.  Many of these are exogenous reasons, or potential 
reasons, such as Pakistan’s control over the main supply corridor to international forces 
in Afghanistan.  But other factors are similar.  Most of these include factors that affect the 
strength of interstate borders and of a state’s sovereignty, which help determine how hard 
an aggressor will be punished.  Transgression of a clearly demarcated, established line, 
like the Franco-German border, should meet a far more immediate and severe response 
than a disputed one, like the Indo-Chinese border.  Of course: all other things being 
equal, which they never are. 
In some of the cases here, the consequences of proxy warfare and the deniability 
of sponsors was profoundly decreased or increased by several additional factors, many of 
which affected the strength of interstate borders.  An overriding theme was that 
sovereignty was cumulative: different elements that affect a state’s sovereignty also 
affected a foreign sponsor’s deniability in projecting power.  This is because the signature 
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transgression of interstate warfare (or intrastate warfare involving outside parties) is the 
projection of military power across state lines.  The transgression of these interstate 
borders is one of the actions that will most readily mobilize international opposition and 
strategic consequences.  Since the prime value of proxy warfare is to mitigate and delay 
that opposition, elements that weaken the sanctity of interstate borders should and do 
allow less deniable support to proxies without incurring the same degree of 
consequences.  In the cases here these elements are several. 
First, diversity breeds conflict.  The more ethnically and geographically 
intermingled conflict lines were, the more effectively a sponsor could project power.  
Intermingled lines of control permitted easier conduct of violence, which increased the 
deniability of sponsors supporting that violence.  A relatively high level of constant 
violence meant that balancing would be slower against spikes in that violence because 
they would be more difficult to differentiate.  Both Georgia and Ukraine were strong 
examples of this effect.  In Georgia, the near-daily violence in July and August 2008 
between ethnic Ossetian and ethnic Georgian villages slowed the Western balancing 
against Russia’s increasing pressure on Tbilisi.  In Ukraine, a line of control that cut 
through built-up, ethnically mixed areas and the level of conflict that was sustained from 
December 2014 to January 2015 similarly helped delay balancing.  The ease of inciting 
violence in these areas meant that sustaining violence and thus heightening deniability 
was very cheap.  Where ethnic Georgians and Ossetians lived side-by-side, individual 
snipers or mortar teams could spark an incident, raising the threshold for identifying an 
intensification of conflict and thus Russian aggression.  Comparatively, in Lebanon after 
2000, it cost more for Hezbollah to conduct military operations across a clearly-defined 
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border.  Such operations had to be more complex and higher-profile, often involving 
more advanced weapons, inciting a greater reaction against both it and Iran. 
Second, war begets war.  Proxy wars in one area make related wars less costly for 
aggressors.  The most obvious example of this was in Lebanon, where Hezbollah used its 
proxy war with Israel to reduce international opposition to Iran’s military support, which 
then allowed it to retain its dominance over other domestic factions.  Clear examples also 
come from Georgia, where Russia’s war in Chechnya clouded territorial sovereignty 
along the Pankisi Gorge and helped mitigate potential balancing to its extraterritorial 
power projection.  In addition, Saudi Arabia’s sponsorship of militant Salafists in 
Dagestan made its power projection in Chechnya more deniable and thus more effective.  
It seemed less geostrategic to either the Russians or the secular Chechens, and more a 
cultural phenomenon, against which it was more difficult to balance.  In Afghanistan, the 
TTP’s war against Pakistan and Kabul’s alleged tolerance of TTP safe havens enabled 
Islamabad’s deniability for its own sponsorship of the Haqqani network and other 
militants in the other direction.  For the proxy sponsor, in other words, the more the 
better. 
Third, diplomatic mechanisms created to defuse conflicts almost always did long-
term harm to stability if they blurred state lines of sovereignty, even if that was the short-
term cost of peace.  In such cases they served to increase deniability of sponsor countries.  
The more the sponsor country was linked by such a mechanism with the target country, 
especially if it codified its ability to keep its own or proxy forces in the target country, the 
less balancing against its own influence occurred.  The mechanism appeared to legitimize 
the sponsor country’s presence and influence in the target country, and thus reduce 
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balancing efforts.  While conflict was ongoing, diplomatic processes seem to have had a 
numbing effect on rival external powers, reducing their willingness to take action against 
the sponsor country.  This was certainly true in the Georgia, Ukraine, and Lebanon cases.  
The most glaring examples of this were after the 2014 Minsk agreement in Ukraine, 
when international balancing essentially stopped and Russia’s aggression continued, and 
the Joint Peacekeeping Control Commission in Georgia, which legitimized the presence 
of Russian forces on Georgian soil.  Of course, there is a natural balance here.  Some of 
these diplomatic arrangements were an effort to halt ongoing aggression, and thus the risk 
of no agreement might have been greater than imposing a flawed one.  But the point is 
that the costs were higher than they appeared; balancing was how stable diplomatic 
arrangements arise, rather than diplomatic arrangements leading to balancing. 
Fourth, new governments have more corroded rights compared to existing 
regimes.  A change in regime of the target state generally increased the deniability of 
proxy sponsors by reducing the balancing against their power projection.  This was due to 
the fact that upending the status quo seemed to reduce the penalties for outside powers to 
aggressively expand their influence in a target state.  Once a state’s foreign policy 
orientation was changing, there was far less balancing against a different state to try and 
change it back.  This was most clearly the case in Georgia and (to a lesser extent) 
Ukraine, where newly installed pro-Western leaders were faced with aggressive action by 
Russian proxies and struggled to garner external support.  It was also particularly the case 
in Chechnya, where Maskhadov received little external support against the Salafists after 
independence or for his increasingly more Islamist government against the Russians in 
the second war. 
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Fifth, the strategic posture of a proxy mattered.  In all five cases, the sponsor’s 
deniability of its proxy warfare was reduced when its proxies were used for offensive 
purposes, especially with a close proxy-sponsor relationship.  The effect was the 
strongest in Georgia, where the separatists enjoyed one of the closest relationships with 
their sponsor.  Russian infusions of various kinds of support after an aggressive Georgian 
move always incurred less balancing than without one.  It was weakest in Chechnya, 
where it was still visible when the influx of Salafist support during the first Chechen war 
incurred little balancing compared to later cross-border attacks into Russia.  This more 
remote linkage may have been due to the increased distance between proxy and sponsor, 
since it was also somewhat weak in Pakistan.  This makes intuitive sense: the more an 
agent is supported by its sponsor, the more the agent’s actions are viewed in light of its 
sponsor’s goals.  But because most proxy-sponsor relationships are closer than that of the 
Saudis, such proxies are usually more effective on defense, when they incur 
comparatively less balancing but still retain a baseline policy victory (as in Ukraine).  
Conversely, more deniable relationships are more effective on offense. 
 
Case Results 
 One important distinction should be noted in the results.  Most of the 
consequences for proxy sponsorship came at the strategic level.  At the operational level, 
a closer sponsor-proxy relationship was sometimes better militarily.  It was tactically 
more effective to have more involvement of a state’s armed forces, more supplies, and 
tighter control over proxies during a battle or a campaign.  But it usually came out in the 
wash.  By using national armed forces, by exerting more direct control, a state in the 
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medium- to longer-run lost the benefit of using a proxy, even if – as in Georgia – many 
factors mitigated against a strong international response to fairly conventional interstate 
aggression.  Russia’s use of proxies was operationally successful in Georgia and Ukraine.  
But one was tempted to say: so what?  Conventional operations against both states could 
also be successful, and were.  But the strategic costs Russia incurred, particularly against 
Ukraine in 2015, made its use of proxy warfare almost irrelevant.  Comparatively, Saudi 
Arabia might have had very little influence on the Afghan Arabs, with significant 
consequences later on, but that helped very much deflect accusations of Saudi culpability 
for Islamist uprisings in places like Tajikistan and Chechnya.  When the amount of policy 
utility for Riyadh that these militant groups achieved is measured against the materiel and 
strategic cost they incurred, even including the odd bombing in Riyadh…well, the return 
on investment did not look too bad. 
 
Case One: Russia and Georgia 
 The conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 was the first time that 
the modern European order had been broken by interstate war.  When it was over, 
Russia’s key operational goals seemed to have been accomplished.  South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia had slipped further beyond Georgia’s control, their territories reinforced by 
thousands of Russian troops and the moral and legal question about their status muddled.  
Strategically, too, Georgia’s ambitions for joining the EU and NATO remained halted, 
and a strong deterrent signal was sent to like-minded states in Russia’s near abroad that 
might stray.  Russia also escaped punishment from the US and Europeans despite having 
invaded its neighbor, though the August War may have contributed to a balancing effort 
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among the NATO border states.  Even so, the war’s outcome was more mixed than first 
appeared.  NATO membership had not been eliminated by the war: indeed, French and 
German doubts and opposition to such a move had existed long before August 2008.  The 
United States quickly followed the war with a $1 billion aid package, a new strategic 
framework agreement, as well as visits by senior members of the outgoing and incoming 
administration.  There was a crest building, which was partially cut short by the Obama 
administration’s declared “reset” policy with Russia – which, if anything, meant 
absolving Moscow of the consequences for its actions. 
The key tool for Russia in this conflict were Abkhazian and especially South 
Ossetian proxies, which were closely supported by Moscow.  Their institutions were 
dominated by Russian soldiers, Russian money, and Russian politics.  Russian troops had 
been stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia since the early 1990’s.  When the president 
of South Ossetia Ludvig Chibirov was replaced by the complaint Eduard Kokoity in 
February 2001, South Ossetia’s policy became Putin’s policy.  Even though Russian 
peacekeeping troops were already on the ground in Tskhinvali as part of the 1992 
ceasefire agreement, Russian officers also commanded many of the security institutions 
of the South Ossetian government.  By 2008, these included its Minister of Internal 
Affairs, its intelligence service, its National Security Council, and its Ministry of 
Defense.  Moscow provided heavy weaponry to the separatists, such as seventy-five T-72 
tanks in June 2004, and provided training to South Ossetian troops and cadet officers at 
its military academy in North Ossetia.  Volunteer fighters from across Russia were also 
encouraged to join the separatists in their cause. 
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How, despite very direct Russian support for the South Ossetians, did its war 
succeed?  In this case, Russia conducted an effective proxy war not by disguising its 
support of its proxies or reducing it, but by eroding the threshold of conflict such that its 
operations in Georgia did not incur the same cost similar actions and conventional 
aggression would elsewhere.  It blurred the line between peace and war by gradually 
increasing combat incidents conducted by its proxy.  When Georgia responded with its 
own conventional forces, which by definition had little deniability, it incurred significant 
costs internationally.  There were also several factors that increased Moscow’s 
deniability.  First, the two main periods when Russia increased its support for its proxies 
came when it was on the defensive, from 1991 to 1992 and then from mid-2004 to early 
2006.  It thus seemed reactive, rather than aggressive.  Once the materiel was in country, 
of course, it could be used for whatever Moscow’s goals were.  The biggest initiators of 
external balancing came when Russia attempted to change the region’s formal political 
status, rather than achieve de facto change on the ground.  The two main examples of this 
came during South Ossetia’s vote for independence and Russia’s establishment of formal 
relations with the breakaway areas.  Russia’s military deniability, in other words, was far 
greater than its political deniability. 
Diplomatically, the Joint Control Commission was a valuable enabling 
mechanism to legitimize the presence of Russian forces in South Ossetia.  Once some 
Russian forces were stationed in Georgia, accountability for them blurred, increasing 
Russian deniability.  The intermixing of Georgian and Russian villages also assisted 
Russia in raising the threshold of conflict.  Because it was so easy to initiate violence in 
such areas, increases in the intensity of local conflict were not immediately recognized, 
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increasing Russian deniability when it was on offense and delaying the international 
reaction.  The newness and reorientation of Georgia’s government also increased Russian 
deniability.  Because the strategic status quo was already changing, the balancing that 
aggressive Russian movements and increases in its support for its proxies might have 
incurred was lessened.  The leaders of important external powers viewed Saakashvili as 
unreliable and a hothead which allowed Russia to successfully shift the blame for 
aggression when war came.  Lastly, the spillover of the second Chechen war into Georgia 
helped normalize Russia’s power projection across the frontier.  As Chechen terrorism 
became more violent, Russia’s cross-border military action became more normalized, and 
thus its deniability increased. 
 
Case Two: Russia and Ukraine 
Russia’s style of proxy warfare varied significantly in the Ukraine example, but 
on average the state gave a high degree of support to its proxies including committing its 
own troops at key intervals.  When its deniability slipped at these and other moments, the 
price Russia paid for its war rose.  Whether these costs were worth it – whether this case 
was a success for Russia or not – depended on a cost-benefit analysis of the goals being 
sought.  Moscow did retain control of the naval base in Crimea and fractured Ukraine, 
where under the Steinmeier diplomatic formula Russia could retain troops essentially 
indefinitely.  The result was an ambiguous entity in its east that could mitigate the costs 
of future Russian military pressure against Kiev.  Russia’s actions also probably 
increased the pressure against additional eastern European countries joining NATO.  But 
Russia abandoned the idea of a broader Donbas state on its border.  This was far from 
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what many of the separatist leadership had hoped for, which was independence or 
annexation.  Due to the control Russia exerted over the rebels, particularly later in the 
conflict, when disagreements over goals arose Moscow showed little compunction about 
bringing separatist goals in line with its own.   
Moscow paid heavily for these gains, however.  It suffered from multiple rounds 
of sanctions, including sectoral sanctions that were the most severe since the end of the 
Cold War.  It also incited a NATO military deployment on its border, which arrived in 
2016 with Enhanced Forward Presence.  Its actions effected a total reversal of the Obama 
Administration’s policy towards Russia, which had attempted to improve the bilateral 
relationship throughout its first five years.  The key judgment here was that these costs 
were worth it in the first portion of the war, during the summer of 2014, when Russia 
achieved most of its goals.  In the second portion, from January to February 2014, they 
were not worth it, as Russia incurred strategic costs for only tactical gains. 
 Russia’s relationship with its Ukrainian proxies was the second-closest of the five 
cases reviewed here.  This was partly a function of the speed by which events transpired: 
after Viktor Yanukovych’s overthrow, the Russian government had to create a proxy 
military organization from scratch.  In Crimea, barely-disguised Russian troops took 
control of the area’s government buildings with a thin fiction of proxy participation.  In 
Donbas, Moscow had more time and could establish more deniability, but only slightly.  
The men it selected to lead this insurgency were mostly Russian military and intelligence 
officers themselves.  They included Igor Bezler, commander of a militia unit near 
Luhansk; Alexander Borodai, who was prime minister in Donetsk; and Igor Strelkov, 
who was the separatists’ overall military commander for several months.  Russia supplied 
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heavy weapons to the rebels, such as the Buk-M1 air defense system, which shot down 
flight MH17 in July 2014.  Most importantly, however, Russian forces themselves 
directly intervened in the conflict, both in terms of specialists (particularly after the 
MH17 disaster) and combat troops who were deployed when the separatists’ fortunes 
were at their lowest.  These were times when Russian deniability slipped the most and 
incurred the highest degree of balancing. 
These strategic balancing instances came in four tranches of increasingly heavy 
sanctions.  The first round was applied after Russia annexed Crimea, an action that was 
conducted with essentially no deniability that almost precluded the need for proxies at all.  
The second came after the downing of MH17.  The third set of sanctions was applied in 
August, after the first major intervention of Russian troops in eastern Ukraine.  An 
estimated 1,000 Russian troops crossed the border to help separatist forces claw back 
many of the gains Kiev had made since June.  This intervention was strategically 
worthwhile, however, as it probably saved the rebel enclave from being cut off after the 
success of Kiev’s summer offensive in reclaiming separatist territory.  The fourth was 
applied in a similarly decisive instance, when Russian troops entered the battle at critical 
moments at places like Debaltseve and Mariupol to advance the rebels’ winter offensive 
and seize territory when their proxies stalled.  Each of these balancing actions came after 
particularly direct Russian support, except for the MH17 attack.  In that instance as well, 
however, Russian-made weapons were a key identifier of blame. 
In general, Moscow faced more rapid balancing when it used proxies on offense, 
which helped make the second period of fighting more costly than the first.  This was 
particularly evident during the separatists’ winter operations in late January 2015, when 
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US Secretary of State John Kerry and other American officials were quicker to condemn 
Russian support as the extent of the proxy offensive became clear.  The US and other 
external balancers had been much slower to balance Russian support for the separatists – 
particularly the supply of heavy weapons into Ukraine – during the summer of 2014.   
Russia achieved significant deniability at two points, in April 2014 and September 
2014.  The US and EU, which had been quick to push back against the Crimean 
annexation, essentially reset their balancing level to zero when the Donbas unrest started 
almost immediately thereafter.  After the Minsk I agreement in September, violence 
remained high but US and EU pressure ratcheted down.  The Minsk process sapped 
Western balancing, as well as muddied the lines of sovereignty, both adding to Russia’s 
deniability and ability to delay external consequences.  It siphoned off key US and 
European pressure on Russia, particularly in 2015, when Russia took advantage of the 
West’s focus on Minsk II from February 6 onward to push its offensive further.  US and 
European officials muted their pubic comments about Russian culpability during the 
negotiations.  Worse, the resulting Minsk processes and the sequencing of events they 
mandated permitted Russian troops to stay more or less indefinitely.  The deep 
intermixing of ethnicities along the line of control also helped increase Russian 
deniability.  In areas like Donetsk, the front line cut through built up civilian areas like 
the airport and villages that were essentially collocated.  The ease of inciting violence and 
sustaining a high level of conflict even during ceasefire periods through artillery and 
other fire made it harder for external balancers to identify territorial aggression and 
summon themselves to respond.  This was particularly true during the rise in violence in 
2015 that heralded the start of Russia’s second offensive.   
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Lastly, as in Georgia, the change in Ukraine’s government offered more 
deniability for Russian proxy support.  Even though the separatist leadership had clear 
ties to Moscow, the abruptness of Ukraine’s political change and the destabilizing of the 
status quo lent some credibility to their claims of self-determination, and thus deniability 
to Russian support.  The West quickly responded to Crimea, but then afterwards almost 
immediately began to offer (or demand) fundamental changes in the sovereignty of 
Ukraine and the political status of the east.  The political changeover in the regime seems 
to have been unconventional enough to call into question the basic formula of 
sovereignty of the country.  The higher proportion of ethnic Russians in Ukraine’s east 
was identified and by all sides, including the West, as a measure of legitimacy for the 
new government that to a certain extent would permit Russian meddling. 
  
Case Three: Iran and Lebanon 
 Iran’s use of Hezbollah as a proxy to project power against Israel and other 
groups in Lebanon was overwhelmingly successful, at least until Hezbollah’s entry into 
the Syrian civil war.  Iran did achieve its goals in Syria.  In the process, however, it 
incurred major strategic costs.  By 2017, it was isolated in the region.  Its policies had 
sparked the creation of a major Sunni military alliance and unprecedented balancing 
action by opposing regional powers, restoring the pro-Hariri international coalition that 
had collapsed after the July war.  However, these strategic costs were somewhat 
mitigated by the exogenous American decision to pursue a nuclear accord with Iran, 
which coincided with scaling back American opposition to Iranian regional influence in 
Syria.  This policy dampened the balancing that Hezbollah’s deployment incurred: it was 
a result of the Obama Administration’s larger strategic desire pursue a nuclear accord and 
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implied regional accommodation with Iran.  Even while its footprint in the region 
increased, it was being reintegrated into the global financial system and reviving its 
economy.  Even so, this would be reversed by the Trump Administration, in no small part 
due to its activities in Syria. 
For its part, Hezbollah was hurt by its deployment to Syria.  It did maintain an 
important supply route and patron.  But that deployment shattered its national legitimacy, 
both domestically and more importantly internationally.  The designation of Hezbollah’s 
military wing as a terrorist organization by two key entities – the EU and Saudi Arabia – 
was an indicator of the increased ease of balancing against the group.  With its external 
combat deployment, it was more clearly an agent of power projection by the Iranians and 
more clearly an instrument of interstate war.  Moreover, by 2016, it had suffered 
significantly at the hands of the Syrian rebels.  Out of an estimated 6,000-8,000 of its 
fighters present in Syria, it had absorbed 700-1,000 casualties.1069  Internal balancing 
came from Sunni militant strikes against Hezbollah targets, Iranian personnel, and Shia 
communities.   
Created in 1982 as a proxy for revolutionary Iran in Lebanon, Hezbollah 
eventually established its dominance among the Shia community and then in Lebanon 
itself.  The support Hezbollah received from Iran was full-spectrum and massive.  Iranian 
officials and the militia itself have described the Islamic Republic as the spiritual and 
political guide to Hezbollah.  Iranian forces have been present in Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley 
to support Hezbollah since its founding and prompted all of the group’s major strategic 
decisions.  Iran supplied a wide variety of weapons, such as explosives and automatic 
 
1069 Dan De Luce, “Syrian war takes rising toll on Hezbollah,” Foreign Policy (July 9, 2015), http://foreign-
policy.com/2015/07/09/syrian-war-takes-rising-toll-on-hezbollah (accessed October 20, 2015). 
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rifles, and later long-range missiles, anti-ship weapons, and aerial drones.  Tehran also 
subsidized Hezbollah with hundreds of millions of dollars annually.  This support was 
complemented by that of Iran’s ally, Syria, which until 2005 maintained tens of 
thousands of troops in Lebanon.  However, despite this support, the group experienced 
long periods without facing major external opposition to its own power projection or 
Iran’s support.   
The key element allowing Iran to achieve significant deniability despite its heavy 
footprint in Lebanon was its related proxy war with Israel.  Throughout its existence, 
Hezbollah was fighting two wars simultaneously: one against Israel and one against other 
Lebanese factions to maintain its weapons and thus Lebanon’s strategic orientation.  This 
first conflict enabled a high degree of Iranian support for Hezbollah, including the 
presence of IRGC forces on Iranian territory, while mitigating external balancing.  This 
effect was magnified by the domestic legitimacy Hezbollah cultivated, which fed its 
mantle of being a national resistance.  Hezbollah built this legitimacy by rooting itself 
organically in the population.  This included providing an extensive array of social 
services to the Lebanese public, creating a political party, and joining the national 
government.  That legitimacy did not necessarily reduce internal balancing from sectarian 
rivals, but it did increase the operational assets available to Hezbollah through the 
national government and most critically split potential external balancers of Iran.  These 
included Sunni Arab states, the US, and the European Union, the aims of which diverged 
when Hezbollah could credibly claim it was acting on behalf of Lebanon’s national 
defense.  That shattered their unity and their support to other Lebanese political factions.  
This effect was diminished when Hezbollah pursued goals that were too explicitly linked 
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to Iranian or Syrian causes, which reduced the deniability of Iranian and Syrian 
involvement.  This united external powers against Iranian influence.  Key examples of 
this were the murder of Rafiq Hariri and Hezbollah’s deployment in Syria.  The Hariri 
tribunal was a dire threat to Iran’s presence in Lebanon, not because the Lebanese did not 
know who killed Hariri – certainly, they did – but because it took aim at Hezbollah’s 
domestic legitimacy that internationally imperiled the deniability of Iran’s presence and 
support.  
A key difference between Russia’s use of proxies and Iran’s was that Hezbollah 
had significant tactical independence.  This was necessary, since Hezbollah – and not 
Russian forces, as in Georgia – was intended to be the primary agent of Iran’s influence. 
Other factors also affected the deniability of Iranian support and thus the effectiveness of 
Hezbollah.  Sponsor goals and the balancing their policies incurred were closely linked at 
times like 2013, when more aggressive Iranian policies were matched by increased 
balancing.  As the border between Israel and Hezbollah became more demarcated, and 
the contact points between the two sides increased, Hezbollah had to use more advanced 
weapons to conduct military operations.  These weapons and complex attacks attracted 
more attention to the state support Hezbollah received, and thus served to reduce Iran’s 
deniability.  Further, the diplomatic mechanism that formed the core of modern 
Lebanon’s relationship external powers was flawed, also serving to increase Iran’s 
deniability.  Because the Taif Accord demanded the disarmament of Hezbollah without 
the ability to enforce it, a precedent was set which reduced the ability of external powers 
to react to such a violation of other agreements later.  In subsequent resolutions, the 
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continued violation by Hezbollah of disarmament clauses – again, due to the national 
resistance mantle it claimed – had the effect of blunting international balancing against it.   
 
Case Four: Pakistan and Afghanistan 
Pakistan’s proxy warfare in Afghanistan achieved success.  However, this was 
because of its broader proxy policy and more deniable support of the Quetta Shura 
Taliban, not because of the Haqqani network, which was a key strategic liability during 
the war.  Islamabad’s approach prevented the emergence of a hostile Afghanistan and 
gave Pakistan a strong voice in the country’s future.  It achieved this despite the United 
States projecting a tremendous amount of military and political power into Afghanistan 
for nearly two decades.  Despite its support for the Haqqani network and its pursuit of 
divergent strategic goals, Pakistan suffered no significant American repercussions.  It was 
never listed as a state sponsor of terrorism and never received less than $1 billion 
annually in aid through 2016.  This effectiveness was the product of Pakistan’s 
familiarity with proxy warfare, its veteran militants, and the indirect support religious and 
social institutions gave to militant groups.  This support for militancy was a feature of the 
Pakistani state for decades, since the regime of Zia-ul-Haq.  But it also incurred 
significant costs.  The institutions that supported the Haqqanis and other insurgents in 
Afghanistan also promoted militancy in Pakistan.  Pakistan’s lack of control over these 
militants resulted in widespread violence in the FATA and elsewhere when their policy 
goals diverged, such as during the state’s cooperation with US counterterrorism strikes.  
Pakistani forces themselves then became a target.  Pakistan had to use the proxies it did 
control more closely – primarily the Haqqani network – to mitigate the costs of the more 
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distantly supported militants through dialogue and mediation.  This was the primary 
value of the Haqqanis.  
The Haqqani network was the most operationally capable Afghan militant group 
and the one most closely supported by the Pakistani state.  This aided the group’s 
capability for high-end attacks, including on prestige targets like the US Embassy in 
2011.  Islamabad offered a mix of both direct and indirect support to the Haqqani 
network.  The group received direct support from the state’s security services; for 
example, Pakistani military and intelligence officers were present in Haqqani training 
camps and supplied the group with weapons.  Pakistani security personnel also reportedly 
tipped off the Haqqanis when raids by the Americans were imminent, and allowed them 
free conduct within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).  They provided 
financial support, such as an alleged $200,000 to help the Haqqanis enable al-Qaeda’s 
2009 bombing of a CIA base.  Not all the Haqqanis’ support was governmental, however.  
They had independent sources of funding, such as income from smuggling, and also 
benefited from indirect support by the Pakistani state.  Beginning in the 1970’s, Pakistan 
began to funnel significant amounts of money into religious foundations, schools, and 
charities.  This affected many facets of Pakistani public life, not least the military’s 
officer corps, which became far more religious than the bastion of secularism it had been 
in the past.  The number of madrassas, for example, rose from 908 in 1971 and 2,861 in 
1988 to over 10,000 today. These schools were integral to inculcating the culture of 
jihadism that became enmeshed with religiosity and the ideology of Zia-ul-Haq’s reign.  
Some, like the Haqqanis’ Mamba al-Ulum school near their stronghold of Miram Shah, 
provided military instruction to students.  Others, like the Red Mosque in Islamabad, 
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were veritable arsenals.  This latter form of support posed a dilemma to potential 
balancers like the United States in Afghanistan as to how much of its support to Islamic 
militants was official policy and how much was individual initiative, organic to Pakistani 
society and the product of ideological shifts decades earlier. 
The Haqqanis’ links to the Pakistani state were also a weakness, however.  The 
moments Pakistan came closest to being sanctioned by the United States were due to the 
actions of the Haqqani network.  And despite their operational competence, the Haqqanis 
were not the main body of the insurgency.  They were in fact a liability, because their 
comparative lack of operational deniability for Pakistan attracted strategic US balancing.  
This deniability was affected at times by other factors.  Certainly, the multiple armed 
conflicts taking place in the FATA lessened the external consequences for conducting 
cross-border aggression.  Pakistan would often blame Afghanistan for sponsoring TTP 
militants when confronted over its support for the Haqqanis.  The use of the Haqqanis 
during operational offensives also seems to have correlated with reduced Pakistani 
deniability.  American balancing reached its peak when high-profile attacks spiked from 
mid-2008 to early 2009 and mid-2011 to mid-2012, along with contacts between security 
officials and Haqqani members.  This also represents the period when Pakistan was 
pressing hardest to sustain its goals against an increased US troop presence.  After 2014, 
when the US presence was declining, there was less conflict between the two states 
despite no significant improvement in the war. 
The degree of ethnic fragmentation along the Afghan frontier also affected 
Pakistani deniability.  The FATA and other Afghan border regions were already highly 
mixed, with tribes and families scattered across the still-disputed frontier.  This made 
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pinning down clear examples of cross-border violations by proxies more challenging for 
balancers.  The ease of initiating conflict also meant that there was a relatively higher 
threshold for violations of territorial aggression, which also aided Pakistan’s deniability 
by weakening the norm against interstate aggression.  The arbitrariness of the Durand line 
was also cited by many Pakistani leaders as an excuse for their lack of control.  Lastly, in 
this case, regime changes in Afghanistan and Pakistan may have had an effect on 
deniability.  Afghanistan experienced only one regime change in the course of this case 
study, and balancing against Pakistan did decline afterwards.  Conversely, balancing 
against Pakistan was highest right before its own periods of regime change, particularly at 
the end of Musharraf’s government, and then leveled off afterwards.  This illustrated how 
despite consistent polices (which were a product of the national security establishment in 
any case), the new Pakistani government had its slate “wiped clean” in terms of interstate 
aggression. 
 
Case Five: Saudi Arabia and Chechnya 
 Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the Chechen Salafists was the most tenuous and 
thus most deniable of the five cases examined here.  For decades, Riyadh sponsored 
Salafism and pan-Islamic ideology through a variety of social institutions like schools, 
charities, and mosques.  They served the goal of propping up the regime’s ideological 
legitimacy first against the Arab secularists and then against the threat of Iran’s Islamic 
revolution.  Particularly during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, these institutions also 
produced militants that projected Saudi geopolitical influence, first against the Soviets 
and then by radicalizing the societies in which they dwelt.  Similar goals were 
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accomplished in Chechnya.  These Salafists were a highly capable force operationally, 
playing a supporting role in the first war and then a dominant role in the second.  During 
the interim period of Chechnya’s independence they successfully imposed their policy 
goals on the secular Chechen government led by Aslan Maskhadov, leading an initially 
secular government to adopt their national and eventually transnational aims.  During its 
independence, Chechnya became increasingly Islamic domestically, in custom and in 
more, with the enthusiastic support of formerly nationalist commanders.  The second 
effect they achieved was the tremendous cost imposed on Russia, nearly sinking Yeltsin’s 
presidency and creating a lasting burr in US-Russian relations.  Chechen militancy during 
and between the wars consistently sapped Russian strength and prestige, a visible 
reminder of the hollowness of the post-Soviet state.  Both of these effects were valuable 
to Saudi Arabia. 
These strategic benefits were also made absurdly on the cheap.  The cost to 
Riyadh was comparatively minor financial support to its domestic institutions, which 
provided some endogenous benefits anyway in the form of regime legitimacy.  Saudi 
Arabia also endured remarkably little direct international balancing.  In Chechnya, 
balancing against the Salafists did not come from Russia until early 1998 and then from 
the secular Chechen authorities until late 1998, far too late to prevent the radicalization of 
the republic.  In fact, the Saudi government delayed direct consequences for its policy 
until 2002, after the exogenous effect of terror attacks in the US increased the pressure on 
Riyadh to reform its funding mechanisms.  This was roughly a decade after Salafist 
influence first began expanding in the Caucasus.  When balancing did occur, it came at 
the moments large groups of militants crossed state lines, primarily the Buynksk attack in 
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1997 and the Khattab attack into Dagestan in 1999, but also at Gudermes the year before.  
These actions (particularly the Khattab raid, which led to the disastrous second war) 
effectively turned the Saudi style of proxy warfare into a less deniable form of 
conventional aggression conducted by the Chechens against their neighbor, and was 
treated as such. 
Saudi Arabia’s support of the Chechen Salafists came almost entirely through 
supporting non-state entities like charitable foundations, mosques, and schools.  Since the 
1960’s, Saudi Arabia had seen benefit in sponsoring pan-Islamist organizations such as 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the International Islamic Relief 
Organization, which provided both domestic legitimacy for the Saudi regime and 
strategic benefits abroad.  These spread Salafist Islam to places like the Caucasus, which 
altered Chechnya’s evolution.  In the 1980’s, some of these institutions became key 
pipelines for funneling Saudi militants and funding to the Soviet war in Afghanistan, and 
then later to battlefields in Tajikstan, Algeria, Bosnia, and elsewhere.  In Chechnya, these 
jihadists were a valuable resource in the country’s first war with Russia.  While initially 
nationalist radicals like Shamil Basayev were more valuable to the cause, the Saudi 
jihadist Khattab and other Afghan Arabs contributed to the victory through both their 
fighting prowess and their knowledge of more advanced guerilla techniques.  They then 
converted many of the key field commanders during the interregnum. 
One factor that affected sponsor deniability less in this case was whether its 
proxies were used for an offensive or defensive purpose locally.  Salafists like Khattab 
poured into Chechnya to combat the Russians during the first war in what was clearly a 
defensive role, and incurred effectively no opposition from Russia or other states.  
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However, they were then used offensively against the Maskhadov government 
throughout the period of independence, also without incurring any balancing until 1998.  
Khattab’s actions in 1999 then initiated the second Chechen war.  But despite even this 
attack, by far the bulk of international pressure until 2002 was on Russia for the conduct 
of its war, not on the militants.  This suggests that the more remote the proxy’s 
connection to the sponsor, the more offensive goals it could pursue while maintaining 
strategic deniability.   
The relatively clear delineation of the border between Chechnya and Dagestan did 
contribute to reducing deniability, however.  The strongest Russian balancing reaction 
came during cross-border actions, particularly after Khattab’s attack in 1999, when the 
hundreds of militants crossing the border incurred a reaction that the Salafists’ actions in 
Dagestan to seize Karamakhi and other villages did not.  Here, the Salafists’ violation of 
territorial sovereignty was met with immediate and harsh consequences.  Salafist 
influence also rose markedly after the death of Dudayev and the election of Maskhadov.  
Maskhadov was certainly a weaker leader than Dudayev and had fewer nationalist 
credentials.  But internationally, potential allies were also more uncertain about his 
administration.  His inability to win support against either the Salafists or the Russians 
(despite harsh international critiques about Russian tactics) hurt his ability to garner 
external legitimacy and support against the Salafists, and hurt his ability to contest their 
influence internally.   
This weakness was exacerbated by the unclear status of Chechnya resulting from 
its 1997 agreement with Russia.  This murkiness hampered Maskhadov’s ability to 
engage the West, which would leaven its statements of support for the Chechens with 
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admonitions that the republic was part of the Russian Federation.  Since they insisted 
they were not part of the Russian Federation, of course, Chechen leaders could similarly 
not receive assistance from Russia to combat the militants.  In fact, there was no natural 
partner to balance the Salafist influence and money that was pouring into Chechnya.  
While there was no diplomatic agreement that facilitated Saudi Arabia projecting 
influence in Chechnya, this was perhaps to the Kingdom’s benefit.  Indeed, avoiding such 
an agreement would have been at the very core of Saudi Arabia’s proxy strategy: such a 
process would have decreased Saudi deniability to an unacceptable degree.  It would have 
presumed the link between Saudi geopolitical interest in the region and the spread of 
Salafist Islam, which would expose Riyadh to unacceptable consequences that it managed 
to defer until 2001. 
Lastly, the transnational impact of Saudi institutions and the proxy wars that 
resulted may have affected the Chechen Salafists in a number of ways.  Their 
participation in other wars like Afghanistan and Tajikistan may have normalized to a 
certain degree their presence in the Chechen war and settlement (even militant 
settlement) in places like Karamakhi in Dagestan.  But they also linked the Chechen war 
and indeed Saudi Arabia to other acts committed by Salafists and Afghan Arabs, most 
disastrously to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  
 
Future research 
This dissertation’s hypothesis – that a proxy’s effectiveness is more dependent on 
its sponsor’s plausible deniability than its own operational capability – could be 
strengthened with other cases that do not rely on the United States and its closest 
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European partners as the balancing powers.  Otherwise, it runs the risk of turning this into 
a dissertation about United States foreign policy and decision-making.  The specific 
exogenous foreign policy interests of the United States also run the risk of distorting the 
causal links that underpin the analysis.  The fifth case here, Chechnya, offsets this design 
vulnerability somewhat, since the Maskhadov government and the Russian Federation are 
the balancers.  The dissertation would be improved by including cases like India’s 
involvement in the Sri Lankan insurgency or other non-US centered examples.  There are 
obviously more challenges in studying the balancing power’s reactions in such examples, 
especially without experience in the language, since the decision processes of most other 
governments are less transparent than that of the United States and the local media more 
inaccessible.  In the Chechnya case included here, these impediments were circumvented 
by using translated local media to report on statements by senior government officials.  
But this is less reliable than tracking official comments from state capitals, and obviously 
runs the risk of introducing bias. 
This dissertation could also be helped by a large-n study.  The weaknesses in this 
study are endemic to any qualitative method: limited case selection, limited control of 
variables, imprecise measurements.  But a quantitative review of the data on intrastate 
war over the past seventy years would strengthen the qualitative approach.  This time 
period, reflecting the apex of American power during the Cold War and after, would 
provide the most practical lessons on how states have most successfully used proxies to 
project power or sustain their influence.  Such a study could use data from the Correlates 
of War dataset, its Uppsala Conflict Data Program/PRIO rival, or somewhere else – there 
is no shortage of competing civil war databases.  To these lists could be added a variable 
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for the proportion of support to a sponsored proxy that comes (for example) from private 
sources, whether individuals, charities, or religious foundations.  This could be the basic 
independent variable in a regression.  The dependent variable could be the duration and 
outcome of a conflict, and their relationship could be tested proportionately, to see how 
the impact of private support on conflict changes as that support rises.  The study could 
also use control variables to hold constant factors like the average income of the host 
country, the size of its population, level of democracy, terrain, and so forth.  In addition, 
there would have to be divined a variable for the relationship of the state to the private 
sponsor: surely, for example, there is some empirical difference between Saudi Arabia’s 
support of militants fighting in Afghanistan and the United States’ tolerance of 
Americans assisting Catholic militants in Northern Ireland. 
This research would serve two purposes.  First, it could help uncover statistically 
significant trends or correlations of more deniable support with the outcome of the 
conflict hinted at in this dissertation – for example, the effect of a nearby civil war.  
Second, it could control for implicit selection biases in the case studies.  The cases of 
indirect support for proxies examined here involve Muslim nations, Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia.  A large-n dataset, however imperfect and even arbitrary in parts, would be an 
important part of the effort to control for such bias enough to test this dissertation’s 
conclusions about proxies and power projection more robustly. 
 Additional qualitative cases would also be useful in delving deeper in the indirect 
support given by Saudi Arabia and other states to various shades of Islamic militants.  
Parsing out that support and how it has affected conflicts from Tajikistan to Bosnia is of 
key importance to understanding how it can be successfully employed to achieve the ends 
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of the sponsor.  This is one of the clearest-cut cases of the extreme end of deniability, and 
thus should be more fully explored, particularly to see what factors increase its utility to 
the sponsor and which decrease it.  In some cases like Bosnia, Saudi foreign policy goals 
were achieved.  In others like Tajikistan, they were not.  And these results do not always 
correspond with whether the local conflict in which the proxy fought was won or lost.  
Thus, an experimental design study of cases involving Saudi proxy support could be 
extremely valuable to understanding how indirect support affects different conflicts.   
In addition, it could be extremely useful to analyze other cases of proxy support 
that are even a standard deviation of deniability beyond the support illustrated by the 
Saudi case.  For example, what sort of support does China or Armenia give to the 
Chinese or Armenian diasporas in places like Malaysia or the United States?  These 
might well have some political effect on the host country, though the sponsor state (if that 
is even the proper term, at the extreme edge of the proxy-sponsor spectrum) has only 
limited involvement with its community at all?  And what difference does it make if these 
proxies are not actively involved in conflict, but nonetheless pose a latent threat to 
conflict, if their or the state’s policy goals are transgressed too egregiously?  They are 
still a potential means of exerting influence on a target and shaping a potential battlefield, 
even though the shade of violence is very far distant.  There is thus a gap on the 
effectiveness (not to say categorization) of agents of influence in the space between 
distantly-supported proxy and reliable ethnic voting bloc.  Additional research on the pre-
conflict use of proxies by even more remote sponsors would be valuable. 
In a broader sense, the use of proxies to spread revisionist states’ influence points 
to a network-centric theory of the balance of power.  In systems where territorial 
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annexation is punished, the balance of power (in terms of spheres of influence in the 
international system) might be best illustrated and determined by competing cross-border 
networks.  In some areas, that means proxy militants.  Changes to the balance happen 
among these networks on the ground, like the capabilities of the Chechens in the interwar 
years being improved (or at least changed) by the Afghan Arabs, who cut across many 
state boundaries.  In other areas like the modern French-German border, that means 
economic proxies.  What sort of proxy relationship does Deutsche Bank have with 
Berlin?  Why is it more effective for Berlin to support Deutsche Bank, which is surely in 
some way an agent of its influence, and not ethnic Germans from the diaspora?  When 
does it become less effective, and why? 
These questions suggest another avenue to be explored is measuring which kind 
of network competition predominates under which conditions.  At certain borders, like 
those of France and Germany or the United States and Canada, such networks could be 
less-security-centric and spheres of influence determined through non-military means like 
economic relationships.  In these static areas, states project power through non-military 
networks such as trade and elite relationships to expand their spheres of influence.  In 
other areas, however, networks are focused on security: proxy forces, like insurgents, 
militias, jihadis, or some secular equivalent.  In either place, the states that manipulate 
these proxy networks the most effectively might establish long-term dominance 
regardless of the type of network.  Comparing the usefulness of militarized networks to 




Practical implications and recommendations 
This dissertation has examined how states are conducting proxy warfare most 
effectively.  In doing so it has taken issue with the arguments put forth by other proxy 
war scholars like Geraint Hughes that proxy war is fundamentally harmful to state 
interests in the long run.  On the contrary: a properly supported proxy can be an effective 
agent of influence for states, given sufficient deniability.  
This is more than an academic question.  The use of proxy war is likely to become 
more pressing as the international system continues its drift from near-unipolarity to 
something much more diffuse.  It is common to note other power centers emerging in the 
world: Russia, basically recovered from its post-Soviet nadir and slowly worming its way 
out of sanctions; India, confronted with a more aggressive China and looking to rethink 
some of its old strategic shibboleths; German-led Europe, instinctually tacking if not 
towards neutrality than to a third way with China and Russia; and always, always, the 
mismatch of power in the Persian Gulf between Iran and a constellation of Sunni Gulf 
states that require constant US tending.  But it is the rapid growth in China’s power that 
threatens to reshape conflict over the next decades, as the United States’ relative edge – 
not least in conventional military superiority – continues to ebb.  China will push at its 
borders, not just militarily but politically and economically.  Beijing’s signature Belt and 
Road Initiative has sunk vast sums of money into regional and extra-regional states with 
political influence as a corollary to boot.   
This dissertation is most valuable for those regional states that are opposed to 
Chinese dominance and looking for other tools to counter Beijing’s influence.  States like 
Vietnam, India, and even Russia will be forced to contend with the choice of acceding to 
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Chinese desires or contesting them, and finding themselves more isolated and more 
threatened.  How to do so most effectively is of the utmost importance, especially since 
many of the factors that discouraged conventional warfare in the last half of the twentieth 
century remain in place, like the proliferation of nuclear weapons and a growing norm 
against interstate war.   
Perhaps nowhere in the modern world is there more a microcosm of these 
conflicts evident than in the case of countries that harbor Shia militants, particularly the 
failed states of the Shia Arab world where Iranian militant proxies often hold dominant 
sway over their hollowed-out states.  The state-within-a-state feature is now a feature of 
Lebanon and Iraq.  When the Yemen war is concluded it may well look similar.  The 
ability of Iran and Hezbollah (and Iran and parts of the Popular Mobilization Forces, or 
PMF, in Iraq) to obtain deniability for their war against other domestic factions comes 
through their proxies’ linked wars against a second enemy (Israel in the case of 
Hezbollah, ISIS in the case of the PMF).  These related proxy wars excuse – enough – the 
significant Iranian military presence in those countries and their maintenance of a parallel 
security state, which the US is left trying to prop up what could be generously called the 
shell state.  Based on the deniability Iran has achieved in Lebanon, balancing powers will 
likely not be effective countering its influence from the top-down through aid to the 
Lebanese government.  Building up a state is far more costly than tearing it down.  A 
regional competitor like Saudi Arabia should focus on its own proxies within a state, like 
the Sunni communities in Lebanon, which would likely be far more effective in toto than 
supporting the target governments even if this risks more instability in the short run.  
Sub-optimal outcomes for the country, in other words, should be acceptable, if they 
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permit balancing against militants more cheaply and effectively (and the bar is not high 
here) than direct support to the state government.  Overall suboptimal outcomes may still 
have a higher benefit than the status quo in the one axis of counter-Iran (or counter-
whoever) influence, and should be pursued as such.  This may have a spillover effect.  In 
places like Lebanon, Hezbollah’s weapons are its trump card in the sectarian balance, its 
ability to prevent a different strategic outcome from emerging.  Paradoxically, in cases 
like this, if status quo countries themselves sought to overturn the balance of power 
through asymmetric proxy warfare, and not always be on the receiving end, they might 
wind up creating a more sustainable equilibrium.   
This raises the important question of ideology.  The state ideologies of Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia are all explicitly based around ethnicity and religion, 
and are all easily translated into support for ethnic or religious compatriots abroad.  In 
addition to the exogenous ideological benefit that this provided to both sponsor and 
proxy, there were strategic benefits and strategic requirements.  Ideology was not 
ecumenical: it helped set certain strategic goals, like empowering revolutionary Shia 
communities with Iran.  The pre-identification of ideologically simpatico populations 
also helped Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia build institutional pathways to transfer 
support to their proxies.  Almost certainly, that made them more effective fighting forces.  
In the case of Pakistan and especially Iran, it kept them closely hewn to Iran’s strategic 
goals.  The proxy that remained closest to its sponsors’ goals were the Russian proxies in 
Ukraine and Georgia, but they required constant tending by the Russian government and 
so Moscow suffered a strategic cost in terms of deniability.  Changes in the current global 
political trends from democracy towards different kinds of authoritarianism make it more 
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likely that states will seek to activate outlying members of their national ethnic groups as 
weapons.  Particularly since the borders of state control in many places do not match up 
neatly with national populations.  It is a practical question how states that are not based 
around a specific ethnic or sectarian group could sufficiently incentivize civil society in 
foreign countries to mobilize against their government.  It should be pointed out, 
however, that both the United States and (especially) the Soviet Union supported proxy 
groups during the Cold War.  In the Soviet case, the mobilizing ideological factor was an 
economic theory rather than Russian-ness or religion.  A migration away from liberal 
democracy, therefore, is likely to increase the prevalence of proxy warfare. 
Perhaps this is not necessarily a bad thing for the cause of peace.  In a traditional 
great power manner, the global maintenance of the status quo and the reinforcement of 
the norm of territorial non-aggression across the board are far too costly for one power to 
do alone.  Indeed, an entire subfield of international relations is built around the 
inevitable rise and fall of hegemons.  How to short-circuit this cycle?  If revisionist states 
are willing to upset the status quo and wage proxy war beneath the level of armed 
conflict, balancing powers should look for ways to do the same against them – especially 
smaller regional balancing powers, like Vietnam.  Until the sponsor states incur some 
similar cost for their actions, they will not contribute to the upholding of global order.  In 
fact, upholders of the current status quo should counterintuitively be on offense as much 
as possible, always projecting power through proxies to balance the power projected by 
others.  If Pakistan were busier with Afghan-supported insurgents in Baluchistan, perhaps 
it would have less ability to support proxies in Afghanistan.  Ditto for Russia and the 
Tatars.  Ditto for Iran and the Azeris.  Of course, there would be a host of legal issues this 
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would raise, which are more problematic in democratic states than in authoritarian ones.  
With such a policy, human rights violations are almost inevitable given the broader left 
and right limits that support to a proxy implies, particularly as the support grows more 
deniable and thus more tenuous.  In these cases, however, the recipients are also often 
more organic to an area’s human terrain and thus more effective against enemy 
insurgents and (usually) proxy forces.  The looser governmental touch which permits 
their organic link to the population would also make them more effective agents to 
project power.  Given sufficient deniability, the sponsor could perhaps mitigate 
international strategic fallout.   
And of course perhaps not.  Perhaps the more the world delegates violence to 
proxies, the easier it would be to break the norm against interstate aggression and the 
more violent the world would become.  But as a rule people and entities do not alter their 
behavior until their costs begin to outweigh the benefits.  Given the immense benefit of 
deniable proxy warfare, at very low cost, they are not yet at that point. 
 
